`
`
`
`CARLSON LYNCH, LLP
`Todd D. Carpenter (CA SBN 234464)
`tcarpenter@carlsonlynch.com
`Scott G. Braden (CA SBN 305051)
`sbraden@carlsonlynch.com
`1350 Columbia Street, Suite 603
`San Diego, CA 92101
`Tel:
`619-762-1910
`Fax: 619-756-6991
`HINDMAN APC
`Jesse Hindman (CA SBN 222935)
`jesse@hindmanapc.com
`402 W. Broadway, Suite 1520
`San Diego, CA 92101
`Tel:
`619-255-4078
`Counsel for Plaintiff
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`Case No. 4:20-cv-06700-JSW
`OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT UBER
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S MOTION TO
`COMPEL ARBITRATION
`Date: April 16, 2021
`Time: 9:00 a.m.
`Dept: Courtroom 5 – 2nd Floor
`Judge: Hon. Jeffrey S. White
`
`ERIN NORMAN,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., NEUTRON
`HOLDINGS, INC., DOING BUSINESS UNDER
`THE NAME LIME, SOCIAL BICYCLES LLC
`DOING BUSINESS AS JUMP BIKES, AND
`ZHEJANG OKAI VEHICLE CO., LTD.,
`Defendants.
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
`Case No. 4:20-cv-06700-JSW
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`Case 4:20-cv-06700-JSW Document 46 Filed 03/23/21 Page 2 of 22
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`3.
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
`I.
`II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................... 1
`III. ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 2
`A.
`The Arbitration Agreement Violates McGill Because It Forecloses Plaintiff from
`Seeking Public Injunctive Relief in Any Forum ....................................................... 2
`1.
`McGill Applies to and Bars the Public Injunctive Relief Waiver .................... 2
`2.
`The Arbitration Agreement Does Not Permit Public Injunctive Relief
`Through Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claims ..................................... 3
`Plaintiff’s Injunctive Relief Claim Is Properly Alleged Against Uber ............. 5
`i.
`Plaintiff Seeks Public Injunctive Relief ............................................. 5
`ii.
`Plaintiff’s Claim for Public Injunctive Relief is Proper
`Notwithstanding Uber’s Purported Sale of Jump to Lime ................... 9
`This Court May Consider the Threshold Question of Arbitrability........................... 11
`B.
`Plaintiff’s Strict Product Liability Claims Are Protected by McGill ......................... 13
`C.
`The Court Should Not Stay Non-Arbitrable Claims Pending Arbitration of Others ... 14
`D.
`IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 15
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`Cases
`Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
`68 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.1995) .............................................................................................................. 5
`Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P.,
`203 Cal. App. 4th 771 (2012) .......................................................................................................... 11
`Arias v. Superior Court,
`46 Cal. 4th 969 (2009) ....................................................................................................................... 4
`Aviles v. Quik Pick Express, LLC,
`No. CV-15-5214-MWF (AGR), 2015 WL 9810998 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) ............................... 12
`Blair v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., No. C,
`17-02335 WHA, 2017 WL 4805577 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017)................................................ 3, 6, 7
`Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,
`928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................................... passim
`Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California,
`21 Cal. 4th 1066 (1999) ..................................................................................................................... 6
`Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human, Res.,
`532 U.S. 598 (2001) ......................................................................................................................... 10
`Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`226 F. Supp. 3d 983 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ............................................................................................. 15
`Cottrell v. AT&T Inc.,
`No. 19-cv-07672-JCS, 2020 WL 2747774 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2020) .............................................. 8
`Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
`889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................... 10
`DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc.,
`No. 20-55058, 2021 WL 647502 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) ........................................................ 3, 4, 5
`Eiess v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank,
`404 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ........................................................................................... 15
`Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
`24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc.,
`877 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ......................................................................................... 9, 10
`Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc.,
`922 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2019) ............................................................................................................ 12
`Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc.,
`59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963) ........................................................................................................................ 14
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`Case 4:20-cv-06700-JSW Document 46 Filed 03/23/21 Page 4 of 22
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
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`Page
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`Cases (cont.)
`Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer &White Sales, Inc.,
`139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) ................................................................................................................. 12, 13
`Higgins v. Superior Ct.,
`140 Cal. App. 4th 1238 (2006) ........................................................................................................ 10
`Ingalls v. Spotify USA, Inc.,
`2016 WL 6679561 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016) ................................................................................ 11
`Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
`No. 17-cv-2477, 2018 WL 4726042 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018) ....................................................... 7
`Lee v. Postmates Inc.,
`No. 18-CV-03421-JCS, 2018 WL 4961802 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018)........................................... 15
`Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.,
`398 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) ......................................................................................................... 15
`McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`772 F. App’x 575 (9th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 4
`McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
`No. 09-CV-01117-CW, 2017 WL 4354998 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017)........................................... 3, 4
`McGill v. Citibank, N.A.,
`2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017) ................................................................................................................ passim
`Meadows v. Dickey's Barbecue Restaurants Inc.,
`144 F. Supp. 3d 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ........................................................................................... 12
`Money Mailer, LLC v. Brewer,
`No. 15-1215, 2016 WL 1393492 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2016) ........................................................ 12
`Rent–A–Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,
`561 U.S. 63 (2010) ........................................................................................................................... 11
`Sponheim v. Citibank,
`No. SACV 19-264 JVS (ADSx), 2019 WL 2498938 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2019) .............................. 8
`Tillage v. Comcast Corp.,
`772 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 4
`Vargas v. Delivery Outsourcing, LLC,
`No. 15-03408, 2016 WL 946112 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) .......................................................... 12
`Wright v. Sirius XM Radio Inc.,
`No. SACV 16-01688, 2017 WL 4676580 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2017) ................................................. 8
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
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`Page
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`Statutes
`9 U.S.C. § 2 .......................................................................................................................................... 13
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203 ............................................................................................................ 4
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535 ............................................................................................................ 4
`Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382 ..................................................................................................................... 4
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`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PURSUANT TO CIVIL STANDING ORDER
`Plaintiff Erin Norman (“Plaintiff”) brings this action on behalf of herself and the general public
`against Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”), arising from allegations that Uber’s rental scooters,
`which lack a signal mechanism, place riders in the predicament of turning without a signal in violation of
`California law or following the law with a dangerous hand signal, endangering riders and the public at
`large, and which ultimately caused Plaintiff’s own significant personal injuries. Plaintiff seeks damages
`for her injuries as well as public injunctive relief to enjoin this ongoing public safety hazard.
`Uber moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s lawsuit, arguing Plaintiff delegated the decision
`on arbitrability to the arbitrator and that the California Supreme Court decision McGill v. Citibank, N.A.,
`2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017) does not apply to her claims. Uber is wrong on both counts. As Plaintiff asserts:
`(1) the arbitration agreement violates McGill by barring injunctive relief all fora—it relegates any
`“dispute, claim or controversy” to arbitration, while limiting “declaratory and injunctive relief … only to
`the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by the claimant’s individual claim” and “preclude[ing]
`[Plaintiff] from bringing any class, collective, or representative action.” Gaddis Decl. Ex. A at 9, 11
`(emphasis added). See Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819, 831 (9th Cir. 2019) (language in an
`arbitration agreement that prohibits a dispute from being “brought, heard or arbitrated as a class,
`collective, mass, private attorney general, or representative action ... precludes the arbitrator from
`awarding public injunctive relief.”) (emphasis added); (2) Plaintiff properly seeks public injunctive relief
`that would enjoin Uber from renting scooters “until the public is properly warned about the scooter
`vehicles’ inherently dangerous condition, and/or until the scooter vehicles’ defective turn signaling
`system is replaced or rectified” First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) (“FAC”), Prayer for Relief ¶ C;
`(3) Uber’s contention that there is “nothing to enjoin” is meritless as it admits “consumers continue to
`have access to dockless e-bikes and e-scooters through [Uber’s] app.” See Uber Technologies (2021)
`Form 10-K 2020, p. 37 (retrieved from https://seekingalpha.com/filing/5401978); (4) this Court should
`determine arbitrability because the delegation clause does not present a “clear and unmistakable” intent
`to delegate the question of arbitrability; (5) Plaintiff’s strict product liability claims fall within the purview
`of McGill and likewise cannot be waived; and (6) Plaintiff’s non-arbitrable claims should not be stayed.
