Case 3:19-cv-02573-EMC Document 788 Filed 12/15/21 Page 1 of 179
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`DURIE TANGRI LLP
`DARALYN J. DURIE (SBN 169825)
`ddurie@durietangri.com
`217 Leidesdorff Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 362-6666
`Facsimile: (415) 236-6300
`HILLIARD & SHADOWEN LLP
`STEVE D. SHADOWEN (pro hac vice)
`steve@hilliardshadowenlaw.com
`1135 W. 6th Street, Suite 125
`Austin, TX 78703
`Telephone: (855) 344-3298
`
`Facsimile: (361) 882-3015
`HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
`STEVE W. BERMAN (pro hac vice)
`steve@hbsslaw.com
`1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Telephone: (206) 623-7292
`Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
`Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`PETER STALEY, et al.,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 3:19-cv-02573-EMC
`FIRST AMENDED
`CONSOLIDATED CLASS
`ACTION COMPLAINT
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`
`FIRST AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT / CASE NO. 3:19-CV-2573
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`II.
`III.
`IV.
`V.
`VI.
`
`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................................6
`INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT.................................................................................................6
`THE PARTIES.................................................................................................................................6
`SCIENCE BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................15
`REGULATORY BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................21
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`E.
`F.
`
`Approval of Generic Drugs and Substitution of Generics for Branded Drugs ................... 21
`The Hatch-Waxman Amendments ...................................................................................... 22
`Paragraph IV Certifications ................................................................................................ 23
`Approvals Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) ............................................................................. 24
`New Chemical Entity Exclusivity ....................................................................................... 25
`Effects of AB-Rated Generic Competition ......................................................................... 26
`
`VII. DEFENDANTS’ ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT ..................................................................27
`
`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`
`Unlawful No-Generics Restraints: Gilead and BMS .......................................................... 28
`Unlawful No-Generics Restraints: Gilead and Janssen ...................................................... 34
`The No-Generics Restraints Contain Virtually Identical Terms......................................... 40
`Increased Prices and Reduced Innovation .......................................................................... 41
`
`1.
`2.
`
`The No-Generics Restraints increased prices. ........................................................ 41
`The No-Generics Restraints reduced innovation. ................................................... 46
`
`a.
`b.
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`Reduced innovation by Gilead’s competitors ............................................. 46
`Reduced innovation by Gilead .................................................................... 47
`
`i.
`ii.
`
` Delaying TAF in 2003-2004 ............................................................... 48
` Degrading Products ............................................................................ 53
`
`E.
`F.
`
`Gilead’s Unlawful Degrading of Stribild ............................................................................ 54
`Gilead’s Unlawful Degrading of Standalone TAF ............................................................. 55
`
`1.
`2.
`3.
`4.
`
`Gilead anticompetitively withheld standalone TAF in 2015-2016. ........................ 56
`Gilead anticompetitively withheld standalone TAF 10mg. .................................... 57
`Gilead anticompetitively withheld an HIV indication for standalone TAF. ........... 59
`Gilead degraded standalone TAF with anticompetitive purpose and effect. .......... 60
`
`G.
`
`Gilead’s Unlawful Regulatory Gaming .............................................................................. 63
`
`1.
`2.
`
`TAF is vulnerable to generic competition in May 2023. ........................................ 64
`Gilead withheld an HIV indication in order to impair competition. ....................... 67
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`Case 3:19-cv-02573-EMC Document 788 Filed 12/15/21 Page 3 of 179
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`H.
`
`Gilead’s Anticompetitive Conduct to Delay Entry of Generic Viread, Truvada, and
`Atripla ................................................................................................................................. 68
`
`1.
`2.
`
`Most-Favored-Entry and Most-Favored-Entry-Plus clauses delay generic entry... 69
`Gilead used MFEs and MFEPs to delay generic entry. .......................................... 71
`
`a.
`b.
`c.
`d.
`
`Teva filed the first ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications. ................... 71
`Second-filers posed a threat to Teva. .......................................................... 73
`Gilead gave Teva an MFEP and put MFEs in all Viread agreements. ....... 74
`Gilead put MFEPs and MFEs in the Truvada and Atripla agreements....... 76
`
`I.
