Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 1 of 20
`
`ECF No. 273-4, Plaintiffs’ Opp. to Facebook’s Mot. for
`Judgment on the Pleadings
`REDACTED VERSION REFILED PURSUANT TO DKT. 350
`
`

`

`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 2 of 20
`
`Eric Kafka (pro hac vice)
`COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS &
`TOLL PLLC
`88 Pine Street, 14th Floor,
`New York, NY 10005
`Telephone: (212) 838-7797
`Facsimile: (212) 838-7745
`ekafka@cohenmilstein.com
`
`Andrew N. Friedman (pro hac vice)
`Geoffrey Graber (SBN 211547)
`Julia Horwitz (pro hac vice)
`Karina G. Puttieva (SBN 317702)
`COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL
`PLLC
`1100 New York Ave. NW, Fifth Floor
`Washington, DC 20005
`Telephone: (202) 408-4600
`Facsimile: (202) 408-4699
`afriedman@cohenmilstein.com
`ggraber@cohenmilstein.com
`jhorwitz@cohenmilstein.com
`kputtieva@cohenmilstein.com
`
`Charles Reichmann (SBN 206699)
`LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES
`REICHMANN
`16 Yale Circle
`Kensington, CA 94708-1015
`Telephone: (415) 373-8849
`charles.reichmann@gmail.com
`Counsel for Plaintiffs and Proposed Class
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`DZ Reserve and Cain Maxwell (d/b/a Max
`Martialis), individually and on behalf of others
`similarly situated,
`
`v.
`
`FACEBOOK, INC.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No.: 3:18-cv-04978-JD
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE
`MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
`PLEADINGS
`
`Date: April 22, 2021
`Time: 10:00 AM
`Court: Courtroom 11, 19th Floor
`Hon. James Donato
`
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 3 of 20
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
`
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND........................................................ 2
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 5
`A.
`The April 22 Hearing Should Be Continued and this Motion Should Be
`Decided in Accordance with the Scheduling Order ................................................ 5
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege They Lack an Adequate Legal Remedy ....................... 6
`
`Plaintiffs Are Entitled to Injunctive Relief Under the UCL ................................. 10
`
`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 14
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`Case No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 4 of 20
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Aberin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
`2018 WL 1473085 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) .........................................................................10
`
`Allen v. Hylands, Inc.,
`773 F. App’x 870 (9th Cir. 2019) ..............................................................................................9
`
`Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,
`300 U.S. 203 (1937) ...............................................................................................................7, 9
`
`Arnold v. Hearst Magazine Media, Inc.,
`2021 WL 488343 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021) ............................................................................10
`
`Boyce v. Grundy,
`3 Pet. 210, 7 L.Ed. 655 (1830) .............................................................................................7, 13
`
`Cal. Physicians Serv., Inc. v. Healthplan Servs., Inc.,
`2021 WL 879797 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2021) .............................................................................10
`
`Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
`889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Deras v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc.,
`2018 WL 2267448 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2018) .........................................................................10
`
`In re Eaton Corp. Sec. Litig.,
`2017 WL 4217146 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) ...........................................................................8
`
`Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth.,
`682 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012) ......................................................................................................12
`
`Gross v. Vilore Foods Co., Inc.,
`2020 WL 6319131 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020) ..........................................................................11
`
`Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York,
`326 U.S. 99 (1945) .....................................................................................................................8
`
`Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,
`150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds by Wal-Mart
`Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 563 U.S. 338 (2011))...........................................................................6, 8
`
`Heredia v. Sunrise Senior Living LLC,
`2021 WL 819159 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021)......................................................................11, 12
`
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`Case No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD
`ii
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 5 of 20
`
`
`
`Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza,
`652 F3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011)......................................................................................................12
`
`IntegrityMessageBoards.com v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2020 WL 6544411 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2020) ..........................................................................11
`
`In re JUUL Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
`2020 WL 6271173 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2020)..........................................................................12
`
`Ketayi v. Health Enrollment Grp.,
`2021 WL 347687 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021) ..............................................................................11
`
`Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC,
`2020 WL 6074107 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) ......................................................................8, 9
`
`Martinez v. Hub Grp. Trucking, Inc.
