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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`San Francisco Division
`
`RIPPLE LABS INC., et al.,
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`YOUTUBE LLC,
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. 20-cv-02747-LB
`
`
`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`DISMISS
`Re: ECF No. 26
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The plaintiffs, Ripple Labs and its CEO Bradley Garlinghouse (collectively, “Ripple”),
`developed a cryptocurrency called XRP. Scammers impersonated Ripple on YouTube (in part by
`using Ripple’s federally registered trademarks and publicly available content such as interviews
`with Mr. Garlinghouse) to make it look like they were Ripple and thus perpetuated a fraudulent
`“giveaway,” promising that if XRP owners sent 5,000 to one million XRP to a “cryptocurrency
`wallet,” then the XRP owners would receive 25,000 to five million XRP. In fact, the XRP owners
`who responded to the scam lost their XRP and received no XRP in return. The plaintiffs sued
`defendant YouTube for not doing enough to address the scam (including by failing to respond to
`multiple takedown notices), claiming the following: (1) contributory trademark infringement in
`violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (by allowing use — and therefore infringement
`— of Ripple’s trademarks); (2) misappropriation of Ripple’s CEO’s identity and thus his right of
`
`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`Case 3:20-cv-02747-LB Document 44 Filed 11/20/20 Page 2 of 12
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`publicity, in violation of Cal. Civil Code § 3344 and California common law; and (3) a violation
`of California’s unfair competition law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, predicated on
`the trademark and state-law claims.1
`YouTube moved to dismiss (1) the Lanham Act claim in part on the ground that the plaintiffs
`did not plausibly plead its knowledge of the trademark infringement, and (2) the state-law claims
`on the ground that it is immune from liability under § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency
`Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), because it is not a content provider.2 The court grants the
`motion (with leave to amend).
`
`STATEMENT
`Ripple is an “enterprise blockchain company” that developed and manages the cryptocurrency
`XRP, which can be used in place of traditional currencies to facilitate cross-border payments.3
`Banks, corporations, and individuals buy XRP.4
`YouTube is a video-sharing platform.5
`Ripple and XRP owners were the target of a fraud — the XRP Giveaway Scam — whereby
`the fraudsters hijacked other users’ channels on YouTube and used the channels to impersonate
`Ripple and its CEO. (Fraudsters can hijack a legitimate YouTube channel through a spear-
`phishing attack: the fraudsters send an email to the channel’s creator, and when the creator
`responds, he inadvertently discloses his YouTube credentials, thereby allowing the fraudsters to
`take over his channel and populate its content.) After hijacking the channels, the fraudsters
`populated the channels with content that included Ripple’s trademarks (such as its logo and name),
`Mr. Garlinghouse’s name and likeness, and publicly available content (such as interviews with
`Mr. Garlinghouse or other members of Ripple’s leadership team). Masquerading as Ripple, the
`
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`1 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 17–21 (¶¶ 61–99). Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File
`(“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
`2 Mot. – ECF No. 26.
`3 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 4 (¶¶ 12, 19), at 5 (¶¶ 20–21).
`4 Id. at 4–5 (¶¶ 19–20).
`5 Id. at 6 (¶ 27).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`fraudsters promised XRP owners that if they sent between 5,000 to one million XRP to a digital
`wallet, then they would receive between 25,000 to five million XRP. After XRP owners sent XRP
`to the digital wallet, the currency disappeared, and the XRP owners received nothing in return.6
`Ripple and YouTube users alerted YouTube about the scam, but YouTube allegedly did not
`respond by taking down the offending content in a reasonable time frame. A Forbes article in
`November 2019 reported the scam, the hijacking of popular YouTube creator MarcoStyle’s
`channel, the conversion of his channel to Mr. Garlinghouse’s profile, the hacker’s running of a
`livestream promoting the scam, and the stealing of $15,000 from viewers’ Ripple wallets.7
`MarcoStyle alerted YouTube, and YouTube acknowledged the issue that day but took a week to
`resolve it.8 During this time, YouTube verified the hijacked channel as authentic (even though it
`was masquerading as Mr. Garlinghouse’s account).9
`After the Forbes article, Ripple alleges that it sent YouTube more than 350 takedown notices:
`49 related directly to the scam and 305 related to accounts and channels that were impersonating
`Mr. Garlinghouse or infringing on Ripple’s brand, likely to monetize the scam.10 Ripple alleges
`that it sent multiple takedown notices for the same conduct because YouTube did not take down
`the fraudulent channels for days, weeks, or months after notice.11 New instances of the scam
`“continued to appear, often amassing thousands of views and creating more victims by the day.”12
`
`
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`6 Id. at 7–9 (¶ 35).
