`
`
`
`
`
`Peter R Afrasiabi (SBN 193336)
`pafrasiabi@onellp.com
`ONE LLP
`4000 MacArthur Blvd.
`East Tower, Suite 500
`Newport Beach, CA 92660
`Telephone: (949) 502-2870
`Facsimile: (949) 258-5081
`
`John E. Lord (SBN 216111)
`jlord@onellp.com
`ONE LLP
`9301 Wilshire Blvd.
`Penthouse Suite
`Beverly Hills, CA 90210
`Telephone: (310) 866-5157
`Facsimile: (310) 943-2085
`
`Samuel J. Salario, Jr. (pro hac vice)
`sam@bayadvocacy.com
`BAY ADVOCACY PLLC
`1700 South Mac Dill Avenue
`Suite 300
`Tampa, FL 33629
`Telephone: (813) 251-6262
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs,
`K.W., a minor through K.W.’s guardian, Jillian Williams,
`and Jillian Williams, individually, on behalf of themselves
`and all others similarly situated
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORINIA
`
`
`K.W., a minor and through K.W.’s guardian,
`Jillian Williams; and JILLIAN WILLIAMS,
`individually, on behalf of themselves and all
`others similarly situated,
`
`
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`EPIC GAMES, INC., a Maryland corporation,
`
` Case No. 3:21-cv-00976-CRB
`
`CLASS ACTION
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`OR COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
`REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
`
`Hearing Date: April 29, 2021
`Hearing Time: 10:00 AM
`
`Complaint Filed: February 8, 2021
`Trial Date: None Set
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 2 of 19
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................1
`
`FACTS ...............................................................................................................................................3
`
`ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................................5
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Ninth Circuit Precedent Prohibits Epic Games’ Attempt to Moot Plaintiffs’ Claims ...........5
`
`Plaintiffs Bought V-Bucks and Virtual Items from Epic Games ...........................................8
`
`III.
`
`Plaintiffs are Not Required to Arbitrate ................................................................................9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Neither K.W. Nor Ms. Williams are Bound to Arbitrate ..........................................9
`
`Epic Games Has Waived its Right to Non-Class Arbitration .................................12
`
`IV.
`
`Plaintiffs Request Discovery on Jurisdiction and Arbitration .............................................15
`
`CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................15
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`i
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 3 of 19
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Aviation Data, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co.,
`62 Cal.Rptr.3d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ................................................................................... 14
`
`Berg v. Traylor,
`56 Cal. Rptr.3d 140 (Cal. 2007) ................................................................................................... 7
`
`C.W. v. Epic Games, Inc.,
`Case No. 4:19-cv-03629-YGR (N.D. Cal.) ......................................................................... passim
`
`Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez,
`U.S. 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) ........................................................................................................... 8
`
`Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Am. Safety Ins. Servs., Inc.,
`702 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2010) ...................................................................................... 11
`
`Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
`819 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................... 6
`
`Comedy Club, Inc. v. Omprov West Assocs.,
`553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................... 11
`
`ConWest Res., Inc. v. Playtime Novelties, Inc.,
`2007 WL 1288349 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2007) ............................................................................. 13
`
`Crafty Prods., Inc. v. Fuqing Sanzing Crafts Co. Ltd.,
`2016 WL 5720684 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016) ........................................................................... 12
`
`Doctors Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo,
`107 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................... 15
`
`Doe v. Epic Games, Inc.,
`435 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2020) .............................................................................. passim
`
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`Case No. 4:20-cv-5640 ............................................................................................................. 1, 3
`
`Hart v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
`2018 WL 1087846 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2018) ............................................................................ 10
`
`Heidbreder v. Epic Games, Inc.,
`438 F. Supp. 3d 591 (E.D.N.C. 2020) ........................................................................ 9, 10, 11, 12
`
`Hoffmann Const. Co. v. Active Erectors & Installers, Inc.,
`969 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................... 13
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`ii
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 4 of 19
`
`
`Hoffmann v. 162 North Wolfe LLC,
