Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 1 of 140
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`Daniel A. Sasse (State Bar No. 236234)
`Joanna M. Fuller (State Bar No. 266406)
`Tiffanie L. McDowell * (State Bar No. 288946)
`CROWELL & MORING LLP
`3 Park Plaza, 20th Floor
`Irvine, California 92614
`Telephone: 949.263.8400
`Facsimile: 949.263.8414
`DSasse@crowell.com
`JFuller@crowell.com
`TMcDowell@crowell.com
`
`Kent A. Gardiner *
`CROWELL & MORING LLP
`1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`Telephone: 202.624.2500
`Facsimile: 202.628.5116
`KGardiner@crowell.com
`* Pro Hac Vice forthcoming
`Attorneys for Plaintiff
`Humana Inc.
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Case No.
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
`JURY TRIAL
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`HUMANA INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
`GILEAD SCIENCES, INC.; GILEAD
`HOLDINGS, LLC; GILEAD SCIENCES, LLC
`(f/k/a BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB &
`GILEAD SCIENCES, LLC); GILEAD
`SCIENCES IRELAND UC (f/k/a GILEAD
`SCIENCES LIMITED); BRISTOL-MYERS
`SQUIBB COMPANY; E.R. SQUIBB &
`SONS, L.L.C.; JANSSEN PRODUCTS, L.P.;
`and JANSSEN R&D IRELAND (f/k/a
`TIBOTEC PHARMACEUTICALS),
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`Defendants.
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 2 of 140
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`C.
`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`G.
`H.
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
`NATURE OF THE ACTION ..................................................................................................... 3
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ................................................................................................. 7
`PARTIES .................................................................................................................................. 8
`REGULATORY BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 11
`A.
`The Regulatory Structure for Approval of Generic Drugs and the Substitution
`of Generic Drugs for Brand Name Drugs. .......................................................... 11
`The Hatch-Waxman Amendments. .................................................................... 12
`B.
`Paragraph IV Certifications. .............................................................................. 13
`C.
`The Benefits of Generic Drugs. ......................................................................... 16
`D.
`The Impact of Authorized Generics. .................................................................. 18
`E.
`DEFENDANTS’ ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT ............................................................... 19
`A.
`The Origin of Gilead’s cART Franchise. ............................................................ 19
`B.
`Gilead and BMS Enter into a No-Generics Restraint Agreement Related to
`Atripla. ............................................................................................................. 21
`Gilead Announces TAF. .................................................................................... 25
`Gilead Enters into a Pay-for-Delay and No-AG agreement with Teva Related
`to Viread. .......................................................................................................... 28
`Gilead and BMS Enter into Pay-for-Delay Agreements Related to Truvada
`and Atripla. ....................................................................................................... 40
`Gilead and Janssen Enter into No-Generics Restraint Agreement Related to
`Complera. ......................................................................................................... 53
`Gilead Introduces Stribild. ................................................................................. 56
`Gilead and BMS Enter into No-Generics Restraint Agreement Related to
`Evotaz............................................................................................................... 57
`Gilead Orchestrates an Unlawful Product Hop from TDF-based Products to
`TAF-based Products Before Generic TDF-based Products Can Enter. ................ 59
`Gilead Amends Its No-Generics Restraint Agreement with Janssen to Include
`Odefsey. ........................................................................................................... 61
`Gilead Further Expands Its TAF-based Product Line with Descovy and Reaps
`the Profits of Its Product-Hopping Scheme......................................................... 64
`Gilead Finally Launches Standalone TAF (Vemlidy) but Strategically Elects to
`Forego Approval for an HIV Indication in Continuing to Impair Competition. .... 67
`INTERSTATE COMMERCE .................................................................................................. 69
`MARKET POWER.................................................................................................................. 70
`A.
`The Markets for Specific cART Drugs. .............................................................. 71
`B.
