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`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`JOSHUA S. LIPSHUTZ, SBN 242557
`jlipshutz@gibsondunn.com
`555 Mission Street, Suite 3000
`San Francisco, CA 94105-0921
`Telephone:
`415.393.8200
`Facsimile:
`415.393.8306
`
`MICHAEL HOLECEK, SBN 281034
`mholecek@gibsondunn.com
`333 South Grand Avenue
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197
`Telephone:
`213.229.7000
`Facsimile:
`213.229.7520
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs
`DOORDASH, INC. and GRUBHUB INC.
`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`DOORDASH, INC. and GRUBHUB INC.,
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
`
`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-05502
`
`COMPLAINT
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
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`Defendant.
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`COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-05502
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`Plaintiffs DOORDASH, INC. and GRUBHUB INC. bring this Complaint for Declaratory
`Relief, Injunctive Relief, and Damages against Defendant CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
`FRANCISCO. By this Complaint, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`The City of San Francisco has taken the unprecedented step of imposing permanent
`1.
`price controls on a private and highly competitive industry—the facilitation of food ordering and
`delivery through third-party platforms—by enacting an ordinance that prevents restaurants and third-
`party platforms from freely negotiating the price that platforms may charge restaurants for their services
`(the “Ordinance”).1 This legislation is unnecessary because restaurants currently have an array of
`options for delivery, including options well below the price control established by the Board (although
`most restaurants have voluntarily chosen options with commissions above the Ordinance’s 15% cap).
`It is also harmful because it likely will lead to reduced choice for restaurants, higher prices for
`consumers, and fewer delivery opportunities for couriers. And it is unconstitutional because it disrupts
`contracts between platforms and restaurants, and permanently dictates the economic terms on which a
`dynamic industry operates. Plaintiffs are committed to help bring renewed vibrancy to the City’s local
`restaurants now that restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have been lifted. But the
`legislation adopted by the Board of Supervisors will do the opposite. Echoing associations and delivery
`couriers who spoke out against this permanent price control because of its anticipated harmful effects,
`Mayor Breed declined to sign the Ordinance because it “oversteps what is necessary for the public
`good.” Left unchecked, the Ordinance’s interference with voluntary, private contracts between
`businesses would set a dangerous precedent for government overreach. It should be struck down.
`The United States and California Constitutions prohibit such government intervention
`2.
`by safeguarding the terms of freely negotiated contracts, protecting the right to contract and pursue
`legitimate business enterprises, and providing for equal protection under the law. Among other aims,
`these constitutional protections seek to prevent political actors from picking economic winners and
`
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` 1 Ordinance No. 234-20 added Article 53 to the San Francisco Police Code and capped fees that
`certain third-party platforms can charge restaurants at 15%.
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`losers, which is precisely the intent of the Ordinance. Through statements made collectively and
`individually, members of San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors have made plain the Ordinance is
`intended to punish the industry for its recent support of Proposition 22, a California ballot initiative
`that passed by an overwhelming majority during the 2020 election, and is intended to make third-party
`platforms less profitable. These are not the legitimate ends of government intervention.
`That the Ordinance lacks a legitimate objective is underscored by the fact that it may
`3.
`actually harm the group it purports to help: local restaurants. Costs to facilitate food delivery that are
`not covered by restaurants will likely shift to consumers—irrespective of whether those restaurants
`would prefer to bear those costs to increase their own sales—thereby reducing order volume, lowering
`restaurant revenues, and decreasing earning opportunities for couriers. There is no evidence that the
`Board of Supervisors solicited or reviewed any studies or data to understand the impact of this extreme
`form of price-fixing, including the negative externalities it will have for San Francisco restaurants,
`couriers, and consumers, or the relationship between what platforms charge restaurants and restaurant
`profitability. Moreover, the Board appears to have ignored these negative externalities, even though
`pointedly raised by couriers and trade associations at the committee hearing where this ordinance was
`first introduced. Furthermore, San Francisco—which ended the most recent fiscal year with a surplus
`exceeding $150 million—has other, lawful means to aid restaurants, such as tax breaks or grants.