`7 Id. at 10 (¶ 40); Paul Tassi, A YouTuber with 350,000 Subscribers Was Hacked, YouTube verified His
`Hacker, Forbes (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/paultassi/2019/11/14/a-youtuber-with-
`350000-subscribers-was-hacked-youtube-verified-his-hacker/?sh=23bd01a76fe6, Ex. 8 to Compl. –
`ECF No. 1-1 at 141–42. The court considers the documents attached to the complaint under the
`incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542,
`1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
`8 Forbes Article, Ex. 8 to Compl. – ECF No. 1-1 at 142
`9 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 10 (¶ 40).
`10 Id. at 12 (¶ 47).
`11 Id. (¶ 48) (14 takedown notices (starting November 12, 2019) about hijacked channel purporting to
`be Mr. Garlinghouse’s channel that resulted in a takedown months later, on February 19, 2020;
`January 2, 2020 takedown notice that took three weeks to resolve; nine takedown notices (starting
`January 21, 2020) about channel promoting the scam that remained active until March 18, 2020;
`January 27, 2020 notice about hijacked channel promoting the scam resolved on February 3, 2020).
`12 Id. (¶ 49).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`Case 3:20-cv-02747-LB Document 44 Filed 11/20/20 Page 4 of 12
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`For example, on March 20, 2020, a YouTube user told YouTube about a channel using Ripple’s
`marks and Mr. Garlinghouse’s image to promote the scam, YouTube did not take action, and by
`the next day, 85,000 users viewed the fraudulent video.13
`YouTube allegedly profited from the scam because it sold ads to the fraudsters that featured
`Mr. Garlinghouse’s name, infringed on Ripple’s trademarks, and promoted the scam.14
`According to its guidelines and policies, YouTube removes offending content when it learns
`about it, including “scams and other deceptive practices.”15
`The parties do not dispute that the court has federal-question jurisdiction over the Lanham Act
`contributory trademark-infringement claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
`claims.16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. All parties consented to magistrate jurisdiction.17
`
`
`STANDARD OF REVIEW
`A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
`entitled to relief” to give the defendant “fair notice” of what the claims are and the grounds upon
`which they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A
`complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
`‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
`recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
`raise a claim for relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).
`To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which
`when accepted as true, “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
`U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
`
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`13 Id. at 14 (¶ 52).
`14 Id. at 10 (¶ 37).
`15 Id. at 6–7 (¶¶ 30–33); YouTube Policies, Ex. 1 to Compl. – ECF No. 1-1 at 2–6; YouTube
`Community Guidelines Enforcement, Ex. 4 to Compl. – ECF No. 1-1 at 114–122.
`16 Id. at 4 (¶¶ 15–16); Mot. – ECF No. 26.
`17 Consents – ECF Nos. 13–14.
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
`defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
`‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
`unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
`merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
`plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
`If a court dismisses a complaint, it should give leave to amend unless the “pleading could not
`possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co.,
`848 F.3d 1161, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
`
`
`ANALYSIS
`YouTube moved to dismiss the trademark and state-law claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
`to state a claim. The court grants the motion with leave to amend.
`
`1. Contributory Trademark Infringement
` “To be liable for contributory trademark infringement, a defendant must have (1) intentionally
`induced the primary infringer to infringe, or (2) continued to supply an infringing product to an
`infringer with knowledge that the infringer is mislabeling the particular product supplied.” Perfect
`10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). If the alleged
`infringer supplies a service (as opposed to a product), then “the court must consider the extent of
`control exercised by the defendant over the third party’s means of infringement.” Id. A plaintiff
`must show that the defendant “continued to supply its services to one who it knew or had reason to
`know was engaging in trademark infringement.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Sols, Inc.,
`658 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011).
