Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 1 of 28 Page ID #:1303
`
`O
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`Case No. CV 20-05193 DDP (JEMx)
` ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
`FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
`
`[Dkt. 46]
`
`))))))))))
`
`APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS
`ANGELES COUNTY, INC.,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL.,
`Defendants.
`
`Presently before the court is Plaintiff Apartment Association
`of Los Angeles County, doing business as the Apartment Association
`of Greater Los Angeles (“AAGLA”)’s Motion for Preliminary
`Injunction. Having considered the submissions of the parties and
`heard oral argument, the court denies the motion and adopts the
`following Order.1
`I.
`Background
`
`1 The court has also considered submissions from amici curiae
`(1) National Housing Law Project (“NHLP”); (2) Professors Ananya
`Roy and Paul Ong, of the University of California, Los Angeles
`(“UCLA Scholars”); and (3) the Cities of Chicago, Albuquerque,
`Austin, Baltimore, Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Cincinnati,
`Columbus, Dayton, Gary, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, Seattle, St.
`Paul, Oakland, Portland, Tucson, Somerville, and West Hollywood,
`and Santa Clara County (“Amici Governments”).
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 2 of 28 Page ID #:1304
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`The COVID-19 global pandemic is the gravest public health
`crisis in over a century. At present, the novel coronavirus has
`killed at least 230,000 Americans and infected over 9 million
`more.2 The true toll may never be known, but is likely
`significantly higher. The Centers for Disease Control and
`Prevention (“CDC”), for example, estimates that the number of
`“excess deaths” in the United States is closer to 300,000.3
`Neither the State of California nor the City of Los Angeles have
`been spared from the ravages of COVID-19. Nearly a million
`Californians have been infected, and nearly 18,000 have died.4
`Approximately 300,000 of those cases and 7,000 of those fatalities
`have occurred in the Los Angeles area.5
`Eight months into the pandemic, the City of Los Angeles
`remains in a state of emergency. In accordance with
`recommendations from national, state, and local public health
`authorities, state and local officials have taken hitherto
`unthinkable steps to slow the spread of the virus. For a time, all
`state and city residents were ordered to stay confined to their
`places of residence, with limited exceptions.6 Although
`
`2 See
`https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/?CDC AA refVal=https%3A%2F
`%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-ncov%2Fcases-updates%2Fcases-in
`-us.html#cases casesper100k
`3 See https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6942e2.htm
`4 See https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/OPA/Pages/NR20-293.aspx
`5 See
`http://dashboard.publichealth.lacounty.gov/covid19 surveillance das
`hboard/
`6 See
`https://covid19.ca.gov/stay-home-except-for-essential-needs/;
`2
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 3 of 28 Page ID #:1305
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`restrictions have eased somewhat at present, many types of
`businesses and gathering places remain closed in Los Angeles,
`including movie theaters, bars, athletic fields, theme parks, gyms
`and fitness centers, museums, live performance venues, indoor
`restaurants, and “non-critical” offices.7 These measures, in
`conjunction with other coronavirus-related concerns, have had
`devastating economic consequences. By one estimate, over 16
`million California households have lost employment income as a
`result of the coronavirus.8 Over the last six months, the
`unemployment rate in the Los Angeles area has ranged from 15 to 20
`percent.9
`Crises of national scope require national responses.
`Initially, the federal government rose to meet the economic
`challenge presented by the COVID crisis and passed the Coronavirus
`Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No.
`116-136. Among the CARES Act’s provisions were (1) a one-time
`stimulus payment to taxpayers and (2) an additional $600 weekly
`payment to Americans collecting unemployment benefits.10 11 Those
`
`6(...continued)
`https://www.lamayor.org/sites/g/files/wph446/f/page/file/20200527%2
`0Mayor%20Public%20Order%20SAFER%20AT%20HOME%20ORDER%202020.03.19%20
`(REV%202020.05.27).pdf
`7 See
`https://corona-virus.la/sites/default/files/inline-files/MO COVID-1
`9 What%27sOpen Updated%2020201007.pdf
`8 See
`https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp14.html
`9 See https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.ca losangeles md.htm
`10 See
`https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares/assistance-for-americ
`an-workers-and-families;
`(continued...)
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 4 of 28 Page ID #:1306
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`additional unemployment payments expired, however, at the end of
`July, and Congress has not provided for further stimulus payments
`or other assistance to the American people. But the crisis has not
`abated. As the pandemic has worsened, its economic consequences
`have persisted.
