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`[Submitting Counsel on Signature Page]
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`IN RE: MCKINSEY & CO., INC.
`NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION OPIATE
`CONSULTANT LITIGATION
`This Document Relates to:
`ALL SUBDIVISION ACTIONS
`
`Case No. 21-md-02996-CRB (SK)
`MASTER COMPLAINT (SUBDIVISION)
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` JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`IV.(cid:3)
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`PREAMBLE ....................................................................................................................... 1(cid:3)
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1(cid:3)
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................... 7(cid:3)
`PARTIES ............................................................................................................................ 7(cid:3)
`A.(cid:3)
`Subdivision Plaintiffs .............................................................................................. 7(cid:3)
`B.(cid:3)
`Defendants ............................................................................................................ 10(cid:3)
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS ................................... 11(cid:3)
`A.(cid:3)
`The Opioid Crisis .................................................................................................. 11(cid:3)
`B.(cid:3)
`Marketing and the Origins of the Opioid Crisis .................................................... 14(cid:3)
`C.(cid:3) What McKinsey Does: “Consulting is more than giving advice.”........................ 17(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Long-Term Partnership with the Pharmaceuticals
`1.(cid:3)
`Industry ..................................................................................................... 21(cid:3)
`The McKinsey Pharmaceuticals and Medical Products Practice
`Group ........................................................................................................ 21(cid:3)
`The Transformational Relationship .......................................................... 26(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`McKinsey and Purdue: A Case Study in Transformation ..................................... 28(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`2004: McKinsey and Purdue Meet ............................................................ 30(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`2007: Purdue Pleads Guilty to Misbranding OxyContin and is
`Bound by a Corporate Integrity Agreement .............................................. 31(cid:3)
`The Sacklers React to the “Concentration of Risk” Posed to Them
`by the Opioid Business. ............................................................................ 33(cid:3)
`Purdue Tasks McKinsey with Boosting Opioid Sales in Light of the
`Guilty Plea and Corporate Integrity Agreement. ...................................... 35(cid:3)
`Purdue Relies on McKinsey. ..................................................................... 38(cid:3)
`McKinsey Delivers. .................................................................................. 39(cid:3)
`a.(cid:3)
`Courting the Regulators: “We All Feel Responsible.”.................. 40(cid:3)
`b.(cid:3)
`The Granularity of Growth ........................................................... 43(cid:3)
`c.(cid:3)
`“Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for
`OxyContin” ................................................................................... 45(cid:3)
`i.(cid:3)
`Marketing – Countering Emotional Messages .................. 45(cid:3)
`ii.(cid:3)
`Targeting – Selling More OxyContin to Existing
`High Prescribers .............................................................. 48(cid:3)
`Titration – Selling Higher Doses of OxyContin ............... 51(cid:3)
`Covered Persons – Sales Quotas and Incentive
`Compensation .................................................................. 53(cid:3)
`Transformation: Purdue and McKinsey Adopt and Implement
`McKinsey’s Strategies. ............................................................................. 55(cid:3)
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`2.(cid:3)
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`H.(cid:3)
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`Page
`Project Turbocharge .................................................................................. 56(cid:3)
`a.(cid:3)
`Targeting High Subscribers .......................................................... 60(cid:3)
`b.(cid:3)
`Circumventing Safeguards Against Abuse and Diversion ............ 65(cid:3)
`c.(cid:3)
`Incentivizing Opioid Sales ............................................................ 66(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Efforts Triple OxyContin Sales ............................................ 67(cid:3)
`9.(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Opioid-Related Work with Other Clients. ........................................ 69(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Endo .......................................................................................................... 70(cid:3)
`a.(cid:3)
`New Blues ..................................................................................... 70(cid:3)
`b.(cid:3)
`Old Friends .................................................................................... 72(cid:3)
`c.(cid:3)
`Opana ............................................................................................ 74(cid:3)
`d.(cid:3)
`Belbuca: Endo’s Answer to Butrans ............................................. 80(cid:3)
`e.(cid:3)