`Contributory trademark infringement claims about conduct on an online platform often involve
`the sale of infringing goods in an online marketplace. In that context, courts have held that “a
`service provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is
`being used to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings
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`are infringing or will infringe . . . is necessary.” Spy Phone Labs LLC v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-
`03756-PSG, 2016 WL 1089267, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2016) (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay
`Inc. 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010)). Also, “notice of certain acts of infringement does not imply
`generalized knowledge of — and liability for — others.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, in Spy
`Phone, the court held that an app developer’s complaint to Google about competing apps’
`violations of Google’s anti-spyware policy was not the same as a trademark complaint. Id. at *2,
`4. A trademark complaint was a notice of infringement, but a spyware complaint was not. Id. at
`*4. Absent notice of trademark infringement in the form of a trademark complaint, Google was
`not liable for not removing infringing apps preemptively. Id.
`The plaintiffs allegedly notified YouTube of the trademark infringement through takedown
`notices and allege that You Tube “ignored or failed to address many of the[ir] takedown
`demands.”18 The examples — in subparagraphs to that general allegation — are about delay in
`taking down the offending channels (not a failure to do so altogether), all in the face of a persistent
`fraud that apparently had near daily new occurrences.19 The examples include (1) a takedown
`notice, 13 subsequent takedown notices, and a hacked channel’s remaining active for more than
`two months until YouTube “took corrective action,” (2) a three-week delay before YouTube
`“addressed” a hacked channel after notice, (3) a takedown notice, eight more takedown notices,
`and slightly less than two months before YouTube addressed a channel promoting the scam, and
`(4) a week’s delay before YouTube addressed a hacked channel.20
`The issue thus is whether the plaintiffs’ allegations about YouTube’s delay in taking down the
`scam and the hijacked channels — which used Ripple’s trademarked content — plausibly plead a
`claim for contributory trademark infringement.
`
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`18 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12–13 (¶¶ 48–49).
`19 Id. at 12 (¶ 48); see Statement.
`20 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12 (¶ 48) (referring to YouTube’s taking “corrective action” eventually). The
`court cannot tell whether “taking corrective action “ involves removing the channels or instead
`involved other corrective action. The court thus uses the proxy that YouTube “addressed” the issue.
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`Courts have found that delays of several days (after receipt of a trademark complaint) do not
`plausibly establish a contributory trademark infringement claim, but delays of at least six months
`can. Spy Phone, No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016)
`(collecting cases, including those involving a six-month delay and a six-to-nine-month delay). In
`Spy Phone, a contributory trademark claim survived a Rule 12(b)(6) motion when Google took 18
`and 27 days to address two trademark complaints. The length of time alone did not plausibly
`establish a claim, but other fact issues about Google’s response to the trademark complaints —
`such as whether it unjustifiably or purposefully delayed its investigation (and thereby provided
`services to a known infringer) — meant that the claim survived at the pleadings stage. Id.
`Under these cases, the plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded a claim for contributory trademark
`infringement.
`The plaintiffs allegedly complained about trademark infringement, and they also complained
`about the misuse of Mr. Garlinghouse’s identity.21 Applying the analysis in Spy Phone, the first
`category is a notice of trademark infringement that required YouTube’s response, and the second
`is not. Id., No. 15-cv-03756-PSG, 2016 WL 1089267 at *4. The complaint lumps the two
`categories together. The plaintiffs must identify their complaints of trademark infringement
`(tethered to a specific YouTube user’s account) and YouTube’s failure to respond or delayed
`response to the specific complaints.
`Without a delineation between the two categories, the court cannot evaluate whether YouTube
`had contemporaneous knowledge of the infringing conduct and continued to supply its services.
`Id.; Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 942. As a result, the court cannot “draw the reasonable inference
`that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Also, the alleged
`delays here — a week, several weeks, around two months — are shorter than the delays that courts
`generally have found actionable. (Spy Phone had shorter delays of 18 and 27 days, but the delays
`themselves did not establish a plausible claim; instead, disputed facts about Google’s reasons for
`the delay did. No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *5 (collecting cases).
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`21 Id. (¶ 47).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`At the hearing, the plaintiffs argued that requiring this specificity imposes a pleading standard
`that exceeds Rule 8)(a)’s “fair notice” requirement and is the equivalent of pleading the claims
`with particularity under Rule 9(b), meaning, the who, what, where, when, and how of the
`misconduct. Vess v. Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). The court is not
`imposing a Rule 9(b) standard. The plaintiffs do not need to plead all of their evidence.