`2021 WL 937671 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2021) ..............................................................................9
`
`Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc.,
`966 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................7
`
`Mora v. Target Corp.,
`2010 WL 11684804 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) ...........................................................................6
`
`Newmark Realty Cap., Inc. v. BGC Partners, Inc.,
`2017 WL 8294175 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2017) ........................................................................14
`
`O’Shea v. Littleton,
`414 U.S. 488 (1974) ...........................................................................................................12, 13
`
`Ramachandran v. City of Los Altos,
`2020 WL 1914961 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020) .........................................................................12
`
`Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc.,
`2020 WL 7769819 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2020) .........................................................................11
`
`Sagastume v. Psychemedics Corp.,
`2020 WL 8175597 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2020) ...........................................................................9
`
`Sanders v. City of Newport,
`657 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................10
`
`Sharma v. Volkswagen AG,
`2021 WL 912271 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2021) .............................................................................11
`
`Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly,
`863 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1988) ...............................................................................................8, 10
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`Case No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD
`iii
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 6 of 20
`
`Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.,
`971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... passim
`
`The Salton Sea Cases v. New Liverpool Salt Co.,
`172 F. 792 (9th Cir. 1909) ...................................................................................................7, 13
`
`United States v. Elias,
`921 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1990) .....................................................................................................9
`
`United States v. Hurtado,
`2009 WL 10671968 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2009) ............................................................................9
`
`Watkins v. Simmons & Clark, Inc.,
`618 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1980) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Wildin v. FCA US LLC,
`2018 WL 3032986 (S.D. Cal. June 19, 2018) ..........................................................................10
`
`Zieger v. WellPet LLC,
`2021 WL 756109 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021) ...........................................................................11
`
`STATUTES
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17205 ......................................................................................................7
`
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 ......................................................................................................8
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)......................................................................................................................9
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) ...................................................................................................6, 8
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`Case No. 3:18-cv-04978-JD
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 7 of 20
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`IL.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`After the Court set deadlines for dispositive motions, and after the Court made clear “the
`
`pleadingsare in final form,” Facebookfiled a dispositive motion ignoring the Court’s deadlines
`
`and challenging the pleadings. Facebook claims its Motion is compelled by last summer’s decision
`
`in Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2020), but Facebook’s
`
`Motion attacks the operative complaint based on issues not even addressedin that case.
`
`Facebook’s Motion violates the Court’s Amended Scheduling Order. That Order provides
`
`for class certification briefing in April and May 2021, followed by briefing on dispositive and
`
`Daubert motions in June and July, and specifically sets July 9 as the “Deadline” to file any
`
`“Opposition to dispositive .
`
`.
`
`. motions.” Yet Facebook set the hearing on this Motion for April 22
`
`(the day before Plaintiffs’ class certification motion is due), forcing Plaintiffs to oppose a
`
`dispositive motion months before the Court’s deadline.
`
`Facebook’s gamesmanship not only injects chaos into the case schedule, it also seeks to
`
`preemptclass certification questions andraise interrelated issues in piecemeal fashion. Granting
`
`the Motion would also leave nearlya ofthe putative class with no remedy at
`
`law or at equity. The Court should continue the April 22 hearing and consider this Motion in
`
`conjunction with other dispositive motions — as called for by the Amended Scheduling Order.
`
`On the merits, the Motion should be denied. Sonner requires only that a complaint for
`
`equitable relief allege that there is no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs have so alleged. Among
`
`other equitable remedies, the UCL has a longer statute of limitations than common law fraud,
`
`covers a broader range of misconduct than common law fraud, and explicitly states that its
`
`remedies are cumulative to other remedies available under California law.
`
`Facebookalso challenges the availability of injunctive relief under the UCL, even though
`
`in Sonner “[ijnjunctive relief [was] not at issue.” Jd. at 1079. Injunctive relief is not available at
`
`law, and it is axiomatic that forward-looking injunctions serve a purpose different from backwards-
`
`looking damages. The Court already held Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm are sufficient to claim
`
`injunctive relief. (ECF No. 83.) For these and the following reasons, the Motion should be denied.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 8 of 20
`
`II.
