KANE TIEN
`Deputy Clerk
`
`Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s)
`None Present
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`
`
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`NOT REPORTED
`Court Reporter
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`Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)
`None Present
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`Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
`[18]
`
`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 1 of 9 Page ID #:353
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 1 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Present: The Honorable DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
`
`
`
`
`Before the Court is the motion to dismiss (“MTD”) brought by Defendants the City of
`
`Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT” and together, “the
`City”). [Doc. # 18.] The motion is fully briefed. [Doc. ## 23, 25.] For the reasons set forth
`below, the Court GRANTS the MTD.
`
`
`
`I.
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`
`
`In late 2017, the streets of Los Angeles saw an “invasion” of motorized electric scooters.
`
`Compl. ¶ 1 [Doc. # 1]. Dispatched by technology companies, the scooters are designed to be
`rented by smartphone-equipped consumers for individual rides. The scooters are “dockless,”
`meaning that when the trip is over, the rider simply leaves the scooter on the street or sidewalk
`where the trip ends. Another consumer who comes along can then rent it again. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 17.
`The scooters are outfitted with GPS trackers, which broadcast their locations to the proprietors
`and are used to track rides and charge consumers accordingly. Id. at ¶ 17.
`
`Faced with this sudden and enormous disruption to the streetscape, the City began to
`
`regulate the industry. On September 28, 2018, the City Council passed an ordinance allowing
`scooter companies to apply for a permit to operate in the City, which requires that they comply
`with LADOT rules and regulations. Id. at ¶ 19; Def’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex.
`A (“Ordinance”) [Doc. # 19-1].1 The ordinance emphasizes the need for regulations “to prevent
`shared mobility devices from being illegally placed or parked on a sidewalk or on a public right-
`
`1 The Court GRANTS the City’s RJN as to the Ordinance, both as a municipal ordinance that is not subject
`to reasonable dispute and as a document incorporated by reference in the Complaint. See Tollis, Inc. v. Cty. of San
`Diego, 505 F.3d 935, 938 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007); Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). To the extent
`any documents attached to the RJN are not discussed herein, the Court DENIES as moot the RJN as to those
`documents because it need not consider them in reaching its conclusions.
`
`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 2 of 9 Page ID #:354
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 2 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`of-way[,] . . . to accommodate a shared mobility device user’s ability to travel safely[, and] . . . to
`create an enforceable framework for managing shared mobility services,” among others.
`Ordinance at 2.2 The Ordinance also notes the need for data collection “to ensure safe and
`equitable access, maintenance and operations, to determine proper fleet size in various locations
`within the City, and to fine tune and update the current rules and regulations in real time to
`ensure compliance with local and state laws, including the development of data programs to aid
`in enforcement, and to prevent the accumulation of devices on sidewalks or other public rights-
`of-way.” Id. at 2-3.
`
`One regulation requires scooter operating companies to hand over historical vehicle
`
`location and trip data to LADOT. Known as the Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”), the
`program compiles spatial and temporal data on each scooter’s location as well as the start and
`end points and times of each ride, and the route the scooter takes. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 25. The data is
`accurate to within “a few dozen feet” of the precise location of the scooter. Id. at ¶ 30. The data
`is anonymous, and does not include any information directly linking the scooter or the trip to the
`individual rider. Id. at ¶ 26.
`
`The purpose of MDS is to “actively manage private mobility providers and the public
`
`right-of-way.” Id. at ¶ 23 (quoting “Mobility Data Specification: Information Briefing,” Los
`Angeles Department of Transportation, https://ladot.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Whatis-
`MDS-Cities.pdf, Oct. 31, 2018).
`
`Plaintiffs Justin Sanchez and Eric Alejo ride dockless rental scooters in Los Angeles,
`
`including to “make trips from their homes to work, friends, businesses, and places of leisure.”
`Id. at ¶ 8. On June 8, 2020, they sued the City, claiming that MDS violates their rights under the
`Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 13 of the California
`Constitution; and the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”), Cal.
`Penal Code § 1546 et seq. See id.
`///
`///
`///
`
`
`
`
`
`2 All page references herein are to page numbers inserted by the CM/ECF system.
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`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 3 of 9 Page ID #:355
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 3 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II.
`LEGAL STANDARD
`
`
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may seek to dismiss a
`
`complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule
`12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
`plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a
`pleading need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more than labels and
`conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555 (citing
`Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
`pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
`liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In evaluating
`the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must accept all factual allegations as true. Id. (citing
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Legal conclusions, in contrast, are not entitled to the assumption of
`truth. Id.
`
`
`IV.
`DISCUSSION
`
`
`Constitutional Claims
`
`
`A.
