Case 2:21-cv-07408-VAP-SK Document 37 Filed 01/27/22 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:541
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Nona Gaprindashvili,
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`Plaintiff,
`v.
`Netflix, Inc.; Does 1–50
`Defendants.
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`Case No. 2:21-cv-07408-VAP-SKx
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`Order DENYING Motion to
`Dismiss and DENYING Motion to
`Strike
`(Dkt. 21)
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`Before the Court is Defendant Netflix, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or Strike
`(“Motion”) Plaintiff Nona Gaprindashvili’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
`pleading claims of false light or in the alternative, defamation. (Dkt. 11).
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`After considering all the papers filed in support of, and in opposition to,
`the Motion, the Court deems this matter appropriate for resolution without a
`hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7-15. The Court DENIES the Motion.
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`BACKGROUND
`I.
`This action arises from a statement made about Plaintiff Nona
`Gaprindashvili in the popular Netflix miniseries, The Queen’s Gambit
`(“Series”). (FAC ¶ 1). The Court bases the following summary on the
`allegations in Plaintiff's complaint.
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`Plaintiff is a trailblazing woman chess player, who throughout her career
`won many championships, defeated some of the best male chess players in
`the world, and became the first woman in history to achieve the status of
`international chess grandmaster among men. (Id. ¶ 2).
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`In 1983, author Walter Tevis wrote a novel entitled The Queen’s Gambit
`(“Novel”), on which the Series is based. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). The Novel’s main
`characters are fictional, but it references a few real chess players, including
`a passing reference to Plaintiff in the context of the fictional Moscow
`Invitational chess tournament. (Id. ¶ 3). The Series, like the Novel, tells the
`story of a fictional American woman named Elizabeth Harmon (“Beth
`Harmon” or “Harmon”), an orphan who rises from humble beginnings to
`become a great chess player. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). The story, set in the 1960s,
`portrays the systemic sexism of the time and the “prevailing view of the era
`that there was no place for women at the highest echelons of chess.” (Id.
`¶¶ 4, 38). The Series culminates in a fictional chess tournament, the
`Moscow Invitational, which Harmon receives an invitation to participate in
`after her triumph in the U.S. Championship. (Id. ¶ 41; Motion at 3).
`Significantly, the fictional Moscow Invitational takes place in 1968. (FAC
`¶ 7).
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`In the first round of the tournament, Harmon plays against fictional
`chess player Victor Laev, an older male player who Harmon had long
`admired. (Id. ¶ 41). After the match between Harmon and Laev ends, the
`announcer for the tournament, in a voice-over commentary, comments on
`Harmon’s gender to make the point that the male players in the tournament
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`did not take Harmon seriously as an opponent. (Id. ¶ 42). The announcer
`states the following:
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`[The male players believe] Harmon’s level of play wasn’t at
`theirs. Someone like Laev probably didn’t spend a lot of time
`preparing for their match. Elizabeth Harmon’s not at all an
`important player by their standards. The only unusual thing
`about her, really, is her sex. And even that’s not unique in
`Russia. There’s Nona Gaprindashvili, but she’s the female
`world champion and has never faced men. My guess is
`Laev was expecting an easy win, and not at all the 27-move
`thrashing Beth Harmon just gave him.
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`(Id. ¶ 42 (emphasis in original)). As Plaintiff’s name is mentioned, an
`actor is shown sitting in the audience who is obviously meant to be Plaintiff.
`(Id. ¶ 43). This language, particularly the line referencing Plaintiff (“but
`[Nona Gaprindashvili] . . . has never faced men”) (“Line”) is the subject of
`the lawsuit.
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`The Line appears to be based on similar text from the Novel, which
`reads:
`
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`As far as they knew, [Harmon’s] level of play was roughly that
`of Benny Watts, and men like Laev would not devote much time
`to preparation for playing Benny. She was not an important
`player by their standards; the only unusual thing about her was
`her sex; and even that wasn’t unique in Russia. There was
`Nona Gaprindashvili, not up to the level of this tournament,
`but a player who had met all these Russian Grandmasters
`many times before. Laev would be expecting an easy win.