`
`FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`When individuals and businesses seek to purchase advertising on Facebook, Facebook
`presents the “Potential Reach” of the advertising, i.e., “an estimation of how many people are in
`an ad set’s target audience.” 3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23–37 (ECF No. 166). But “Potential Reach” is
`grossly inflated. Id. ¶¶ 38–52. Facebook has been aware of this problem since at least 2015, yet it
`has never remedied it. Id. ¶¶ 60–92. Facebook’s deception creates several problems for advertisers.
`Id. ¶¶ 17–21. “[U]ser inflation can skew an advertiser’s decision making, which is frequently based
`on the anticipated reach of the advertising campaign, or ‘Potential Reach.’” Id. ¶ 17. Such inflation
`“can have ‘real consequences for an advertiser’s overall communications plan.’” Id. ¶ 18.
`Plaintiffs DZ Reserve and Cain Maxwell both ran advertising campaigns on Facebook. Id.
`¶¶ 96, 103. “Plaintiffs would not have bought as much advertising services if Facebook had not
`disseminated an inflated Potential Reach statistic.” Id. ¶ 128. While both “wish[] and intend[] to
`purchase additional advertisements from Facebook in the future[,] if Facebook continues to inflate
`its Potential Reach and Estimated Daily Results Reach, it will be difficult for [Plaintiffs] to trust
`Facebook’s representations.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 108.
`Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of a putative class, presently defined as “All persons or
`entities who . . . had an account with Facebook, Inc., and who paid for placement of advertisements
`on Facebook’s platforms, including the Facebook and Instagram platforms.” Id. ¶ 110. Plaintiffs
`assert claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200
`(“UCL”), along with common law fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment. Id.
`¶¶ 121–29, 142–60; see also Order Re Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 2 (ECF No. 255) (dismissing
`other claims). They seek “injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the
`interests of the Class,” including an injunction prohibiting Facebook’s wrongful conduct, requiring
`Facebook to use third-party auditors to evaluate and ensure compliance, and requiring disclosure
`of further inaccuracies. 3d Am. Compl. at 30. “Plaintiffs also request damages, restitution, punitive
`damages, attorneys’ fees, statutory costs, and such other and further relief as is just and proper.”
`Id.
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 9 of 20
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`
`
`After consolidation and appointment of interim class counsel, there have been three
`amended complaints in this case (ECF Nos. 55, 89, 166), each accompanied by a motion to dismiss.
`(ECF Nos. 65, 103, 177.) In its first motion, Facebook sought to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim under
`the UCL. 1st MTD Mem. of Points & Authorities (“Mem.”) at 3–10 (ECF No. 65). Facebook also
`specifically challenged Plaintiffs’ standing to seek injunctive relief under the UCL because it
`claimed that Plaintiffs do not “face[] a threat of imminent or actual harm.” Id. at 14 (citation
`omitted). The Court rejected Facebook’s challenges to the UCL claim. Civil Minutes at 1 (ECF
`No. 83). In its second motion to dismiss, Facebook again challenged Plaintiffs’ UCL claim. 2d
`MTD Mem. at 14–15 (ECF No. 103). The Court stated, “Facebook’s attempt to revisit the denial
`of dismissal of the UCL claim is an improper request for reconsideration, and denied.” Civil
`Minutes (ECF No. 130).
`In its Third Motion to Dismiss, Facebook did not challenge Plaintiffs’ UCL claim.
`Facebook filed its Reply in support of its Third Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 186) two weeks after
`the Ninth Circuit issued its initial opinion in Sonner, but the Reply omitted all mention of the
`Sonner decision. On August 20, 2020, the Ninth Circuit amended the Sonner opinion, but the
`amendment did not affect the court’s central holdings. Compare 962 F.3d 1072 (original), with
`971 F.3d 834 (as amended). On September 10, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the pending
`motion to dismiss. Transcript (ECF No. 215). Again, Facebook did not mention the Sonner
`decision. Id.