`
`
`The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “unreasonable
`searches and seizures.”3 The government violates the Fourth Amendment when it (a) conducts a
`search (b) that is unreasonable. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The Fourth
`Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes
`those which are unreasonable.”).
`
`
`1.
`
`MDS is not a search
`
` A
`
` search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when “the government
`violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo v.
`
`
`3 Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution also prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures”
`and incorporates the same legal standards as the Fourth Amendment, so the Court discusses the two claims together.
`See Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he right to be free from
`unreasonable searches under [Article I, Section 13] parallels the Fourth Amendment inquiry.”).
`
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`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 4 of 9 Page ID #:356
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 4 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
`(Harlan, J., concurring)).4
`
`Especially relevant here are two recent, landmark Supreme Court cases: United States v.
`Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), and Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). In Jones,
`five justices held that a GPS tracker attached to a person’s privately owned car and monitoring
`its movements for 28 straight days impinged on a reasonable expectation of privacy because
`“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that
`reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
`associations.” 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 430 (“[S]ociety’s expectation
`has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply
`could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for a
`very long period.”) (Alito, J., concurring).
`
`In Carpenter, the Court held that collecting historical cell site location information
`(“CSLI”) violated a reasonable expectation of privacy because “[m]apping a cell phone's location
`over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder's whereabouts.”
`138 S. Ct. at 2217. Significantly, the collection of CSLI constituted a search even though the
`data was obtained from a third party—the network carrier—because of “the unique nature of cell
`phone records.” Id.
`
`While there are some clear similarities between Jones and Carpenter and this case—the
`vehicle location data, the third-party carrier—there are also important distinctions. Most
`apparent is the fact that here the MDS data is anonymous. Obviously, a person does not have a
`reasonable expectation of privacy over information that cannot even be connected to her.
`Plaintiffs allege, however, that location data can be readily de-anonymized. Compl. ¶¶ 26-28.
`They back up this assertion by citing to academic studies. See id. at ¶ 28 n. 4 (“[I]n a dataset
`where the location of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to that
`given by the carrier’s antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify 95%
`of the individuals.”) (quoting Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, et al., Unique in the Crowd: The
`privacy bounds of human mobility, 3 Nature Scientific Reports 1376
`(2013),
`http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376). The allegation is not purely conclusory and rises to
`the level of plausibility, so the Court must accept it as true at this stage.
`
`The MDS data is not merely anonymous, however. It is linked only to the scooter, which
`is shared and by its nature used by a person only for the duration of a single ride. Each ride is
`
`4 A search also occurs when the government trespasses onto private property for the purpose of obtaining
`information, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012), which does not apply here.
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`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 5 of 9 Page ID #:357
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 5 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`disassociated from other rides the user may have purchased. De-anonymizing one location data
`point would therefore reveal only a sole trip that a person took from point A to point B, along
`with the route that she took. The Jones Court made clear that “relatively short-term monitoring
`of a person's movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society
`has recognized as reasonable.” 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). Only when the location
`tracking is so pervasive that it “catalogue[s] every single movement of an individual's car for a
`very long period” does it become a search. Id. In order for MDS to be a search, the City must be
`able to not only de-anonymize one trip, but also identify and compile all the trips that Plaintiffs
`took on scooters, from all the various providers they allege to have used, despite the fact that
`they are completely untethered from each other within the data set.5
`
`
`Even if Plaintiffs could adequately allege the feasibility of this data disaggregation,6 their
`claim would still be barred as a matter of law by the “third-party doctrine,” under which “a
`person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
`parties.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44
`(1979)). Here, scooter users knowingly and voluntarily provide their location to the scooter
`company while riding and when they start and stop their trip—GPS tracking of the scooters is
`fundamental to how the service works.7 See Compl. ¶ 18.
`In Carpenter, the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the third-party doctrine for
`cell phone location data. Id. at 2217. The Carpenter Court emphasized, however, that its
`holding was “a narrow one.” Id. at 2220. The Court held that CSLI is different in kind from the
`
`
`5 This also assumes that Plaintiffs use rental scooter services for transportation to the same degree as the
`Supreme Court imagined one uses a privately-owned car, which is far from a foregone conclusion.
`
` 6
`
` It is worth noting that even if it were possible to create such a comprehensive record of an individual’s
`movements from the MDS data, it would likely be an enormously resource- and/or time-intensive project. Plaintiffs
`tacitly acknowledge this, suggesting that the only impediment to the City de-anonymizing the data is “merely time.”
`Opp. at 15. But time is not irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis. Critical to the holding in Jones was that
`the GPS tracking was relatively cheap and easy, and therefore meaningfully different from traditional surveillance.
`Id. at 429 (“In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but
`practical.”); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (“[C]ell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and
`efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.”).