`175 Cal.Rptr.3d 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) ................................................................................. 11
`
`I.C. v. Zynga Inc.,
`2021 WL 51718 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2021) .................................................................................. 15
`
`In re Larry’s Apt., L.L.C.,
`249 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) ........................................................................................................ 8
`
`Laub v. Dep’t, of Interior,
`342 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................... 15
`
`Martin v. Yasuda,
`829 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................................................................. 12, 13, 14, 15
`
`Mavris v. RSI Ent’s., Inc.,
`303 F.R.D. 561 (D. Ariz. 2014) ................................................................................................... 6
`
`McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`2016 WL 3418337 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) ............................................................................. 7
`
`Newirth v. Aegis Senior Communities., LLC,
`931 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2019) ...................................................................................................... 12
`
`Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.,
`653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................. 5, 6, 8
`
`Prestige Cap. Corp. v. Shorebird Homeowners Ass’n,
`2013 WL 5947135 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) ............................................................................. 10
`
`R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc.,
`2020 WL 865420 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2020) .......................................................................... 8, 12
`
`Reynoso v. Bayside Mgt. Co., LLC,
`2013 WL 6173765 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) ........................................................................... 12
`
`T.K. v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`2018 WL 1812200 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2018) ............................................................................ 7
`
`U.S. v. Park Place Assoc’s., Ltd.,
`563 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................... 12
`
`U.S. v. Wilson,
`631 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1980) ........................................................................................................ 1
`
`Statutes
`
`Federal Arbitration Act .................................................................................................................... 14
`
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`iii
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 5 of 19
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`If its arguments here reflect reality, the business success of Fortnite depends on Epic Games
`
`selling virtual stuff to millions of children and then pretending, like Captain Renault in Casablanca,
`
`that it is “shocked, shocked” to find out it is selling virtual stuff to children. Class action claims first
`
`filed here in C.W. v. Epic Games, Inc., Case No. 4:19-cv-03629-YGR, sought to assert legal rights
`
`of children taken advantage of in Fortnite. As described in our opposition to the motion to stay,
`
`Epic Games seeks to evade this Court’s jurisdiction over those class claims so that it might conclude
`
`a settlement in North Carolina state court that would not get approved here. (See Dkt. 21 at 1-3).
`
`In C.W., a minor Fortnite player no different from the plaintiff here brought class claims
`
`seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief from Epic Games on causes of action founded
`
`on a minor’s legal right to disaffirm purchases of virtual items made in Fortnite and related theories.
`
`(See C.W. Dkt. 56 ¶¶ 57-61).1 Epic Games moved to compel arbitration arguing that C.W. accepted
`
`license agreements containing arbitration provisions, including one that “required affirmative
`
`acceptance by an adult.” (C.W. Dkt. 21 at 4). Judge Gonzalez Rogers denied the motion because
`
`C.W. had disaffirmed those agreements, thus eliminating any contractual basis upon which he could
`
`be made to arbitrate. See Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
`
`
`
`Epic Games later tried a motion to dismiss that argued that because C.W.’s Fortnite
`
`purchases were concluded in the Apple (iTunes) and Sony (PlayStation) marketplaces, C.W. had no
`
`disaffirmation claim directly against Epic Games. (C.W. Dkt. 59 at 11; 64 at 7-8). Judge Gonzales
`
`Rogers rejected that argument as well, pointing out in the process that it was inconsistent with Epic
`
`Games’ judicial admissions in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Case No. 4:20-cv-5640, in which it
`
`said that the Apple marketplace was “a payment processing platform for selling digital in-app
`
`content to consumers from which [Epic Games] collects 70 percent of the consumer’s payment.”
`
`C.W. v. Epic Games, Inc., 2020 WL 5257572, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020) (cleaned up).
`
`
`
`Having survived its motions, C.W. was the only class action against Epic Games that was
`
`
`1 In this brief, we cite documents filed in the C.W. and Epic v. Apple cases in this court and
`accessible through CM/ECF. This court may take judicial notice of those records under Fed. R.