`On October 27, 2020, the parties met and conferred to modify the case management
`schedule. Stip. & Proposed Order at 2 (ECF No. 251). Consistent with prior versions of the case
`management schedule, the parties’ proposed schedule called for briefing on class certification
`followed by briefing on dispositive and Daubert motions. When the Court declined to accept all
`of the parties’ changes to the scheduling order, the parties met and conferred again. Id. at 3.
`Through all of this, Facebook never mentioned the Sonner decision or stated its intention to
`challenge the operative complaint based on it.
`On November 23, 2020, the Court entered the currently operative Amended Scheduling
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 10 of 20
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`Order. (ECF No. 252). The Order, by its terms, “sets . . . amended case management deadlines.”
`Id. at 1. One “Deadline” set by the Order is that any “Opposition to dispositive and Daubert
`motions” is due on July 9, 2021. Id. The Order made clear, “All dates set by the Court should be
`regarded as firm. Counsel may not modify these dates by stipulation without leave of court. . . .
`Sanctions may issue for a failure to follow a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Id. at 2 (citation
`omitted).
`On February 12, 2021, the Court ruled on the pending motion to dismiss. Order Re MTD
`(ECF No. 255). The Court granted and denied in part “[t]his third, and the Court expects last,
`pleadings motion.” Id. at 1. At the conclusion of its ruling, the Court stated: “At this point, after
`multiple rounds of complaint amendments and motions to dismiss, the pleadings are in final form.
`The next stop for the parties is trial or possibly summary judgement, if the requirements of Rule
`56 can be satisfied.” Id. at 2.
`On March 15, 2021 – eight months after Sonner was first issued, and with no advance
`notice to Plaintiffs or the Court – Facebook filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF
`No. 270.) Facebook claims its Motion “assert[s] only the dispositive legal rule that the Ninth
`Circuit adopted in Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) – nothing else.”
`Id. at 1. However, Facebook devotes half of its Argument section to injunctive relief, id. at 8–12,
`which was not at issue in Sonner, 971 F.3d at 842 (“Injunctive relief is not at issue . . . .”).
`Facebook set the hearing date for the Motion on April 22, 2021, one day before Plaintiffs’
`class certification brief is due, and months in advance of the July 9, 2021 deadline to oppose
`dispositive motions under the Amended Scheduling Order. Am. Sched. Order at 1. Facebook’s
`motion requires Plaintiffs to file their Opposition on March 29, 2021, although the Amended
`Scheduling Order sets that date for July 9. Id. Plaintiffs asked Facebook to alter the briefing
`schedule to conform to the Amended Scheduling Order, but Facebook refused. Admin. Mot. at 2
`(ECF No. 271).
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`Il.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`Facebook’s Motion violates the Amended Scheduling Order set by the Court. In addition,
`
`the Motionitself is meritless; Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief under the UCL.
`
`A.
`
`The April 22 Hearing Should Be Continued and this Motion Should Be
`Decided in Accordance with the Scheduling Order
`
`Bysetting the hearing date for this Motion on April 22, 2021, Facebook violated the
`
`Court’s Amended Scheduling Order, which sets July 9, 2021 as the “Deadline”for “Opposition to
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`dispositive and Daubert motions” Am. Sched. Order at 1 (ECF No. 252). In addition to forcing
`
`Plaintiffs to respond to its Motion months earlier than agreed by the parties and ordered by the
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`Court, Facebook engaged in gamesmanship bysetting the hearing date for this Motion the day
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`before Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is due. See id. Tellingly, when Plaintiffs asked
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`Facebook to movethe briefing schedule in line with the Amended Scheduling Order, Facebook
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`refused. Admin. Mot. at 2 (ECF No. 271).
`
`Plaintiffs previously raised this issue in their Administrative Motion to Enforce the
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`Amended Scheduling Order. See id. passim. As explained morefully in the Administrative Motion,
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`“Tw]hile Facebook wasfree to file its Motion early, it is not entitled to force Plaintiffs to file their
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`Opposition three months ahead ofthe stipulated deadline .
`
`.
`
`. and in the midst of intensive expert
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`discovery.” Jd. at 3.1 The Court should follow its Amended Scheduling Order by continuing the
`
`April 22 hearing and decide this Motion with other dispositive motions. Jd. at 3-4.
