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`Rachel W. Dempsey (SBN 310424)
`rachel@towardsjustice.org
`David H. Seligman (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`david@towardsjustice.org
`TOWARDS JUSTICE
`2840 Fairfax Street, Suite 220
`Denver, CO 80207
`Tel: (720) 441-2236
`
`Rafey Balabanian (SBN 315962)
`rbalabanian@edelson.com
`Yaman Salahi (SBN 288752)
`ysalahi@edelson.com
`P. Solange Hilfinger-Pardo (SBN 320055)
`shilfingerpardo@edelson.com
`EDELSON PC
`150 California St., 18th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: (415) 212-9300
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class
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`
`
`TAJE GILL, ESTERPHANIE ST. JUSTE,
`and BENJAMIN VALDEZ, individually and
`on behalf all others similarly situated,
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`
`
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` Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a
`Delaware corporation, and LYFT, INC., a
`Delaware corporation,
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`
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`Defendants.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`1
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`ELECTRONICALLY
`F I L E D
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`Superior Court of California,
`County of San Francisco
`06/21/2022
`Clerk of the Court
`BY: KAREN VALDES
`Deputy Clerk
`
`CGC-22-600284
`
`
`Case No.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT:
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`(1) Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
`Code §§ 16720, et seq.,
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`(2) Providing Secret Payments or
`Commissions, Cal. Bus. & Prof.
`Code § 17045, and
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`(3) Unlawful, Unfair, And Fraudulent
`Business Practices, Cal. Bus. &
`Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
`COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 3 of 34
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`Plaintiffs Taje Gill, Esterphanie St. Juste, and Benjamin Valdez, individually and on behalf
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`of others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, bring the following allegations against
`Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Lyft, Inc.
`INTRODUCTION
`Defendants Uber and Lyft operate a powerful duopoly that controls an
`1.
`approximately $61 billion rideshare industry.
`In California, Defendants maintain their duopoly and exploit their drivers through
`2.
`persistent violations of California antitrust and consumer protection laws.
`First, Defendants label their drivers independent contractors, yet deprive those
`3.
`drivers of economic independence by fixing the prices that drivers must charge to customers for
`rides. This is a form of vertical price fixing that is per se illegal under California’s Cartwright Act.
`Vertical price fixing harms drivers and customers by allowing Uber and Lyft to
`4.
`increase customer prices even while suppressing driver pay. If drivers could set prices for their
`rides, they could offer lower prices to consumers on the platform that offered the drivers the most
`competitive compensation. By preventing drivers from doing so, Uber and Lyft harm competition
`in both the labor market as well as the consumer market. Customers pay more, and drivers earn
`less.
`
`In addition to vertical price-fixing, Uber and Lyft each adopt non-price restraints
`5.
`that are designed to limit competition between Uber and Lyft with respect to driver compensation
`and working conditions. One of these practices is to keep driver compensation so low when
`measured on a per-ride basis that drivers have no choice but to participate in game-like
`compensation packages that offer drivers a premium payment if, for example, they can complete
`a certain number of trips within a short period of time (such as a weekend). These practices are
`designed to make it harder for Uber and Lyft drivers, nominally independent contractors, to switch
`between ride-hailing platforms based on which would pay them more.
`Since their inception, both Uber and Lyft have built their business models on
`6.
`classifying their drivers as independent contractors. They have always maintained that their drivers
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 4 of 34
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`are independent contractors and not employees, both in litigation and in public statements made to
`press and investors. In 2020, Uber and Lyft spent tens of millions of dollars each to fund
`Proposition 22, a ballot initiative to exempt app-based companies like Uber and Lyft from
`otherwise-applicable employment requirements.1
`Relying on their insistence that their drivers are independent, Uber and Lyft have
`7.
`avoided paying a broad range of benefits for workers and taxes to the government, including
`unemployment insurance premiums, minimum wage, and payroll taxes.
`Of course, if Uber and Lyft conceded that their drivers are employees protected by
`8.
`labor standards, they could exert control of this sort. Firms can set the prices their employees
`charge customers, and they can dictate when and where their employees work.
`9.
