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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 1 of 104
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`
`
`Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice)
`Robert F. Lopez (pro hac vice)
`HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
`1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Telephone: (206) 623-7292
`Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
`steve@hbsslaw.com
`robl@hbsslaw.com
`
`Ben M. Harrington (SBN 313877)
`Benjamin J. Siegel (SBN 256260)
`HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
`715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202
`Berkeley, CA 94710
`Telephone: (510) 725-3000
`Facsimile: (510) 725-3001
`benh@hbsslaw.com
`bens@hbsslaw.com
`
`
`
`Interim Co-Lead Class Counsel
`
`
`Bonny E. Sweeney (SBN 176174)
`Kyle Geoffrey Bates (SBN 299114)
`HAUSFELD LLP
`600 Montgomery Street, Suite 3200
`San Francisco, CA 94104
`Telephone: (415) 633-1908
`Facsimile: (415) 358-4980
`bsweeney@hausfeld.com
`kbates@hausfeld.com
`
`Eamon P. Kelly (pro hac vice)
`Joseph M. Vanek (pro hac vice)
`Alberto Rodriguez (pro hac vice)
`SPERLING & SLATER, P.C.
`55 W. Monroe Street, 32nd Floor
`Chicago, IL 60603
`Telephone: (312) 676-5845
`Facsimile: (312) 641-6492
`jvanek@sperling-law.com
`ekelly@sperling-law.com
`arodriguez@sperling-law.com
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`
`IN RE GOOGLE PLAY DEVELOPER
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`
`
`Related Actions:
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`No. 3:20-cv-5671-JD
`In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust
`Litigation, No. 3:20-cv-5761-JD
`
` Case No. 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR
`VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN AND
`CLAYTON ACTS (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 15,
`26), CARTWRIGHT ACT (CAL. BUS. &
`PROF. CODE §§ 16700 ET SEQ.) AND
`UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (CAL. BUS.
`& PROF. CODE §§17200 ET SEQ.)
`
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL OF ALL
`ISSUES SO TRIABLE
`
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`
`-
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 2 of 104
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
`
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ................................................................................................ 7
`
`III.
`
`INTRA-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT ......................................................................................... 8
`
`IV.
`
`PARTIES ................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Plaintiffs ................................................................................................................. 8
`
`The Defendants ............................................................................................................ 10
`
`V.
`
`RELEVANT FACTS ............................................................................................................... 11
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The Market for Licensable Smart Mobile Operating Systems .................................... 12
`
`The Google Play Store ................................................................................................. 17
`
`C. While the Android OS is Superficially Open-Source, Google
`Leveraged a Thicket of Contracts, Incentive Payments, and
`Technological Impediments to Maintain an Iron Grip on the Ecosystem
`and to Cement Play’s Dominance. .............................................................................. 19
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`F.
`
`Google Is a Monopolist in the Markets for Android OS App
`Distribution and In-App Payment Processing. ............................................................ 28
`
`Apple Does Not Constrain Google’s Monopoly Power. ............................................. 34
`
`Google Engages in Unlawful Behavior in Order to Restrain Trade and
`to Maintain and Grow Its Monopoly. .......................................................................... 36
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`Google enters anticompetitive contracts with OEMs. ..................................... 36
`
`Google designs and implements technical barriers. ........................................ 39
`
`Google blocks sideloaded applications and app stores from
`auto-updating and advertising through Google Ads. ....................................... 52
`
`Google has, at times, shut down existing consumers’ access to
`competitive stores. ........................................................................................... 54
`
`Google has substantially foreclosed competition by leveraging
`agreements with OEMs to foreclose third-party distribution and
`imposing unreasonable and/or pretextual technological barriers
`that stymie rivals. ............................................................................................. 55
`
`G.
`
`Google’s Unlawful Practices Harm Developers and Competition. ............................. 57
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Google’s monopolization of the market stifles innovation. ............................ 57
`
`Google harms developers by killing competition and
`diminishing consumer choice. ......................................................................... 60
`
`Google also harms developers and competition by depressing
`output. .............................................................................................................. 60
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- i -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
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`

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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 3 of 104
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`4.