`
`Doing so will allow the Court to consider together interrelated issues and, if warranted,
`
`craft a class certification order accounting for Facebook’s untimely motion. For example,as set
`po
`forth below, almostP| class members would be time-barred from asserting common law
`fraud but fall within the UCL’s statute of limitations. Graber Decl. § 2. Dismissing the UCL claim
`
`! Facebook has suggested it is entitled under the Amended Scheduling Order to demand that
`Plaintiffs respond to both dispositive and Daubert motions prior to the deadlines set by the Court.
`See Opp’n to Admin. Mot. (ECF No. 272). Facebook’s position is specious and makes a mockery
`of the Court’s deadlines. Following Facebook’s logic, Plaintiffs could have filed a class
`certification motion in December and forced Facebook to respond two weeks later, prior to the
`close of expert discovery, even though the Court’s Orderstates that the “Opposition to motion for
`class certification” is due May 14. Am. Sched. Orderat 1.
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 12 of 20
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`
`
`now would leave these class members without any remedy. That determination should be made
`with the benefit of class certification briefing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D); see also, Hanlon v.
`Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 1988) (class action device superior where “many
`claims could not be asserted individually” on account of statutes of limitations), overruled on other
`grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 563 U.S. 338 (2011); Watkins v. Simmons & Clark,
`Inc., 618 F.2d 398, 404 n. 9 (6th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he class action is a superior device to numerous
`individual actions because it will not preclude relief for those individuals on whose claims
`the statute of limitations has run.”).
`And while the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are sufficient, summary
`judgment may determine whether Plaintiffs’ legal remedies are adequate. Rather than address this
`Motion in isolation, the Court should consider it together with interrelated summary judgment
`issues and within the context of completed class certification briefing. That orderly presentation
`of issues is exactly what is called for by the Court’s Amended Scheduling Order. See Am. Sched.
`Order at 1.
`In addition, the Court should consider further relief under Rule 16, Adm. Mot. at 3–4, up
`to and including striking the motion outright as a violation of the Amended Scheduling Order, see
`Mora v. Target Corp., 2010 WL 11684804, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010). Indeed, the Court has
`already warned that, “[s]anctions may issue for a failure to follow a scheduling or other pretrial
`order.” Am. Sched. Order at 2.
`Plaintiffs Plausibly Allege They Lack an Adequate Legal Remedy
`B.
`Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. requires only that a party seeking restitution under the
`UCL show that it lacks an adequate remedy at law. 971 F.3d at 838. Plaintiffs meet that
`requirement by plausibly alleging they lack an adequate legal remedy, and their allegations are
`well supported by evidence in the record.
`In Sonner, both the plaintiff’s equitable UCL claim and her claim for damages under the
`Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) survived summary judgment. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 838.
`Yet shortly before trial, the plaintiff amended the complaint to remove the CLRA claim, leaving
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 13 of 20
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`only the equitable UCL claim, in order to secure a bench trial. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that “a
`federal court must apply traditional [federal] equitable principles before awarding restitution under
`the UCL.” Id. at 841. For that reason, the plaintiff was required to “establish that she lacks an
`adequate remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL.” Id. at
`844. The plaintiff failed to do so because “the operative complaint does not allege that Sonner
`lacks an adequate legal remedy” and because she conceded that she sought the same amount in
`equitable restitution as she had sought in damages to compensate for the same harm. Id.
`Sonner’s holding is simply that a party seeking restitution under the UCL must show that
`they lack an adequate remedy at law. Sonner did not alter a party’s ability to plead in the
`alternative, nor did it reverse longstanding precedent defining what constitutes an “adequate
`remedy at law.” Under that precedent, a remedy at law is adequate only if “it is equally prompt
`and certain and in other ways efficient.” Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 214–15 (1937)
`(collecting cases). “It is not enough that there is a remedy at law. It must be plain and adequate,
`or, in other words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as
`the remedy in equity.” The Salton Sea Cases v. New Liverpool Salt Co., 172 F. 792, 803 (9th Cir.