`But Defendants have consistently insisted that their drivers are independent
`contractors. To defend this suit, they cannot take a contrary position that drivers are employees
`without admitting to liability for withholding wages and benefits to millions of workers.
`10.
`The statutory independent contractor status created by Prop 22, even if that measure
`is constitutional, also does not protect Uber and Lyft from the claims alleged here. Nothing in Prop
`22 immunizes Defendants from California law prohibiting unfair competition and unlawful and
`fraudulent business practices.
`Uber and Lyft are either employers responsible to their employees under labor
`11.
`standards laws, or they are bound by the laws that prohibit powerful corporations from using their
`market power to fix prices and engage in other conduct that restrains fair competition to the
`detriment of both drivers and riders.
`Therefore, having opted to treat their drivers as third-party independent contractors
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`rather than in-house employees, Uber and Lyft now must lie in the bed they have made. Antitrust
`laws protect fair competition by ensuring that businesses (whether they are large corporations,
`small companies, or independent contractors) make economic decisions in an independent manner.
`But Uber and Lyft have each adopted vertical restraints that constrain the economic independence
`
`1 Prop 22 passed, but on August 20, 2021, a California superior court found that Prop 22
`is unconstitutional and unenforceable. Castellanos v. California (Super. Ct. S.F., No.
`RG21088725). That decision is currently on appeal.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 5 of 34
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`of their drivers. They have structured their businesses to have it both ways, denying drivers the
`rights owed to employees while also denying them meaningful independence.
`13. With this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to permanently enjoin Defendants from fixing
`prices for rideshare services, withholding fare and destination data from drivers when presenting
`them with rides, imposing other non-price restraints on drivers, such as minimum acceptance rates,
`and utilizing non-linear compensation systems based on hidden algorithms rather than transparent
`per-mile, per-minute, or per-trip pay. Plaintiffs also seek treble damages for suppressed
`compensation on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated.
`PARTIES
`Plaintiff Taje Gill is a natural person and resident of the State of California.
`Plaintiff Benjamin Valdez is a natural person and resident of the State of California.
`Pliantiff Esterphanie St. Juste is a natural person and resident of the State of
`
`14.
`15.
`16.
`California.
`Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
`17.
`place of business in San Francisco, California
`Defendant Lyft, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
`18.
`in San Francisco, California.
`
`JURISDICTION & VENUE
`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to California
`19.
`Business and Professions Code §§ 16750, 17070, 17203 and 17204. This Court has personal
`jurisdiction over the parties because Defendants have their principal places of business in
`California and because Defendants transact business in, and this action arose from transactions
`conducted in, this county.
`Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §§
`20.
`395 and 395.5, and Business and Professions Code § 16750, 17070, 17203 and 17204 because
`Defendants’ principal place of business is San Francisco County.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 6 of 34
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`I.
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`COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`Uber’s and Lyft’s Business Models
`Uber and Lyft are both “ride-hailing” companies that dispatch drivers to customers
`21.
`on demand. Riders use the Uber and Lyft mobile phone apps to request a driver who can transport
`them by private car from one point to another. In response to a request, the rider receives a fare
`quote and, if the request is for immediate service, an estimated wait time.
`Once the rider orders the ride, the app pairs the rider with an available driver based
`22.
`on some combination of the driver’s current location, the rider’s current location, whether the
`driver’s vehicle is sufficient to the rider’s trip request, and other factors known only to Defendants.
`The terms of the transaction between driver and passenger are dictated by Uber and
`23.
`Lyft. Uber and Lyft receive a request from a passenger, determine the price of the trip for the
`passenger, assign the passenger to a driver, determine the pay the driver receives, accept payment
`from the passenger, determine what amount the companies will take from the transaction, and
`provide payment to the driver.
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`Rideshare drivers are not paid for the time they are available to accept rides
`(“activated”) but not yet dispatched, nor are they compensated for the costs they incur in
`performing their work, such as auto maintenance, insurance, or gasoline.2 Drivers are also not paid
`for time or distance from their starting location, where they accept an offered trip, to the trip’s
`pick-up location for the rider. Uber and Lyft only pay drivers for time when they have a passenger
`in the car.
