Case 2:22-cv-01425 Document 1 Filed 03/02/22 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:1
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`DANIELLE J. MOSS, PRO HAC VICE PENDING
`dmoss@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166-0193
`Telephone: 212.351.4000
`Facsimile: 212.351.4035
`MEGAN COONEY, SBN 295174
`mcooney@gibsondunn.com
`LAUREN M. FISCHER, SBN 318625
`lfischer@gibsondunn.com
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`3161 Michelson Drive
`Irvine, CA 92612-4412
`Telephone: 949.451.3800
`Facsimile: 949.451.4220
`Attorneys for Defendant
`PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`MARK COHEN, as an individual and
` CASE NO.
`2:22-cv-01425
`on behalf of all others similarly situated,
`DEFENDANT PELOTON
`INTERACTIVE, INC.’S NOTICE OF
`Plaintiff,
`REMOVAL OF CLASS ACTION
`(Los Angeles County Superior Court Case
`No. 22STCV00201)
`Action Filed:
`January 3, 2022
`
`v.
`PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC., a
`Delaware corporation; and Does 1
`through 50, inclusive,
`Defendants.
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`Case 2:22-cv-01425 Document 1 Filed 03/02/22 Page 2 of 25 Page ID #:2
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL ............................................................................ 1
`SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL ........... 2
`A.
`The Proposed Class Consists of More than 100 Members ........................ 5
`B.
`Peloton and Plaintiff Are Not Citizens of the Same State ......................... 6
`C.
`The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $5 Million ...................................... 7
`1.
`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Waiting Time Penalties
`Place More than $2.9 Million in Controversy ................................. 9
`Plaintiff’s Claim for Alleged Violation of Labor Code
`Section 226 Places Another $1.4 Million in Controversy ............. 11
`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Meal and Rest Periods
`Places Another $694,411.20 in Controversy ................................. 13
`Plaintiff’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees Places an Additional
`$1.2 Million in Controversy........................................................... 16
`Just Four of Plaintiff’s Nine Causes of Action, Including
`Attorneys’ Fees, Places More than $6.3 Million in
`Controversy .................................................................................... 17
`III. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL IS PROPER ............ 18
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`4.
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`5.
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott,
`936 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 7, 8, 16
`Avila v. Kiewit Corp.,
`789 F. App’x 32 (9th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................... 15
`Ayala v. Cox Auto., Inc.,
`2016 WL 6561284 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) ............................................................. 6
`Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc.,
`2009 WL 587844 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009) .............................................................. 16
`Branch v. PM Realty Grp., L.P.,
`647 F. App’x 743 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 15
`Campbell v. Vitran Exp., Inc.,
`471 F. App’x 646 (9th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................... 7
`Crummie v. CertifiedSafety, Inc.,
`2017 WL 4544747 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) .......................................................... 10
`Danielsson v. Blood Ctrs. of Pac.,
`2019 WL 7290476 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2019) ......................................................... 15
`Dart Cherokee Basin Op. Co. v. Owens,
`574 U.S. 81 (2014) .................................................................................................. 7, 8
`De Bedoy v. ATN Window & Door Corp.,
`2016 WL 7647203 (Cal. Super.) .............................................................................. 16
`Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC,
`11 Cal. 5th 858 (2021) .............................................................................................. 13
`Garza v. Brinderson Constructors, Inc.,
`178 F. Supp. 3d 906 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ...................................................................... 14
`Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
`150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................................................................. 16
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
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`Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
`559 U.S. 77 (2010) ...................................................................................................... 6
`Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP,
`437 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................... 7
`Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.,
`704 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1983) .................................................................................... 6
`Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
`199 F. Supp. 2d 993 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ........................................................................ 7
`Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp.,
`536 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ...................................................................... 7
`LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc.,
`775 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2015) .................................................................................... 7
`Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc.,
`627 F.3d 395 (9th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................... 8
`Mackall v. Healthsource Glob. Staffing, Inc.,
`2016 WL 4579099 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) ........................................................... 14
`Mamika v. Barca,
`68 Cal. App. 4th 487 (1998) ....................................................................................... 9
`Marentes v. Key Energy Servs. Cal., Inc.,
`2015 WL 756516 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) ............................................................ 10
`Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`804 F. App’x 641 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................. 12
`Mejia v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,
`2015 WL 2452755 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2015) .......................................................... 12
`Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Inc.,
`40 Cal. 4th 1094 (2007) ............................................................................................ 14
`Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
`50 Cal. 4th 1389 (2010) .............................................................................................. 9
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page(s)
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`Rippee v. Boston Mkt. Corp.,
`408 F. Supp. 2d 982 (S.D. Cal. 2005) ........................................................................ 7
`Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc.,
`974 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2020) .................................................................................. 7, 8
`Soto v. Tech Packaging, Inc.,
`2019 WL 6492245 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019) ............................................................ 12
`Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,
`568 U.S. 588 (2013) .................................................................................................... 8
`State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer,
`19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................... 6
`Tajonar v. Echosphere, L.L.C.,
`2015 WL 4064642 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2015) ............................................................. 10
`Vasquez v. Randstad US, L.P.,
`2018 WL 327451 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018) ............................................................... 15
`STATUTES
`28 U.S.C. § 84(c) ........................................................................................................... 18
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ................................................................................................. 6, 7
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) ................................................................................................ passim
`28 U.S.C. § 1441 .................................................................................................... 2, 5, 18
`28 U.S.C. § 1446 .................................................................................................. 1, 18, 19
`28 U.S.C. § 1453 .................................................................................................... 1, 2, 18
`28 U.S.C. § 1711 .............................................................................................................. 1
`Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(a) ........................................................................................ 12
`Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a) .................................................................................... 9, 14
`Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 382 .............................................................................................. 2
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page(s)
`Cal. Lab. Code § 201 ................................................................................................. 9, 10
`Cal. Lab. Code § 202 ................................................................................................. 9, 10
`Cal. Lab. Code § 203 ................................................................................................. 9, 10
`Cal. Lab. Code § 226 ......................................................................................... 11, 12, 13
`Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7 .................................................................................................. 13
`Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ......................................................................... passim
`REGULATIONS
`Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 13520 ........................................................................................ 9
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`Case 2:22-cv-01425 Document 1 Filed 03/02/22 Page 7 of 25 Page ID #:7
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`
`TO THE CLERK FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL
`DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, PLAINTIFF MARK COHEN, AND HIS
`COUNSEL OF RECORD:
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of
`2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711, Defendant Peloton Interactive, Inc.
`(“Peloton” or “Defendant”) hereby removes to the United States District Court for the
`Central District of California the above-captioned state court action, originally filed as
`Case No. 22STCV00201 in Los Angeles County Superior Court, State of California.
`Removal is proper on the following grounds:
`I.
`TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL
`1.
`Plaintiff Mark Cohen (“Plaintiff”) filed a putative Class Action Complaint
`against Peloton in Los Angeles County Superior Court, State of California, Case No.
`22STCV00201, on January 3, 2022. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), true and correct
`copies of the (a) Summons, (b) Class Action Complaint, (c) Civil Case Cover Sheet, (d)
`Civil Case Cover Sheet Addendum, (e) Notice of Posting Jury Fees, (f) First Amended
`Class Action Complaint, (g) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information
`Package, (h) Notice of Service of Process Transmittal, (i) Proof of Service of Summons,
`(j) Initial Status Conference Order (Complex Litigation Program), (k) Minute Court
`Order Re: Complex Designation and Initial Status Conference, (l) Certificate of Mailing
`for Minute Order Re: Complex Designation and Initial Status Conference, (m) Peloton’s
`Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Class Action Complaint, and (n) Filing
`Confirmation of Peloton’s Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Class Action Complaint
`are attached as Exhibits A–N to the Declaration of Megan Cooney (“Cooney Decl.”)
`filed concurrently herewith.
`2.
`According to the Notice of Service of Process Transmittal, Plaintiff served
`Peloton through its registered agent for service of process on February 1, 2022. See
`Cooney Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. H. This notice of removal is timely because it is filed within 30
`days after service was completed. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL
`Removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1453 because this
`3.
`Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action and all claims asserted against
`Peloton pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1332(d).
`CAFA applies “to any class action before or after the entry of a class
`4.
`certification order by the court with respect to that action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8). This
`case is a putative “class action” under CAFA because it was brought under California
`Code of Civil Procedure section 382, California’s state statute or rule authorizing an
`action to be brought by one or more representative persons as a class action. See id. §
`1332(d)(1)(B); see also Cooney Decl., Ex. F, First Amended Class Action Complaint
`(“Compl.”) ¶ 19.
