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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER JAMES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.,
Defendant.

Case No. [19-cv-06462-EMC](#)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Docket No. 56

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Plaintiffs Christopher James and Spencer Verhines are current or former Uber drivers who contend that they and a putative class of approximately 4,828 other Uber drivers are Uber’s employees and therefore eligible for various protections under the California Labor Code. *See* Docket No. 81 (Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“Am. Compl.”)) ¶ 23. Plaintiffs raise various wage-and-hour claims under California law and seek various forms of relief, including under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the federal Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). *Id.*

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. *See* Docket No. 56 (“Mot.”). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion is **GRANTED in part** and **DENIED in part**.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court and the parties are well acquainted with the background of this case, so it is not set forth in detail here. On May 19, 2020, Plaintiffs filed the pending motion to certify Class, *see* Mot, and two days later Uber filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ consolidated class action

1 On June 30, 2020, the Court dismissed, with leave to amend, the consolidated amended
2 complaint's claims that Uber failed to provide paid sick leave as required by section 246 of the
3 California Labor Code, and any UCL claims premised on violations of section 246. *See* Docket
4 No. 74 ("Order on MTD"). The Court also dismissed Thomas Colopy as a named Plaintiff in this
5 case without prejudice to his claims. *See id.*

6 On July 14, 2020, Messrs. James and Verhines (hereinafter, "Plaintiffs") filed the operative
7 amended consolidated class action complaint (hereinafter, "Amended Complaint") alleging as
8 follows. Plaintiffs are residents of California who drive for Uber. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9, 17–18. They
9 bring this case as a putative class action on "behalf of . . . all other individuals who have worked as
10 Uber drivers in California who have not released all of their claims against Uber." *Id.* ¶ 10. They
11 assert claims related to their alleged misclassification as independent contractors, including (1) failure
12 to reimburse business expenses, (2) failure to pay minimum wage, (3) failure to pay overtime, (4)
13 failure to provide properly itemized pay statements, (5) failure to provide paid sick leave, and (6)
14 unlawful business practices. *See id.* Plaintiffs seek damages dating back to February 28, 2019, as
15 well as declaratory and injunctive relief, which would require Uber to reclassify its drivers as
16 employees. *Id.* ¶ 7.

17 II. LEGAL STANDARD

18 Although expressly authorized by Rule 23, the "class action is 'an exception to the usual
19 rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.'" *Wal-*
20 *Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes*, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S.
21 682, 700–01 (1979)). "In order to justify departure from that rule, 'a class representative must be
22 part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as [her fellow] class
23 members.'" *Id.* (quoting *E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez*, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)).

24 Accordingly, before certifying a class, the Court "must conduct a 'rigorous analysis' to
25 determine whether the party seeking certification has met the prerequisites of Rule 23." *Mazza v.*
26 *Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Zinser v. Accufix Rsch.*
27 *Inst., Inc.*, 253 F.3d 1180, 1186, *amended* 273 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Supreme Court

1 *Behrend*, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (quoting *Wal-Mart*, 564 U.S. at 349). Rather, the party seeking
 2 certification must “affirmatively demonstrate” her compliance with the requirements of both Rules
 3 23(a) and 23(b). *See Wal-Mart*, 564 U.S. at 349.

4 Rule 23(a) permits plaintiffs to sue as representatives of a class only if (1) “the class is so
 5 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable” (“numerosity” requirement); (2) “there are
 6 questions of law or fact common to the class” (“commonality” requirement); (3) “the claims or
 7 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”
 8 (“typicality” requirement); and (4) “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
 9 interests of the class” (“adequacy” requirement). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). The purpose of
 10 Rule 23(a)’s requirements is largely to “ensure[] that the named plaintiffs are appropriate
 11 representatives of the class whose claims they wish to litigate,” and to “effectively limit the class
 12 claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.” *Wal-Mart*, 564 U.S. at 349
 13 (quoting *Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)).

14 If each of the Rule 23(a) requirements are satisfied, the purported class must also satisfy
 15 one of the three prongs of Rule 23(b). Here Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
 16 which requires the Court to find that “questions of law or fact common to class members
 17 predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” (“predominance”
 18 requirement), and “that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
 19 efficiently adjudicating the controversy” (“superiority” requirement). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

20 The underlying merits of the case, while admittedly relevant at the class certification stage,
 21 should not overly cloud the Court’s certification analysis—the only question presently before the
 22 Court is whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met. *See Comcast*, 569 U.S. at 33–34. The fact
 23 that certain elements of proof may favor the defendant on the merits does not negate class
 24 certification; the issue is whether the proof is amenable to class treatment. Indeed, once a class is
 25 certified, the party prevailing on the merits can benefit from certification, be it Plaintiffs or
 26 Defendant.