`Evid. 201, see U.S. v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980), and we request that it do so.
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`1
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 6 of 19
`
`
`moving ahead. But then one of C.W.’s lawyers left the firm that filed the case, settled C.W.’s claim
`
`with Epic Games on an individual basis, voluntarily dismissed this case, and showed up without
`
`C.W. in North Carolina state court in a sprawling, pre-packaged class settlement of virtually every
`
`consumer claim Epic Games could ever face. (Dkt. 21 at 2-7).
`
`
`
`This case is a continuation of C.W., filed one month after it was voluntarily dismissed. Like
`
`C.W., the plaintiff here is a minor Fortnite player who brings class claims for declaratory, injunctive,
`
`and monetary relief founded on a minor’s legal right to disaffirm purchases of virtual items in
`
`Fortnite and related theories. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1-3). The minor class is defined in essentially the same
`
`way as in C.W., and the claims are essentially the same as those in C.W. (Id. ¶ 56, Counts I, III-V).
`
`For present purposes, the only significant difference between the two cases is that this one also
`
`involves claims brought by the minor’s guardian on behalf of a class of California parents (id. ¶ 57,
`
`Counts II-V), but nothing in the motion to dismiss or compel hinges on that difference.
`
`
`
`Given what the C.W. opinions hold, Epic Games should not have filed its motion here. It
`
`does not argue that Judge Gonzalez Rogers’ rulings were mistaken, so those are a given. And its
`
`efforts to show that this case is different are either factually inaccurate or legally irrelevant.
`
`
`
`First, Epic Games’ assertion that this case is moot because it offered a refund to K.W. (that
`
`K.W. rejected) is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent holding that a defendant cannot moot a class
`
`action by satisfying the named plaintiff’s individual claim. Epic Games’ effort to characterize the
`
`refund as its “acceptance” of a “proposal” K.W. made by disaffirming his contracts—and not an
`
`attempt to moot the case by satisfying his individual claim—does not make sense.
`
`
`
`Second, Epic Games’ assertion that K.W. lacks standing because K.W. did not make any
`
`purchases from it is make-weight. K.W. completed at least one purchase entirely in Fortnite, which
`
`even Epic Games would agree is a purchase from it. And, as in C.W., the record here shows that the
`
`PlayStation and Xbox marketplaces are serving as payment processors. Although K.W. concluded
`
`transactions on those platforms, the transactions were in-game purchases from Epic Games.
`
`
`
`Third, Epic Games’ assertion that K.W. must arbitrate because he clicked agreements
`
`requiring acceptance by an adult was rejected in C.W. Its argument that it believed K.W. was acting
`
`as agent for an adult is wrong because, among other reasons, Epic Games knows that it is dealing
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`2
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 7 of 19
`
`
`with children. Further, Epic Games has waived its right to arbitrate by affirmatively and through
`
`dubious tactics seeking to channel Plaintiffs’ claims to a North Carolina state court for resolution.
`
`
`
`Finally, Epic Games’ motion rests on multiple assertions of fact that are both disputed and
`
`questionable. As described below, Plaintiffs should be granted leave to conduct discovery on the
`
`questions of subject matter jurisdiction and arbitrability.
`
`FACTS
`
`
`
`With respect to the proposed settlement in North Carolina, we rely upon our opposition to
`
`Epic Games’ motion to stay. (Dkt. 21). We deal here with K.W.’s experience playing Fortnite.
`
`Epic Games makes a spectacular amount of money on Fortnite—$2.4 billion in 2018 and
`
`$1.9 billion in 2019. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 15). Eighty-three percent of that comes from Epic Games’ sale in
`
`Fortnite of its virtual currency called V-Bucks. (Id.). Fortnite players use real money to buy V-
`
`Bucks while in the game, which they exchange in-game for virtual items like outfits and dance
`
`moves. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14). Epic Games’ CEO has testified that “[f]rom a business perspective” in-game
`
`purchasing “is an important part of the Fortnite model” because “[i]f users had to leave the app to
`
`purchase digital content, they would be much less likely to do so.” (Apple Dkt. 65 ¶ 7).