`The cost of the trip to the rider and the pay to the driver are both determined by
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`Uber and Lyft based on hidden algorithms not disclosed to drivers or riders. These algorithms
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`2 Prop 22 provides drivers with a minimum wage guarantee of 120% of the local
`minimum wage, plus 30 cents per mile for expenses, for all active time (i.e., time driving to pick
`up a passenger or with a passenger in the car). There is no wage guarantee and no wages
`provided for time spent waiting for the app to assign a ride. In practice, few drivers receive an
`expense reimbursement, because fares are generally higher than the guarantee. For example, the
`minimum wage guarantee on a 30-minute, 10-mile trip in a city with a $12/hour minimum wage
`would provide a driver with a guarantee of $10.20. If a fare is $11, the driver would receive no
`additional mileage reimbursement or additional pay, even if he or she did not get assigned
`another rider for the rest of the hour and therefore earned less than minimum wage for that hour.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 7 of 34
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`consider flat base rates, time, and distance, along with variables such as vehicle type and region.
`The algorithms also take into account other factors that the companies do not disclose.
`The amount Uber and Lyft decide to pay the driver is decoupled from the amount
`26.
`they decide to charge the customer, meaning that it is not a simple percentage of the customer’s
`payment for the ride. In addition, Uber and Lyft retain the right by contract to adjust the passenger
`fare and dock driver pay if they determine the driver took an inefficient route.
`Uber and Lyft pocket the difference between what a customer pays the company
`27.
`and what the company pays a driver for each trip. This amount is known as the “take rate.” The
`greater the take rate, the more money Uber and Lyft keep from each transaction, and the less
`drivers take as compensation. To maximize profit, the companies are incentivized to charge
`passengers as much as possible and pay drivers as little as possible. Neither customers nor drivers
`are informed of the take rate.
`In fact, in the last several years, passenger prices have soared even as driver pay
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`has dwindled.
`As explained below, Uber and Lyft have steadily increased their average take rates
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`through various unfair methods of competition that limit driver independence and exclude
`competitors from offering a product that is better for both drivers and customers.
`Uber’s and Lyft’s Vertical Price-Fixing
`II.
`To position themselves to increase their profits, Uber and Lyft have structured their
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`pricing schemes around vertical price fixing that harms both drivers and rides.
`Each time a driver accepts a ride on Uber or Lyft, the companies’ apps set the price
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`that riders must pay using secret algorithms that are hidden from both drivers and riders. Drivers
`have no ability to adjust the price a customer must pay for a ride. For example, Uber’s contract
`with drivers explicitly provides that “you [driver] agree to charge the Rider Payment to the Rider
`at the amount recommended by us.” Lyft requires drivers to enter a similar agreement.
`Riders who request an Uber or Lyft to a given destination receive a price directly
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`from Uber or Lyft.
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 8 of 34
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`At the moment when the driver commits to provide the ride, the driver does not
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`know what price Uber or Lyft will charge the passenger.
`This scheme requires drivers to agree to surrender their pricing autonomy to Uber
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`and Lyft as a condition of working with the companies, even though Uber and Lyft classify them
`as independent contractors. In this way, the companies’ vertical price restraints deprive drivers of
`any power over the price customers are paying for their services.
`Uber admits this practice is a form of vertical price-fixing. In 2019, an arbitrator
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`from the American Arbitration Association considered federal antitrust claims brought by a
`consumer against Uber. In the course of the proceeding, Uber acknowledged that the consumer
`plaintiff’s allegations about Uber’s conduct pled a vertical price fixing or resale price maintenance
`arrangement. The arbitrator concluded that “Uber’s individual relationships with its drivers [was]
`. . . vertical in nature in regard to the prices paid by riders and the amount earned by drivers,” and
`that “[t]he pricing was controlled and set by Uber.” (emphasis added).
`Uber’s and Lyft’s vertical price fixing of fares is anticompetitive for both drivers
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`and consumers.
`Vertical price-fixing is core to Uber’s and Lyft’s maintenance of their duopoly and
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`helps to insulate both companies from competitive pressures over take rates.