`
`Google harms developers by charging a supracompetitive price
`for distribution services for Android OS apps and in-app
`payment processing. ........................................................................................ 61
`
`H.
`
`Google Monopolizes the Market for Android In-App Payment
`Processing for Digital Products. .................................................................................. 67
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`The In-App Payment Processing Market is a relevant antitrust
`market. ............................................................................................................. 67
`
`Google has unlawfully tied Google Play Billing to the Google
`Play Store. ........................................................................................................ 68
`
`But for Google’s anticompetitive tie, Developers would choose
`between a variety of reliable and less expensive payment
`processing options. .......................................................................................... 70
`
`Google’s in-app payment processing tie is not necessary to
`incentivize its investment in the Play Store or Android. ................................. 71
`
`Google’s unlawful tie has led to supracompetitive service fees
`and other anticompetitive effects in the In-App Payment
`Processing Market. .......................................................................................... 72
`
`VI.
`
`INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE ......................................................................... 75
`
`VII. RELEVANT MARKETS ........................................................................................................ 75
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`First Relevant Product Market ..................................................................................... 75
`
`Second Relevant Product Market ................................................................................ 78
`
`Geographic Market ...................................................................................................... 80
`
`VIII. CLASS ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................ 80
`
`IX.
`
`APPLICABILITY OF CALIFORNIA LAW .......................................................................... 83
`
`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`MONOPOLIZATION OF ANDROID APP DISTRIBUTION MARKET
`(15 U.S.C. § 2) ......................................................................................................................... 84
`
`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION OF ANDROID APP DISTRIBUTION
`MARKET (15 U.S.C. § 2) ....................................................................................................... 85
`
`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT -
`MONOPOLIZATION OF MARKET FOR ANDROID IN-APP PAYMENT
`PROCESSING (15 U.S.C. § 2) ............................................................................................... 86
`
`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION OF MARKET FOR ANDROID IN-
`APP PAYMENT PROCESSING (15 U.S.C. § 2) ................................................................... 88
`
`FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`RESTRAINT OF TRADE RE: IN-APP PAYMENT PROCESSING
`(15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3) ................................................................................................................... 89
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- ii -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 4 of 104
`
`
`
`SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT – TYING
`AS ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR RESTRAINT OF TRADE RE: IN-APP
`PAYMENT-PROCESSING (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3) ..................................................................... 90
`
`SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION
`ACT (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ.) ........................................................ 92
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Google’s Conduct is Unlawful .................................................................................... 92
`
`Google Has Behaved Unfairly ..................................................................................... 93
`
`Google Has Behaved Fraudulently .............................................................................. 94
`
`EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE CARTWRIGHT ACT
`(CA. BUS & PROF. CODE §§ 16700 ET SEQ.) .................................................................... 94
`
`NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE CARTWRIGHT ACT;
`TYING AS ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR RESTRAINT OF TRADE
`REGARDING IN-APP PAYMENT PROCESSING (CA. BUS & PROF.
`CODE §§ 16700 ET SEQ.) ..................................................................................................... 96
`
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ...................................................................................................................... 98
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .............................................................................................................. 98
`
`
`
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- iii -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 5 of 104
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`For their suit against Defendants Google LLC, Google Ireland Limited, Google Commerce
`
`Limited, Google Asia Pacific PTE. Ltd. and Google Payment Corp. (collectively, Google), Plaintiffs
`
`Pure Sweat Basketball Inc., Peekya App Services, Inc., LittleHoots, LLC, and Scalisco LLC d/b/a
`
`Rescue Pets on their own behalf and that of all similarly situated U.S. Android OS application
`
`developers, allege as follows:
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`1.