`
`A huge number of Fortnite players are minors, a fact Epic Games does not dispute. (Dkt. 1
`
`¶ 16). A survey conducted in late 2018 showed that 61% of all teenagers in the United States have
`
`played the game (id.) and that 45% of parents with kids between the ages of eight and seventeen
`
`have kids who play the game.2 The game is rated T for Teen by the Entertainment Software Ratings
`
`Board, which means minors are in the game’s strike zone.3 Of the six top Fortnite players in the
`
`world, five were minors as of August 2020. (Id.). It is thus clear that the business success of Fortnite
`
`depends on minors making in-game purchases of V-Bucks.
`
`
`2 Common Sense Media, Fortnite Frenzy: New Survey of Parents and Teens Reveals
`Concerns About the Video Game Everyone Seems To Be Playing (Dec. 6, 2018), available at
`https://www.commonsensemedia.org/about-us/news/press-releases/fortnite-frenzy-new-survey-of-
`parents-and-teens-reveals-concerns-and (last accessed Apr. 5, 2021); Laura Wronski, Common
`Sense
`Media
`Survey
`Monkey
`Poll:
`Fortnite,
`available
`at
`https://www.surveymonkey.com/curiosity/common-sense-media-poll-fortnite/ (last accessed Apr.
`5, 2021).
`
` 3
`
` See https://www.esrb.org/ratings/37406/Fortnite/ (last accessed Apr. 5, 2021).
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`3
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 8 of 19
`
`
` K.W. is a twelve-year-old who lives in California. (Declaration of K.W. (“K.W. Decl.”) at ¶
`
`2). K.W. started playing Fortnite in 2018, at the age of nine or ten. (Id. ¶ 3). K.W. made multiple
`
`in-game purchases of V-Bucks, the price of which were stated in the store in Fortnite. (See id. ¶¶
`
`7-8). Because K.W. did not have a credit card or other way to pay electronically, K.W. used payment
`
`information from a father and grandmother and, on one occasion, Plaintiff Jillian Williams.4 (Id.¶¶
`
`at 9-10). K.W. normally went to the grandmother or father and told them what K.W. wanted to buy
`
`and how much it cost in real dollars, paid them the real dollars the V-Bucks cost, and then used their
`
`payment information to complete the purchase in Fortnite. (Id. ¶ 9).
`
`
`
`K.W. made one purchase of V-Bucks when playing Fortnite on his personal computer using
`
`the grandmother’s payment information. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 11). To do that, K.W. went to the virtual store
`
`in Fortnite, picked the V-Buck package K.W. wanted to buy, put in the payment information, and
`
`finished the purchase. (Id. ¶ 7). Fortnite can also be played on certain game consoles—such as
`
`Sony PlayStation, Microsoft Xbox—and according to a 2019 review, as many as 78% of players do
`
`so.5 K.W. played Fortnite on a PlayStation 4 and an Xbox and made multiple V-Bucks purchases
`
`while doing that. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 8). For those purchases, K.W. went to the store in Fortnite and clicked
`
`the desired package of V-Bucks. (Id.). From there, K.W. was automatically directed to the checkout
`
`page of the PlayStation or Microsoft marketplaces, where K.W. would enter payment information
`
`and finish the purchase. (See id.). As far as K.W. could tell, K.W. “was buying the V-Bucks from
`
`Epic Games and just making the payment . . . in the PS4 or Microsoft store.” (Id.).
`
`Epic Games’ effort to characterize V-Bucks buys completed in the Sony or Microsoft
`
`marketplaces as being something other than in-game purchases from Epic Games is unconvincing.
`
`In what may be a Freudian slip, Epic Games’ own declaration calls purchases made while playing
`
`on Xbox and PlayStation “in-game purchases.” (Dkt. 23-3 ¶ 20). And Epic Games’ website
`
`
`4Epic Games has stated that personal data of a woman whose credit card was used for in-
`game purchases (i.e., K.W.’s grandmother) was associated with the account. (Salario Decl. ¶ 3(b)).