`Indeed, it has used such lawful means to aid the City’s nightlife venues.2 But the Board did not adopt
`similar legislation to aid the City’s restaurants in contrast to Mayor Breed, who made $12 million in
`interest-free loans accessible to certain local businesses.3 Rather than limit itself to means consistent
`with the United States and California Constitutions, it chose instead to adopt an irrational law, driven
`by naked animosity and ill-conceived economic protectionism, that violates the United States and
`California Constitutions and exceeds San Francisco’s limited police power.
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`See Amanda Bartlett, SF Board of Supervisors unanimously approves recovery fund to save
`local entertainment venues, SFGATE.COM (updated Feb. 23, 2021), https://bit.ly/3e09ZSV; see
`also Nat’l Restaurant Ass’n, Letter to Governor Andrew Cuomo (Feb. 18, 2021),
`https://bit.ly/3wubYoS (laying out strategies to aid restaurants, including tax breaks and grants,
`but not suggesting any form of price-fixing).
`See Mayor Breed Launches $12 Million San Francisco Small Business Recovery Loan Fund,
`S.F. OFF. OF THE MAYOR (July 8, 2021) https://bit.ly/3hzMYZc.
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`For at least the last century, courts have held that the Constitution prohibits local
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`governments from engaging in such economic protectionism. Further, California courts consistently
`have held that cities may not fix prices to benefit only a segment of the general public—such as one
`industry or group of businesses. See State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40
`Cal. 2d 436, 447 (1953) (holding that a minimum dry cleaning price-setting ordinance was
`unconstitutional because it “protect[s] the industry” which is “only a small segment of the general
`public”); In re Kazas, 22 Cal. App. 2d 161, 171 (1937) (holding that a municipality could not legislate
`minimum barbershop prices to protect barbers).
`For this reason, the only price controls that typically survive constitutional scrutiny are
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`those applicable to public utilities of civic necessities (e.g., electricity, gas, water). But platforms such
`as those covered by the Ordinance here are not so essential to public health or safety, particularly as
`the pandemic abates, that they should be regulated like public utilities. Moreover, unlike a public
`utility—which often is granted a geographic monopoly in exchange for regulated prices—Plaintiffs
`compete vigorously with each other and other platforms, and merchants and consumers can choose
`which platform(s) to use, if any.
`In light of the significant competition, Plaintiffs have always strived for fair contracts
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`that properly value the services that their platforms offer to restaurants. To that end, in April 2021,
`DoorDash introduced new Partnership Plans that provide restaurants with even greater transparency
`and choice, including a Basic Partnership Plan where DoorDash facilitates delivery of online orders,
`for a flat commission rate of 15%. (Tellingly, the vast majority of San Francisco-based restaurants
`who opted into a new Partnership Plan selected plans with 25% and 30% commission rates so as to
`obtain enhanced services to boost sales.) Grubhub’s commission structure is also negotiable with
`restaurants selecting a rate that reflects their desired level of marketing and visibility on the Grubhub
`Marketplace. Further, Plaintiffs have partnered with restaurants, spending hundreds of millions of
`dollars in marketing to enable restaurants to expand the reach of their menus to new consumers because
`when restaurants survive and succeed, so do platforms. As a result, restaurants have had meaningful
`choice in whether and how they use delivery and marketing services from Plaintiffs to grow their
`businesses. For example, restaurants can:
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`a. Choose whether to offer delivery at all,
`b. Choose to facilitate delivery themselves,
`c. Choose which, if any, third-party platform to use,
`d. Choose a third-party delivery option that charges nothing more than credit card
`fees,
`e. Choose a third-party delivery option that charges a flat fee per delivery instead of
`a commission, or
`f. Subject to the cap, choose from a range of commission-based third-party delivery
`and marketing options at different price points, depending on the products and
`services that are best suited to their business’ needs.
`But San Francisco’s permanent cap puts restaurants’ choice in jeopardy. Mayor Breed
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`agrees. In refusing to sign the law, Mayor Breed stated it was “unnecessarily prescriptive in limiting
`the business models of the third-party organizations, and oversteps what is necessary for the public
`good.” Accordingly, through this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
`damages on the grounds that:
`a. The Ordinance violates the Contract Clauses of the United States and California
`Constitutions;
`b. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
`Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the
`California Constitution;
`c. The Ordinance violates Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution (Police
`Power);
`d. The Ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
`and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution (Due Process);
`e. The Ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
`and Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution (Equal Protection);
`f. The Ordinance violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
`Article I, Section 2 of the California Constitution; and
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`g. The Ordinance violates the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
`Constitution.