`
`Native applications—apps of various sorts programmed for and downloaded to a
`
`mobile device—bring smartphones and tablets to life. In turn, add-ons for apps—items such as
`
`consumables (for example, extra lives in an adventure game) or subscriptions for full-fledged mobile
`
`productivity apps—make apps more fun or useful. These apps and in-app digital content are created
`
`through the ingenuity, training, investment, and hard work of developers, and the buyers of their
`
`products now include most households in the United States. As of February 2021, 85% of Americans
`
`owned smartphones, and 53% owned tablets.1 Where U.S. consumers buy apps and add-ons depends
`
`on whether their devices run on Apple’s or Google’s respective operating systems. As the
`
`Congressional Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law recently reported,
`
`“both Apple and Google have durable and persistent market power in the mobile operating system
`
`market; iOS and Android run on more than 99% of mobile devices in the U.S. and globally.”2 The
`
`Apple App Store is “the only app store available on iOS devices,” and the “Google Play store is the
`
`primary app store installed on all Android devices.”3
`
`2.
`
`And because the apps and add-ons for iOS and Android devices are incompatible4 (with
`
`all the barriers and switching costs entailed), Apple’s app store does not place competitive pressure on
`
`
`1 http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last accessed July 19, 2021).
`2 Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations,
`Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary,
`United States House of Representatives (October 6, 2020) (“House Report”) at 94, available at
`https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf (last accessed Oct. 21,
`2020).
`3 Id. at 95.
`4 https://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/apple-apps-compatible-android-20369.html (last accessed
`Aug. 15, 2020); see House Report at 94.
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- 1 -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 6 of 104
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`the Google Play Store, particularly regarding the prices that Google charges developers for app-
`
`distribution services. The same is true for in-app purchases (often called “IAP”), which primarily entail
`
`the processing of consumers’ payments for any add-ons they purchased in apps distributed through
`
`Google Play Store (collectively, “in-app digital content”).5 As a result, Google and Apple split the
`
`lucrative mobile apps world between them, with enormous profits for each.
`
`3.
`
`This suit concerns the anticompetitive conduct Google has engaged in to (1) establish
`
`and maintain its monopoly in the market for the distribution of apps that run on the Android operating
`
`system (OS), and (2) extend that monopoly to the market for in-app digital content.
`
`4.
`
`Initially, Google purported to be building an “open ecosystem” that permitted
`
`developers to sell apps to consumers however they choose.6 In reality, through a thicket of agreements
`
`with smartphone manufactures and carriers, “revenue sharing” payoffs, and technical barriers, Google
`
`has constructed an effectively closed ecosystem, i.e., an ecosystem closed to rival app stores. In total,
`
`Google Play now distributes more than 90% of all Android OS apps in the United States, enjoying
`
`monopoly power in the market for the distribution of Android OS apps. Furthermore, Google illegally
`
`ties the Google Play Store to its own in-app payment processor (“Google Play Billing,” or “GPB”)—
`
`requiring all developers selling apps through Google Play Store to sell any in-app digital content
`
`through Google Play Billing. Google also enjoys a monopoly in the market for in-app payment
`
`processing on Android OS.7
`
`
`5 See House Report at 95 (“The App Store and the Play Store do not compete against one another.
`Android users cannot access the Apple App Store, and iOS users cannot access the Google Play Store,
`so the dominance of the Play Store is not constrained by the App Store and vice versa.”) (citation
`omitted); id. at 102 (“high switching costs and a lack of on-device competition means that neither
`firm’s market power is disciplined by the presence of the other.”).
`6 Or as Google’s Donald Harrison put it in a March 2020 email to Tim Sweeny, the CEO of Epic
`Games: “Android continues to be an open ecosystem, where you have multiple options for
`distributing your [app], including through OEM stores.”
`7 While Google has “always required developers who distribute their apps on Play to use Google
`Play’s billing system if they offer in-app purchases of digital goods, and pay a service fee from a
`percentage of the purchase,” it recently “clarified” its Payments Policy “to be more explicit that all
`developers selling digital goods in their apps are required to use Google Play’s billing system.” “[F]or
`those who already have an app on Google Play that requires technical work to integrate [Google’s]
`billing system[,]” Google initially set a deadline of September 30, 2021 for developers to “complete
`any needed updates.” See https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2020/09/listening-to-developer-
`
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- 2 -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 7 of 104
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`5.