`For these reasons, Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Uber’s motion to compel arbitration.
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`Case 4:20-cv-06700-JSW Document 46 Filed 03/23/21 Page 7 of 22
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`This action highlights and seeks to remediate an ongoing threat to public safety regarding the
`use of defectively designed electric scooters rentable through Defendant Uber Technology, Inc.’s
`(“Uber”) smartphone application. Because the scooters lack turning signals, riders cannot legally
`perform a turn without performing a dangerous hand signal, required by California law. First Amended
`Complaint (ECF No. 27) (“FAC”) ¶¶ 27-37. Plaintiff Erin Norman (“Plaintiff”) seeks recompense for
`her injuries due to this and an injunction to remove the scooters from use until the public is properly
`warned about their inherently dangerous condition, and/or until their defective turn signaling system is
`corrected. FAC, Prayer for Relief ¶ C. Uber moves to compel all claims to arbitration by misconstruing
`Plaintiff’s claims as well as the applicability of McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945 (2017). As set
`forth below, the arbitration agreement violates McGill by waiving public injunctive relief, which
`Plaintiff properly alleges against Uber, in all fora. Further, the “delegation clause” Uber seeks to
`enforce does not present “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate the question of arbitrability.
`Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 37) (“Motion” or “Mot.”) should be denied.
`PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
`II.
`Plaintiff filed this action on September 24, 2020 (ECF No. 1) and the operative FAC on
`December 21, 2020. ECF No. 27. The FAC brings several causes of action against Uber arising from
`the use of Uber’s rental scooters, which lack a signal mechanism and place riders in the predicament
`of violating California law requiring a signal before turning or performing a dangerous hand signal.
`Riders are not warned of this dangerous condition. FAC ¶ 123. As a result of the design defects, failure
`to warn, breach of express and implied warranties, and negligence of Uber, Plaintiff was severely
`injured while riding a Jump scooter and operating it in a manner prescribed by the laws of California.
`Plaintiff’s suit seeks both a public injunction against Uber enjoining it from selling or leasing scooters
`in the State of California without first providing the necessary warnings and/or safe means of legal
`operation, and to compensate her for significant personal injuries. On March 9, 2021, Uber filed the
`instant Motion. ECF No. 37.
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`A.
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`III. ARGUMENT
`The Arbitration Agreement Violates McGill Because It Forecloses Plaintiff from Seeking
`Public Injunctive Relief in Any Forum
`
`McGill Applies to and Bars the Public Injunctive Relief Waiver
`1.
`Under California law, “a provision in any contract ... that purports to waive, in all fora, the
`statutory right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL [or] the CLRA ... is invalid and
`unenforceable.” McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 962.1 The threshold issue is whether Uber’s arbitration agreement
`purports to waive a plaintiff’s right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL in all fora, and here,
`the answer is yes.
`First, the arbitration agreement broadly mandates “any dispute, claim or controversy” be
`submitted to “binding arbitration between you and JUMP, and not in a court of law.” Gaddis Decl.,
`Ex. A. at 9, 11. ECF No. 37-4. Second, the arbitration agreement prohibits Plaintiff from seeking public
`injunctive relief at arbitration by declaring any arbitration will be conducted “on an individual basis
`[which] will preclude [Plaintiff] from bringing any class, collective, or representative action”, language
`the Ninth Circuit has understood to prohibit public injunctive relief. See Blair v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.,
`928 F.3d 819, 831 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that language in an arbitration agreement that prohibits a
`dispute from being “brought, heard or arbitrated as a class, collective, mass, private attorney general,
`or representative action ... precludes the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive relief.”) (emphasis
`added). The arbitration agreement reenforces its preclusion of an award of public injunctive relief in
`arbitration by specifying, “[t]he Arbitrator may award declaratory and injunctive relief only in favor
`of the claimant and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by the claimant’s
`individual claim.” Gaddis Decl., Ex. A. at 11 (emphasis added); see also id. (permitting Uber to
`“compel arbitration of any remaining claims on an individual basis . . .”) (emphasis added).