`The cART Market and Narrower Markets Therein. ............................................ 73
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`MARKET EFFECTS ............................................................................................................... 83
`TOLLING ............................................................................................................................... 84
`IMPACT AND CONTINUING INJURY TO PLAINTIFF ....................................................... 86
`CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................... 90
`DEMAND FOR JUDGMENT ............................................................................................... 136
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 4 of 140
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`Plaintiff Humana Inc. (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action against Defendants Gilead
`Sciences, Inc., Gilead Holdings, LLC, Gilead Sciences, LLC (f/k/a Bristol-Myers Squibb &
`Gilead Sciences, LLC), Gilead Sciences Ireland UC (f/k/a Gilead Sciences Limited) (collectively,
`“Gilead”), Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, E.R. Squibb & Sons, L.L.C. (collectively, “BMS”),
`Janssen Products, L.P., and Janssen R&D Ireland (f/k/a Tibotec Pharmaceuticals) (collectively,
`“Janssen”) (collectively, “Defendants”) under United States antitrust laws and the laws of various
`states. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Since 1981, more than 35 million people worldwide and 700,000 people in the
`1.
`U.S. have died from Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) infection. Despite the advent of
`numerous drugs over the past twenty years, the disease continues to affect millions of Americans.
`As of 2017, more than 1.1 million people in the U.S. were living with HIV and nearly 40,000 new
`patients are diagnosed with the disease each year.
`Gilead dominates the market for antiretroviral drugs, which are essential to
`2.
`effective HIV treatment. It manufactures three of the four best-selling HIV drugs on the market,
`as well as many other drugs that are used in HIV combination antiretroviral therapy (“cART”).
`Presently, more than 80% of U.S. patients starting an HIV drug treatment regimen take one or
`more of Gilead’s products every day.
`Several of Gilead’s HIV medications cost less than $10 to produce; yet for nearly
`3.
`20 years, Gilead has charged health plans like Plaintiff thousands of dollars for a 30-day supply.
`With yearly sales in the U.S. exceeding $13 billion, Gilead has extracted enormous profits from
`its HIV drugs.
`Gilead’s ability to sustain supracompetitive profits in its multi-billion-dollar HIV
`4.
`treatment franchise has been engineered through a comprehensive, illegal scheme to blockade
`competition. Beginning in 2004, Gilead entered into a series of anticompetitive agreements with
`competing cART drug makers to:
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`• Create branded combination drugs, with express bans on using generic
`components to create competitive drugs even after patents on the combination
`drugs expired; and
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 5 of 140
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`• Delay market entry by competing generic manufacturers for years beyond the date
`that Gilead’s patents would have been invalidated, in exchange for protecting the
`generic manufacturers from competition at the point of delayed entry.
`In addition, Gilead engaged in an array of improper, anticompetitive actions to
`5.
`preserve and extend its monopoly cART franchise, including:
`•
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`Intentionally delaying the introduction of safer cART drugs it had developed, so it
`could fully monetize its less-safe drugs while they were insulated from
`competition via Gilead’s anticompetitive agreements;
`• Switching doctors and patients away from patent-vulnerable drugs while Gilead’s
`delayed generic entry agreements were in effect, leaving doctors and patients with
`no generic alternatives;
`• Degrading the efficacy of certain of its products that were more vulnerable to
`competition to induce patients to switch to Gilead’s monopoly products; and
`• Otherwise using false and misleading marketing and treatment indications to
`impede competition and perpetuate Gilead’s monopoly positions.
`
`All of these anticompetitive agreements and actions combined to insulate Gilead’s
`6.
`product portfolio from the drastic price erosion that would have occurred with effective
`competition, and resulted in billions of dollars in annual excess profits that accrued (and continue
`to accrue) to Gilead and its co-conspirators.
`As further explained below, Defendants’ anticompetitive schemes involved
`7.
`unlawful contracts, combinations and restraints of trade in the markets for cART regimen drugs
`and unlawful monopolization in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
`Sections 1 and 2, and various states’ laws.
`As a result of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, Plaintiff paid more for cART
`8.
`regimen drugs than it otherwise would have paid in the absence of Defendants’ unlawful conduct
`and has sustained, and continues to sustain, damages in the form of overcharges paid for its
`members’ prescriptions of cART regimen drugs.
`Plaintiff seeks redress for the economic harm it has sustained as a result of
`9.
`Defendants’ violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 and 2, and
`various states’ laws. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton
`Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 26.
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 6 of 140
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
`Combination antiretroviral therapy regimen drugs are commonly used to treat
`10.