`
` 7
`
` For this discussion, the Court does not rely on the companies’ privacy policies, of which the City requests
`that the Court take judicial notice. See RJN, Ex. M, N, and O. The privacy policies are not incorporated by
`reference in the Complaint and their authenticity is subject to dispute, so the Court DENIES the RJN as to these
`documents. Nonetheless, it is clear from the allegations in the Complaint that consumers know (or reasonably
`should know) that the scooter company tracks their location while they ride—otherwise, the company would not
`know where to locate a scooter at the end point of a ride or how much to charge for the ride, and the next customer
`would not be able to locate the scooter via the app.
`
`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 6 of 9 Page ID #:358
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 6 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`types of information at issue in prior third-party doctrine cases because it reveals “a detailed
`chronicle of a person's physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several
`years.” Also, carrying a cell phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society,” such
`that “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a
`comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).
`
`In this way, a rental scooter is not analogous to a cell phone. Riding a one-time rental
`scooter is not indispensable to modern life. Cf. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
`Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A] home occupant does not assume the risk of
`near constant monitoring [of her electricity usage] by choosing to have electricity in her home.”).
`Scooter users’ locations are tracked only for so long as they ride the scooter. Location tracking
`is not an incidental and unanticipated bug, but an obvious, core design feature of the service.
`When someone chooses to use a rental scooter service for transportation, she assumes the risk
`that a technology company will be tracking her location for so long as she rides a scooter
`belonging to that company.
`
`It is true that modern technology and “big data” have brought renewed scrutiny to the
`third-party doctrine in recent years. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (“[I]t may be necessary to
`reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
`voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). But this case is not a
`difficult or problematic application of the existing doctrine, the size of the data collection
`notwithstanding. The disclosure here is even more knowing and voluntary than in Smith v.
`Maryland and United States v. Miller, the two cases from the 1970s that established the third-
`party doctrine. Smith involved a “pen register” tracking the phone numbers that a caller dialed,
`442 U.S. at 742-45, and Miller dealt with bank transaction records, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
`Viewed retrospectively through the framing of Carpenter, a telephone and a checking account
`are far more essential to modern life (or at least were to life in the 1970s) than rental scooters are
`today. And the phone company or the bank tracking a person’s numbers dialed or bank account
`withdrawal history is less obvious, apparent, and inherent than a GPS-based mobility service
`tracking a rental scooter’s location.
`
`In other words, even though MDS would not be possible without modern technology, it is
`far from the type of case that the Carpenter Court or Justice Sotomayor in Jones feared could
`result from an anachronistic application of the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at
`418 (“I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to
`the government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”)
`(Sotomayor, J., concurring). Rather, the MDS data is a classic example of information
`voluntarily disclosed to a third party, squarely within the ambit of Smith and Miller.
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`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 7 of 9 Page ID #:359
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 7 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`In sum, because Plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily disclose their location to scooter
`companies whenever they ride a rental scooter, they do not have a reasonable expectation of
`privacy over the information.
`
`
`2.
`
`Even if it is a search, MDS is reasonable
`
`
`
`A search can be reasonable—and thus constitutional—even without a warrant and
`probable cause “in the context of safety and administrative regulations” when there are “special
`needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
`Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002). Plaintiffs agree that even if MDS is a
`search, it would be an administrative search. See Opp. at 21. The reasonableness of
`administrative searches depends on a balancing test, requiring the Court to weigh (1) “the nature
`of the privacy interest allegedly compromised” by the search, (2) “the character of the intrusion
`imposed” by the government, and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the government’s concerns
`and the efficacy of the [search] in meeting them.” Id. at 830-34.
`
`Even if MDS is considered a search, it would pass the balancing test. The nature and
`character of the privacy intrusion would be, at the absolute most, knowledge of the places that
`Plaintiffs have traveled to on rental scooters in Los Angeles. The nature of this intrusion is
`limited by the factors discussed above—namely, that it would be difficult to actually effectuate
`the intrusion, and that the privacy interest is diminished by the consumer’s voluntary and
`knowing choice to use a rental service that obviously depends on the use of GPS tracking.
`
`Most importantly, the government’s interests are legitimate and substantial. In Plaintiffs’
`own words, the introduction of dockless scooters to city streets amounted to nothing less than an
`“invasion.” Compl. ¶ 1. At best, the scooters could “represent[] a novel and potentially useful
`form of transit,” but at worst, they “clutter[] city sidewalks, lack[] safety features, and interfere[]
`with disabled access to city streets.” The difference between these two outcomes, of course, is
`meaningful regulation. And smart, effective regulation of a completely novel industry requires
`robust data. See Naperville, 900 F.3d at 528-29 (city’s interest in modernizing its electrical grid
`justified use of “smart meters” to collect granular electricity-consumption data, even though the
`data collection amounted to a search).