`Turbocharging the Sales Force with a Blitz .................................. 86(cid:3)
`Johnson & Johnson ................................................................................... 89(cid:3)
`a.(cid:3)
`Noramco ........................................................................................ 91(cid:3)
`b.(cid:3)
`Duragesic ...................................................................................... 92(cid:3)
`c.(cid:3)
`Turbocharging Nucynta ................................................................ 93(cid:3)
`Other Manufacturers ................................................................................. 96(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Work with Opioid Distributors ............................................. 97(cid:3)
`4.(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Work with the FDA .............................................................. 97(cid:3)
`5.(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Efforts to Increase the Overall Size of the Opioid Market: the
`Larger the Pie, the Larger the Slice ..................................................................... 102(cid:3)
`McKinsey’s Work Kills People. ......................................................................... 103(cid:3)
`McKinsey Knew that OxyContin Was Highly Abusable, Addictive, and
`Dangerous, and that Its Marketing Strategies Increased Those Harms. ............. 109(cid:3)
`McKinsey Portrays Itself as Part of a Solution to a Problem It was Integral
`in Creating. .......................................................................................................... 112(cid:3)
`Coda .................................................................................................................... 117(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Guilty Again - 2020 ................................................................................ 119(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`A Mea Culpa ........................................................................................... 120(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`A Hedge Fund ......................................................................................... 122(cid:3)
`TOLLING OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ........................................................... 126(cid:3)
`VI.(cid:3)
`VII.(cid:3) HARM CAUSED TO SUBDIVISION PLAINTIFFS .................................................... 128(cid:3)
`VIII.(cid:3) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................. 132(cid:3)
`B.(cid:3)
`Multiple States’ Plaintiffs ................................................................................... 132(cid:3)
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
`§ 1961, et seq. (All Plaintiffs who pleaded RICO claims in
`underlying complaints)............................................................................ 132(cid:3)
`Negligence (All Plaintiffs) ...................................................................... 168(cid:3)
`Gross Negligence (Florida, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington
`Plaintiffs) ................................................................................................. 170(cid:3)
`Negligence Per Se (All Plaintiffs) ........................................................... 170(cid:3)
`Common Law Nuisance (Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
`Louisiana, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
`Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia Plaintiffs) ........... 171(cid:3)
`Civil Conspiracy (All Plaintiffs) ............................................................. 173(cid:3)
`Fraud (All Plaintiffs) ............................................................................... 175(cid:3)
`Aiding And Abetting (All Plaintiffs) ...................................................... 177(cid:3)
`Wanton Intentional Conduct (Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, and
`Tennessee Plaintiffs) ............................................................................... 178(cid:3)
`Declaratory Relief (28 U.S.C. § 2201; N.Y. CPLR § 3001) (All
`Plaintiffs) ................................................................................................. 178(cid:3)
`Alabama Plaintiffs ............................................................................................... 179(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (Ala. Code §§ 6-5-121, 6-5-122, 11-1-2) ..................... 179(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Drug Nuisance (Ala. Code § 6-5-155) .................................................... 181(cid:3)
`California Plaintiffs ............................................................................................. 182(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3479, 3480) ................................... 182(cid:3)
`Florida Plaintiffs ................................................................................................. 184(cid:3)
`Civil Remedies For Criminal Practices Act (Fla. Stat. §§ 772.101 et
`1.(cid:3)
`seq.) ......................................................................................................... 184(cid:3)
`Georgia Plaintiffs ................................................................................................ 184(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (O.C.G. § 41-2-2) (Georgia County Plaintiffs) ............ 184(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Drug Dealer Liability Act (O.C.G. § 51-1-46)........................................ 186(cid:3)