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`(Id. ¶ 62).
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`The statement that Plaintiff herself had “never faced men,” even by
`1968, is inaccurate.1 (Id. ¶ 18; Motion at 3). Beginning in 1962 and 1963,
`Plaintiff competed against and frequently defeated male chess players. In
`1965, “she played 28 male players at once.”2 (FAC ¶ 18). Plaintiff began
`playing chess at the age of thirteen and proceeded to have an extraordinary
`and successful career. She won the semi-final of the Women’s Soviet Union
`Championship at the age of fourteen. In 1961, she became female World
`Champion at the age of 20. (Id. ¶ 16). She participated in and won medals
`in Chess Olympiads internationally and faced and defeated men in
`significant chess tournaments, many of which garnered international
`attention. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 21–26; Decl. of Gaprindashvili (“Gaprindashvili Decl.”),
`Dkt. 28-1 at 4–7 (enumerating accomplishments)). In fact, by 1968, the
`year in which the episode is set, she had competed against at least 59 male
`chess players, at least ten of which were Grandmasters of that time,
`including Dragoljub Velimirovich, Svetozar Gligoric, Paul Keres, Bojan
`Kurajica, Boris Spassky and Mikhail Tal. The last three were also world
`champions during their careers. (FAC ¶ 7). Plaintiff later became the first
`woman in history to be awarded the honor and rank of International Chess
`Grandmaster among men. (Id. ¶ 28).
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`1 Netflix concedes as much but argues that the Line is fiction and thus not
`understood to be conveying a fact. (Motion at 2). Netflix additionally argues
`for a substantial truth defense because the difference between having faced
`men by 1963 versus 1968 amounts to only a minor inaccuracy. (Id. at 3).
`Both these issues are discussed infra.
`2 The FAC shows an image of Plaintiff on one side of a row of men, playing
`individual chess games down the row of men.
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`During Plaintiff’s career, she encountered severe prejudice because she
`was a woman—and often the only woman—competing amongst men. (Id.
`¶ 19). In 1976, Plaintiff wrote a book in which she described her devotion to
`chess, the difficulty she faced in overcoming barriers as a woman in that
`world, and her pride for the part she played in advancing gender equality in
`the chess world. (Id. ¶ 20 (“The term ‘Women’s chess’ has expired. I am
`proud that I have my share in promoting the creative emancipation of
`women in chess. I had my share in helping women to overcome
`psychological barriers separating them from ‘man’s chess.’”)). Plaintiff is
`well-known in the chess world and was the subject of many news stories
`about her accomplishments in tournaments. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 25). Plaintiff also
`alleges she is the subject of a film that portrayed her as a “woman who
`helped revolutionize female chess by taking on male competitors across the
`globe” and in which she “became a Georgian icon of female emancipation.”
`(Id. ¶ 30).
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`Netflix released all seven episodes of the Series on October 23, 2020.
`The final episode, “End Game,” contains the scene that features the Line.
`(Id. ¶ 34). On November 23, 2020, Netflix announced that the Series had
`been watched by 62 million households since its release. The Series
`topped the United States television Nielsen’s streaming rankings for three
`straight weeks, the first series in history to do so. (Id.).
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`When the Series aired, multiple news outlets and various individual
`internet users commented on the inaccuracy of the Line. (Id. ¶¶ 48–58).
`Plaintiff states that the Line “misrepresented one of [her] most significant
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`career achievements . . . before millions of viewers worldwide” and
`“tarnished [her] personal and professional reputation.” (Gaprindashvili Decl.
`at 9).3 To this day, Plaintiff continues to compete in chess tournaments and
`receive accolades for her accomplishments. (FAC ¶ 31). Plaintiff’s life-long
`career is in the world of competitive chess, in which she remains an active
`leader, role-model, and competitor. (Id. ¶ 77). Plaintiff contends that the
`Line cuts to the heart of her hard-won standing in her profession and as a
`result, injures her current participation in the chess world and ability to earn
`income from that participation. This “remains tied to her historical success
`and accomplishments. The professional reputation and brand of
`Gaprindashvili was inextricably bound up with her courageous efforts to face
`and defeat estimable male opponents when chess was overwhelmingly a
`man’s world.” (Id. ¶ 77).