`These economic impacts have, unsurprisingly, affected the
`ability of many residential tenants to make rent payments.
`Somewhere between one million and 1.4 million California households
`are behind on their rent.12 Approximately 14% of renter households
`in Los Angeles County are behind on rent, largely due to the
`effects of the pandemic on employment.13 These households include
`over 450,000 people in the City of Los Angeles.14
`As the CDC has explained, the novel coronavirus “spreads very
`easily and sustainably between people who are in close contact with
`one another . . . .”15 “[H]ousing stability helps protect public
`
`10(...continued)
`https://www.edd.ca.gov/about edd/coronavirus-2019/cares-act.htm
`11 Undocumented immigrants, including those who pay federal
`taxes with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, are not
`eligible for one-time stimulus payments, nor are United States
`citizens who are married to and file taxes jointly with
`undocumented spouses. See, e.g., Amador v. Mnuchin, No. CV
`ELH-20-1102, 2020 WL 4547950, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2020). Many
`vulnerable renters in Los Angeles are concentrated in immigrant
`neighborhoods. (UCLA Scholars brief at 7.)
`12 See
`https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/hhp/hhp14.html
`13 See UCLA Scholars brief at 4:10-11.
`14 Id. at 5:12.
`15 See Dep’t of Health and Human Serv.’s, Centers for Disease
`Control and Prevention, Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to
`Prevent the Further Spread of
`COVID-19, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-04/pdf/202
`(continued...)
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 5 of 28 Page ID #:1307
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`health because homelessness increases the likelihood of individuals
`moving into congregate settings . . .” 16 Thus, “[i]n the context
`of a pandemic, eviction moratoria – like quarantine, isolation, and
`social distancing – can be an effective public help measure
`utilized to prevent the spread of communicable disease,” and
`“facilitate self-isolation by people who become ill or who are at
`risk for severe illness from COVID-19.”17
`Recognizing that “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic threatens to
`undermine housing security and generate unnecessary displacement of
`City residents,” the City of Los Angeles adopted, among other
`measures, Ordinance 186606 (“the Eviction Moratorium,” “City
`Moratorium,” or “Moratorium”). The Moratorium “temporarily
`prohibits evictions of residential and commercial tenants for
`failure to pay rent due to COVID-19, and prohibits evictions of
`residential tenants during the emergency for no-fault reasons, for
`unauthorized occupants or pets, and for nuisances related to COVID-
`19.” (Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3 at 2.)
`Landlords may continue to seek to evict tenants for other reasons,
`and do not run afoul of the Moratorium at all if they seek to evict
`a tenant on the basis of a good faith belief that the tenant does
`not qualify for the Moratorium’s protections.18 (Id. at 3, 4).
`
`15(...continued)
`0-19654.pdf
`16 Id.
`17 Id.
`18 The Moratorium also creates a private right of action for
`residential tenants against landlords for certain violations, but
`only after written notice to the landlord and a fifteen day window
`to cure the alleged violation. (Moratorium at 4-5.)
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 6 of 28 Page ID #:1308
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`The Moratorium’s prohibition of evictions for COVID-related
`unpaid rent extends for twelve months after the expiration of the
`local emergency.19 (Id. at 3.) In other words, tenants have one
`year after the end of the emergency to make any rent payments that
`were missed as a result of COVID, including as a result of
`workplace closures, health care expenses, child care expenses due
`to school closures, “or other reasonable expenditures stemming from
`government-ordered emergency measures.”20 (Id.) The Moratorium
`explicitly states, however, that it does not “eliminate[] any
`obligation to pay lawfully charged rent.” (Id. at 4.) If, at the
`end of the one year grace period, a tenant still owes rent that
`came due during the emergency period, a landlord may seek to evict
`for that unpaid rent. Landlords may not, however, charge late fees
`or interest for missed rent during the emergency or twelve month
`grace period. (Id. at 3.)
`Plaintiff AAGLA is comprised of thousands of owners and
`managers of rental housing units, including over 55,000 properties
`within the City of Los Angeles. Plaintiff’s Third Amended
`Complaint (“TAC”) alleges that the City Eviction Moratorium and
`Rent Freeze Ordinance violate landlords’ rights under the Contract
`Clause of the Constitution, as well as the Due Process Clause,
`
`19 The City also adopted Ordinance No. 186607 (the “Rent
`Freeze Ordinance”), which prohibits rent increases on units subject
`to existing rent control provisions for a similar twelve-month
`period following the end of the COVID emergency. (Plaintiff’s RJN,
`Ex. 4 at 21.)