`Kentucky Plaintiffs.............................................................................................. 186(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Failure to Warn ....................................................................................... 186(cid:3)
`Louisiana Plaintiffs ............................................................................................. 188(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`False Advertising (La. Rev. Stat. § 40:6245(A)) .................................... 188(cid:3)
`Michigan Plaintiffs .............................................................................................. 190(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Drug Dealer Liability Act (MCL 691.1402 et seq.) ................................ 190(cid:3)
`Ohio Plaintiffs ..................................................................................................... 190(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Absolute Public Nuisance ....................................................................... 190(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Injury through Criminal Acts (R.C. § 2307.60) ...................................... 194(cid:3)
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`Engaging in a Pattern of Corrupt Activity (R.C. 2923.21 et seq.) .......... 197(cid:3)
`3.(cid:3)
`Oklahoma Plaintiffs ............................................................................................ 203(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (50 O.S. § 16) ............................................................... 203(cid:3)
`Tennessee Plaintiffs ............................................................................................ 204(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (Tenn. Code § 29-3-101(B)) ........................................ 204(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Drug Dealer Liability Act (Tenn. Code § 29-38-105, et seq.) ................ 205(cid:3)
`Virginia Plaintiffs ................................................................................................ 205(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Public Nuisance (Va. Code § 15.2-900).................................................. 205(cid:3)
`2.(cid:3)
`Willful and Wanton Negligence .............................................................. 208(cid:3)
`N.(cid:3) West Virginia Plaintiffs ...................................................................................... 209(cid:3)
`1.(cid:3)
`Intentional Acts and Omissions .............................................................. 209(cid:3)
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................. 210(cid:3)
`JURY DEMAND ............................................................................................................ 211(cid:3)
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`I.
`
`PREAMBLE
`This complaint is an administrative device as described in In re Propulsid Prods. Liab.
`Litig., 208 F.R.D.133, 142 (E.D. La. 2002), for the specific purpose of enabling the Court to
`address the threshold issues it articulated in its statements and Orders to date, and does not
`supersede the complaints filed in the individual actions consolidated in this multi-district
`litigation for pretrial proceedings only. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am., 574 U.S. 405, 413 n.3
`(2015). This Complaint is not intended to consolidate the Plaintiffs’ claims for trial. This
`Complaint does not include every Plaintiff-specific fact alleged in the underlying complaints,
`including facts related to individual damages. This complaint incorporates by reference the
`complaints filed by individual subdivision Plaintiffs pending in this MDL as of November 22,
`2021.
`
`This Complaint does not concede that a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over
`any Plaintiff’s case or claim where that Plaintiff filed a timely motion to remand. Any properly-
`made objections to removal are preserved. Some Plaintiffs have filed motions to remand based on
`the absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. By joining in the filing of this complaint, these
`Plaintiffs do not waive their right to seek remand of their cases to the state courts in which they
`were originally filed.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`1.
`For more than two decades, the opioid crisis has raged across this country. An
`opioid-related public health emergency was declared by the President in 2017. Last year was the
`worst on record, with drug overdoses soaring nearly 30%.1 Today, there are increasingly few
`Americans whose lives have not been affected by the consequences of opioid dependency,
`addiction, and overdoses.
`2.
`McKinsey is a management consulting firm with operations across the globe. It
`played a central role in the unfolding, propagation, and exploitation of the opioid crisis by
`advising multiple opioid manufacturers and other industry participants how to sell as many
`
`1 Betsy McKay, “U.S. Drug-Overdose Deaths Soared Nearly 30% in 2020, Driven by Synthetic Opioids,” Wall Street
`Journal, July 14, 2021, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-drug-overdose-deaths-soared-nearly-30-in-
`2020-11626271200.
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`opioids as conceivably possible. Knowing that its clients’ products were highly addictive,
`ineffective, and unsafe for the treatment of long-term chronic pain, non-acute pain, and non-
`cancer pain, McKinsey developed a singular focus on increasing opioid sales, no matter the
`resultant cost to society. McKinsey did this for well over a decade, despite knowing full well the
`risk to public health and safety and the widespread economic harm from developing and
`implementing the transformation of strictly-controlled substances into top-selling blockbuster
`drugs.