`In pursuing this action, Plaintiffs seek to vindicate the deprivation of their federal
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`constitutional rights under color of state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, and/or usage. Thus,
`Plaintiffs seek damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also are entitled to attorneys’
`fees and expert fees if they prevail on any of their Section 1983 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
`II.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff DoorDash, Inc. (“DoorDash”) is a Delaware corporation founded in 2013 and
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`is headquartered in San Francisco, California. Since day one, DoorDash’s mission has been to
`empower local businesses by providing access to e-commerce. Its platforms (including the DoorDash
`and Caviar platforms) connect consumers, a broad array of restaurants, and in some cases, delivery
`couriers, each of whom are affected by the Ordinance. DoorDash offers several options to restaurants,
`including Marketplace (DoorDash’s web- and app-based platform that facilitates pick-up and delivery),
`Storefront (an application that enables restaurants to create a branded online store to enable pick-up
`and delivery from their own website, in exchange for payment of credit card processing fees of 2.9%,
`plus $0.30 per order), and Drive (a platform that facilitates delivery of orders originating outside the
`Marketplace in exchange for a flat fee). As such, DoorDash has a beneficial interest in the relief sought
`herein.
`Plaintiff Grubhub Inc. (“Grubhub”) is a Delaware corporation founded in 2004 and is
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`headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Grubhub’s longstanding priority has been to serve restaurants. The
`Company’s online food ordering and delivery marketplace connects consumers, a broad array of local
`takeout and delivery restaurants, and in some cases, independent-contractor couriers that are affected
`by the Ordinance. Grubhub elevates food ordering through innovative restaurant technology, easy-to-
`use platforms and an improved delivery experience, which includes the Grubhub Guarantee to facilitate
`diner satisfaction and protect restaurants’ reputation. Grubhub drives orders to restaurants through its
`Marketplace, while also offering restaurants tools to grow their own digital businesses. These tools
`include Grubhub Direct to develop and manage customized restaurant ordering websites, enabling
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`restaurants to market directly to their diners. As such, Grubhub has a beneficial interest in the relief
`sought herein.
`Defendant City and County of San Francisco (the “City” or “San Francisco”) is a
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`municipal corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California,
`and is a city and county. By naming the City as a defendant, Plaintiffs incorporate allegations against
`City officials in their official capacity.
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`III.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 over all
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`Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims, and has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367
`over the remaining claims. This Court also has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as to
`Grubhub’s claims.
`Plaintiffs bring this action as both a facial challenge and an “as-applied” challenge to
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`the Ordinance, and are excused from exhausting any administrative remedy before the City.
`Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance is invalid (1) on its face, (2) as applied to Plaintiffs, and (3) as
`applied to certain of Plaintiffs’ contracts with San Francisco restaurants.
`Venue is proper in this Court because the Ordinance was enacted by the San Francisco
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`Board of Supervisors, and the violations of Plaintiffs’ rights occurred in this judicial district.
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`IV.
`FACTUAL AND LEGAL STATEMENT
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`A.
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`The Role Of, And Public Debate Over, Commissions Charged By Third-Party Platforms
`Plaintiffs operate third-party platforms in San Francisco that connect restaurants with
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`consumers who wish to purchase food and have it delivered to them or be ready for pick-up by the
`consumer. Consumers can access the platforms via Plaintiffs’ websites or mobile applications on a
`smartphone.
`Other third-party platforms operating in San Francisco and elsewhere in the United
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`States include Uber Eats, Postmates, goPuff, Delivery.com, Slice, and Instacart, among others.
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`The rise of third-party platforms has resulted in the expansion of restaurants’ consumer
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`base. Consumers, who otherwise would not have patronized a restaurant in person or would not have
`discovered a restaurant but for Plaintiffs’ platforms, use the platforms to purchase food from that
`restaurant to be delivered or picked up.