`
`5Stijn Wernars, Newzoo’s Battle Royale Sentiment Study: Understanding the Phenomena and
`What Draws Players
`to Particular Franchises
`(Jul.
`11,
`2019),
`available
`at
`https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/newzoos-battle-royale-sentiment-study-understanding-the-
`phenomena-and-what-draws-players-to-particular-franchises/ (last accessed Apr. 4, 2021).
`
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`4
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 9 of 19
`
`
`describes how players make in-game purchases of V-Bucks exactly the way K.W. does—the player
`
`goes to the store in Fortnite, selects the V- Bucks she wants to buy, and completes the order using
`
`the “check-out” system for whatever platform she is playing on—in K.W.’s case PlayStation and
`
`Xbox. (Salario Decl., Ex. A). Public reporting establishes that Sony and Microsoft have the same
`
`economic relationship for Fortnite transactions with Epic Games described in C.W.: Microsoft and
`
`Sony take 30%, and Epic Games keeps 70%.6 Although Epic Games denies having detailed
`
`information about such transactions, it avoids denying that receives a substantial amount of money
`
`for in-game purchases of V-Bucks items completed in this way. (See Dkt. 23-3 ¶¶ 20-21).
`
`K.W. remembers having to click on Fortnite license agreements at various times when he
`
`was playing Fortnite. (K.W. Decl. ¶ 5). K.W. did not understand what they were, what they said, or
`
`that they said anything about the right to bring a case in court. (See id.). K.W. never talked with an
`
`adult about clicking the button before doing so. (Id.). To the extent K.W. clicked on a license
`
`agreement that said it could only be accepted by an adult, he did not know that either. (Id. ¶ 6).
`
`Epic Games thinks it significant that K.W. might play Fortnite again. (Dkt. 23 at 16). K.W.
`
`has no plans to play in the future. (Id. ¶ 13).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I.
`
`Ninth Circuit Precedent Prohibits Epic Games’ Attempt to Moot Plaintiffs’ Claims.
`
`Epic Games’ argument that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because it has refunded K.W.’s
`
`Fortnite purchases (Dkt. 23 at 8-12) is foreclosed by Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081,
`
`1086 (9th Cir. 2011), which holds that a defendant may not moot a class case by paying the named
`
`plaintiff’s claims so long as the plaintiff can still file a timely motion for class certification.
`
`In Terrible Herbst, the defendant in a class action made an offer of judgment for more than
`
`the amount of the named plaintiff’s individual claim. Id. at 1085. After it was rejected, the defendant
`
`argued that the offer satisfied and mooted the named plaintiff’s claims. Id. Reversing an order
`
`dismissing the case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the claims of a named plaintiff in a class action
`
`
`6See, e.g., Kyle Orland, Epic’s Battle for “open platforms: ignores consoles massive closed
`market, Ars Technica (Aug. 14, 2020), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2020/08/as-epic-attacks-
`apple-and-google-it-ignores-the-same-problems-on-consoles/ (last accessed Apr. 5, 2021).
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`5
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 10 of 19
`
`
`are “inherently transitory” in that even if those individual claims go away, other class members will
`
`continue to have the same unresolved claim. See id. at 1089-90 (cleaned up). The court thus held
`
`that a defendant’s satisfaction of a named plaintiff’s claim does not moot a class action because the
`
`claim is “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id. (cleaned up).