`In his First Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiff alleges nine causes
`5.
`of action against Peloton: (1) Failure to Authorize or Permit Meal Periods or Timely
`Meal Periods in Violation of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512; (2) Failure to
`Authorize or Permit Rest Periods in Violation of Labor Code section 226.7; (3) Failure
`to Provide Complete and Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of Labor Code section
`226; (4) Failure to Pay All Overtime and Minimum Wages in Violation of Labor Code
`sections 510, 558, and 1194; (5) Failure to Pay All Wages for All Time Worked,
`Including Minimum Wage, in Violation of Labor Code sections 204, 218, 1194, 1197,
`and 1198; (6) Failure to Pay All Accrued and Vested Vacation/PTO Wages in Violation
`of Labor Code section 227.3; (7) Failure to Adequately Indemnify Employees for
`Employment-Related Losses/Expenditures in Violation of Labor Code section 2802; (8)
`Failure to Timely Pay All Earned Wages and Final Paychecks Due at the Time of
`Separation of Employment in Violation of Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 203; and
`(9) Unfair Business Practices in Violation of Business & Professions Code
`section 17200, et seq. See Cooney Decl., Ex. F, Compl. ¶¶ 31–93.
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`6.
`Plaintiff asks the Court for “an order certifying the proposed Class” and “an
`order appointing Plaintiff as the representative of the Class[.]” Id., Compl., Prayer for
`Relief. He seeks to represent nine classes of individuals. Each of the putative classes
`are defined as follows:
`(1) Wage Statement Class: “All current and former California hourly,
`non-exempt employees of Peloton who received one or more itemized
`wage statements at any time between four years prior to filing this
`action and through the present.”
`(2) Rest Break Class: “All current and former California hourly, non-
`exempt employees of Peloton who worked 3.5 hours or more in one
`shift at any time between four years prior to filing this action and
`through the present.”
`(3) Meal Break Class: “All current and former California hourly, non-
`exempt employees of Peloton who worked more than 5 hours in one
`shift at any time between four years prior to filing this action and
`through the present.”
`(4) Overtime Class: “All current and former California hourly, non-
`exempt employees of Peloton who worked more than 8 hours a day in
`a workday or 40 hours in a workweek at any time four years prior to
`filing this action and through the present.”
`(5) Unpaid Wage Class: “All current and former hourly, non-exempt
`employees employed by Peloton in California at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present and who were
`not paid an hourly wage at their regular rate of pay, including minimum
`wages, for all time they were subject to Peloton’s control.”
`(6) Regular Rate Class: “All current and former hourly non-exempt
`employees employed by Peloton in California at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present and who earned
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`additional remuneration during pay periods the employees worked in
`excess of eight hours in a workday or 40 hours in a workweek.”
`(7) Indemnification Class: “All current and former hourly, non-exempt
`employees employed by Peloton in California at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present and who did not
`receive
`indemnification
`to reimburse
`them for
`the necessary
`expenditures incurred in the discharge of their duty, including their
`driving costs, such as mileage reimbursement for distance traveled and
`any tolls paid for driving their personal vehicle, and their monthly cell
`phone expenses.”
`(8) Vacation Wages Class: “All current and former hourly, non-exempt
`employees employed by Peloton in California at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present and who did not
`properly accrue vacation/personal time off and/or accrued vacation
`time/personal time off and were not paid by Peloton for all wages due
`for vested vacation time/personal time off upon separation of
`employment.”
`(9) Waiting Time Class: “All current and former hourly, non-exempt
`employees employed by Peloton in California at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present and who were
`not timely paid all earned wages and final paychecks due at time of
`separation of employment from Peloton.”
`Id., Compl. ¶¶ 19 (A–I).
`7.
`Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that putative class members are
`entitled to statutory penalties for allegedly non-compliant rest periods, late payment of
`wages and inaccurate wage statements, restitution, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
`See id., Compl., Prayer for Relief.
`8.
`Removal of a class action under CAFA is proper if: (1) there are at least
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`100 members in the putative class; (2) there is minimal diversity between the parties,
`such that at least one class member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant;
`and (3) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest
`and costs. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1441.