`Representative examples — similar to those in paragraph 48 of the complaint but identifying the
`specific trademark complaints and YouTube’s response to those complaints — are sufficient.
`The plaintiffs’ remaining theories for contributory trademark infringement fail for the
`following reasons.
`The plaintiffs contend that YouTube had constructive knowledge that the scam was persistent
`and the tools to eliminate the scam from its platform.22 This claim turns on the actual notice to
`YouTube. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109; Spy Phone, No. 15-cv-03756-PSG, 2016 WL 1089267 at *3–
`4, id., No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *6. As discussed above, the allegations in the
`plaintiffs’ complaint do not sufficiently differentiate between the trademark notices and the other
`notices. Thus, the plaintiffs do not plausibly plead a claim.
`The plaintiffs also contend that YouTube was willfully blind to the scam and failed to prevent
`it.23 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. S.E.B. SA., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011); Spy Phone, No. 15-
`cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *6. The facts alleged here do not establish a duty to
`preemptively address the scam based on YouTube’s knowledge of the infringements. Spy Phone,
`No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *6 (analyzing cases and holding that Google did
`not have a generalized duty — based on knowledge that a vendor was selling counterfeit goods —
`to preemptively police online vendors). The result in Spy Phone applies with greater force here
`because YouTube is not an online marketplace policing its vendors and instead is a social-media
`platform hosting its users. Its ability to react to and police hackers is different than an online
`marketplace’s ability to react to and police its vendors.
`
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`22 Opp’n – ECF No. 29 at 16–20.
`23 Id. at 20–21.
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`To illuminate the point, consider the cases that the parties cite: they all involve online
`marketplaces. (The parties did not cite any case involving similar allegations of trademark
`infringement on a hijacked social-media platform, and the court did not find any.) The cases
`establish that an online marketplace is responsible for contributory trademark infringement when
`— after notice that a vendor is selling infringing products — it allows the vendor to keep selling
`the infringing products. For example, in Spy Phone, Google allegedly allowed a vendor to release
`an infringing app after notice that the vendor’s released app was infringing Spy Phone’s
`trademark. No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *6. In Spy Optic, Inc. v. Alibaba, Inc.,
`on one occasion, the Alibaba marketplace allowed the infringing vendor to post “multiple
`infringing products” after the plaintiff identified the trademark infringement. 163 F. Supp. 3d 755,
`766 (C.D. Cal. 2015). By contrast, in Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., eBay took down challenged
`listings promptly, warned sellers and buyers, canceled fees it earned, and directed buyers not to
`consummate the sale of the disputed item. 600 F.3d at 106.
`The cases illustrate an online marketplace’s duty (and ability) to remove a known vendor from
`the online platform when it knows about the trademark infringement. Louis Vuitton, 658 F.3d at
`942. Thus, it might be reasonable to hold eBay to a tight time period to discontinue its services to
`someone selling fake Tiffany or Louis Vuitton products: eBay and its vendors have a business
`relationship, and eBay can terminate a vendor easily. eBay also derives revenue from the
`relationship. And if eBay delays an investigation and a takedown, there might be fact issues about
`whether it purposefully or unjustifiably did so, presumably for self-serving reasons. Cf. Spy
`Phone, No. 15-cv-03756-KAW, 2016 WL 6025469 at *5. That ability to police its vendors
`arguably makes it more accountable when it does not take action.
`An online social-media platform’s delay in investigating and removing scams like the one here
`is not obviously analogous to the marketplace’s delay. Investigating a scam — involving phishing
`and hijacked user credentials — is (at minimum) different and likely more complicated. For one,
`YouTube does not control a hacker in the same way that a marketplace controls a vendor’s ability
`to sell on the platform. See Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 807. Also, YouTube’s investigation involves
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`legitimate YouTube users and a persistent, evolving scam creating “more victims by the day.”24 Its
`investigation differs in scope from the marketplace’s investigation of its vendor. The impact of
`notice (or in the language of the cases, “contemporary knowledge” of infringement) is different
`too. Spy Phone, No. 15-cv-03756-PSG, 2016 WL 1089267 at *3. When a marketplace knows
`about infringing products, it can terminate the infringing vendor. The only thing that matters is
`notice of the trademark infringement. But when YouTube learns about hacked content that
`includes trademarked content, the scope of its inquiry also is about protection of data and its users
`and eliminating the scam.