`1909) (quoting Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 213, 7 L.Ed. 655 (1830)). In other words, unless the
`legal remedy will offer the same relief equally promptly and with equal certainty, it is not
`sufficiently “adequate” to bar equitable relief.
`Plaintiffs’ alternative legal remedy (common law fraud) does not meet the high bar of
`adequacy. As a threshold matter, the fact that the UCL provides cumulative remedies is itself
`sufficient to demonstrate the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17205;
`Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1021 n.13 (9th Cir. 2020).2
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`2 Moore was decided after the original Sonner opinion, and the two cases can be read
`harmoniously. While Sonner requires that there be no adequate remedy at law, Moore states that
`an equitable statute’s allowance of cumulative remedies is one way to satisfy that requirement.
`Facebook may argue that Moore is incorrect because it relies on state law to determine the scope
`of federal equitable remedies, but binding precedent establishes that state law can affect equitable
`remedies in federal court. Sims Snowboards, Inc.,863 F.2d at 646–67; Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y.
`v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105–07 (1945).
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`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
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`NyNONYNYKNNYNYROROReeeeeOoNYDnA&—WwNYKFDODOODOOoNYDOH&—WwNYKFOS
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`The UCLalso has a longerstatute of limitations than common law fraud. Compare Cal.
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`Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (four years), with Cal. Code Civ. P. § 338(d) (three years). This is not
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`a theoretical issue. Nearly[IIIedvertisers purchasedads on Facebook only duringthefirst
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`year of the class period, so they could assert a claim under the UCL but not under common law
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`fraud. Graber Decl. § 2. For these class members, their legal remedy is not just inadequate but
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`totally unavailable. This kind of disparity in limitations periods creates a “significant argument||
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`demonstrating that [plaintiffs’] remedies at law would be inadequate.” Krommenhock v. Post
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`Foods, LLC, 2020 WL 6074107, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) (granting leave to amend to add
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`this allegation to the complaint); see also Guaranty Trust Co. ofN.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110
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`(1945) (finding state statutes of limitations to be substantive under Erie). Dismissing the UCL
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`claim would leave these class members without any remedy at law or at equity. See also Fed. R.
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`Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023.
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`Thus, the situation here is different than in Sonner, which did not address statutes of
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`limitations, but noted that the plaintiff sought the same amountof relief under her legal and
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`equitable claims: “Sonner concedes that she seeks the same sum in equitable restitution as ‘a full
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`refund of the purchase price’—$32,000,000—as she requested in damages to compensate her for
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`the same past harm.” 971 F.3d at 844. Here, Plaintiffs seek different sums under the UCL and
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`common law fraud.
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`Facebook may argue that named Plaintiffs purchased ads within bothstatutes of limitations,
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`see 3d Am. Compl. §§ 96, 103, and ask the Court to ignore the claims of unnamed class members
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`until a class is certified. But Facebook already challenged the claims of unnamed class members
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`on statute-of-limitations grounds; it cannot now actas if those claims do not exist. 34 MTD Mem.
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`at 15; see also In re Eaton Corp. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 4217146, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017)
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`(finding, in the context ofamending the complaint, that “unnamed purported class members should
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`be considered ‘parties’ for the purposesofthe statute of limitations”). Moreover, fact discovery is
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`closed, and Plaintiffs will move for class certification one day after this Motion is currently set to
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`be heard. At this stage in the proceedings, it makeslittle sense to ignore class issues. In fact, the
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`Case 3:18-cv-04978-JD Document 355 Filed 12/21/21 Page 15 of 20
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`operative Scheduling Order contemplates that the Court will hear dispositive motions after class
`certification briefing is complete. Am. Sched. Order at 1.
`Facebook may point to Martinez v. Hub Group Trucking, Inc. 2021 WL 937671 (C.D. Cal.
`Jan. 11, 2021), which rejected a statute of limitations argument because “[f]ailure to comply with
`a remedy at law does not make it inadequate.” Id. at *8 (quoting United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d
`870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990)).3 However, named Plaintiffs here did not fail to comply. Krommenhock,
`2020 WL 6074107, at *1 (“This is not a situation where plaintiffs