`There are over 200,000 Uber and Lyft drivers in California.
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`Uber and Lyft have the market power to implement market-wide price increases
`without fear that consumers or drivers would flock to a competitor that would offer a lower take
`rate for the benefit of drivers and riders.
`In the absence of vertical price fixing, Uber and Lyft drivers would naturally offer
`40.
`lower prices to riders on whatever rideshare platform (whether Uber, Lyft, or otherwise) offered
`the drivers better compensation. If drivers could set prices for the rides they provided, they would
`be incentivized to offer lower prices to consumers on the platform that offered them a greater share
`of the earnings by implementing a lower take rate.
`For example, assume Company A offers drivers 30% of each fare, and Company B
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`offers drivers 40% of each fare. If drivers were permitted to set ride prices with either company,
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`they would offer consumers better prices through Company B than through Company A. If the
`driver’s goal is to make $10 off a ride, they would need to charge $33.33 for the ride through
`Company A, but could charge $25 for the same ride through Company B. By setting their own
`fares, drivers would steer passengers to Company B. To attract customers, Company A would need
`to offer more favorable compensation to its drivers—which in turn would result in lower prices
`for its riders.
`Price fixing is not necessary for Uber and Lyft to be able to arrange rideshare
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`services through their apps. For example, in the months leading up to the November 2020 election
`in which Prop 22 was on the California ballot, Uber launched a pilot program whereby California
`drivers had some discretion to set their own prices, expressed as a multiple of the Uber-fixed price.
`In other words, they could set their price higher or lower than whatever fare Uber assigned to the
`transaction (e.g., 1.2x or 0.8x), although the actual value of the fare still was not disclosed to them
`in advance of accepting the ride.
`Shortly after Prop 22 was enacted, Uber stripped drivers of any autonomy over
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`price setting, eliminated its policy of independent fare-setting, and returned to its price-fixing
`scheme.
`Uber’s and Lyft’s price fixing conduct has allowed them to increase passenger fares
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`substantially in recent years. Many passengers have assumed that driver pay is increasing as well,
`and sometimes lower the amount they tip drivers in response to that perception. The truth is that
`driver pay has decreased, with the fare increases largely going straight to Uber and Lyft. In 2019,
`Uber’s and Lyft’s take rate was estimated to be approximately 35 to 40 percent. In 2021, take rates
`appeared to increase to as high as approximately 70 percent of the passenger fare.
`If drivers had pricing autonomy, they could use that autonomy to set lower prices
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`while shopping among apps for the take rate that would allow them to earn the most. Meanwhile,
`Uber and Lyft (along with any new market entrants) would face competitive pressure to attract
`drivers and therefore customers to their platforms by lowering their take rates and offering drivers
`higher compensation for their work. Instead, under the current price-fixing regime, consumers pay
`more and drivers earn less.
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`III.
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`Surge Pricing for Drivers and Riders
`Both Uber and Lyft vary consumer prices via hidden algorithms during certain
`46.
`times and in certain locations. This pricing strategy, which operates differently for riders and
`customers, is a key component of how Uber and Lyft fix prices for riders, mislead drivers, and
`manipulate competition.
`47. When they were first introduced to customers, Uber called these price variations
`“surges”; Lyft called them “Prime Time.”
`As Uber and Lyft initially grew their customer and driver base, they characterized
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`price fluctuations as a way to clear the market for both drivers and riders with minimal wait times
`for both parties. According to them, larger surges in response to excess demand would induce more
`drivers and deter riders, and smaller ones in response to excess supply would do the inverse.
`Over time, the companies have fine-tuned algorithms that estimate with great
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`specificity the maximum amount an individual rider is willing to pay for a ride at any given time
`before they switch to another ridesharing app or choose not to take the trip at all.3 The riders quoted
`the highest fares are those with either the greatest ability to pay, or the fewest transportation
`alternatives. The apps can infer this by analyzing how customers respond to fare variation in both
`experimental and natural settings. The apps can also consider the rider’s location and individual
`characteristics (such as physical disabilities), both of which indicate the availability of functional
`transportation alternatives. The apps surveil and track that data, as they themselves disclose.