`
`Gilead’s Unlawful Delay-and-Extend ................................................................................. 78
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`In granting patent extensions, the PTO has no authority to consider anticompetitive
`delay tactics like Gilead’s. ...................................................................................... 79
`PTE on the TAF patents was a key part of a scheme that made sense for Gilead
`only because it impairs competition. ...................................................................... 80
`
`VIII. MARKET POWER ........................................................................................................................84
`IX. MARKET EFFECTS ...................................................................................................................104
`X.
`ANTITRUST IMPACT AND EFFECT ON INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE
`COMMERCE ...............................................................................................................................106
`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................107
`XI.
`XII. ONGOING AND FUTURE HARM ............................................................................................110
`XIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ...............................................................................................................113
`XIV. DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT .....................................................................................................162
`XV.
`JURY DEMAND .........................................................................................................................163
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`Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (the “Class,” as defined
`below), on personal knowledge with respect to facts pertaining to them and upon information and belief
`as to other matters, bring this class action complaint against Defendants Gilead Sciences, Inc., Gilead
`Holdings, LLC, Gilead Sciences, LLC, Gilead Sciences Ireland UC (together, “Gilead”), Bristol-Myers
`Squibb Company, E. R. Squibb & Sons, L.L.C. (together, “BMS”), Janssen R&D Ireland, Janssen
`Products LP, and Johnson & Johnson (together, “Janssen”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for damages,
`injunctive relief, and other relief pursuant to the federal antitrust laws and state antitrust and consumer
`protection laws.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Gilead and its coconspirators have engaged in a long-running scheme to restrain
`1.
`competition with respect to some of the most important drugs used to treat Human Immunodeficiency
`Virus (“HIV”) infection—a disease which, if left untreated, destroys the immune system, leading to
`Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) and eventual death. Through an array of
`anticompetitive practices—including horizontal agreements constituting per se violations of the antitrust
`laws—Gilead has acquired and maintained a monopoly in the market for drugs that comprise the modern
`HIV treatment regimen known as “combination antiretroviral therapy” (“cART”). The scheme has
`enabled Gilead and its coconspirators to unlawfully extend patent protection for their drugs, impair entry
`by would-be generic competitors, and charge exorbitant, supracompetitive prices for the drugs that
`people living with HIV need to survive.
`2.
`Gilead dominates the class of drugs that target HIV known as “antiretrovirals,” which are
`essential to effective HIV therapy. Modern antiretroviral drug regimens comprise a combination or
`“cocktail” of drugs, most often consisting of two nucleotide/nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase
`inhibitors (“NRTIs”) taken with at least one antiretroviral drug of another class, such as an integrase
`inhibitor, commonly referred to as “third agents.” These antiretroviral cocktails are known as cART
`regimens. During most of the relevant time, Gilead was the exclusive maker (and is still the dominant
`maker) of one of the principal NRTIs used in cART regimens: Tenofovir. By controlling the market for
`Tenofovir, and through its collusive agreements with its coconspirators, Gilead now dominates the
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`market for cART. Today more than 80% of patients starting an HIV regimen in the United States, and
`more than 80% of continuing patients, take one or more of Gilead’s products every day. Gilead’s sales of
`these products in the United States alone are more than $13 billion annually.
`3.
`Gilead maintains a stranglehold on the cART market even though Tenofovir was
`discovered more than 30 years ago by researchers in the Czech Republic. In 2001, Gilead began
`marketing its patented formulation of the compound known as tenofovir disoproxil (“TDF”), quickly
`reaching sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Gilead expected that generic manufacturers would
`challenge the validity of its Tenofovir patents and potentially enter the market as early as 2009. So, in
`order to head off the threat of generic competition, Gilead and each of its coconspirators, BMS and
`Janssen, entered into a series of collusive and illegal horizontal agreements providing that each
`coconspirator would not compete against Gilead’s Tenofovir, and would effectively block other
`companies from competing against Tenofovir, even after Gilead’s Tenofovir patents expired.
`4.