`
`The purpose of McKinsey’s work with its opioids clients was at all times to
`3.
`maximize return on investment. The whole point for those clients (and hence McKinsey) was to
`make as much money as possible. They all did. This relentless drive to increase sales and create
`greater availability of opioids was made with no concern about the parallel, known, and inevitable
`increase in opioid-related deaths, addiction, abuse, diversion, and misuse.
`4.
`In the world of management consulting, McKinsey is preeminent. It is one of the
`world’s oldest, largest, and most lucrative consulting firms and is generally seen as the most
`prestigious firm in the industry. More consiglieri than one-off advisor, McKinsey touts its model
`of engaging in “transformational partnerships” with its clients. McKinsey learns each client’s
`business intimately, embeds itself into all levels of the corporate hierarchy, and provides granular
`strategies to achieve transformative goals for its clients.
`5.
`Marvin Bower, the managing director of McKinsey from 1950 to 1967, was “the
`father of the consulting profession.”2 He “turned the business of selling management advice into a
`keystone of American corporate culture,” and is “credited with taking a fledgling industry and
`setting its course not only as to the kinds of services it could sell but also the standards it must
`uphold for its work to be respected.”3 A lawyer by trade, Bower stressed that management
`consulting should be seen as an emergent profession, akin to the law or accounting, with
`obligations to clients and to the broader society that extend beyond the mere commercial.
`
`2 Douglas Martin, Marvin Bower, 99; Built McKinsey & Co., N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2003, available at:
`https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/24/business/marvin-bower-99-built-mckinsey-co.html
`3 Id.
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` Bower instilled an ethos at McKinsey that has been reinforced throughout the
`6.
`decades as a core value of the firm: “Deliver the bad news if you must, but deliver it properly.”4
`Bower’s principles, and the values he imparted within McKinsey, are said to guide the firm to the
`present day. “In many ways, certainly in spirit and soul, Marvin continued to lead it after he
`retired, and he leads it still,” eulogized Rajat Gupta, McKinsey’s then-global managing partner, at
`Bower’s funeral in 2003.5
`7.
`This case is, in large part, about the firm’s failure to adhere to Bower’s simple,
`foundational tenet. It arises instead from the firm’s steadfast and continual work to maximize
`opioid sales in partnership with numerous clients during the pendency of the worst man-made
`epidemic in modern medical history. It is about McKinsey never delivering the “bad news” of
`opioids’ devastating impact on Plaintiffs and the public, properly or otherwise, and instead
`looking the other way for money.
`8.
`When it came to opioids, McKinsey did far more than just give advice. Not only
`did it suggest courses of action that its clients should adopt, the firm remained in place and
`worked collaboratively alongside its clients to actually implement McKinsey’s recommendations
`to achieve objectives jointly identified by the clients and McKinsey. McKinsey stood alongside
`its clients in the arena doing the deeds.
`
`4 Duff McDonald, The Firm 35 (2014).
`5 Id. at 270. In many ways, Gupta was an interesting figure to opine on Bower’s legacy. Indeed, Gupta’s leadership of
`McKinsey is in many respects to be contrasted with Bower’s legacy. Many of the values Bower emphasized—an
`emphasis on professionalism over commercial exploitation, for example—were jettisoned under Gupta’s tenure as
`managing partner of the firm, which ended in 2003. “Under his watch, McKinsey began to chase top billings in a way
`it never had before.” Id. at 234. For instance, McKinsey first began accepting equity stakes in clients as a form of
`incentive compensation during Gupta’s tenure. Previously, McKinsey only charged standard fees for its consulting
`services as Bower disdained the notion of taking equity stakes in clients. Id. at 234. Under Gupta, McKinsey also
`began to allow consultants’ compensation to be tied to client performance. Id.
`Consistent with Gupta’s efforts to monetize McKinsey’s consulting business in ways previous firm
`leadership had not, McKinsey also began to expand its client base. “While the firm would never admit as much,
`under Gupta, McKinsey began working for just about anyone with a fat bank account and a checkbook.” Id. at 266.