`20 As discussed in further detail below, this grace period
`will, by operation of state law, expire no later than March 1,
`2022. See California Assembly Bill 3088 § 1179.05(a)(2)(A).
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 7 of 28 Page ID #:1309
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`Takings Clause, and Tenth Amendment. Plaintiff now moves for a
`preliminary injunction on the basis of the TAC’s first two claims.
`II. Legal Standard
`A private party seeking a preliminary injunction must show
`that: (i) it is likely to succeed on the merits; (ii) it will
`suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (iii)
`the balancing of the equities between the parties that would result
`from the issuance or denial of the injunction tips in its favor;
`and (iv) an injunction will be in the public interest. Winter v.
`Natural Resources Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary
`relief may be warranted where a party: (i) shows a combination of
`probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
`harm; or (ii) raises serious questions on such matters and shows
`that the balance of hardships tips in favor of an injunction. See
`Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th
`Cir. 1987). “These two formulations represent two points on a
`sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm
`increases as the probability of success decreases.” Id.; see also
`hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 992 (9th Cir.
`2019). Under both formulations, the party must demonstrate a “fair
`chance of success on the merits” and a “significant threat of
`irreparable injury” absent the requested injunctive relief.21
`Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937.
`III. Discussion
`
`21 Even under the “serious interests” sliding scale test, a
`plaintiff must satisfy the four Winter factors and demonstrate
`“that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
`injunction is in the public interest.” Alliance for the Wild
`Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 8 of 28 Page ID #:1310
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`A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
`AAGLA contends that the Eviction Moratorium and the Rent
`Freeze Ordinance run afoul of the Contract Clause’s prescription
`that states shall not pass “any Law impairing the Obligation of
`Contracts.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10. Although this language “is
`facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the
`inherent police power of the State to safeguard the vital interests
`of its people.” Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light
`Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`“The constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency
`is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of
`it in response to particular conditions.” Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n
`v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934). Thus, to determine whether
`the Eviction Moratorium runs afoul of the Contract Clause, this
`Court must examine (1) whether the law “operate[s] as a substantial
`impairment of a contractual relationship,” (2) whether the City
`“has a significant and legitimate public purpose” in enacting the
`moratorium, and (3) whether the “adjustment” of the rights of the
`contracting parties is “based upon reasonable conditions and is of
`a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
`legislation’s adoption.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12
`(alterations omitted); see also Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815,
`1821 (2018) (combining public purpose and reasonableness
`inquiries). Here, although AAGLA concedes that the Eviction
`Moratorium is motivated by a legitimate public purpose, it
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 9 of 28 Page ID #:1311
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`nevertheless contends that the moratorium substantially and
`unreasonably impairs landlords’ contract rights.22
`1. Substantial Impairment
`Whether a law substantially impairs a contractual relationship
`depends upon “the extent to which the law undermines the
`contractual bargain, interferes with a party’s reasonable
`expectations, and prevents the party from safeguarding or
`reinstating his rights.”23 Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1822. AAGLA
`asserts that the Eviction Moratorium deprives landlords of the
`“primary enforcement mechanism embodied in residential leases,” and
`that such mechanisms are “the heart of what the Supreme Court has
`held must be protected under the Contract Clause.” (Memorandum in
`support of motion at 22:4-7.) This argument is premised upon
`several mischaracterizations. First, notwithstanding AAGLA’s
`description of eviction as the “primary” enforcement mechanism of a
`rental contract, the Eviction Moratorium does not deprive landlords
`of their contract remedies. The Moratorium does not excuse tenants
`from their contractual obligations to pay rent, and landlords
`remain free to sue in contract for back rent owed.
`Second, the Blaisdell court, contrary to AAGLA’s
`representation, did not state that contract enforcement measures
`are sacrosanct. Although the Court did recount its prior
`
`22 Because the Rent Freeze Ordinance is less burdensome than
`the Eviction Moratorium, the discussion of the former is subsumed
`within that of the latter, herein.