`9.
`Peloton denies any liability in this case, both as to Plaintiff’s individual
`claims and as to the claims he seeks to pursue on behalf of the putative class. Peloton
`also intends to oppose class certification on multiple grounds, including that class
`treatment is inappropriate under these circumstances in part because there are many
`material differences between the experiences of Plaintiff and the putative class members
`he seeks to represent, as well as amongst the putative class members. Peloton expressly
`reserves all rights to oppose class certification and contest the merits of all claims
`asserted in the First Amended Class Action Complaint. However, for purposes of the
`jurisdictional requirements for removal only, the allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended
`Class Action Complaint identify a putative class of more than 100 members and put in
`controversy, in the aggregate, an amount that exceeds $5 million, as demonstrated
`below. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6).
`A. The Proposed Class Consists of More than 100 Members
`10. Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, this action satisfies CAFA’s requirement
`that the putative class contains at least 100 members. See id. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
`11. Each of Plaintiff’s proposed classes consists of “[a]ll current and former
`California hourly, non-exempt employees of Peloton” or “current and former hourly
`non-exempt employees employed by Peloton in California” “at any time between four
`years prior to filing this action and through the present[.]” Cooney Decl., Ex. F, Compl.
`¶¶ 19 (A–I). According to Peloton’s records, there were approximately 1,065 full-time,
`non-exempt individuals employed by Peloton in California between January 3, 2019 and
`January 3, 2022. Declaration of Christine Pinkston (“Pinkston Decl.”) ¶ 4(b). This
`number represents only a portion of Plaintiff’s proposed putative class. This putative
`class size estimate is conservative because (a) it excludes all part-time employees; and
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`(b) it does not include non-exempt employees who only worked for Peloton in California
`between January 3, 2018 and January 3, 2019, or after January 3, 2022.
`12. Accordingly, while Peloton denies that class treatment is permissible or
`appropriate, the proposed class consists of over 100 members.
`B.
`Peloton and Plaintiff Are Not Citizens of the Same State
`13. Under CAFA’s minimum diversity of citizenship requirement, the plaintiff
`or any member of the putative class must be a citizen of a different state from any
`defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
`14. A person is a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled. Kantor v.
`Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). A party’s residence is
`prima facie evidence of his or her domicile. Ayala v. Cox Auto., Inc., 2016 WL 6561284,
`at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d
`514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff alleges that he “is a resident of Los Angeles,
`California” who was employed by Peloton “as a sales associate in Los Angeles,
`California.” Cooney Decl., Ex. F, Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff is therefore considered a citizen
`of California for purposes of removal under CAFA. See Ayala, 2016 WL 6561284, at
`*4.
`
`15. A corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the state of its
`principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Peloton is a Delaware corporation
`with its principal place of business in New York. Pinkston Decl. ¶ 3.
`16. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “principal place of business”
`in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) and (d)(2)(A) to mean “the place where a corporation’s
`officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,” i.e., its “nerve
`center,” which “should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its
`headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control,
`and coordination[.]” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). Peloton’s
`headquarters, which are located in New York, constitute its “nerve center” under the test
`adopted in Hertz because Peloton’s high-level officers oversee the corporation’s
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`activities from that state. See Pinkston Decl. ¶ 3. As such, Peloton is a citizen of New
`York, in addition to Delaware, the place where it is incorporated. See 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1332(c)(1); Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir.
`2006).
`17. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Peloton are citizens of different states and
`CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement is met. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
`C. The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $5 Million
`18. CAFA requires that the amount in controversy in a class action exceed
`$5 million, exclusive of interests and costs. Id. § 1332(d)(2). In calculating the amount
`in controversy, a court must aggregate the claims of all individual class members. Id.
`§ 1332(d)(6).
`19.
`In assessing whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been
`satisfied, “a court must ‘assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume
`that a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.’”
`Campbell v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 471 F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kenneth
`Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001 (C.D. Cal.
`2002)). In other words, the focus of the Court’s inquiry must be on “what amount is put
`‘in controversy’ by the plaintiff’s complaint, not what a defendant will actually owe.”
`Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (citing
`Rippee v. Boston Mkt. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986 (S.D. Cal. 2005)). Further, “when
`a statute or contract provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, prospective attorneys’
`fees must be included in the assessment of the amount in controversy” for CAFA
`purposes. Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2019).
`20.
`“[A] defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation
`that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee
`Basin Op. Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). To satisfy this burden, a defendant
`may rely on a “reasonable” “chain of reasoning” that is based on “reasonable”
`“assumptions.” LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2015).
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`“An assumption may be reasonable if it is founded on the allegations of the complaint.”
`Arias, 936 F.3d at 925; see also Salter v. Quality Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th
`Cir. 2020) (“[I]n Arias we held that a removing defendant’s notice of removal need not
`contain evidentiary submissions but only plausible allegations of jurisdictional
`elements.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). That is because “[t]he
`amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a
`prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627
`F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010).
`21. Accordingly, “when a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the
`defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by
`the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87. Importantly,
`plaintiffs seeking to represent a putative class cannot “bind the absent class” through
`statements aimed to limit their recovery in an effort to “avoid removal to federal court.”
`Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595–96 (2013).
`22. Peloton reserves the right to present evidence establishing the amount
`placed in controversy by each of Plaintiff’s claims should Plaintiff challenge whether
`the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy threshold is satisfied. See Dart Cherokee, 574
`U.S. at 87–89; see also Salter, 974 F.3d at 964 (holding that only a “factual attack” that
`“contests the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence
`outside the pleadings,” requires the removing defendant to “support her jurisdictional
`allegations with competent proof” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[W]hen a notice
`of removal plausibly alleges a basis for federal court jurisdiction, a district court may
`not remand the case back to state court without first giving the defendant an opportunity
`to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional requirements are
`satisfied.” Arias, 936 F.3d at 924.
`23. Although Peloton denies that Plaintiff’s claims have any merit, for the
`purposes of meeting the jurisdictional requirements for removal only, if Plaintiff were
`to prevail on every claim and allegation in his First Amended Class Action Complaint
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`on behalf of the putative class, the requested monetary recovery would exceed $5
`million.
`1.
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`Plaintiff’s Allegations Regarding Waiting Time Penalties Place More
`than $2.9 Million in Controversy
`24. Plaintiff’s claim for waiting time penalties pursuant to Labor Code section
`203 puts at least $2.9 million in controversy.
`25. Plaintiff alleges that he and other putative class members who ended their
`employment with Peloton during the three-year period prior to filing this action—
`January 3, 2019 to January 3, 2022—are entitled to recovery of “waiting time penalties”
`pursuant to Labor Code section 203.1 See Cooney Decl., Ex. F, Compl. ¶¶ 19 (I), 88.
`26.
`If an employer fails to pay all wages due to an employee at the time of
`termination, as required by Labor Code section 201, or within 72 hours after resignation,
`as required by Labor Code section 202, then the wages “shall continue as a penalty from
`the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced,”
`for up to a maximum of 30 calendar days. Cal. Lab. Code § 203. An employer may not
`be liable for these penalties if a good faith dispute exists as to whether the wages are
`owed. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, § 13520. Further, to be liable for waiting time penalties,
`an employer’s failure to pay wages within the statutory time frame must be willful. See
`Cal. Lab. Code § 203. “A willful failure to pay wages within the meaning of Labor Code
`Section 203 occurs when an employer intentionally fails to pay wages to an employee
`when those wages are due.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 13520.
`27. To calculate waiting time penalties, the employee’s daily rate of pay is
`multiplied by a maximum of 30 days, depending on the length of delay in receipt of
`wages. See Mamika v. Barca, 68 Cal. App. 4th 487, 489, 493 (1998) (holding that the
`waiting time penalty is “equivalent to the employee’s daily wages for each day he or she
`
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` 1 The statute of limitations for an action under Labor Code section 203 is three years.
`Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a); Cal. Lab. Code § 203(b); Pineda v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
`50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1399 (2010).
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`remained unpaid up to a total of 30 days” and noting that the “critical computation” is
`“the calculation of a daily wage rate, which can then be multiplied by the number of
`days of nonpayment, up to 30 days”); Tajonar v. Echosphere, L.L.C., 2015 WL 4064642,
`at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2015). Where final “wages [due] are alleged to have not been
`paid, the full th