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`Plaintiff filed suit against Netflix and Does 1–50 on September 16, 2021
`and filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on September 20, 2021.
`(Compl., Dkt. 1; FAC, Dkt. 11). Plaintiff brings claims for false light invasion
`of privacy (FAC ¶¶ 69–75), or in the alternative, defamation per se (FAC
`¶¶ 76–81). Netflix moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`Rule 12(b)(6), or to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California
`Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss or Strike
`(“Motion”), Dkt. 21). Plaintiff opposed the Motion, and Netflix filed a Reply.
`(Pl. Opp. (“Opp.”), Dkt. 28; Def. Reply (“Reply”), Dkt. 29).
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`3 For ease of reference, the Court uses the page numbering given by the
`electronic filing system for the Gaprindashvili Declaration. All other page
`references utilize internal page numbering.
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`II. MOTION TO DISMISS
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`A. Legal Standard
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to bring a mo-
`tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
`Rule 12(b)(6) is read along with Rule 8(a), which requires a short, plain
`statement upon which a pleading shows entitlement to relief. Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (holding that the Fed-
`eral Rules require a plaintiff to provide “‘a short and plain statement of the
`claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
`and the grounds upon which it rests” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).); Bell
`Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule
`12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all material allegations in the com-
`plaint—as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them—as
`true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
`See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005); ARC Ecol-
`ogy v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); Moyo v.
`Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). “The court need not accept as
`true, however, allegations that contradict facts that may be judicially noticed
`by the court.” Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000).
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`“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
`does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
`the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and con-
`clusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
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`not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Rather, the allega-
`tions in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
`speculative level.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege
`“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
`Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009).
`“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
`asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
`Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defend-
`ant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
`‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
`556).
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`The Ninth Circuit has clarified that: (1) a complaint must “contain suffi-
`cient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the op-
`posing party to defend itself effectively” and (2) “the factual allegations that
`are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it
`is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of
`discovery and continued litigation.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th
`Cir. 2011). Although the scope of review is limited to the contents of the
`complaint, the Court may also consider exhibits submitted with the com-
`plaint, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,
`1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990), and “take judicial notice of matters of public rec-
`ord outside the pleadings,” Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646,
`649 (9th Cir. 1988).
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`B. False Light
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`To state a claim for false light invasion of privacy, Plaintiff must
`demonstrate: (1) disclosure to one or more persons (2) information about or
`concerning Plaintiff presented as factual but that was actually false or
`created a false impression about him; (3) that was highly offensive and
`would injure Plaintiff’s reputation; (4) constitutional malice; and (5) Plaintiff
`suffered damages as a result. Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082
`(9th Cir. 2002) (applying California law). California courts have taken the
`view that since false light is a division of invasion of privacy tort, the claim
`must relate to the plaintiff's interest in privacy, and hence cannot involve
`matters, however offensively misrepresented to the public, which are in
`essence “public” themselves. Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 263 Cal.App.2d
`760, 768 (1968). Here, where the challenged statements were exclusively
`related to Plaintiff’s public professional life, she fails to plead that the
`publication of these statements “intrudes into [her] private li[fe].” Id.
`Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for false light invasion of privacy, that
`claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.4
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`C. Defamation Per Se
`To establish a claim for defamation, Plaintiff must plead (a) a publication
`that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged and that (e) has a
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`4 Plaintiff pleads false light as an alternative theory of liability to the second
`cause of action for defamation per se. (FAC ¶ 21). Plaintiff’s defamation
`claim, based on the same facts, provides a complete remedy for any dam-
`ages Plaintiff suffered by the alleged conduct. See Selleck v. Globe Int’l,
`Inc., 166 Cal. App. 3d 1123, 1129, 1136 (1985) (affirming denial of false light
`claim which was in substance equivalent to libel claim). Further, given the
`claims are entirely based on Plaintiff’s public, rather than private, life,
`amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182.