`Institutions age, and by the time Gupta came to lead the firm in 1994, McKinsey was a mature institution. It
`had built up significant value in its reputation by historically advising only “blue chip” companies “at the top of the
`corporate pyramid.” Id. Under Gupta, McKinsey began the process of realizing that value. For McKinsey, the way to
`monetize an elite reputation was to start advising those it historically may have shunned as clients—to start offering
`its imprimatur, in addition to its services, for money. McKinsey’s work with opioid manufacturers began under
`Gupta’s leadership.
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`The deceptive marketing strategies that McKinsey and its clients invented,
`9.
`developed, deployed, and continually refined for years to expand the market for opioids are
`foundational to the epidemic.
`10. McKinsey worked hand-in-hand with major opioid manufacturers, including
`Purdue Pharma L.P., Endo Pharmaceuticals,6 Johnson & Johnson,7 and Mallinckrodt8 for years.
`At the same time, McKinsey advised other participants in the opioid supply chain, including
`distributors, pharmacies, and even regulators.
`11.
`In particular, McKinsey advised the Sackler family and their company, Purdue, for
`years while Purdue aggressively marketed OxyContin, widely viewed as the taproot of the opioid
`crisis. The relationship began no later than 2004. In the years following Purdue’s 2007 guilty plea
`for misleadingly marketing OxyContin, McKinsey continued to work closely with Purdue to
`dramatically increase OxyContin sales, notwithstanding the existence of a five-year Corporate
`Integrity Agreement that Purdue entered as part of its guilty plea.
`12. McKinsey knew of the dangers of opioids and in particular the prior misconduct of
`Purdue but nonetheless advised Purdue and other opioid manufacturers to improperly market and
`sell OxyContin and other prescription opioids, supplying granular sales and marketing strategies
`and remaining intimately involved throughout implementation of those strategies. McKinsey’s
`actions resulted in a surge in sales of OxyContin and other opioids that fueled and prolonged the
`opioid crisis.
`For years, McKinsey advised Purdue on, designed, and helped to implement
`13.
`various strategies to raise sales of OxyContin by focusing on high dose sales and deceptively
`messaging to physicians that OxyContin would improve function and quality of life. For example,
`McKinsey urged Purdue to maximize sales by dictating, to a greater degree, which prescribers its
`sales representatives would target, exploring ways to increase the amount of time those sales
`
`6 “Endo Pharmaceuticals” or “Endo” refers to Endo Health Solutions Inc., Endo International plc, and Endo
`Pharmaceuticals Inc., collectively.
`7 “Johnson & Johnson” refers to Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary Janssen
`Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Janssen”).
`8 “Mallinckrodt” refers to Mallinckrodt LLC and Mallinckrodt plc, together.
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`representatives spent in the field increasing opioid sales and prioritizing OxyContin in incentive
`compensation targets.9
`14. McKinsey’s partnership with Purdue reached its fever pitch in the summer of
`2013. In January of that year, Purdue’s Corporate Integrity Agreement expired, and Purdue was
`no longer bound by its constraints. Within months, the Sacklers tasked McKinsey with
`transforming Purdue’s approach to OxyContin sales in order to extract as much money as
`possible from the remaining patent life of the drug.10
`15.
`In response, McKinsey developed and proposed Project Turbocharge, a series of
`transformational changes that McKinsey proposed to implement at Purdue to dramatically
`increase OxyContin sales by re-tooling Purdue’s sales force and investing large amounts of
`capital to “turbocharge” it. “[O]ur recommendation is that Purdue makes a clear go-no-go
`decision to ‘Turbocharge the Sales Engine’,” McKinsey told Purdue on August 8, 2013.
`16.
`The Sacklers chose “go,” and McKinsey subsequently implemented and
`continually refined Project Turbocharge at Purdue over the course of years, to devastating, but
`profitable, effect.