`On most third-party platforms, including Plaintiffs’, independent contractor couriers
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`perform the deliveries of food from certain restaurants to consumers, while other restaurants provide
`their own delivery services. Restaurants may choose to perform other services like marketing, order
`processing, customer support, and technology and product development on their own. Restaurants are
`free to leave Plaintiffs’ platforms at any time for any reason.
`One way Plaintiffs generate revenue to cover their costs is through commissions charged
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`to restaurants. These commissions represent a substantial part of Plaintiffs’ revenue streams.
`The operational costs that Plaintiffs incur include (but are not limited to):
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`a. Platform development, maintenance, and operation;
`b. Marketing of Plaintiffs’ services to consumers, including promotions and
`advertising to drive demand to local restaurants;
`c. Procurement and development of technology, including for payment processing,
`order management, application maintenance, and dispatching technology;
`d. Procurement and development of restaurant-dedicated products, including products
`to manage promotions, order volume, and menu management;
`e. Onboarding delivery couriers, including background checks for every courier on
`Plaintiffs’ platforms;
`f. Ensuring delivery couriers earn fair compensation for their work (which, as required
`by Proposition 22 in California, is at least 120% of the local minimum wage plus
`expenses and tips);
`g. Dedicated customer service specialists to provide support to restaurants, couriers,
`and consumers for orders placed through Plaintiffs’ platforms; and
`h. Safety of Plaintiffs’ platforms, including insurance costs and personal protective
`equipment to protect couriers.
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`Plaintiffs compete amongst each other and with many other companies, and thus have
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`powerful market-based incentives to offer the best overall value proposition to restaurants.
`Restaurant commissions are not one-size-fits-all, and they are often tailored to each
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`restaurant’s needs. These contracts are also good for restaurants—in almost all cases, a restaurant’s
`overall revenue increases when it joins one or more of Plaintiffs’ platforms. For instance, nearly two-
`thirds of restaurants surveyed say they were able to increase their profits during COVID-19 because of
`DoorDash.
`A typical contract between Plaintiffs and a restaurant includes a commission whereby
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`the restaurant agrees to pay Plaintiff a fixed percentage of the price of the consumer’s order. That said,
`restaurants have significant flexibility in how they partner with DoorDash to facilitate delivery.
`Restaurants can partner with DoorDash to facilitate delivery via Marketplace, Storefront, and Drive.
`See ¶ 9. A restaurant that selects Marketplace as the means to facilitate delivery can opt in to one of
`three Partnership Plans at different price points depending on the products and services that are best
`suited to its needs, including a Basic Partnership Plan where DoorDash facilitates the delivery of online
`orders for a commission rate of 15%. However, restaurants can also choose enhanced services by
`opting into the Plus or Premium Packages in exchange for higher commission rates. The vast majority
`of restaurants who have opted into a Partnership Plan in San Francisco have chosen a plan that includes
`a commission greater than 15%.
`DoorDash has used a percentage commission structure with many restaurants for many
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`years such that restaurants only pay DoorDash when they receive an order through the DoorDash
`website or mobile application. DoorDash’s contracts with restaurants—including the percentage
`commission structures contained therein—often last several years (though such contracts are generally
`terminable at will). DoorDash has contracts with over 3,000 restaurants in San Francisco. The vast
`majority of these contracts have been long-term and contain a fixed-percentage commission structure.
`When not artificially capped by law, most of DoorDash’s contracts with restaurants include a
`commission rate greater than 15%, and the commission rates have remained the same or decreased
`since the COVID-19 crisis began.
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`Grubhub has used a percentage commission structure with many restaurants for many
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`years. Restaurants that use products like Grubhub’s Direct Order Toolkit or Grubhub Direct do not
`pay any marketing fees. Restaurants that opt to use the Grubhub Marketplace to generate orders from
`the Grubhub network of more than 30 million diners select a negotiable marketing package that
`typically ranges from 5–20% per order, based on the restaurant’s desired level of marketing support
`and visibility. Even though Grubhub’s contracts with restaurants are terminable at will, its contracts—
`including the percentage commission structures contained therein—often last several years because
`restaurants recognize the value that Grubhub provides. Grubhub has contracts with thousands of
`restaurants in San Francisco. Grubhub’s contracts vary restaurant-by-restaurant, depending on the suite
`of services each restaurant decides is best for its business. For contracts between Grubhub and
`restaurants that include delivery facilitation, the total commission rate is generally greater than 15%
`(largely as a pass-through charge to cover Grubhub’s costs), and the commission rates have not
`increased since the COVID-19 crisis began.