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`natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage. Taus v. Loftus, 40
`Cal. 4th 683, 720 (2007). As a public figure, Plaintiff must also plead the
`requisite constitutional malice. Reader’s Dig. Assn. v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal.
`3d 244, 256 (1984) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
`280 (1964)). “Defamation is effected by either of the following: (a) Libel. (b)
`Slander.” Cal Civ. Code § 44. In California, defamation in a television
`broadcast is treated as slander. Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955, 961
`(1966). Slander per se is actionable without proof of special damages. Cal.
`Civ. Code § 46. Slander per se includes such publications which tend to
`injure a plaintiff with respect to their “office, profession, trade or business,
`either by imputing to [plaintiff] general disqualification in those respects
`which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing
`something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that
`has a natural tendency to lessen its profits.” Cal. Civ. Code § 46(3). If a
`plaintiff establishes the Line injured her with respect to her profession or
`trade, this is sufficient to establish slander per se under section 46(3) and
`does not require proof of actual damage. Id.
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`Netflix contends that Plaintiff fails to plead the elements of this claim,
`specifically arguing that: (1) Plaintiff fails to plead falsity because a
`reasonable viewer would not believe the Line conveyed an objective fact;
`(2) the Line is not defamatory because it contains no defamatory
`implication, or because a reasonable viewer would not see the defamatory
`implication because it relies on information that is not common knowledge;
`(3) the Line falls under the “substantial truth” defense; and (4) Plaintiff
`cannot plead the requisite “actual malice.” (Motion at 3).
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`1. Falsity – Whether the Line Conveyed Objective Fact
`To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present a statement of fact
`that is provably false. Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798,
`809 (2002) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)).
`“Whether published material is reasonably susceptible of an interpretation
`which implies a provably false assertion of fact . . . is a question of law for
`the court.” Couch v. San Juan Unified Sch. Dist., 33 Cal. App. 4th 1491,
`1500 (1995). “This question must be resolved by considering whether the
`reasonable or ‘average’ reader would so interpret the material.” Id.
`“Statements do not imply a provably false factual assertion and thus cannot
`form the basis of a defamation action if they cannot reasonably [be]
`interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.” Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-
`Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1048 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
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`Netflix argues that no reasonable viewer would have understood the
`Line to convey a statement of fact because the Series is an entirely fictional
`work. (Motion at 12). Netflix points to various cases for the proposition that
`“[f]ictional works have no obligation to the truth.” (Motion at 12 (quoting
`Sarver v. Hurt Locker LLC, No. 2:10-CV-09034-JHN (JCx), 2011 WL
`11574477, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011), aff’d sub nom. Sarver v. Chartier,
`813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016))).
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`As an initial matter, Netflix does not cite, and the Court is not aware, of
`any cases precluding defamation claims for the portrayal of real persons in
`otherwise fictional works. On the contrary, the fact that the Series was a
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`fictional work does not insulate Netflix from liability for defamation if all the
`elements of defamation are otherwise present. See Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92
`Cal. App. 3d 61, 73 n.2, 76 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979),
`disapproved of on other grounds by McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal. 3d 835
`(1986) (fictional character in the novel was identifiable as the real person);
`see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1995) (creators
`of docudramas that mix fact and fiction “must attempt to avoid creating the
`impression that they are asserting objective facts”). The test is whether a
`reasonable viewer would understand the character to be the person
`identified and to have the characteristics as described. See Sarver, 2011
`WL 11574477, at *8. Courts “must look to the specific context in which the
`statements were made and to the content of the statements themselves” to
`determine whether the speaker “creat[ed] the impression that they [were]
`asserting objective facts.” Partington, 56 F.3d at 1155.