`
`Far from maintaining its Android OS apps monopoly in a competitive “open”
`
`ecosystem, Google has and continues to systematically leverage anticompetitive agreements and
`
`technical barriers to secure that monopoly and block potential competition. Google has done so in two
`
`main ways.
`
`6.
`
`First, Google obtained and maintains its monopoly status through agreements with
`
`device manufacturers (often called original equipment manufacturers or “OEMs”). The key agreement
`
`in this respect is the Mobile Application Distribution (“MADA”) Agreement. Any OEM that wants to
`
`preinstall the Google Play Store must sign a MADA Agreement to obtain a license for Google’s must-
`
`have apps—including the popular YouTube and Google Maps apps, which are literally “must-have”
`
`because of Google’s forced-bundling practices.8 And under the MADA Agreements, the manufacturer
`
`is required not only to preinstall Google Play Store but must, in addition, give it premium placement
`
`through a permanent position on the device’s home screen.
`
`7.
`
`As discovery produced so far in this case has revealed, starting in 2019, Google also
`
`began entering new “Revenue Sharing Agreements” (“RSAs”) with OEMs. Under these new RSAs,
`
`Google both (1) expressly prohibits several key manufacturers, in exchange for a share of the revenue
`
`generated through Google Play Store, from loading any app store on certain devices except for the
`
`Google Play Store, and (2) significantly restricts the types of apps those manufacturers can preinstall.
`
`One express purpose of the RSAs is to exclude nascent competitors from the market.
`
`8.
`
`Second, in addition to using a thicket of agreements with OEMs to substantially
`
`foreclose distribution of other app stores,9 Google deploys unnecessary and pretextual technical
`
`barriers to deter consumers from “sideloading” apps. These barriers include (1) default settings to
`
`
`feedback-to.html (last accessed July 15, 2021). Google subsequently extended that deadline to March
`31, 2022. See https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2021/07/apply-more-time-play-payments-
`policy.html (last accessed Nov. 29, 2021).
`8 See House Report at 213 (finding that “Google required that any smartphone manufacturer
`seeking to license Android preinstall Google Search and Google Play Store, alongside a host of other
`rotating apps selected by Google.”) (citation omitted).
`9 See id. at 219 (“Because Google’s Play Store is the primary way that users install applications on
`Android devices, the Play Store effectively functions as a gatekeeper for software distribution on a
`majority of the world’s mobile devices.”)
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
`
`- 3 -
`
`
`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 8 of 104
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`block downloading; (2) misleading official Android security warnings; and (3) other security
`
`mechanisms designed to deter consumers from using a competing app store or downloading apps from
`
`outside the Google Play Store. Google also prevents the automatic updating of apps downloaded
`
`outside Google Play Store and, through its security systems, sometimes disables such apps without a
`
`user’s knowledge.
`
`9.
`
`Google’s pretextual technical barriers create, as the Congressional Subcommittee
`
`explained, “significant friction for sideloading apps to Android devices. … [S]ideloading entails a
`
`complicated twenty-step process, and users encounter multiple security warnings designed to
`
`discourage sideloading.”10
`
`10.
`
` Through this conduct, Google has substantially and intentionally foreclosed
`
`competition, even from otherwise established and successful companies capable of policing their
`
`own stores for malware.
`
`11. Not surprisingly, an internal Google document from 2021 estimates that, in the United
`
`States, only 3% of devices have a user-sideloaded store.
`
`12.
`
`That is precisely what Google intended—to degrade and eliminate alternative channels
`
`of app distribution and in-app content. As Google knows, few Android users are even aware of the
`
`necessary process for going outside the Google Play Store, much less willing to go to such trouble
`
`(and ignore Google’s security warnings) to download an app from a competitor. Its internal documents
`
`show that Google “kn[ew] from [its] data” that “install friction” from sideloading “is not only a bad
`
`experience,” but” that it would “drastically limit [an app’s] reach.”11
`
`13.