`This language closely resembles Citibank’s arbitration provision at issue in McGill, which
`stated, “[c]laims must be brought in the name of an individual person or entity and must proceed on an
`individual (non-class, non-representative) basis. The arbitrator will not award relief for or against
`
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`1 Uber does not challenge the validity of McGill, for instance, by asserting any federal preemption
`under the Federal Arbitration Act.
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`anyone who is not a party.” McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 952. Both the Uber and Citibank arbitration provisions
`bar public injunctive relief using the same mechanism—i.e., by limiting relief to an individual basis to
`the exclusion of anyone who is not a party.
`Thus, because the arbitration agreement grants Uber discretion to send any dispute to arbitration
`and the arbitrator may only award “relief warranted by the claimant’s individual claim,” and not in a
`“representative action,” it deprives consumer of their ability to seek public injunctive relief in any
`forum in violation of McGill.2 See also McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 09-CV-01117-CW, 2017
`WL 4354998, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2017) (Granting plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and
`holding that the defendant’s arbitration provision was unenforceable under McGill); Blair v. Rent-A-
`Ctr., Inc., No. C 17-02335 WHA, 2017 WL 4805577, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017) (holding McGill
`rendered arbitration clause unenforceable with respect to UCL claim).
`The Arbitration Agreement Does Not Permit Public Injunctive Relief Through
`2.
`Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Individual Claims
`
`Although not raised by Uber, the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in DiCarlo v. MoneyLion, Inc.,
`No. 20-55058, 2021 WL 647502 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) presents an outlier ruling on the application
`of McGill but is not controlling in light of the fact that it creates a split decision within the Circuit, as
`well as mischaracterizes the California Supreme Court’s controlling interpretation of California law as
`set forth in McGill. Under California law, claims for public injunctive relief constitute a
`“representative” action—and not an “individual” action—for purposes of applying the McGill rule.
`The Ninth Circuit has already indicated that a private plaintiff who pursues public injunctive
`relief does so in a “representative capacity,” finding in Blair that language in an arbitration agreement
`that prohibits a dispute from being “brought, heard or arbitrated as a class, collective, mass, private
`attorney general, or representative action ... precludes the arbitrator from awarding public injunctive
`relief.” Blair, 928 F.3d at 831 (emphasis added).
`
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`2 Notwithstanding this plain language, Uber argues, “nothing in the Rental Agreement requires Plaintiff
`to waive her right to seek public injunctive relief” (Mot. at 15), as if an explicit clause stating “the
`arbitrator may not award public injunctive relief” were the only possible way to affect this result. The
`Court should rebuff Uber’s attempt to retroactively disguise the arbitration agreement’s true meaning
`in its Motion.
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`Similarly, in McArdle, 772 F. App’x 575 (mem.), the Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed a
`district court’s holding that an arbitration agreement violated McGill where it prohibited plaintiffs from
`bringing claims “as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class action or representative
`proceeding.” McArdle, 2017 WL 4354998, at *4 (emphasis added); see also Tillage v. Comcast Corp.,
`772 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2019), (deeming similar categories of claims to bar public injunctive relief).
`Meanwhile, DiCarlo suggests that the “McGill court made clear that a litigant proceeding as an
`‘individual’ ‘on his or her own behalf’ may ‘request[] public injunctive relief’”, and on this basis held
`that an arbitration agreement which bars a plaintiff from acting as a private attorney general does not run
`afoul of McGill and instead permits public injunctive relief claims to be pursued through an individual
`action in arbitration. But this is a mischaracterization of the reasoning and ruling in McGill. DiCarlo,
`2021 WL 647502, at *6.