`23 AAGLA asserts that an impairment is substantial “if it
`deprives a private party of an important right, thwarts performance
`of an essential term, defeats the expectations of the parties, or
`alters a financial term.” S. California Gas Co. v. City of Santa
`Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations
`omitted). That slightly looser standard applies, however, to
`public contracts. Id.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 10 of 28 Page ID #:1312
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`observation in Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 551
`(1866), that “[n]othing can be more material to the obligation [of
`a contract] than the means of enforcement,” the Court explained, in
`the very same paragraph, that the Von Hoffman court itself limited
`its “general statement” with the observation that “it is competent
`for the States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it
`otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right
`secured by the contract is thereby impaired. . . . Every case must
`be determined upon its own circumstances.” Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at
`430 (internal quotation marks omitted).24 Indeed, the Court went
`on to reject the very argument raised by AAGLA here.
`[I]t does not follow that conditions may not arise in which
`a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with
`the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and
`thus be found to be within the range of the reserved power
`of the state to protect the vital interests of the
`community. It cannot be maintained that the constitutional
`prohibition should be so construed as to prevent limited
`and temporary interpositions with respect to the
`enforcement of contracts if made necessary by a great
`public calamity such as fire, flood, or earthquake. ***
`And, if state power exists to give temporary relief from
`the enforcement of contracts in the presence of disasters
`due to physical causes such as fire, flood, or earthquake,
`that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent
`public need demanding such relief is produced by other and
`economic causes.
`Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439.
`That said, it would be difficult to conclude that the
`Moratorium does not, at a minimum, significantly interfere with
`landlords’ reasonable expectations. The reasonableness of a
`party’s expectations will depend, to a significant extent, on the
`
`24 The Blaisdell court further explained that none of the
`cases it cited, including Von Hoffman, were “directly applicable,”
`and that “broad expressions contained in some of these opinions
`went beyond the requirements of the decision, and are not
`controlling.” Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 11 of 28 Page ID #:1313
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`degree of regulation in the relevant industry. See Energy
`Reserves, 459 U.S. at 413; Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
`438 U.S. 234, 242 n.13 (1978); Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v.
`PacifiCorp, 357 F.3d 1042, 1051 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004). AAGLA
`concedes, as it must, that the landlord-tenant relationship has
`long been subject to extensive regulation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
`3604; Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.4. Several courts, examining Contract
`Clause challenges to eviction moratoria in other locales, have
`relied upon this history of regulation to conclude that eviction
`moratoria are relatively minor alterations to existing regulatory
`frameworks, and therefore do not interfere with landlords’
`reasonable expectations. See, e.g., HAPCO v. City of Philadelphia,
`C.A. No. 20-3300, 2020 WL 5095496, *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2020);
`Auracle Homes, LLC v. Lamont, No. 3:20-cv-00829 (VAB), 2020 WL
`4558682, *17 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2020); Elmsford Apt. Assocs., LLC v.
`Cuomo, No. 20-cv-4062 (CM), 2020 WL 3498456, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
`2020).
`This Court respectfully concludes that the scope and nature of
`the COVID-19 pandemic, and of the public health measures necessary
`to combat it, have no precedent in the modern era, and that no
`amount of prior regulation could have led landlords to expect
`anything like the blanket Moratorium. See Baptiste v. Kennealy,
`No. 1:20-CV-11335-MLW, 2020 WL 5751572, at *16 (D. Mass. Sept. 25,
`2020) (“[T]he court finds that a reasonable landlord would not have
`anticipated a virtually unprecedented event such as the COVID-19
`pandemic that would generate a ban on even initiating eviction
`actions against tenants who do not pay rent and on replacing them
`with tenants who do pay rent.”). This Court cannot ignore the
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 12 of 28 Page ID #:1314
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`possibility that some landlords may face, at the very least, the
`prospects of reduced cash flow and time value of missed rent
`payments and increased wear and tear on rental properties, and that
`these effects were, at least in terms of degree, unforeseeable. At
`this stage, therefore, the court concludes that AAGLA is likely to
`succeed in showing a substantial impairment of its contractual
`rights.25
`
`Reasonableness
`2.
`No party disputes that the Moratorium was enacted in pursuit
`of a legitimate public purpose. The next question, therefore, “is
`whether the adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of
`contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a
`character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
`legislation’s adoption.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 (quoting
`United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersy, 431 U.S. 1, 22
`(1977) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
`“Unless the State itself is a contracting party, ... courts
`properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
`reasonableness of a particular measure.” Id. at 412-13 (internal
`quotation marks omitted).