`Gilead and its coconspirators coformulated TDF with the coconspirators’ third agents into
`single pills known as fixed-dose-combination drugs (“FDCs”). Each of the joint development agreements
`prevented the coconspirator from creating or marketing a competing version of the FDC formulated with
`generic versions of Gilead’s TDF even after Gilead’s patents expired (hereinafter a “No-Generics
`Restraint”). This gave Gilead an enormous financial incentive to move prescriptions from its standalone
`version of TDF to the FDCs, which would be insulated from generic competition even after TDF’s
`patents expired. And it meant that Gilead’s most likely competitors—the companies that could formulate
`FDCs with generic alternatives to TDF—had instead promised not to compete with Gilead. In exchange,
`the No-Generics Restraints and joint development agreements enabled Gilead and the coconspirator to
`share the artificially inflated profits from each other’s sales.
`5.
`As part of the unlawful scheme’s quid pro quo, Gilead also agreed to shield BMS and
`Janssen’s HIV drugs from imminent generic competition by allowing them to coformulate FDCs that
`combined their vulnerable products with a Gilead booster drug, Cobicistat, which enjoyed much longer
`patent protection. Just as BMS and Janssen agreed not to market a competing FDC even after Gilead’s
`patents expired, Gilead returned the favor by agreeing not to market a competing FDC after the BMS and
`Janssen patents expired.
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`Collectively, the unlawful agreements between Gilead and each of its coconspirators
`6.
`effectively foreclosed competition for drugs essential to cART regimens. In 2018, the agreements
`covered more than 75% of all sales of NRTIs, more than 75% of all sales of booster drugs, and a
`substantial percentage of all sales of third agents for use in a cART regimen in the United States.
`7.
`In a relentless effort to reap ever-more monopoly profits, Gilead engaged in further
`anticompetitive conduct to reinforce the exclusionary effects of these illegal exclusion agreements. When
`generic competition to TDF became imminent, Gilead amended the No-Generics pacts to preclude its
`coconspirators from competing not only against Gilead’s then-marketed TDF but also against a new
`formulation of the compound, tenofovir alafenamide (“TAF”), and further extended the term of the No-
`Generics Restraints. Gilead had been holding TAF in reserve for more than a decade to roll out later as
`part of its scheme to impair competition once generic entry was imminent. With the extended No-
`Generics Restraints in place, Gilead reformulated the original TDF-based FDCs with TAF and then used
`anticompetitive tactics to drive patients towards the reformulated FDCs, which are shielded from
`competition in some instances until at least 2032.
`8.
`Gilead drove patients into treatment with TAF-based FDCs by intentionally degrading
`some of its key products. Gilead knew before seeking FDA approval of its TDF-based FDC marketed as
`Stribild that the dosage of TDF in it was much higher than needed and would subject patients to
`increased risk of significant adverse side effects. But Gilead was already planning to eventually replace
`that product with a TAF-based version. Refusing to reduce the dosage in the TDF version artificially
`magnified the safety differences between it and the TAF-based version, helping Gilead to drive patients
`to the TAF version.
`9.
`Gilead also pressed patients to TAF-based FDCs by intentionally delaying and degrading
`the standalone version of TAF. TAF has a substantially lower incidence than TDF of significant adverse
`side effects. Beginning in 2015, Gilead intentionally steered patients to the TAF-based FDCs by
`degrading standalone TAF in at least three ways:
`(a) Gilead intentionally delayed applying for FDA approval of standalone TAF by a
`year, ensuring that the new, safer version of Tenofovir was available during that
`time only through purchase of a Gilead TAF-based FDC;
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`(b) When Gilead finally did make TAF available as a standalone product, Gilead
`intentionally degraded its safety by making it available only in a much greater
`dose—with consequent greater risk of side effects—than the dose that Gilead
`used in its FDCs; and
`(c) Gilead did not seek FDA approval for the use of standalone TAF to treat HIV
`(getting it approved instead only for treatment of Hepatitis B), even while
`seeking and obtaining FDA approval for its use in treating HIV when used as a
`component of a Gilead FDC.
`Gilead’s refusal to get an HIV indication for standalone TAF also imposed a regulatory
`10.
`barrier to generic competition. Gilead did not seek that indication for standalone TAF despite designing
`and intending the drug as an HIV treatment and submitting data to the FDA showing its safety and
`efficacy in treating HIV. Gilead’s decision to forgo the HIV indication for standalone TAF forced would-
`be competitors to re-perform time-consuming and expensive clinical trials that Gilead had already
`performed. Forgoing this HIV indication costs Gilead hundreds of millions of dollars in sales of
`standalone TAF every year, but blocking competitors’ entry into the market was even more valuable.