`McGill only held “that a request for such relief does not constitute the ‘pursu[it]’ of
`‘representative claims or relief on behalf of others’ within the meaning of Business and Professions
`Code sections 17203 or 17535, such that ‘compli[ance] with Section 382 of the Code of Civil
`Procedure’ is required.” 2 Cal. 5th at 959–60 (emphasis added). That comment was a reference to the
`“threshold issue” of whether a private plaintiff could even seek public injunctive relief under
`California’s Proposition 64, which stated that a plaintiff can “pursue representative claims or relief on
`behalf of others only if [they] meet[ ] [these] standing requirements ... and compl[y] with Section 382
`of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
`§§ 17203, 17535). As McGill explained, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382 “imposes a requirement that the
`action be brought as a class action.” 2 Cal. 5th at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
`Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 978 (2009)).
`Thus, rather than hold that a private plaintiff who seeks public injunctive relief is not acting in
`a “representative capacity” as a general matter, McGill merely held that Proposition 64 only amended
`the standing requirements to seek restitution, not injunctive relief, and therefore that a private plaintiff
`can seek public injunctive relief whether or not the case is certified as a class action. 2 Cal. 5th at 960
`(“[W]e find nothing in the ballot materials for Proposition 64 suggesting an intent to link or restrict
`such relief to the class action context.”); see also Blair, 928 F.3d at 828 (“In McGill, the California
`
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`Supreme Court expressly held that claims for public injunctive relief need not comply with state-law
`class procedures.”) (citing McGill, 2 Cal. 5th at 960).
`Indeed, the arbitration provision at issue in McGill—which even the defendant conceded
`prohibited public injunctive relief, 2 Cal. 5th at 956—stated that “the arbitrator may award relief only
`on an individual (non-class, nonrepresentative) basis,” and prohibited the plaintiff from pursuing “a
`class action, private attorney general action or other representative action.” Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
`In short, McGill is consistent with Blair (as well as McArdle and Tillage) in holding that a
`private plaintiff who seeks public injunctive relief does so in a representative capacity. Accordingly,
`the provision in Uber’s arbitration agreement that prohibits a plaintiff from seeking public injunctive
`relief in any fora, is a “provision related to a ... representative action” that is “unenforceable” under
`McGill. Accordingly, McGill, and not DiCarlo, is the controlling authority on this issue of California
`contract law.3 See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the Ninth
`Circuit is bound to follow the holdings of the California Supreme Court when applying California law).
`Plaintiff’s Injunctive Relief Claim Is Properly Alleged Against Uber
`3.
`Uber argues Plaintiff’s public injunctive relief claim is improperly alleged against Uber because
`(1) Plaintiff merely seeks “compensation for her injury,” with her public injunctive relief claim being
`offered in name only, and (2) Uber no longer owns the “Jump” scooter business, leaving “nothing to
`enjoin.” Mot. at 13-15. The first argument misconstrues the FAC, while the second presents a question
`of fact not relevant to the arbitration determination.
`Plaintiff Seeks Public Injunctive Relief
`i.
`McGill applies here because Plaintiff plainly seeks public injunctive relief in the FAC. In
`McGill, the California Supreme Court broadly acknowledged that an injunction to prevent the
`defendant “from continuing to conduct business via ... unlawful, fraudulent or unfair business acts and
`practices,” qualifies as “public injunctive relief” under California law. 2 Cal. 5th at 955 (emphasis
`added). Indeed, the telltale indicia of public injunctive relief is whether the injunction would confer a
`benefit on unsuspecting members of the public by protecting them from harm they might otherwise
`
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`3 Furthermore, DiCarlo is critically distinguishable on the facts as unlike here, the arbitration
`agreement in that case included an “all-remedies” clause, empowering the arbitrator to issue all
`remedies available to courts. See DiCarlo, 2021 WL 647502, at *3.
`5
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
`Case No. 4:20-cv-06700-JSW
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`Case 4:20-cv-06700-JSW Document 46 Filed 03/23/21 Page 12 of 22
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`suffer in the future. Id. (“[P]ublic injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising
`law is relief that has ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ prohibiting unlawful acts that threaten future
`injury to the general public.”) (quoting Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 21 Cal. 4th 1066,
`1077 (1999)); Blair, 2017 WL 4805577, at *3 (“[W]hen a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief under [the
`UCL and CLRA], their benefits ‘by and large do not accrue to that party, but to the general public in
`danger of being victimized by the same deceptive practices as the plaintiff suffered.’”) (quoting
`Broughton, 21 Cal. 4th at 1080), aff’d, Blair, 928 F.3d at 819.