`patients with HIV. HIV can result in Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”) and
`death. Modern antiretroviral cART drug regimens comprise a combination or “cocktail” of drugs,
`most often consisting of two nucleotide/nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors
`(“NRTIs”) taken with at least one antiretroviral drug of another class, such as an integrase
`inhibitor, commonly referred to as “third agents.” Tenofovir, one of the principal NRTIs used in
`cART regimens, was discovered more than 30 years ago and has long since lost any patent
`protection.
`In 2001, Gilead began marketing tenofovir disoproxil (“TDF”) as Viread. TDF is
`11.
`a “prodrug” of tenofovir, meaning that TDF has slight alterations from tenofovir, and, in the
`body, TDF metabolizes into tenofovir. Considering these slight alterations, Gilead’s patents on
`TDF were weak and vulnerable to attack by generic competitors. In light of that threat, Gilead
`entered into a series of agreements with co-conspirators BMS and Janssen to combine their drugs
`and insulate them and their component parts from generic competition. These agreements
`unlawfully restricted competition in ways unnecessary to achieve any legitimate business
`purpose.
`In 2003 and 2004, Gilead began marketing emtricitabine (commonly, “FTC”) as
`12.
`Emtriva. It then launched a fixed-dose combination (“FDC”) drug comprised of TDF and FTC
`called Truvada. Like TDF, FTC became a principal NRTI, and the two together were described
`as the “[r]ecommended NRTI backbone for most initial [cART] regimens.”1 However, also like
`TDF, Gilead’s patent protection on FTC was weak, as Gilead obtained its rights to FTC from
`others who had publicly disclosed FTC over ten years earlier.
`In December 2004, Gilead entered into an agreement with BMS to combine
`13.
`Gilead’s Truvada (TDF/FTC) and BMS’s Sustiva (efavirenz, “EFV”) into an FDC named Atripla
`(TDF/FTC/EFV). At the time, Gilead expected imminent challenges to its patents covering
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`1 HHS Panel on Antiretroviral Guidelines for Adults and Adolescents (Nov. 13, 2014),
`https://clinicalinfo.hiv.gov/en/guidelines/archived-guidelines/adult-and-adolescent-guidelines.
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`Truvada and sought to combine Truvada with Sustiva so that the resulting combination would be
`protected by BMS’s patents. Gilead and BMS aggressively promoted Atripla and induced
`physicians and patients to switch their prescriptions from other TDF-based drugs to Atripla,
`knowing that those physicians and patients would be reluctant to switch back to their earlier,
`standalone drugs when generic versions of those drugs became available. As a result, Gilead and
`BMS could continue to charge supracompetitive prices for Atripla even after standalone generic
`versions of the Atripla components launched.
`The Gilead-BMS Atripla agreement included a “No-Generics Restraint” clause,
`14.
`which barred both parties from using generic versions of each other’s standalone drugs to make
`partially-generic versions of Atripla, even after the patents on their standalone drugs expired. For
`example, BMS could not make a combination drug that would compete with Atripla consisting of
`generic Truvada (TDF/FTC) and Sustiva (EFV).
`In 2009, Gilead entered into an agreement with Janssen to combine Gilead’s
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`Truvada (TDF/FTC) and Janssen’s Edurant (rilpivirine, “RPV”) into an FDC named Complera
`(TDF/FTC/RPV). As with Atripla, Gilead and Janssen aggressively sought to switch physicians
`and patients from other TDF-based drugs to Complera knowing that they could continue to
`charge supracompetitive prices for Complera even after generic versions of Truvada and other
`drugs were launched.
`The Gilead-Janssen Complera agreement included a No-Generics Restraint clause
`16.
`that was broader than the No-Generics Restraint clause in the Atripla agreement. This No-
`Generics Restraint provision not only barred Janssen from making a partially-generic version of
`Complera using generic Truvada (TDF/FTC) and branded Edurant (RPV), but also barred Janssen
`from developing a competitor to Complera consisting of generic Viread (TDF), generic
`lamivudine (“3TC”) — a substitute for FTC that entered the market around January 2012 — and
`branded Edurant (RPV).
`Gilead subsequently entered into an additional agreement with Janssen to combine
`17.