`For several years, there has been a robust public debate about the amount of
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`commissions restaurants pay to third-party platforms. See, e.g., Filling Delivery Gaps, RESTAURANT
`HOSPITALITY (June 13, 2018), https://bit.ly/3eeA52Q; Lori Weisberg, Why restaurants are jumping on
`the food delivery bandwagon, L.A. TIMES (April 11, 2018), https://lat.ms/3e9bI6V; Should your
`restaurant be on Grubhub? BUSINESS.COM (Jan. 13, 2018), https://bit.ly/2xiWPhu; Eve Batey, San
`Francisco Mulls Legislation for Ghost Kitchens and Food Delivery Services, EATER SAN FRANCISCO
`(Feb. 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/3aVvG2F.
`Supervisor Aaron Peskin recently stated that his “office has been working on”
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`commission cap legislation “even actually prior to the [COVID-19] emergency, because reality is,
`emergency or not, we really have an imperative to protect independent restaurants from the exploitive
`and predatory practices of third-party food delivery apps that seek to extract wealth from our local
`economy.” (In fact, Plaintiffs are neither exploitive nor predatory. As just two examples, restaurants
`that partnered with DoorDash were eight times more likely to survive the COVID-19 pandemic than
`those that did not, and three quarters of restaurants agree that Grubhub increases the amount customers
`spend from their restaurant. The fees that restaurants pay in exchange for the services they select from
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`third-party platforms pay for the costs of operating Plaintiffs’ platforms, which ultimately are for
`restaurants’ benefit.)
`Nonetheless, the Board of Supervisors cited the COVID-19 pandemic as its purported
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`justification to pass a temporary “emergency” ordinance that it now has converted into permanent
`legislation, even though the emergency has abated.
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`B.
`
`The Mayor Announces An Emergency Cap On Delivery Commissions In Response To
`The COVID-19 Pandemic
`COVID-19 is a novel virus that began spreading across the United States in early 2020.
`29.
`30.
`On or about February 25, 2020, Mayor Breed declared a state of emergency in San
`Francisco due to COVID-19.
`On or about March 16, 2020, the California Department of Public Health issued
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`guidance for all restaurants to suspend in-restaurant seated dining and offer only drive-through or other
`pick-up/delivery options.
`On or about March 16, 2020, the City and County of San Francisco Department of
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`Public Health issued a shelter-in-place order due to COVID-19. That order was subsequently extended
`several times.
`Beginning in March 2020, Plaintiffs made significant investments during the public-
`33.
`health emergency:
`a. Between March 2020 and May 2020, DoorDash relief programs saved restaurants
`more than $120 million. DoorDash undertook took significant measures to protect
`and support consumers and couriers, and also made significant investments to
`support local restaurants. For example, DoorDash provided a 30-day commission-
`free trial to over 1,400 restaurants in San Francisco that chose to join its platform
`during the pandemic. DoorDash voluntarily reduced commissions for existing
`restaurants by half from April 9, 2020 to May 31, 2020. DoorDash further invested
`millions of dollars to reduce or eliminate consumer fees and to generate more orders
`for restaurants, which helped restaurants keep their doors open for delivery. And
`DoorDash built a new product to enable every independent restaurant or franchise
`
`11
`COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-05502
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`Case 3:21-cv-05502 Document 1 Filed 07/16/21 Page 12 of 72
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`to receive daily payouts to ease cash flow concerns. DoorDash additionally granted
`$250,000 to help San Francisco restaurants make preparations for a winter of
`outdoor dining, with 50 restaurants receiving $5,000 each, in partnership with the
`Golden Gate Restaurant Association. For many restaurants, these measures were
`key to keeping their doors open during the pandemic, paying bills, and retaining and
`hiring additional staff.
