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15 16	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION						
17	IN RE GOOGLE PLAY DEVELOPER	Case No. 3:20-cv-05792-JD					
18	ANTITRUST LITIGATION	SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED					
19		CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR					
20		VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 15,					
21		26), CARTWRIGHT ACT (CAL. BUS. &					
		PROF. CODE §§ 16700 ET SEQ.) AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (CAL. BUS.					
22		& PROF. CODE §§17200 ET SEQ.)					
23		DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL OF ALL					
24	Related Actions:	ISSUES SO TRIABLE					
25	Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC,						
26	No. 3:20-cv-5671-JD In re Google Play Consumer Antitrust						
27	Litigation, No. 3:20-cv-5761-JD						





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For their suit against Defendants Google LLC, Google Ireland Limited, Google Commerce Limited, Google Asia Pacific PTE. Ltd. and Google Payment Corp. (collectively, Google), Plaintiffs Pure Sweat Basketball Inc., Peekya App Services, Inc., LittleHoots, LLC, and Scalisco LLC d/b/a Rescue Pets on their own behalf and that of all similarly situated U.S. Android OS application developers, allege as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1. Native applications—apps of various sorts programmed for and downloaded to a mobile device—bring smartphones and tablets to life. In turn, add-ons for apps—items such as consumables (for example, extra lives in an adventure game) or subscriptions for full-fledged mobile productivity apps—make apps more fun or useful. These apps and in-app digital content are created through the ingenuity, training, investment, and hard work of developers, and the buyers of their products now include most households in the United States. As of February 2021, 85% of Americans owned smartphones, and 53% owned tablets. Where U.S. consumers buy apps and add-ons depends on whether their devices run on Apple's or Google's respective operating systems. As the Congressional Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law recently reported, "both Apple and Google have durable and persistent market power in the mobile operating system market; iOS and Android run on more than 99% of mobile devices in the U.S. and globally." The Apple App Store is "the only app store available on iOS devices," and the "Google Play store is the primary app store installed on all Android devices."
- 2. And because the apps and add-ons for iOS and Android devices are incompatible⁴ (with all the barriers and switching costs entailed), Apple's app store does not place competitive pressure on

⁴ https://yourbusiness.azcentral.com/apple-apps-compatible-android-20369.html (last accessed Aug. 15, 2020); *see* House Report at 94.



¹ http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ (last accessed July 19, 2021).

² Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives (October 6, 2020) ("House Report") at 94, available at https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf (last accessed Oct. 21, 2020).

³ *Id.* at 95.

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