`Janssen’s Prezista (darunavir, “DRV”) with Gilead’s Tybost (cobicistat, “COBI”) into a drug
`named Prezcobix (DRV/COBI) so that Janssen could take advantage of Gilead’s longer-lived
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`patents for COBI. Gilead then entered into a similar agreement with BMS to combine BMS’s
`Reyataz (atazanavir, “ATV”) with Tybost into a drug named Evotaz (ATV/COBI). Both
`agreements contained No-Generics Restraint clauses.
`In 2009, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”) challenged Gilead’s TDF
`18.
`patents. Gilead responded by suing Teva and then entering into an unlawful reverse payment
`settlement agreement with Teva, with the intent and effect of eliminating Teva’s patent
`challenges to Gilead’s core group of TDF-based drugs: Viread, Truvada, and Atripla.
`In February 2013, the day before trial, Gilead and Teva announced a settlement
`19.
`that delayed the introduction of generic Viread by more than 4.5 years until December 15, 2017,
`only six weeks before Gilead’s TDF patents were set to expire. In exchange, Gilead granted Teva
`six weeks of exclusivity as the only seller of generic Viread — a deal that was worth over $100
`million to Teva.
`Then, in February 2014, the day before closing arguments in a trial concerning
`20.
`Gilead’s FTC patents, Gilead and Teva announced another settlement. This one delayed the
`introduction of generic Truvada and Atripla by more than 6.5 years until September 30, 2020, one
`year before the expiration of Gilead’s patents. In return, Gilead granted Teva six months of
`exclusivity as the only seller of generic Truvada and Atripla — a deal that was worth more than
`$1 billion to Teva.
`Gilead entered into separate conspiracies with BMS, Janssen, and Teva to impede
`21.
`and delay competition for its TDF products so that Gilead could delay bringing its safer and more
`effective tenofovir alafenamide (“TAF”) products to market, further extending its cART regimen
`monopoly. Gilead had known since at least 2001 that TAF had significantly fewer risks of side
`effects than TDF. The company had conducted studies on toxicity that demonstrated that TAF
`was far more effective than TDF and could be administered at much lower doses to reduce the
`risk that users would suffer bone loss or kidney damage. Despite this knowledge, once Gilead
`entered into its separate No-Generics Restraint agreements with BMS and Janssen, and conspired
`with Teva to delay competition from Teva’s generic TDF, Gilead intentionally delayed
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`introducing its safer, more effective TAF products for years in order to extend its monopoly on
`TDF-based products.
`22. When Gilead finally began introducing its TAF drugs, it did so in ways that both
`endangered patients and further impeded competition. In 2014, Gilead entered into two
`additional No-Generics Restraint agreements with Janssen, expanding their prior relationship to
`include Gilead’s new TAF platform. The parties agreed to develop Odefsey, a TAF-based
`successor to Complera, and Symtuza, a combination of TAF, FTC, and Prezcobix (DRV/COBI).
`These drugs ultimately launched in 2016 (Odefsey) and 2018 (Symtuza). Gilead also launched
`Stribild (TDF/FTC/EVG/COBI), including elvitegravir (“EVG”), which contained TDF in a
`boosted form, and thus had greater risks for patients. Gilead then highlighted these risks to
`doctors and patients in order to facilitate a switch from Gilead’s TDF-based products to its TAF-
`based products.
`Gilead next declined to apply for FDA approval of standalone TAF, forcing
`23.
`patients who sought the safer formulation of tenofovir to take TAF-based FDCs. Then, when
`Gilead finally did seek approval for standalone TAF, it only sought approval for its use in treating
`Hepatitis B, not HIV, despite concurrently seeking approval of a TAF-based combination product
`to treat HIV. Because Gilead did not pursue FDA approval of standalone TAF as an HIV
`treatment, potential generic competitors were impeded in their efforts to bring competing
`standalone TAF products to market. Doctors also could not prescribe standalone TAF to HIV
`patients for “off label” use with other generic component cART drugs (such as 3TC or generic
`Emtriva) because the dosage of TAF in its standalone form was much higher than in Gilead’s
`TAF-based FDCs.
`In November 2015, Gilead launched its first TAF-based drug, Genvoya
`24.