`b. Grubhub has dedicated hundreds of millions of dollars to directly support restaurants
`since the pandemic began. Rather than maintaining profits it would have generated
`during the pandemic, Grubhub reinvested these profits to support restaurants,
`including deferred and waived commissions for independent restaurants to provide
`much-needed cash flow relief and Grubhub-funded diner promotions on behalf of
`restaurants, as well as platform improvements. Grubhub’s Community Relief Fund
`collected more than $30 million, which was used to directly support restaurants,
`workers, couriers, first responders, and others impacted by the crisis. Grubhub also
`invested in procedures to help keep consumers, restaurants, and couriers safe.
`On April 10, 2020, Mayor Breed promulgated the Ninth Supplement to Mayoral
`34.
`Proclamation Declaring the Existence of a Local Emergency Dated February 25, 2020 (the “Order”)
`thereby temporarily capping the commissions third-party platforms could charge restaurants. See
`Exhibit A. The Order stated:
`a. “It is in the public interest to take action to maximize restaurant revenue”;
`b. “Capping the per-order fees at 15% will accomplish the legitimate public purpose
`of easing the financial burden on struggling restaurants”; and
`c. “It shall be unlawful for a third-party food delivery service to charge a covered
`establishment a fee per online order for the use of its services that totals more than
`15% of the purchase price of such online order.”
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`COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-05502
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`Case 3:21-cv-05502 Document 1 Filed 07/16/21 Page 13 of 72
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`important service and support
`
`local
`
`On the same day, Mayor Breed held a COVID-19 update4 and issued a press release
`35.
`titled “Mayor London Breed Announces Delivery Fee Cap to Support San Francisco Restaurants
`During COVID-19 Pandemic.” See Exhibit B. At the update and through the press release, Mayor
`Breed announced that:
`a. “Third-party delivery providers can charge restaurants no more than 15%
`commission for food delivery for the duration of the Local Emergency”;
`b. The intent of the Order is to “make sure that our restaurants are protected”5;
`c. The “cap on delivery fees is intended to support small businesses through the
`COVID-19 pandemic”;
`d. “[D]elivery companies provide an
`employment”; and
`e. She drafted the Order “after working with the Golden Gate Restaurant Association.”
`During the COVID-19 pandemic and shelter-in-place orders, many San Francisco
`36.
`consumers relied on third-party platforms to facilitate delivery of food to their homes. Similarly, many
`San Francisco restaurants relied on platforms to facilitate the sale and delivery of their food.
`Accordingly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, restaurant demand for use of Plaintiffs’ platforms
`generally increased.
`The COVID-19 pandemic also caused many of Plaintiffs’ costs to increase. For
`37.
`example, to ensure that delivery couriers could remain active and earning, DoorDash provided free
`personal protective equipment and highly subsidized on-demand healthcare to couriers, and provided
`financial assistance to couriers who tested positive for COVID-19 and those in certain other high-risk
`categories.
`Despite increased demand for Plaintiffs’ platforms and, in many cases increased costs
`38.
`to meet that demand, in many instances, Plaintiffs lowered their commissions.
`
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`4
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`5
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` City and County of San Francisco, COVID-19 update, YOUTUBE (April 10, 2020),
`https://bit.ly/2Rt06ln (relevant portions appear between 10:21 – and 13:26 on the video).
` City and County of San Francisco, April 10, 2020 COVID-19 update, https://bit.ly/2Rt06ln.
`13
`COMPLAINT
`CASE NO. 3:21-CV-05502
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`Case 3:21-cv-05502 Document 1 Filed 07/16/21 Page 14 of 72
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`Throughout early 2021, vaccinations and other public health measures significantly
`39.
`reduced the number of COVID-19 infections in San Francisco and elsewhere throughout the country.
`On or about June 11, 2021, the City and County of San Francisco Department of Public
`40.
`Health issued Order of the Health Officer No. C19-07y, which lifted local capacity limits on business
`and other sectors, local physical distancing requirements, and many other previous health and safety
`restrictions as of June 15, 2021. Order No. C19-07y also suspended the obligation of businesses to
`prepare and post social distancing protocols or in most instances submit health and safety plans to the
`Health Officer. See Exhibit C.
`
`C.
`
`DoorDash Advocates For—And California Voters Overwhelmingly Pass—
`Propo

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