`
`Although Terrible Herbst involved an unaccepted offer of judgment and not a refund
`
`tendered upon a minor’s disaffirmation of contracts, the same logic applies. Plaintiffs seek to
`
`prosecute class claims against Epic Games founded upon a minor’s right to disaffirm contracts. In
`
`order to assert those claims as a class representative, K.W. disaffirmed all contracts with Epic
`
`Games. Epic Games has since attempted to moot the case by refunding K.W.’s purchases—a refund
`
`K.W. refused. (See Dkt. 23-1 ¶ 8). As with claims that have been satisfied by an offer of judgment,
`
`K.W.’s claims are “inherently transitory” and “capable of repetition yet evading review” because
`
`Epic Games otherwise could repeatedly moot the claim of any named plaintiff in exactly the same
`
`way. See also Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying Terrible
`
`Herbst to defendant’s escrow deposit of the named plaintiff’s damages); Mavris v. RSI Ent’s., Inc.,
`
`303 F.R.D. 561, 565 (D. Ariz. 2014) (holding that a class action was not moot under Terrible Herbst
`
`even after the named plaintiff accepted an offer of judgment that satisfied her individual claims).
`
`Epic Games asserts that Terrible Herbst does not apply because K.W.’s disaffirmation in the
`
`Complaint was actually a “proposal” to resolve K.W.’s claims that it “honored” and “accepted”
`
`when it tendered a refund. (Dkt. 23 at 8, 11). The statement that Epic Games “honored” or
`
`“accepted” K.W.’s disaffirmation is inaccurate. Both in a letter and in a declaration, Epic Games
`
`was clear that, as far as it is concerned, K.W. has no legal right to disaffirm contracts made through
`
`the Microsoft and Sony marketplaces or with K.W.’s grandmother’s payment information, which is
`
`to say all of the Fortnite in-game purchases at issue. (See Dkt. 18-1 ¶ 19; Salario Decl. ¶ 3(b)).
`
`This is a rejection of K.W.’s right to disaffirm. And it highlights that there is no difference
`
`in principle between this case and Terrible Herbst: Both involve nothing more than a defendant’s
`
`attempt to avoid a class action by satisfying the named plaintiff’s monetary demand. Further, it
`
`shows that Epic Games has not resolved K.W.’s full claim. K.W. seeks a declaratory judgment that
`
`the case may be maintained as a class action, that K.W.’s contracts and those of the class members
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`6
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 11 of 19
`
`
`are legally subject to disaffirmance, and that K.W. and the class are entitled to restitution and interest.
`
`(Dkt. 1 ¶ 65). Thus, even if Epic Games had mooted K.W.’s monetary claims, its rejection of K.W.’s
`
`legal right to disaffirm does not resolve the prayer for declaratory relief. See T.K. v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`
`2018 WL 1812200, at *12 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 2018) (declining discretionary dismissal of an
`
`identical claim for declaratory relief where the defendant tendered a refund to a disaffirming minor
`
`because the declaration “would serve a useful purpose”); McLaughlin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
`
`2016 WL 3418337, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) (holding that plaintiff’s termination of her
`
`relationship with defendant did not moot her class claims for declaratory and injunctive relief).
`
`
`
`Furthermore, Epic Games’ theory of disaffirmation is based on a mischaracterization of
`
`Judge Gonzales Rogers’s decision in C.W. Relying solely on C.W., Epic Games argues that (a)
`
`K.W.’s disaffirmation was a “proposal” to Epic Games, and (b) its “acceptance” moots K.W.’s
`
`claims because he should have sent Epic Games a pre-suit letter disaffirming the contracts so Epic
`
`Games could have accepted it. (Dkt. 23 at 11). But C.W. says nothing of the kind.
`
`
`
`First, C.W. actually says the exact opposite of what Epic Games claims. Relying on settled
`
`disaffirmation law, C.W. holds that disaffirmation does not even require “express notice to the other
`
`party—let alone a pre-suit letter—and that a statement in a complaint is sufficient to initiate a
`
`disaffirmation. See Doe, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1035-36 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (also stating that “any act or
`
`declaration” is sufficient to disaffirm) (cleaned up) (collecting cases); see also Berg v. Traylor, 56
`
`Cal. Rptr.3d 140 (Cal. 2007) (holding disaffirmation announced after a final arbitration award was
`
`sufficient to disaffirm the contract containing the arbitration provision).