`50. When Lyft and Uber first began to do business, they pocketed a set percentage of
`the passenger fare—either 20 or 25 percent—on each ride completed. Therefore, during a surge,
`drivers’ pay increased by the same surge multiplier as the passenger’s payment.
`Starting in 2016, however, the companies decoupled the fare paid by riders from
`51.
`the payments made to drivers. This enabled Uber and Lyft to simultaneously increase the prices
`for customers while lowering compensation to drivers, thereby increasing the companies’ take
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`3 Uber has been documented quoting higher fares to individuals whose mobile phone
`batteries are running low, figuring they are less likely to multi-home among rideshare apps or opt
`for alternative transportation options.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`rates. The shift undermined the companies’ purported justification for price surges, which they
`publicly claimed reflected proportional increases in driver pay to induce more drivers to get on the
`road during times of high demand. Under the new pricing structure set by Uber and Lyft, Uber’s
`and Lyft’s Surge and Prime Time pricing do not lead to proportional increases in driver pay.
`Uber and Lyft still charge customers for surges based on multipliers of the base
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`rate, but the multiplier used is no longer disclosed to customers. In neither app are customers
`informed by how much surge or Prime Time pricing increases the fare.
`The fares that Uber and Lyft charge customers during busy times can be many times
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`the base rate.
`54. Whereas Uber and Lyft increase customer prices by using multipliers that are not
`disclosed to either drivers or riders, drivers receive incentive offers of flat dollar amounts rather
`than multipliers of the passenger fare during busy periods. These flat dollar amounts do not
`increase proportionally to the cost of the ride to the passenger, meaning that the surge incentive
`amounts provided to drivers are often much smaller than the surge price presented to riders. The
`algorithm may show different surge incentive amounts to drivers in the same area.
`Because the surge prices that Uber and Lyft fix for riders can be many times the
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`additional payment provided to drivers, Uber and Lyft are able to use surges to drive up take rates,
`fixing high prices for riders while passing on only a fraction of that increased price to drivers.
`Even though drivers’ surge bonus is relatively small compared to the surge price
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`charged to riders, many drivers plan their driving around surges because per-trip pay is too low to
`take too many rides without a surge bonus attached to them. In other words, to make money, some
`drivers “must chase a surge.” This makes drivers particularly vulnerable to unlawful, unfair, and
`deceptive practices related to how Uber and Lyft deploy surges.
`For Uber drivers, surges appear on driver maps as either orange or red spots that
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`show a dollar bonus for a pickup in that area.
`For Lyft, surges appear as a “Personal Power Zone,” which is a pink or purple area
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`on driver maps. A driver who drives to a purple Personal Power Zone receives an increased
`payment on their next ride, and if they advance to a pink Personal Power Zone, the payment
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`increases further. Personal Power Zone increases grow the longer a driver spends within the zone,
`although there are many factors that can void the additional pay. For example, if a driver does not
`accept or cancels the first ride they are offered after becoming eligible for an increased payment,
`the opportunity for the increased payment lapses entirely. It also lapses if the driver leaves the
`Personal Power Zone. In addition, the app retains the ability to assign a driver to a ride outside of
`the Personal Power Zone that is ineligible for a bonus, even if the driver themselves is in the
`Personal Power Zone when the assignment is received.
`Lyft recently replaced the Personal Power Zone with the Bonus Zone. The Bonus
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`Zone operates similarly to the Personal Power Zone except that it is a flat amount that does not
`grow over time, and it does not disappear if the driver leaves the Bonus Zone area.
`Because it takes time for drivers to reach an area where a surge incentive amount
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`is being offered, drivers can begin driving to a surge area, only for the surge incentive amount to
`drop or disappear by the time they arrive. Disappearing surge incentives persuade drivers to begin
`driving if they were not already on the road or to continue driving when it is unprofitable, without
`actually providing drivers with the extra compensation that they believed they would receive.