`
`Through its anticompetitive conduct, including both its anticompetitive agreements
`
`with OEMs and others and unjustifiable technical barriers, Google has secured, and prevented the
`
`erosion of, monopoly power in the market for distribution of Android OS apps and in the market for
`
`in-app payment processing. Google’s contracts and practices “cut off the air supply” even from well-
`
`
`
`10 Id. at 97.
`11 See also “Download apps to your Android device,” available at: https://support.google.com/
`android/answer/7391672?hl=en&ref_topic=7311596 (last accessed Aug. 15, 2020) (setting forth
`official safety warnings for those who would venture outside Google Play).
`
`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
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`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 9 of 104
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`resourced competitors like Amazon, robbing the marketplace of innovative means of distributing apps
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`at lower costs to developers. By stifling competition, Google deprives consumers of readily accessible,
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`alternative choices in the market for Android OS app distribution and in-app payment processing.
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`14.
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`Google also abused
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`its unlawfully acquired market dominance
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`to
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`impose
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`supracompetitive pricing on developers. Google maintains a default service fee of 30%12 (subject to
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`exceptions for certain kinds of purchases) paid by developers to Google on each sale of non-zero-
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`priced Android OS apps through the Google Play Store and of in-app digital content through (the
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`mandatory) Google Play Billing.13 So if an app or in-app digital content costs $1.99, Google usually
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`takes nearly 60 cents.
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`15. Moreover, as a condition of accessing Google Play Store, Google forces developers to
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`process payments for in-app purchases exclusively through Google Play Billing—at a default cost of
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`30% on each transaction. In other words, Google illegally ties its Google Play Billing solution to the
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`agreement to distribute apps through Google Play Store and then charges a supracompetitive fee for
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`that tied product.
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`16.
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`The anti-competitive effects of this tie are far-reaching; not only does it impose a
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`supracompetitive fee on developers, but it also stymies innovation and limits key ways in which
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`developers manage and develop their businesses. But for that illegal tie, developers could create and
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`use proprietary payment systems or the products of competitors that could compete not just on price
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`but by offering more features and better functionality. The result would be an ecosystem fundamentally
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`enriched by market competition.
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`12 Google’s current and past 70% (developer) / 30% (Google) revenue split is memorialized at
`paragraph 3.4 of its Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement by reference to a Service Fee,
`See
`which
`in
`turn
`is
`linked
`to
`Google’s
`“Service
`fees”
`schedule.
`https://play.google.com/about/developer-distribution-agreement.html (Dev. Agr.) (last accessed Dec.
`3, 2021); https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/112622?hl=en
`(last
`accessed Dec. 3, 2021).
`13 Google also charges developers a $25 fee to set up a Google Play developer account.
`(https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-developer/answer/6112435?hl=en)
`(“There
`is a
`US$25 one-time registration fee … .”) (last accessed Dec. 3, 2021).) This fee helps offset costs that
`Google may claim as justification for its supracompetitive 30% service fee, especially considering the
`sheer number of developers from whom Google collects it.
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`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 10 of 104
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`17.
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`Documents produced by Google confirm that its 30% service fee was picked out of a
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`hat in 2009, when Google launched the earliest version of what is now the Google Play Store. A slide
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`from a January 2009 presentation titled “Apps Marketplace Monetization” is explicit:
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`30% is an arbitrary fee >
`the transaction cost to GOOG (2%).
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`More recent documents confirm the arbitrariness of Google’s pricing—a Google presentation from
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`2021 estimates that processing in-app payments costs Google just 2.6% per transaction.
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`18. What all this shows is that Google could generate a profit while charging developers
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`significantly less than it currently charges—a conclusion confirmed by Google’s own documents, as
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`well as by other benchmarks for competitive rates. Epic, for example, charges a 12% service fee on
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`the Epic Games Store. Another relevant benchmark comes from Google’s own Chrome Web Store.