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`In the last episode, the Series identifies Plaintiff in dialogue by a fictional
`commentator analyzing fictional character Beth Harmon’s likelihood of
`defeating a fictional chess champion. (FAC ¶¶ 41–42). Despite the
`presence of fiction surrounding the Line, however, the Court cannot ignore
`that the Series does reference real people and events and most importantly,
`the Line identifies a real person, Plaintiff, by name, references her real
`career, and then shows an actor sitting in the audience who resembles
`Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 43). In other words, a “physical description,” “biographical
`references” and unique identifying characteristics which “would allow a
`reasonable person to conclude that the fictional [Nona Gaprindashvili] was
`in fact the real [Nona Gaprindashvili]” accompany the Line. Tamkin v. CBS
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`Case 2:21-cv-07408-VAP-SK Document 37 Filed 01/27/22 Page 13 of 25 Page ID #:553
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`Broad., Inc., 193 Cal. App. 4th 133, 147 (2011). Not only does this close the
`gap between associating the supposedly fictional character with the real
`person, but regardless of whether viewers recognized Plaintiff’s name (as
`indeed, some did), viewers may reasonably have believed the comment to
`be one of these historical details incorporated into the Series.
`
`The Court also considers the presence of the disclaimer that the Series
`is a work of fiction as a factor in this analysis, albeit not a dispositive one.
`Mossack Fonseca & Co. v. Netflix, Inc., No. 19-CV-9330-CBM (ASx), 2020
`WL 8510342, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020). The cases that Defendant
`cites on this point are distinguishable.
`
`In Mossack, the court considered a film portraying a law firm that
`represented clients involved with money laundering, tax evasion, and other
`criminal conduct. 2020 WL 8510342, at *4. The court found that no
`reasonable viewer would believe the film was making “assertions of
`objective fact,” rather than a dramatization, “particularly given the statement
`at the beginning of the Film ‘BASED ON ACTUAL SECRETS’ which sets the
`stage and the disclaimer at the end of the Film that states the Film is
`fictionalized. . . .” Id. Here, the Series includes a similar disclaimer, but the
`Line resembles one of those factual details incorporated into the Series for
`believability more than it resembles the main plot devices, such as Beth
`Harmon, or the law firm, which are clearly fictional or at least dramatized. In
`De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, the court found that fictionalized
`interviews portrayed in the work would not reasonably be interpreted as
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`Case 2:21-cv-07408-VAP-SK Document 37 Filed 01/27/22 Page 14 of 25 Page ID #:554
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`literal statements of the actual person, which has little bearing on the issues
`here. 21 Cal. App. 5th 845, 867–68.
`
`Moreover, the Series purports to be set in a historical setting and does
`reference real people and events. (Decl. of Scott Frank (“Frank Decl.”), Dkt.
`21-7 ¶ 6). In context, therefore, Netflix “creat[ed] the impression that [it] was
`asserting objective facts.” Partington, 56 F.3d at 1155. Plaintiff sufficiently
`pleads falsity because the Line is “reasonably susceptible of an
`interpretation which implies a provably false assertion of fact.” Couch, 33
`Cal. App. 4th at 1500.
`
`2. Defamatory Meaning – Whether the Line Carries a Defamatory
`Implication and Whether a Reasonable Viewer Would Have
`Understood a Defamatory Implication
`Netflix next argues that even if believed, the Line is not defamatory
`because a reasonable viewer would not conclude that the Line “never faced
`men” carries the implication of Plaintiff’s inferiority, the defamatory meaning
`attributed by Plaintiff. (Motion at 15).5 Netflix contends that this implication
`is inconsistent with the “Series’ portrayal of the structural barriers that
`impeded women’s advancement in elite chess during the 1960s.” (Motion at
`15). In other words, Netflix advances an interpretation that Nona
`Gaprindashvili “never faced men” not because she was inferior, but rather
`
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`5 In the alternative, Netflix argues that even if the Line implies inferiority, that
`implication is statement of opinion rather than a “provably false factual as-
`sertion.” Motion 16–17. In doing so, Netflix confuses the question of de-
`famatory meaning with the element of falsity. The line between a statement
`of fact versus opinion is relevant for the latter. If Netflix concedes the Line
`carries the implication of inferiority, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded the el-
`ement of defamatory meaning.