`Here, Plaintiff seeks an injunction under the UCL compelling Uber to “remove the scooter
`vehicles from use until the public is properly warned about their inherently dangerous condition and/or
`until the scooter vehicles’ defective turn signaling system is replaced or rectified.” FAC, Prayer for Relief
`¶ C. See also ¶¶ 1, 115, 122-127.4 Such relief would undeniably confer a public benefit by removing from
`use the scooters that are currently rentable through Uber’s app until the public receives proper warning
`about their inherently dangerous condition and/or until the scooters feature a functional turn signaling
`system. Not only would this benefit scooter users, but all pedestrians and motorists on public
`thoroughfares who encounter them.5 Moreover, correcting these deceptive and unsafe features also
`benefits consumers’ ability to make safe and rational choices regarding their method of travel.
`Compared to the facts of McGill, it is clear that Plaintiff seeks relief on behalf of the “general
`public” and not merely as “compensation for her injury.” In McGill, the plaintiffs sought injunctive
`relief for Citibank’s deceptive misrepresentations in advertising credit protector plans to Citibank credit
`card holders. Only Citibank credit card holders were able to purchase the credit protector plan, and thus
`according to Uber’s blinkered logic, only Citibank credit card holders would benefit from the injunctive
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`4 Uber conveniently ignores these paragraphs as well as the fact that Plaintiff’s entire eighth cause of
`action is dedicated to public injunctive relief.
`5 See Trivedi, T. K. et al (2019). Injuries Associated With Standing Electric Scooter Use. JAMA
`Network Open, 3. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2722574 (“Of the
`249 patients, 228 (91.6%) were riders and 21 (8.4%) were nonrider pedestrians.”); Yasmin Khorram,
`CDC says there’s an epidemic of e-scooter injuries that could easily be prevented, CNBC, May 1,
`2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/01/cdc-study-says-e-scooter-injuries-are-largely-preventable-
`with-helmets.html (“The majority of injuries occurred on the street, with 29% connected to first-time
`riders and 18% involving motor vehicles.”); Epidemiology and Disease Surveillance Unit. (2019).
`Dockless Electric Scooter-Related Injuries Study, 7. Austin Public Health. https://www.austintexas.gov
`/sites/default/files/files/Health/Epidemiology/APH_Dockless_Electric_Scooter_Study_5-2-19.pdf
`(“Sixteen percent of the incidents with injured riders involved a motorized vehicle. These incidents
`include colliding and swerving, stopping, and jumping off the scooter to avoid a collision.”)
`6
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
`Case No. 4:20-cv-06700-JSW
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`relief the plaintiffs sought. However, the Court rejected Citibank's argument that the plaintiffs were not
`truly seeking public injunctive relief, explaining, “we disagree with Citibank that McGill has failed
`adequately to . . . explain how the public at large would benefit from [the injunctive] relief.” McGill, 2
`Cal. 5th at 957. In so holding, the Court based its decision, in part, on the request for an injunction to
`prevent Citibank from continuing to use “advertising that includes false, misleading or deceptive
`information, and material omissions” in violation of the CLRA and UCL when advertising its credit
`protection plan to its cardholders. Id. at 956-57.
`Here, like McGill, Plaintiff sues under the UCL, alleging Uber “knowingly sold, leased or
`rented scooters that were unsafe for their intended use on public roads or knowingly provided
`inadequate or misleading product literature.” FAC, ¶ 123. Thus, like McGill, the relief sought here
`would enjoin the dissemination of misleading and harmful product literature. See id. (“Defendants’
`product literature fails to provide adequate warnings of danger or instructs riders to operate the scooters
`in an unsafe manner.”). Indeed, the relief sought here presents a far stronger case for qualifying as
`“public injunctive relief” than McGill because the scooters available through Uber’s app endanger
`scooter riders and all others who come into their path.
`Yet, in the face of Plaintiff’s robust public injunctive relief al