`Moreover, YouTube does not provide services to or profit from a hacker in the same way that
`a marketplace provides services to and profits from a vendor. Id. In some ways, it too is a victim
`of the hijacking. Its revenues from ads are not obviously equivalent to revenues resulting from a
`business contract between a marketplace and a vendor.
`Ultimately, it may be that the sufficiency of YouTube’s response involves factual disputes that
`are not amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, at least as to whether YouTube had
`contemporaneous knowledge of the infringing conduct and continued to supply its services. Louis
`Vuitton, 658 F.3d at 942.
`For now, the court dismisses the contributory trademark claim with leave to amend.
`
`2. Section 230 Immunity
`Absent a federal claim, the court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.
`28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Even assuming that there is a viable federal claim, YouTube is immune
`under § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act for the state claims: (1) misappropriation
`of Ripple’s CEO’s identity and his right of publicity, in violation of Cal. Civil Code § 3344 and
`California common law, and (2) a violation of the UCL based on the predicate state-law and
`federal claims.25
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`24 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 12–13 (¶¶ 48–49).
`25 Id. at 18–21 (¶¶ 75–99).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`Case 3:20-cv-02747-LB Document 44 Filed 11/20/20 Page 11 of 12
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`Under the Communications Decency Act, (1) website operators generally are immune from
`liability for third-party content posted on their websites, but (2) they are not immune if they create
`or develop the information, in whole or in part. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1) & (f)(3). “Immunity from
`liability exists for (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service, (2) whom a plaintiff
`seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker of (3) information
`provided by another information content provider.” Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934
`F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
`YouTube is an interactive-computer service.26 It is undisputed that it did not create any ads:
`YouTube ads are third-party content, and the at-issue “ads were presented to YouTube by the
`scammers” here.27 It is not “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of the
`information,” and thus, it is immune from liability for the third-party content. 47 U.S.C. §
`230(f)(3); cf. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 801–03 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (Facebook
`created ads, including content, based on users’ browsing history, and thus it was not immune
`under the Act for violating the plaintiffs’ statutory right of publicity, among other things).
`The plaintiffs nonetheless contend that YouTube materially contributed to the scam (and
`created content) by awarding a “verification badge” — by giving the MarcoStyle hacked channel a
`badge that it allegedly reserves for “authentic” channels — thereby “communicating to hundreds
`of thousands of viewers and subscribers that these hacked accounts and channels were ‘the official
`channel of a creator, artist, company, or public figure.’”28 A website helps to develop unlawful
`content if it “contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the content.” Fair Hous. Council v.
`Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008). The badge did not materially
`contribute to the content’s illegality here. Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 n.4 (9th Cir.
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`26 Opp’n – ECF No. 29 at 21–26; Reply – ECF No. 33 at 7.
`27 Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 10 (¶ 37).
`28 Opp’n – ECF No. 29 at 22 (quoting Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 3 (¶ 10)).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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`2016). What made the content illegal was that the scammers hijacked users’ content and tricked
`them into sending their XRP to a digital wallet.29
`The plaintiffs also contend that YouTube materially contributed to the fraudulent
`advertisements for the scam by allowing advertisers to display “views” that the video received.30
`Displaying views does not create content, and the plaintiffs’ argument thus does not alter the
`conclusion that YouTube has immunity under § 230(c) for the state-law claims. Dyroff, 934 F.3d
`at 1096; Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270; Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1169.
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`CONCLUSION
`The court grants the motion to dismiss with leave to amend within 21 days. This disposes of
`ECF No. 26.
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`Dated: November 20, 2020
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`______________________________________
`LAUREL BEELER
`United States Magistrate Judge
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`29 The complaint’s allegations do not establish that verification of YouTube accounts promotes the
`scam either. See, e.g., Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 11 (¶ 43).
`30 Opp’n – ECF 29 at 25 (citing Compl. – ECF No. 1 at 10 (¶ 37)).
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`ORDER – No. 20-cv-02747-LB
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