`Plaintiffs argue that the City fails to articulate why its regulatory interests necessitate
`collecting such precise route data. Opp. at 24. While the Court has not taken judicial notice of
`the contents of the City’s “Data Protection Principles,” the veracity of which Plaintiffs challenge,
`it seems self-evident that understanding where scooters tend to transit and park would help the
`City determine how and where to adjust the rules of the road to accommodate them (or not
`accommodate them, as the case may be). There is no need to know the identity of the riders, but
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`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 8 of 9 Page ID #:360
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 8 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`B.
`
`knowing what streets they typically take, at what hours, and at what destinations they tend to
`stop would all be immensely useful for municipal authorities attempting to regulate the public
`right-of-way. That is all the information that MDS collects.8
`
`In sum, MDS is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But even if it
`were a search, it would be an administrative search, not for law enforcement purposes, that is
`justified by its furtherance of legitimate government interests. The Court GRANTS the MTD as
`to the federal and state constitutional claims.
`
`CalECPA Claim
`
`CalECPA prohibits “a government entity” from “compel[ing] the production of or access
`to electronic communication information from a service provider” except under limited
`circumstances. Cal. Pen. Code § 1546.1. It does not provide, however, Plaintiffs with a private
`right of action.
`
`Plaintiffs purport to sue under Section 1546.4(c), which provides:
`
`An individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, order, or other legal
`process that is inconsistent with this chapter . . . may petition the issuing court to
`void or modify the warrant, order, or process, or to order the destruction of any
`information obtained in violation of this chapter . . . [emphasis added].
`
`This Court is not the “issuing court” of any warrant, order, or process by which the City collects
`the MDS data. Section 1546.4(c) gives standing to a person whose information has been
`targeted pursuant to a court order, warrant, or process to challenge that order, warrant, or process
`
`8 Plaintiffs also claim that MDS is unreasonable because administrative searches still require an opportunity
`for pre-compliance review, citing City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 419 (2015). But the type of
`administrative search contemplated by Patel was an individual, targeted search, such as through an administrative
`subpoena, where “[t]he authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbridled discretion upon executive
`and administrative officers.” Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978). The Supreme Court has held
`that searches that are programmatic and uniform in application, without opportunity for discretion, are constitutional
`even absent any pre-compliance review so long as they serve a special need beyond ordinary law enforcement. See
`City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000) (discussing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
`MDS indiscriminately collects data from every scooter ride, without the opportunity for arbitrary discretion. See
`Compl. ¶ 7. Indeed, this lessens the constitutional concern, rather than heightens it. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39;
`see also Earls 536 U.S. at 837 (“A program of individualized suspicion might unfairly target members of unpopular
`groups.”). Pre-compliance review makes no sense in a programmatic search, and in fact defeats the purpose.
`Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether dockless scooters are a “closely regulated industry” such that they
`are exempt from the pre-compliance review requirement for targeted, discretionary administrative searches.
`
`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`

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`Case 2:20-cv-05044-DMG-AFM Document 27 Filed 02/23/21 Page 9 of 9 Page ID #:361
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
`
`
`Date February 23, 2021
`
`Page 9 of 9
`
`Case No. CV 20-5044-DMG (AFMx)
`
`
`Title Justin Sanchez, et al. v. Los Angeles Department of Transportation, et
`al.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`before that same court in the same proceeding. It does not allow the person to initiate an entirely
`new civil action before another, unrelated tribunal.
`
`By contrast, Section 1546.4(b) allows the Attorney General to “commence a civil action
`
`to compel any government entity to comply with the provisions of this chapter” (emphasis
`added). The language differs from subpart (c) because the Legislature intended a different
`meaning. If the Legislature wanted to allow an individual whose information has been targeted
`to “commence a civil action” to challenge the production, it could have grouped these
`individuals along with the Attorney General in bestowing that right in subpart (b). But it did not,
`and instead granted them a different right, employing different language, in a separate
`subsection.
`
`
`
`
`Accordingly, the MTD is GRANTED as to the CalECPA claim.
`
`V.
`CONCLUSION
`
`
`The Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ concern with the unprecedented breadth and scope of the
`
`City’s location data collection. But that alone does not mean it violates their constitutional or
`statutory privacy rights. This is an issue that may be more appropriately addressed as a matter of
`public policy, which is not for this Court to opine. Therefore, the City’s MTD is GRANTED as
`to all claims.9 A district court may dismiss a complaint without leave to amend if “the allegation
`of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”
`Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks
`omitted). Because the Court finds that amendment to add more facts would be futile, the action
`is DISMISSED with prejudice, without leave to amend.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`
`9 Because the Court dismisses the entire action, it need not address the City’s alternative argument that
`LADOT was improperly named as a defendant.
`
`CV-90
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`CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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`Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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`