`17. McKinsey has recently been the subject of scrutiny for its various business
`practices, including its work facilitating the opioid crisis with Purdue.11 On March 7, 2019, Kevin
`Sneader, McKinsey’s then-global managing partner, addressed all McKinsey employees
`regarding this scrutiny. Drawing inspiration from Theodore Roosevelt, Sneader stated,
`
`[W]e cannot return to a time when we were in the background and unobserved.
`Those days have gone. Indeed, I have little doubt that scrutiny—fair and unfair—
`will continue. It is the price we pay for being “in the arena” and working on what
`matters.12
`
`9 PPLPC012000437346
`10 OxyContin, like any branded pharmaceutical, is subject to eventual patent expiration and competition from generic
`opioid manufacturers.
`11 See Michael Forsythe and Walt Bogdanich, McKinsey Advised Purdue Pharma How to ‘Turbocharge’ Opioid
`Sales, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2019, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/business/purdue-
`pharma-mckinsey-oxycontin-opiods.html.
`12 See “The Price We Pay for Being ‘In the Arena’”: McKinsey’s Chief Writes to Staff About Media Scrutiny and
`Scandal, Fortune Magazine, March 8, 2019, available at https://fortune.com/2019/03/08/mckinsey-staff-letter-kevin-
`sneader/. The “arena” reference is to Citizenship in a Republic, a speech delivered by Theodore Roosevelt at the
`Sorbonne on April 23, 1910:
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`18. Weeks later, McKinsey announced that it would no longer work for any opioid
`manufacturer. “Opioid abuse and addiction are having a tragic and devastating impact on our
`communities. We are no longer advising clients on any opioid-specific business and are
`continuing to support key stakeholders working to combat the crisis.”13
`19.
`The price for being in the arena is more than mere scrutiny. McKinsey is liable for
`its misconduct and the harms it caused or exacerbated. McKinsey is liable for its successful
`efforts to increase opioid sales for years. It continued this work unabated and with alacrity despite
`events as stunning as Purdue’s 2007 guilty plea for misbranding OxyContin, Purdue’s 2015
`settlement with the State of Kentucky, and numerous other enforcement actions related to opioid
`sales and marketing by McKinsey clients. Through it all, McKinsey remained steadfast in its
`efforts to promote opioid sales for all of its clients for the purpose of maximizing return on
`investment without regard to the obvious implications of what they were doing. Indeed, the firm
`endeavored alongside its clients to increase the size of the overall opioid market for nearly two
`decades, until as late as March 22, 2019, despite increasingly blood-red flags along the way.14
`
`It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where
`the doers of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the
`arena [here, McKinsey; and the arena, opioid sales], whose face is marred by dust and sweat and
`blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort
`without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great
`enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in
`the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring
`greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory
`nor defeat.
`As it happens, Mr. Sneader is not the only McKinsey person to draw inspiration from Roosevelt. Citizenship
`in a Republic similarly inspired Dominic Barton, the man Mr. Sneader succeeded as McKinsey’s global managing
`partner. It served as the basis for his 2017 address to the Ivey Business School in Canada. See Dominic Barton In the
`Arena: Leadership in an Age of Disruption, October 17, 2017, available at: https://www.ivey.uwo.ca/media/
`3780710/daquino_lecture2017.pdf. While McKinsey continues to preach the values of corporate integrity from the
`Bower area, its actions show that it has moved far afield from its professed moral compass.
`13 See Paul La Monica, Consulting firm McKinsey no longer working with opioid maker Purdue Pharma, CNN, May
`24, 2019, available at: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/business/mckinsey-purdue-pharma-oxycontin/index.html.
`The statement was attributed to McKinsey as an entity. No individual’s name was attributed.
`14 See “About McKinsey’s past work for opioid manufacturers,” last updated March 22, 2021, available at:
`https://www.mckinseyopioidfacts.com (“We decided nearly two years ago to end all work on opioid-specific
`business . . . .”)
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`III.
`
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`20.
`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action for the reasons stated in
`each underlying complaint.
`21.
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over McKinsey