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8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
9 WHATSAPP INC. and FACEBOOK, INC.

10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
12

13 WHATSAPP INC., a Delaware corporation,  
14 and FACEBOOK, INC., a Delaware  
corporation,

15  
16 Plaintiffs,

17 v.

18 NSO GROUP TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED  
19 and Q CYBER TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED,

20 Defendants.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

Case No.

**COMPLAINT**

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

1 Plaintiffs WhatsApp Inc. and Facebook, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege the following  
2 against Defendants NSO Group Technologies Ltd. (“NSO Group”) and Q Cyber Technologies Ltd.  
3 (“Q Cyber”) (collectively, “Defendants”):

#### 4 **INTRODUCTION**

5 1. Between in and around April 2019 and May 2019, Defendants used WhatsApp servers,  
6 located in the United States and elsewhere, to send malware to approximately 1,400 mobile phones  
7 and devices (“Target Devices”). Defendants’ malware was designed to infect the Target Devices for  
8 the purpose of conducting surveillance of specific WhatsApp users (“Target Users”). Unable to break  
9 WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption, Defendants developed their malware in order to access messages  
10 and other communications after they were decrypted on Target Devices. Defendants’ actions were  
11 not authorized by Plaintiffs and were in violation of WhatsApp’s Terms of Service. In May 2019,  
12 Plaintiffs detected and stopped Defendants’ unauthorized access and abuse of the WhatsApp Service  
13 and computers.

14 2. Plaintiffs bring this action for injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the Computer  
15 Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access  
16 and Fraud Act, California Penal Code § 502, and for breach of contract and trespass to chattels.

#### 17 **PARTIES**

18 3. Plaintiff WhatsApp Inc. (“WhatsApp”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal  
19 place of business in Menlo Park, California.

20 4. Plaintiff Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place  
21 of business in Menlo Park, California. Facebook acts as WhatsApp’s service provider for security-  
22 related issues.

23 5. Defendant NSO Group was incorporated in Israel on January 25, 2010, as a limited  
24 liability company. Ex. 1. NSO Group had a marketing and sales arm in the United States called  
25 WestBridge Technologies, Inc. Ex. 2 and 3. Between 2014 and February 2019, NSO Group obtained  
26 financing from a San Francisco-based private equity firm, which ultimately purchased a controlling  
27 stake in NSO Group. Ex. 4. In and around February 2019, NSO Group was reacquired by its founders  
28

1 and management. *Id.* NSO Group’s annual report filed on February 28, 2019, listed Defendant Q  
2 Cyber as the only active director of NSO Group and its majority shareholder. Ex. 5.

3 6. Defendant Q Cyber was incorporated in Israel on December 2, 2013, under the name  
4 L.E.G.D. Company Ltd. Ex. 6 and 7. On May 29, 2016, L.E.G.D. Company Ltd. changed its name  
5 to Q Cyber. Ex. 7. Until at least June 2019, NSO Group’s website stated that NSO Group was “a Q  
6 Cyber Technologies company.” Ex. 8. Q Cyber’s annual report filed on June 17, 2019, listed OSY  
7 Technologies S.A.R.L. as the only Q Cyber shareholder and active Director. Ex. 9

8 7. At all times material to this action, each Defendant was the agent, partner, alter ego,  
9 subsidiary, and/or coconspirator of and with the other Defendant, and the acts of each Defendant were  
10 in the scope of that relationship. In doing the acts and failing to act as alleged in this Complaint, each  
11 Defendant acted with the knowledge, permission, and consent of each other; and, each Defendant  
12 aided and abetted each other.

### 13 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14 8. The Court has federal question jurisdiction over the federal causes of action alleged in  
15 this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

16 9. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action alleged in  
17 this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because these claims arise out of the same nucleus of  
18 operative fact as Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

19 10. In addition, the Court has jurisdiction over all the causes of action alleged in this  
20 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete diversity between the Plaintiffs and each  
21 of the named Defendants exists, and because the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.

22 11. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they obtained financing  
23 from California and directed and targeted their actions at California and its residents, WhatsApp and  
24 Facebook. The claims in this Complaint arise from Defendants’ actions, including their unlawful  
25 access and use of WhatsApp computers, several of which are located in California.