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`Unlike Google Play Store, the Chrome Web Store faces competition from various distribution
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`channels, and thus Google cannot charge arbitrary anticompetitive rates. Instead, Google charges just
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`5%—a rate that is one sixth the charge for the Google Play Store.14
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`19.
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`By imposing supracompetitive fees on developers, Google extracts more money from
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`developers than they would otherwise have to pay for the distribution of Android OS apps and the
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`payment processing for in-app digital content. But for Google’s exclusionary behavior, competition in
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`the Android app distribution market (as well as the tied market for in-app payment processing) would
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`have eroded Google’s monopoly power and constrained its ability to impose supracompetitive prices.
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`20.
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`In sum, Google’s willful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power in the
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`markets identified, and its abuse of that power (among other things) to impose its supracompetitive
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`distribution and in-app payment-processing fees on U.S. Android OS developers like Plaintiffs, are
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`harmful to competition and, specifically, to developers.
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`14 “The transaction fee for all purchases in Google Play (apps and in-app purchases) is 30% of the
`price the customer pays. In other words, developers get 70% of the payment and the remaining 30%
`goes to the distribution partner and operating fees.” “The transaction fee for app purchases in Chrome
`Web Store is 5% of the app prices. In other words, developers get 95% of the purchase price.” See
`Google Pay Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/paymentscenter/answer/7159343?hl=en-IN
`(last accessed Dec. 3, 2021).
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`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 11 of 104
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`21.
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`Alternatively, if Google is found to be the purchaser of digital products from Android
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`OS developers and to, in turn, sell those products to end-users via Google Play Store or otherwise, then
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`Google acts as a monopsonist, or attempted monopsonist. (A monopsonist is a buy-side monopolist.)
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`The circumstances, effects, and allegations are essentially the same for monopoly or attempted
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`monopoly: Google uses its monopsony power to pay Android OS developers a price below the but-for
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`price they would obtain in a competitive market for their apps and in-app products. Therefore,
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`Plaintiffs’ allegations herein should be understood to also plead in the alternative claims based on
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`monopsony, both for Plaintiffs and the putative class. In either alternative, and as pleaded in this
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`complaint, Google’s behavior violates antitrust and consumer protection laws.
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`22.
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`Plaintiffs seek monetary relief to redress the injuries caused by Google’s past and
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`ongoing conduct, and injunctive relief to stop Google’s ongoing improper, unlawful, and harmful
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`behavior in the relevant markets.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`23.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
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`because Plaintiffs allege violations of federal law, namely, the federal Sherman Act. The Court has
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`supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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`24.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Google LLC and Google
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`Payment are headquartered in this District. All Defendants have engaged in sufficient minimum
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`contacts with the United States and have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and
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`protections of United States and California law, such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them would
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`comport with due process requirements. Further, the Defendants have consented to the exercise of
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`personal jurisdiction by this Court.
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`25.
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`Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Google LLC
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`and Google Payment maintain their principal places of business in the State of California and in this
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`District, because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred
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`in this District, and because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), any Defendants not resident in the
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`United States may be sued in any judicial district and their joinder with others shall be disregarded in
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`SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`010803-11/1709085 V1
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`Case No.: 3:20-cv-05792-JD
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`

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`Case 3:21-md-02981-JD Document 182 Filed 01/24/22 Page 12 of 104
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`determining proper venue. In the alternative, personal jurisdiction and venue also may be deemed
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`proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, because Defendants may be
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`found in or transact business in this District. Furthermore, the Google Play Terms of Service
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`incorporates the Google Terms of Service by reference, and the latter designates this judicial district
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`as the federal venue for this action.15
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`III.
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`INTRA-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
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`26.
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`Pursuant to N.D. Cal. Civil Local Rule 3-2 and General Order 44, this antitrust class
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`action has been assigned on a district-wide basis and is not