27 Moreover, “[n]either the possibility that a plaintiff will be unable to prove [her]

1 original decision to certify the class wrong, is a basis for declining to certify a class which
 2 apparently satisfies the Rule.” *Blackie v. Barrack*, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir. 1975). Indeed,
 3 even “after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of
 4 subsequent developments in the litigation.” *Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 160
 5 (1982). Ultimately, whether or not to certify a class is within the discretion of the Court. *See*
 6 *Levy v. Medline Indus. Inc.*, 716 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2013); *United Steel, Paper & Forestry,*
 7 *Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL–CIO CLC v. ConocoPhillips*
 8 *Co.*, 593 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2010).

9 III. DISCUSSION

10 This order proceeds as follows. First, the Court will apply the Rule 23(a) criteria
 11 (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy) to Plaintiffs’ claim that they are/were Uber’s
 12 employees, rather than independent contractors, and for each of their five substantive law claims:
 13 failure to (1) reimburse business expenses, (2) pay minimum wage, (3) pay overtime, (4) provide
 14 properly itemized pay statements, and (5) provide paid sick leave.

15 Second, the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs have met their burden under Rule
 16 23(b)(3), which requires them to establish that the employment classification question, and all of
 17 their substantive claims, can be resolved with reference to predominately common proof
 18 (predominance) and that prosecuting their claims in a class action is superior to other available
 19 methods (superiority).

20 A. Rule 23(a) Requirements

21 1. Ascertainability and Numerosity

22 Before analyzing numerosity under Rule 23(a)(1), courts typically require a showing that
 23 the class to be certified is ascertainable. *See Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal.*, 305 F.R.D. 115,
 24 121–22 (N.D. Cal. 2014); 7A Charles Alan Wright et al., *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1760 at
 25 142–47 (3d ed. 2005). To be ascertainable, the definition of the class must be “definite enough so
 26 that it is administratively feasible for the court to ascertain whether an individual is a member”
 27 before trial, and by reference to “objective criteria.” *Daniel F.*, 305 F.R.D. at 122; *see also*

1 June 9, 2015) (discussing ascertainability requirement). Put differently, the Court must identify
2 “the persons (1) entitled to relief, (2) bound by a final judgment, and (3) entitled under Rule
3 23(c)(2) to the ‘best notice practicable’ in a Rule 23(b)(3) action.” *Daniel F.*, 305 F.R.D. at 121
4 (quoting Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.222 (2004)).

5 Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of drivers who have driven for Uber in the state of
6 California since February 28, 2019 and who opted out of Uber’s arbitration agreement.
7 Membership in this class is objectively ascertainable from Uber’s business records. *See O’Connor*
8 *v. Uber (O’Connor II)*, No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015).
9 Uber does not dispute that it maintains business records with respect to each of its drivers, nor is
10 there any dispute that those records will reveal whether each putative class member drove for Uber
11 in the state of California since February 28, 2019. In fact, Uber has already identified 4,828
12 putative class members,¹ which represent “all individuals who completed at least one ride on the
13 Uber app in California between February 28, 2019 and August 31, 2020, attempted to opt out of
14 arbitration, and have a California driver’s license.” Docket No. 94 (Decl. of Justin McCrary in
15 Support of Opp’n to Mot. (“McCrary Decl.”)) ¶ 11, n. 4. The ascertainability requirement is
16 therefore satisfied here.

17 A plaintiff satisfies the numerosity requirement if “the class is so large that joinder of all
18 members is impracticable.” *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)
19 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)). While no court has set the precise number of class members
20 that are needed to satisfy the numerosity requirement, there is general recognition that Rule
21 23(a)(1) is satisfied when the proposed class contains one hundred or more members. *See, e.g.*,
22 *Wang v. Chinese Daily News*, 231 F.R.D. 602, 607 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recognizing there is a
23 presumption of numerosity where the proposed class contains one hundred or more members),
24 *reversed on other grounds by* 737 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2013); *Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp.*, 122
25 F.R.D. 258, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding a proposed class of forty members sufficient to satisfy

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¹ Uber explains that this number might be an overestimation because it includes folks who
attempted to opt out of the arbitration clause but might not have been eligible to opt out. McCrary

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