`
`25 This is not to say, of course, that further factual
`development could not affect the court’s conclusion. In Baptiste,
`for example, the court found it “not possible to determine
`conclusively the extent of the impairment of plaintiffs’
`contractual right to evict” because of factual uncertainties
`regarding the temporal extent of Massachusetts’ eviction
`moratorium. Baptiste, 2020 WL 5751572, at *17. That particular
`concern is less salient here, as the Moratorium’s limitation on
`evictions will persist for at least one year from today, and likely
`until March 2022. Further factual development, however, such as on
`the question whether landlords are able, in practice, to secure
`their contractual rights without recourse to eviction, could yet
`affect the substantial impairment question.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 13 of 28 Page ID #:1315
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`Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s prescription, AAGLA urges
`this Court to set aside the City’s determination that the
`Moratorium is necessary to protect public health, life, and
`property, and to conclude that the law is not a reasonable means of
`achieving its stated end.26 AAGLA’s argument rests largely upon
`unsupported factual assertions and a misreading of Supreme Court
`precedent. First, AAGLA asserts, without citation to any source,
`that “there is no need for the Ordinances now . . ., with COVID
`cases decreasing . . . .” (Reply at 16:18-19.) It is unclear to
`the court whether that representation has been true at any point
`since the onset of the pandemic.27 But even assuming that COVID
`cases were decreasing at the time of writing, that is most
`definitely not the case now, as fall wanes and winter approaches.28
`Necessity aside, AAGLA primarily argues that, under Blaisdell,
`no “government entity, even in an acute and sustained economic
`emergency, may excuse tenants from paying a reasonable amount of
`rent contemporaneous with occupancy as a condition to avoiding
`eviction.”29 (Mem. in support at 24:18-19 (emphasis omitted).)
`AAGLA misreads Blaisdell, and subsequent cases interpreting it.
`
`26 See Moratorium at 2.
`27 See
`https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends totalandratecases
`28 See
`https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends dailytrendscases
`29 As discussed in further detail below, in the context of the
`irreparable harm analysis, this position is somewhat surprising in
`light of AAGLA’s argument that a separate, statewide eviction
`moratorium is more reasonable than the City Ordinance, and that “we
`can certainly assume that the state law is constitutional.” As
`discussed below, that state law, like the Moratorium, prohibits
`evictions for COVID-related nonpayment of rent, even where a tenant
`has paid no rent for a period of as much as eleven months.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 14 of 28 Page ID #:1316
`
`In 1933, in the midst of a state of economic emergency brought
`on by the Great Depression, Minnesota passed the “Mortgage
`Moratorium Law.” Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416. The Mortgage
`Moratorium Law automatically extended the period of redemption from
`foreclosure sales for thirty days, and empowered county courts to
`grant “just and equitable” further extensions, during which
`mortgagee-purchasers would be unable to take possession or obtain
`title. Id. In Blaisdell, defaulting mortgagors obtained a two
`year extension of the redemption period, subject to the condition
`that they make payments equal to the reasonable rental value of the
`property. Id. at 420. The mortgagee, a building and loan
`association, contended that the Mortgage Moratorium Law violated
`the Contract Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection
`Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 416.
`The Supreme Court, focusing on the Contract Clause,
`disagreed.30 Id. at 447-48. In so concluding, the Court observed
`that (1) a state of emergency existed, (2) the moratorium was
`addressed to “the protection of a basic interest of society” rather
`than to the benefit of particular individuals, (3) the moratorium’s
`relief could only be “of a character appropriate to the emergency,
`and could only be granted upon reasonable conditions,” (4) the
`moratorium, on balance, met that reasonableness requirement, and
`(5) the legislation was temporary. Id. at 447; see also Allied
`Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 242. In finding the conditions
`imposed by the Minnesota Moratorium Law reasonable on balance, the
`Blaisdell court looked to several of the moratorium’s provisions.
`
`30 “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
`Obligation of Contracts.” U.S.Const., Art. I, § 10.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 15 of 28 Page ID #:1317
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`Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 445-46; Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at
`243. The relevant conditions included (1) a continuation of the
`mortgage indebtedness, (2) the continued validity of the
`mortgagee’s right to title or a deficiency judgment, (3) the
`mortgagor’s obligation to pay the reasonable rental value, and (4)
`the fact that most mortgagees were corporations and banks “not
`seeking homes or the opportunity to engage in farming.” Id.