`11.
`Timely competition from generic manufacturers could have complicated Gilead and its
`coconspirators’ schemes. The world’s largest generic-pharmaceutical manufacturer, Teva
`Pharmaceuticals, started challenging the validity of Gilead’s vulnerable patents covering its NRTIs in
`2009. Instead of defending its portfolio, however, Gilead settled with Teva, inducing it to withdraw its
`challenges and significantly delay entering the market with its generic version of the Gilead NRTIs.
`Gilead induced Teva’s delay by including anticompetitive “Most Favored Entry” clauses in settlement
`agreements with Teva and other generic manufacturers. Those pacts assured Teva that it would have an
`exclusivity period with the only generic on the market, in exchange for which Teva agreed to delay
`marketing its generic products.
`12.
`This delay bought Gilead the time it needed to move its customers from TDF-based FDCs
`(about to face generic competition) to TAF-based FDCs. By 2017, when TDF finally faced generic
`competition, Gilead had switched more than 60% of its HIV product sales to the reformulated, TAF-
`based FDCs protected from competition by its unlawful agreements with Janssen.
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`Starting in 2004, Gilead intentionally delayed the development and regulatory approval of
`13.
`TAF in order to use it in the anticompetitive scheme only once generic competition to TDF was
`imminent. Despite that intentional delay, Gilead recently obtained from the Patent and Trademark Office
`(“PTO”) a patent-term extension on its principal patent on TAF, extending its termination from May
`2023 to April 2025. Congress intended such extensions to benefit pharmaceutical manufacturers who
`encounter delays in getting their products to market as a result of government-imposed regulatory
`hurdles, through no fault of their own. But Gilead intentionally delayed bringing TAF to market in order
`to impair generic competition later. Nevertheless, the PTO was powerless to deny the patent-term
`extension to Gilead because the statute permits such denial only if the manufacturer’s delay occurs after
`the patent has issued. Gilead’s conduct in intentionally delaying TAF and then getting a patent-term
`extension on it is both a perversion of the patent-extension statute and unlawfully exclusionary conduct
`under the antitrust laws.
`14.
`The consequences of Gilead and its coconspirators’ unlawful conduct have been, and
`continue to be, burdensome to the government and catastrophic for many patients. The United States
`federal government alone spends over $20 billion annually on HIV treatment, most of it on these
`Defendants’ dramatically overpriced drugs. Even more of the costs of these unlawfully monopolized
`drugs are borne by union health and welfare funds, other third-party payors, state and local governments,
`and the patients themselves. Worse, the high cost of these life-saving medications prevents many patients
`from gaining access to the drugs at all. Half of those in this country living with HIV are not accessing the
`required medications, and fully 400,000 more Americans should be on HIV treatment. The high prices of
`cART regimens contribute to that problem.
`15.
`Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct has also stifled innovation, causing tens of thousands
`of people living with HIV to needlessly suffer debilitating side effects from inferior products. Gilead
`delayed getting FDA approval of TAF for more than a decade while it used the illegal No-Generics
`Restraints, rather than product innovations, to protect its market share. The unlawful restraints also
`prohibited competing manufacturers from gaining access to the pharmaceutical compounds needed to
`formulate new, innovative, superior, and substantially less expensive treatments—precluding the
`development and marketing of more than two dozen specifically identifiable HIV treatments. Gilead’s
`
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`unlawful scheme also altogether foreclosed the availability of an affordable method of pre-exposure
`prophylaxis (PrEP) that would prevent HIV infection in the first place, crippling this nation’s ability to
`stop new HIV infections.
`16.
`To remedy these and the other devastating effects of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct
`set forth in detail below, Plaintiffs seek nationwide injunctive relief pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton
`Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, because, unless enjoined, the Defendants’ unlawful conduct will continue
`unchecked and Plaintiffs and those similarly situated will continue to suffer. Plaintiffs also assert claims
`for damages for Defendants’ continuing violations of state antitrust and consumer protection laws.
`
`II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`
`The Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this is
`17.
`a class action in which the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and at least one member
`of the putative class is a citizen of a state different from that of one of the Defendants. The Court further
`has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 in that
`Plaintiffs bring claims under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, for injunctive and equitable
`relief to remedy Defendants’ violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1
`and 2. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state-law claims pursuant to 28
`U.S.C. § 1367.