26 12. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants agreed  
27 to WhatsApp’s Terms of Service (“WhatsApp Terms”) by accessing and using WhatsApp. In relevant  
28 part, the WhatsApp Terms required Defendants to submit to the personal jurisdiction of this Court.

1 13. Venue is proper in this Judicial District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the  
2 threatened and actual harm to WhatsApp and Facebook occurred in this District.

3 14. Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-2(d), this case may be assigned to either the San Francisco or  
4 Oakland division because WhatsApp and Facebook are located in San Mateo County.

### 5 **FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

#### 6 **A. Background on Facebook**

7 15. Facebook is a social networking website and mobile application that enables its users  
8 to create their own personal profiles and connect with each other on their personal computers and  
9 mobile devices. As of June 2019, Facebook daily active users averaged 1.59 billion and monthly active  
10 users averaged 2.41 billion.

11 16. In October 2014, Facebook acquired WhatsApp. At all times relevant to this action,  
12 Facebook has served as WhatsApp's service provider, which entails providing both infrastructure and  
13 security for WhatsApp.

#### 14 **B. Background on WhatsApp**

##### 15 **1. The WhatsApp Service**

16 17. WhatsApp provides an encrypted communication service available on mobile devices  
17 and desktop computers (the "WhatsApp Service"). Approximately 1.5 billion people in 180 countries  
18 use the WhatsApp Service. Users must install the WhatsApp app to use the WhatsApp Service.

19 18. Every type of communication (calls, video calls, chats, group chats, images, videos,  
20 voice messages, and file transfers) on the WhatsApp Service is encrypted during its transmission  
21 between users. This encryption protocol was designed to ensure that no one other than the intended  
22 recipient could read any communication sent using the WhatsApp Service.

##### 23 **2. WhatsApp's Terms of Service**

24 19. Every WhatsApp user must create an account and agree and consent to WhatsApp's  
25 Terms (available at <https://www.whatsapp.com/legal?eea=0#terms-of-service>).

26 20. The WhatsApp Terms stated that "You must use our Services according to our Terms  
27 and policies" and that users agreed to "access and use [WhatsApp's] Services only for legal,  
28 authorized, and acceptable purposes."

1           21.     The WhatsApp Terms prohibited using the WhatsApp services in ways that (a) “violate,  
2 misappropriate, or infringe the rights of WhatsApp, our users, or others, including privacy;” (b) “are  
3 illegal, intimidating, harassing, . . . or instigate or encourage conduct that would be illegal, or otherwise  
4 inappropriate;” [or] . . . (e) “involve sending illegal or impermissible communications.”

5           22.     The WhatsApp Terms prohibited users from “exploiting [WhatsApp’s] Services in  
6 impermissible or unauthorized manners, or in ways that burden, impair, or harm us, our Services,  
7 systems, our users, or others.” The Terms also required users to agree not to: “(a) reverse engineer,  
8 alter, modify, create derivative works from, decompile, or extract code from our Services; (b) send,  
9 store, or transmit viruses or other harmful computer code through or onto our Services; (c) gain or  
10 attempt to gain unauthorized access to our Services or systems; (d) interfere with or disrupt the safety,  
11 security, or performance of our Services; [or] . . . (f) collect the information of or about our users in  
12 any impermissible or unauthorized manner.”

13           23.     The WhatsApp Terms prohibited users not just from personally engaging in the conduct  
14 listed above, but also from assisting others in doing so.

15           **C.     Background on NSO Group and Pegasus**

16           24.     Defendants manufactured, distributed, and operated surveillance technology or  
17 “spyware” designed to intercept and extract information and communications from mobile phones and  
18 devices. Defendants’ products included “Pegasus,” a type of spyware known as a remote access trojan.  
19 Ex. 10 and 11. According to Defendants, Pegasus and its variants (collectively, “Pegasus”) were  
20 designed to be remotely installed and enable the remote access and control of information—including  
21 calls, messages, and location—on mobile devices using the Android, iOS, and BlackBerry operating  
22 systems. *Id.*

23           25.     On information and belief, in order to enable Pegasus’ remote installation, Defendants  
24 exploited vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications (e.g., CVE-2016-4657) and used other  
25 malware delivery methods, like spearphishing messages containing links to malicious code. *Id.*

26           26.     According to media reports and NSO documents, Defendants claimed that Pegasus  
27 could be surreptitiously installed on a victim’s phone without the victim taking any action, such as  
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