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`Case 2:21-cv-07408-VAP-SK Document 37 Filed 01/27/22 Page 15 of 25 Page ID #:555
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`because she had simply been impeded by the structural barriers depicted in
`the Series.
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`Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation. Gilbert v. Sykes,
`147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 27 (2007). A falsehood is defamatory if it “attribute[es]
`to a person specific misdeeds or certain unfavorable characteristics or
`qualities, or uttering certain other derogatory statements regarding a person,
`constitutes slander.” Nguyen-Lam v. Cao, 171 Cal. App. 4th 858, 867
`(2009). In addition to false statements that cause actual damage, the
`California Legislature has specified slander per se categories, which include
`false and unprivileged publications that “tend[] directly to injure [a plaintiff]
`with respect to [her] profession, trade, or business.” Cal. Civ. Code § 46.
`
`“If it is determined that the publication is susceptible of a defamatory
`meaning and also of an innocent and nondefamatory meaning it is for the
`jury to determine which meaning would be given to it by the average
`reader.” Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 765 (1968).
`“The fact that an applied defamatory charge or insinuation leaves room for
`an innocent interpretation as well does not establish that the defamatory
`meaning does not appear from the language itself.” O’Connor v. McGraw-
`Hill, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 478, 485 (1984); see also Solano, 292 F.3d at
`1084 (“[O]ur inquiry is not to determine whether the publication may have an
`innocent meaning but rather to determine if it reasonably conveys a
`defamatory meaning.”).
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`Here, the Line in context discusses why a male Russian chess master
`underestimated Beth Harmon. The commentator delivering the Line
`explains that Harmon’s gender is her most noteworthy characteristic but
`adds: “even [her gender is] not unique in Russia. There’s Nona
`Gaprindashvili, but she’s the female world champion and has never
`faced men. My guess is Laev was expecting an easy win . . . .” (FAC
`¶ 63). The Line clearly conveys an import to the very feat of playing chess
`against men—not only because men were believed to be better at chess,
`but also because it was a monumental achievement to break into that world.
`Breaking these gender barriers is a primary theme of the Series, which
`celebrates Harmon for doing just that. The Line also uses Plaintiff as a
`comparison point to Harmon, one with lesser achievements. An average
`viewer easily could interpret the Line, as Plaintiff contends, as “disparaging
`the accomplishments of Plaintiff” and “carr[ying] the stigma that women bear
`a badge of inferiority” that fictional American woman Harmon, but not
`Plaintiff, could overcome. (Opp. at 11). At the very least, the line is
`dismissive of the accomplishments central to Plaintiff’s reputation. Given
`Plaintiff’s allegations about the role Plaintiff’s reputation plays as a matter
`not merely of personal pride, but in her ongoing professional pursuits, such
`a falsehood “constitutes an injury to reputation,” that “tends directly to injure
`[Plaintiff] with respect to [her] profession, trade, or business.” Nguyen-Lam,
`171 Cal. App. 4th at 867; Cal. Civ. Code § 46.
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`Plaintiff further alleges that viewers did in fact attribute a defamatory
`meaning to the Line. (FAC ¶¶ 51–57). Such evidence, while not dispositive,
`supports how a “reasonable” viewer might have understood the Line. See
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`Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C.
`2019), aff’d, 991 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 2021 WL 5043599
`(Nov. 1, 2021). Because this falsehood tends to “directly to injure [her] in
`respect to [her] office, profession, trade, or business,” it qualifies as
`defamation per se. Balla v. Hall, 59 Cal. App. 5th 652, 675 (2021), review
`denied (Apr. 14, 2021) (quoting Civ. Code § 46(3)).
`
`Netflix next argues that Plaintiff cannot establish defamation per se
`because understanding the alleged defamatory implication requires
`knowledge of competitive Soviet chess in the 1960s. (Motion at 19). Netflix
`argues that the audience “would be able to recognize a defamatory meaning
`only by virtue of his or her knowledge of specific facts and circumstances,
`