`18.
`Defendants transact business within this district. Venue is appropriate within this district
`under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c), and section 12 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 22).
`
`III.
`
`INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
`
`Pursuant to Local Rule 3-2(c), this is an Antitrust Class Action to be assigned on a district-wide
`
`basis.
`
`IV.
`
`THE PARTIES
`
`Plaintiff Peter Staley is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Shohola, Pennsylvania.
`19.
`Mr. Staley purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand Viread,
`
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`Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz,
`Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in
`Pennsylvania and New York, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been
`injured. In addition, there is a substantial probability that Mr. Staley will in the future purchase one or
`more of these products manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase
`generic versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`20.
`Plaintiff Ivy Kwan Arce is an adult, individual consumer, residing in New York, New
`York. Ms. Arce purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand
`Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz,
`Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in
`New York, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In addition,
`there is a substantial probability that Ms. Arce will in the future purchase one or more of these products
`manufactured by the Defendants, and she has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic versions of
`those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`21.
`Plaintiff Steve Fuller is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Cheverly, Maryland.
`Mr. Fuller purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand Viread,
`Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz,
`Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in Maryland,
`at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In addition, there is a
`substantial probability that Mr. Fuller will in the future purchase one or more of these products
`manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic versions of
`those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`22.
`Plaintiff Gregg S. Gonsalves, PhD is an adult, individual consumer, residing in New
`Haven, Connecticut. Dr. Gonsalves purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or
`more of brand Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy,
`Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other
`than for re-sale, in Connecticut, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been
`injured. In addition, there is a substantial probability that Dr. Gonsalves will in the future purchase one or
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`more of these products manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase
`generic versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Brenda Emily Goodrow is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Milford,
`23.
`Pennsylvania. Ms. Goodrow purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more
`of brand Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy,
`Reyataz, Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-
`sale, in New York and Pennsylvania, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby
`been injured. In addition, there is a substantial probability that Ms. Goodrow will in the future purchase
`one or more of these products manufactured by the Defendants, and she has purchased and/or intends to
`purchase generic versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Andrew R. Spieldenner, PhD is an adult, individual consumer, residing in San
`24.
`Diego, California. Dr. Spieldenner purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or
`more of brand Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy,
`Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other
`than for re-sale, in New York and California, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has
`thereby been injured. In addition, there is a substantial probability that Dr. Spieldenner will in the future
`purchase one or more of these products manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or
`intends to purchase generic versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Robert J. Vazquez is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Brooklyn, New
`25.
`York. Mr. Vazquez purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand
`Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz,
`Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in
`New York, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In addition,
`there is a substantial probability that Mr. Vazquez will in the future purchase one or more of these
`products manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic
`versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Jason Walker is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Brooklyn, New York.
`26.
`Mr. Walker purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand Viread,
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`Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz,
`Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in New York,
`at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In addition, there is a
`substantial probability that Mr. Walker will in the future purchase one or more of these products
`manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic versions of
`those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Michael Warner is an adult, individual consumer, residing in East Point, Georgia.
`27.
`Mr. Warner purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand Viread,
`Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyataz, Evotaz,
`Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-sale, in Georgia, at
`supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In addition, there is a
`substantial probability that Mr. Warner will in the future purchase one or more of these products
`manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic versions of
`those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Jacob Zydonis is an adult, individual consumer, residing in Grass Valley,
`28.
`California. Mr. Zydonis purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of
`brand Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy,
`Reyataz, Evotaz, Prezista, Prezcobix, Edurant, Symtuza, Tybost, or other cART drugs other than for re-
`sale, in California, at supracompetitive prices during the Class Period and has thereby been injured. In
`addition, there is a substantial probability that Mr. Zydonis will in the future purchase one or more of
`these products manufactured by the Defendants, and he has purchased and/or intends to purchase generic
`versions of those drugs, other than for re-sale, once they become available.
`Plaintiff Michael Snipe is an adult, individual consumer, residing in New York, New
`29.
`York. Mr. Snipe purchased and/or paid for some or all of the purchase price for one or more of brand
`Viread, Emtriva, Truvada, Atripla, Complera, Stribild, Odefsey, Genvoya, Descovy, Vemlidy, Reyata