`According to AAGLA, the Blaisdell court’s inclusion of
`reasonable rental value as a factor relevant to the reasonableness
`of the Mortgage Moratorium Law was tantamount to a requirement that
`any “adjustment” of rights relating to tenancy or occupancy include
`rent payments. For support, AAGLA points to the Supreme Court’s
`subsequent pronouncement in Allied Structural Steel that “[t]he
`Blaisdell opinion [] clearly implied that if the Minnesota
`moratorium legislation had not possessed the characteristics
`attributed to it by the Court, it would have been invalid under the
`Contract Clause of the Constitution.” Allied Structural Steel, 438
`U.S. at 242. The characteristics to which the Allied Structural
`Steel court referred, however, were not the provisions bearing on
`the reasonableness of the Mortgage Moratorium Law, but rather the
`five broader considerations, of which reasonableness was but one.
`Id. As the Court explained,
`In upholding the state mortgage moratorium law, the
`[Blaisdell] Court found five factors significant. First,
`the state legislature had declared in the Act itself that
`an emergency need for the protection of homeowners existed.
`Second, the state law was enacted to protect a basic
`societal interest, not a favored group. Third, the relief
`was appropriately tailored to the emergency that it was
`designed to meet. Fourth, the imposed conditions were
`reasonable. And, finally, the legislation was limited to
`the duration of the emergency.
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 16 of 28 Page ID #:1318
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`Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, although
`the Blaisdell court might conceivably have reached a different
`conclusion in the absence of a reasonable rent requirement, it did
`not go so far as AAGLA would suggest. Furthermore, the Supreme
`Court has explained that, to the extent any of its post-Blaisdell
`decisions did impose any specific limitations on legislatures’
`powers vis-à-vis contracts, “[l]ater decisions abandoned these
`limitations as absolute requirements.” U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 22
`n.19. Instead, specific requirements, including such a seemingly
`fundamental consideration as the existence of an emergency, are
`“subsumed in the overall determination of reasonableness.” Id.
`“Undoubtedly the existence of an emergency and the limited duration
`of a relief measure are factors to be assessed in determining the
`reasonableness of an impairment, but [even] they cannot be regarded
`as essential in every case.” Id.
`In the absence of any specific prerequisite for
`reasonableness, let alone a requirement that the Moratorium provide
`for rent payments to landlords, this Court will defer to the City
`Council’s weighing of the interests at stake. In so doing, the
`court joins at least four other courts that have found eviction
`moratoria reasonable in light of the COVID-19 pandemic at the
`preliminary injunction stage, notwithstanding the lack of any
`provision for partial rent payments. See Baptiste, 2020 WL
`5751572, at *19; HAPCO, 2020 WL 5095496, at *10; Auracle, 2020 WL
`4558682, at *18-19; Elmsford, 2020 WL 3498456, at *15.31 32
`
`31 To be sure, although all four of these cases involve
`eviction moratoria with no partial rent requirement, the moratoria
`at issue differ in their particulars from each other and from the
`(continued...)
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`Case 2:20-cv-05193-DDP-JEM Document 80 Filed 11/13/20 Page 17 of 28 Page ID #:1319
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`Notably, here, as in Blaisdell, the Moratorium is addressed to
`protect a basic societal need, is temporary in nature, does not
`disturb landlords’ ability to obtain a judgment for contract
`damages, does not absolve tenants of any obligation to pay any
`amount of rent, does not appear to impact landlords’ ability to
`obtain housing, and was implemented in the context of a state of
`emergency. Indeed, the current emergency is arguably more serious
`than that brought on by the Great Depression, coupling, as it does,
`the consequences of economic catastrophe with a serious, and
`worsening, threat to public health.
`AAGLA makes much of the fact that the Moratorium does not
`require tenants affected by COVID-19 to make an affirmative
`declaration to that effect. Although such a requirement would
`certainly make it more difficult for ill-intentioned, financially
`secure tenants to game the Moratorium, landlords remain free to
`seek to evict such nonpaying tenants, so long as there exists a
`good faith basis to believe that the tenant falls outside the
`Moratorium’s protections. (Moratorium at 2.) There does not
`appear to this Court to be anything inherently unreasonable about
`the City Council’s decision to spare legitimately-impacted tenants
`the burden of attestation.
`
`31(...continued)
`Moratorium here. Of the four moratoria at issue in the cited
`cases, the City’s Moratorium is most akin to the City of
`Philadelphia’s, discussed in HAPCO, 2020 WL 5095496, at *2-4.
`32 The Elmsford court converted a motion for a preliminary
`injunction into a motion for summary judgment, and, strictly
`speaking, did not reach the reasonableness question because it
`concluded, as a matter of law, that New York’s eviction moratorium
`did not substantially impair landlords’ contractual rights.
`Elmsford, 2020 WL 3498456, at *15.
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