`In addition, drivers en route to or in an area offering surge incentive amounts may
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`be assigned to rides outside of a surge area. If they do not accept those rides, they face
`consequences like losing access to information about future rides before acceptance, and if they
`cancel those rides after accepting them, they risk discipline including deactivation.
`Exclusive Commitment Incentives
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`In addition to the surge incentive amounts that Uber and Lyft offer to drivers for
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`picking up passengers during periods of high demand, Uber and Lyft operate other secretive
`compensation schemes administered through hidden algorithms that are geared towards inhibiting
`drivers from switching between apps (i.e., multi-homing) to find the platform that offers the best
`compensation to drivers at a particular time.
`These compensation schemes can be described as “exclusive commitment
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`incentives” because they provide drivers with incentive payments that cannot be accessed unless
`they effectively commit to working exclusively for the app offering the incentives, no matter how
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`unfavorable the terms of the rides may be, as opposed to switching between apps for more
`favorable rides. Limiting drivers’ ability to switch between apps reduces the extent to which Uber
`and Lyft need to compete with one another to attract drivers to their platforms.
`As with surges, exclusive commitment incentives are important to drivers because
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`Uber’s and Lyft’s baseline per-trip pay is too low to profit as a rideshare driver. At the basic rates
`Uber and Lyft provide, drivers may not even make minimum wage for every hour of their work if
`they have to spend time between rides waiting for a passenger request, and they may not break
`even after expenses such as gas and maintenance.
`For Uber, the most significant of these commitment incentives is called a “Quest.”
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`Quests operate as follows: weeks are divided into two segments, weekdays from early morning
`Monday to early morning Friday, and the weekend from early morning Friday to early morning
`the following Monday. Before the start of one of these segments, the driver is presented with
`several options for how many rides they will commit to fulfilling before the end of the segment,
`each of which corresponds to a payment of a certain amount. Options may range from 20 rides for
`a lower-end payment to 90 rides for a higher-end payment. The driver must select an offer before
`the segment begins.
`Uber also offers Consecutive Trip boosts, which require drivers to complete a series
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`of consecutive rides offered by the app without cancelling any rides, rejecting any offers, or “going
`offline” (i.e., making oneself unavailable to receive ride assignments from the app). Accepting a
`ride offered by Lyft or another competitor would break a streak and make a driver ineligible for a
`Consecutive Trip boost.
`Lyft operates a system called a “Ride Challenge,” which is similar to Uber’s Quests.
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`Drivers presented with a Ride Challenge receive a certain number of rides and a corresponding
`payment amount. If they complete the specified number of rides within a certain time period, they
`receive that payment.
`Lyft also provides drivers with “earnings guarantees,” which promise drivers that
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`they will not make below a certain amount of money for a certain number of rides in a given period
`of time (for example, at least $1,000 for 70 rides between Friday and Monday). Drivers have no
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`Case 3:22-cv-04379 Document 1-1 Filed 07/28/22 Page 14 of 34
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`prior information about when or whether the algorithm will offer them these guarantees and no
`ability to plan around them.
`In addition, Lyft offers Streak Bonuses, which require drivers to accept all of the
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`rides offered by Lyft consecutively and to stay online for the duration of the streak (excepting the
`option of a brief 15-minute break). Pursuing a streak for Lyft means drivers cannot accept Uber
`rides while the streak is active.
`Screenshots showing a Quest and a Ride Challenge are below in Figures 1 and 2,
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`respectively.
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`(Figure 1.)
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`(Figure 2.)
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`During a commitment incentive period Uber and Lyft can exercise considerable
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`control over drivers, including by preventing them from multi-homing by switching back and forth
`between apps.
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`Uber’s and Lyft’s control over drivers is especially strong at the end of a
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`commitment incentive period. When nearing the end of a particular Quest or Ride Challenge, for
`example, drivers are particularly unwilling to multi-home, no matter how unfavorable the
`compensation terms for the rides that the app is offering them.
`Uber’s and Lyft’s leverage over drivers during a commitment incentive period
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`pressures drivers to accept all offered rides. This is because Uber and Lyft can stop presenting
`rides to drivers that have rejected a ride, thereby preventing them from obtaining the promised
`bonus. They can pres