`(TAF/FTC/EVG/COBI), a TAF-based successor to Stribild. Gilead then exploited the illegal
`agreements it had separately reached with BMS, Janssen, and Teva — which, among other things,
`had created a several year delay in the onset of generic TDF competition — by using that window
`to aggressively shift physicians and patients from TDF-based drugs to TAF-based drugs.
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`This “product hop” scheme was wildly successful for Gilead. By September 2020,
`25.
`when generic Truvada finally came to market, 91% of Gilead’s U.S. prescription base had been
`converted to TAF-based regimens. And even though by this time generic TDF drugs had finally
`entered the market, they were not easily substitutable for the TAF drugs physicians and patients
`were now prescribing and taking. Gilead thus succeeded in further extending its cART monopoly
`franchise.
`The separate horizontal agreements between Gilead and each of its co-conspirators
`26.
`covered more than 75% of all sales of NRTIs, more than 50% of all sales of third agents, and
`more than 75% of all sales of boosted drugs for use in a cART regimen in the U.S.
`In the absence of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, generic versions of cART
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`regimen drugs would have launched years earlier. Competition from TDF-based generics would
`have driven prices down to competitive levels. Gilead also would have brought its safer, more
`effective TAF drugs to market years earlier, and those products would have faced earlier generic
`competition.
`Plaintiff has sustained, and continues to sustain, injuries to its business and
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`property as a result of Defendants’ conduct.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§
`29.
`15 and 26, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, as Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of Sections 1
`and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and seeks injunctive relief under Section
`4 and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) and § 26. This Court has subject-matter
`jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because its state law claims
`are so related as to form part of the same case or controversy as its federal claims. Exercising
`supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims will avoid unnecessary duplication and
`multiplicity of actions and, therefore, promotes judicial economy, fairness, and convenience.
`Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22, 28 U.S.C.
`30.
`§§ 1391(b)-(d), and 28 U.S.C. § 1407. At all relevant times, Defendants transacted business
`within this District, carried out interstate trade and commerce in substantial part in this District,
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 11 of 140
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`and/or have an agent and/or can be found in this District. Defendants sold and distributed the
`relevant drugs in a continuous and interrupted flow of interstate commerce, which included sales
`of relevant HIV cART drugs in the U.S. (including in this District). Defendants’ conduct had a
`direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on interstate commerce in the U.S.
`(including in this District).
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because each Defendant
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`transacted business throughout the U.S. (including in this District); sold and distributed cART
`market drugs, including one or more of the relevant drugs, throughout the U.S. (including in this
`District); engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade for cART market drugs, including
`one or more of the relevant drugs, that was directed at and had the intended effect of causing
`injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing business throughout the U.S. (including in this
`District); entered into agreements for the development and manufacture of cART market drugs,
`including the relevant drugs in the U.S. (including in this District); has registered agents in the
`U.S. (including in this District); may be found in the U.S. (including in this District); and is
`otherwise subject to the service of process provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 22. Defendant Gilead also
`has a principal place of business in California and is at home in this District.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff Humana Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
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`business at 500 West Main Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40202. Humana and its subsidiaries are
`providers of healthcare related services, including insuring risk for prescription drug costs for
`more than 8 million members in all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. More
`than 75% of Humana’s total premium revenues in the year 2012 were derived from contracts with
`the federal government, including Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage and Medicare
`Advantage plans. Humana operates its insurance businesses through a variety of health plans and
`other subsidiaries, all of which have assigned their relevant claims in this action to Humana.2 As
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`2 Some of the subsidiaries, health plan and otherwise, through which Humana conducts insurance
`business and incurs expenses related to HIV cART drugs include the following entities: Arcadian
`Health Plan, Inc., CarePlus Health Plans, Inc., Cariten Health Plan Inc., CHA HMO, Inc.,
`CompBenefits Insurance Company, Emphesys Insurance Company, Health Value Management,
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`a Part D sponsor, Humana is obligated both to recoup overcharges for prescription drugs and to
`return a portion of such recoupments to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”).
`Humana also offers “Administrative Services Only” (“ASO”) services to self-
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`funded health plans across the United States. Under these ASO agreements, Humana’s
`subsidiaries serve as a third-party administrator to self-funded health plans for purposes of claims
`processing and other services.