`
`
`
`Second, C.W. does not imply that a pre-suit letter might be required. The Court considered
`
`(a) whether the minor had clearly disaffirmed his license agreements as distinguished from his in-
`
`game purchases and (b) whether there was an actual controversy about disaffirmation, not whether
`
`a pre-suit letter was required to disaffirm. Doe, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37. It held that (a) the
`
`statements in the pre-suit letter taken together with statements in the complaint were sufficiently
`
`clear and (b) Epic Games’ failure to respond to a pre-suit letter—taken together with the fact that
`
`Epic Games did not in its submissions to the Court after the complaint was filed agree that the
`
`plaintiff was legally entitled to disaffirm—meant that there was an actual controversy supporting a
`Case No. 3:21-cv-00976
`7
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS/COMPEL
`
`
`
`
`
`1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
`
`10
`
`11
`
`12
`
`13
`
`14
`
`15
`
`16
`
`17
`
`18
`
`19
`
`20
`
`21
`
`22
`
`23
`
`24
`
`25
`
`26
`
`27
`
`28
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-00976-CRB Document 30 Filed 04/05/21 Page 12 of 19
`
`
`declaratory judgment action. See Doe, 435 F. Supp. 3d at 1036, 1044.
`
`Third, Epic Games did not try to moot C.W.’s purchases by refunding them, which should
`
`explain why the opinion days nothing at all about proposal-by-disaffirmation, acceptance, mootness,
`
`or any other idea Epic Games tosses out in support of its argument.7
`
`Epic Games’ assertion that R.A. v. Epic Games, Inc., 2020 WL 865420 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20,
`
`2020), shows that the class claims here are moot mischaracterizes that decision as well. R.A. did
`
`hold that the named plaintiff’s claim was moot after he disaffirmed his contract with Epic Games.
`
`As Epic Games knows, the plaintiff in R.A. never argued that his claims were inherently transitory
`
`or capable of repetition yet evading review, which is what Terrible Herbst is all about.8 (Dkt. 21 at
`
`18-19). R.A. cannot be read to have decided questions that were never briefed or mentioned in the
`
`decision. See In re Larry’s Apt., L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). And even if it could,
`
`R.A.’s abbreviated reasoning is unpersuasive. It hinges solely on the assertion that R.A.’s
`
`disaffirmation “erase[d] the entire basis” of his claims. 2020 WL 865420, at *2. But the court
`
`neither cited any authority for that conclusion nor explained why that was true or why it mooted the
`
`whole class action as distinguished from R.A.’s individual claim. And in the end, Terrible Herbst,
`
`not R.A., is the controlling precedent here, and it requires holding that this case is not moot.
`
`II.
`
`Plaintiffs Bought V-Bucks and Virtual Items from Epic Games.
`
`Epic Games’ argument that Plaintiffs’ lack standing because K.W. never bought V-Bucks
`
`from it is not accurate. K.W. bought V-Bucks directly from the store in Fortnite, which Epic Games
`
`concedes is a purchase from it. (See Dkt. 23 at 7). That K.W. used a grandmother’s credit card is
`
`
`7 Epic Games makes general statements about the law of disaffirmation that it purports to
`support with case citations. (See Dkt. 23 at 10). But none of it amounts to an argument that supports
`its proposal-by-disaffirmation theory of mootness. Epic Games also says, with no citation to
`authority, that the pending settlement in North Carolina means that “there was never any ‘class’ for
`K.W. to represent.” (Dkt. 23 at 11-12). That is wrong. See William B. Rubenstein, 4 Newberg on
`Class Actions § 13:19 (5th ed. 2020) (“A court’s preliminary approval of a proposed class
`settlement—in and of itself—has no effect on parallel actions. . . .”).
`
` 8
`
` That is likely because the plaintiff in R.A. was not pursuing class action claims based on
`the right of disaffirmance. He disaffirmed his contracts with Epic Games solely in connection with
`a dispute about arbitration. (Dkt. 21 at 19 nn. 14, 15). The plaintiff in R.A. did analogize his facts
`to an unaccepted offer of judgment, which the Supreme Court has held is a nullity. See Campbel