`At all times relevant to this Complaint, when any of Humana’s members filled a
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`prescription of HIV drugs at a third-party pharmacy, Humana — through its various health plans
`— has paid a large share of the cost of those drugs. For instance, over the relevant time period,
`Humana paid billions of dollars to third-party pharmacies for HIV drugs dispensed to its members
`in all 50 States, as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
`In addition to the expenditures associated with its health plans, Humana has spent
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`millions of dollars on HIV cART drugs that were dispensed through Humana’s own mail-order
`pharmacy and retail pharmacy locations, Humana Pharmacy, Inc. (“HPI”). HPI buys prescription
`drugs from manufacturers and wholesalers and dispenses them to Humana’s benefits plan
`members and patients who are members of non-Humana health plans through its mail-order and
`retail pharmacy businesses.
`Defendant Gilead Sciences, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with a principal place
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`of business at 333 Lakeside Drive, Foster City, California 94404.
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`Inc. d/b/a ChoiceCare Network, Humana Benefit Plan of Texas, Inc., Humana Benefit Plan of
`Illinois, Inc., Humana Employers Health Plan of Georgia, Inc., Humana Health Benefit Plan of
`Louisiana, Inc., Humana Health Company of New York, Inc., Humana Health Insurance
`Company of Florida, Inc., Humana Health Plan of California, Inc., Humana Health Plan of Ohio,
`Inc., Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., Humana Health Plan, Inc., Humana Insurance
`Company, Humana Insurance Company of Kentucky, Humana Insurance Company of New York,
`Humana Medical Plan of Michigan, Inc., Humana Medical Plan of Pennsylvania, Inc., Humana
`Medical Plan of Utah, Inc., Humana Medical Plan, Inc., Humana Pharmacy, Inc., Humana
`Regional Health Plan, Inc., Humana Wisconsin Health Organization Insurance Corporation,
`Humana Health Plans of Puerto Rico, Inc., Humana Insurance of Puerto Rico, Inc., and
`HumanaDental Insurance Company. These entities have assigned their relevant claims in this
`action to Humana Inc.
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`COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`Case 3:21-cv-09621 Document 1 Filed 12/13/21 Page 13 of 140
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`Defendant Gilead Holdings, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with a
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`principal place of business at 333 Lakeside Drive, Foster City, California 94404. Gilead
`Holdings, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gilead Sciences, Inc.
`Defendant Gilead Sciences, LLC (f/k/a Bristol-Myers Squibb & Gilead Sciences,
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`LLC) is a Delaware limited liability company with a principal place of business at 333 Lakeside
`Drive, Foster City, California 94404. Gilead Sciences, LLC is now a wholly owned subsidiary of
`Gilead Sciences, Inc.
`Defendant Gilead Sciences Ireland UC (f/k/a Gilead Sciences Limited) is an Irish
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`unlimited liability company with a principal place of business at IDA Business & Technology
`Park, Carrigtohill, Co. Cork, Ireland. Gilead Sciences Ireland UC is a wholly-owned subsidiary
`of Gilead Sciences, Inc.
`Defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb Company is a Delaware corporation with a
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`principal place of business at 430 East 29th Street, Fourteenth Floor, New York, New York
`10016.
`Defendant E.R. Squibb & Sons, L.L.C. is a Delaware limited liability company
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`with a principal place of business at 430 East 29th Street, 14th Floor, New York, NY 10016. E.R.
`Squibb & Sons, L.L.C. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company.
`Defendant Janssen Products, L.P. is a New Jersey company with a principal place
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`of business at 1125 Trenton-Harbourton Road, Titusville, NJ 08560. Janssen Products, L.P.’s
`employees participated in the negotiation and/or execution of the agreements regarding
`Complera, Odefsey, Prezista, and/or Symtuza. Janssen Products, L.P. is the owner of the New
`Drug Applications for Edurant, Prezista, Prezcobix, and Symtuza. Janssen Therapeutics
`(formerly known as Tibotec Therapeutics), a division of Janssen Products, L.P., sells and
`promotes Edurant, Prezista, Prezcobix, and Symtuza in the U.S.
`Defendant Janssen R&D Ireland (formerly known as Tibotec Pharmaceuticals) is a
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`private Irish company with a principal place of business at Eastgate Village, Eastgate, Little
`Island, County Cork, Ireland. Janssen R&D Ireland is a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson.
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