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`BOTTINI & BOTTINI, INC.
`Francis A. Bottini, Jr. (SBN 175783)
` fbottini@bottinilaw.com
`Nicholaus H. Woltering (SBN 337193)
` nwoltering@bottinilaw.com
`7817 Ivanhoe Avenue, Suite 102
`La Jolla, CA 92037
`Telephone: (858) 914-2001
`Facsimile: (858) 914-2002
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff and the
`Proposed Class
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`DOMINICK BATTIATO, on behalf of himself
`and all others similarly situated,
`
`Case No. _________________
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`TESLA, INC., dba TESLA MOTORS, INC.;
`TESLA LEASE TRUST; and
`TESLA FINANCE LLC,
`
`
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`
`
`1. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
`UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
`
`2. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
`FALSE ADVERTISING LAW
`
`3. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
`CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT
`
`4. VIOLATION OF THE MAGNUSON-
`MOSS WARRANTY ACT
`
`5. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
`
`6. BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES
`
`7. FRAUD AND DECEIT
`
`8. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
`
`9. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
`
`10. NEGLIGENCE
`
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`
`
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`Case 3:22-cv-05264-AGT Document 1 Filed 09/15/22 Page 2 of 74
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`I.
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`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE .................................................................................................... 4
`
`III. PARTIES ....................................................................................................................................... 5
`A.
`Plaintiff ............................................................................................................................. 5
`B.
`Defendants ........................................................................................................................ 5
`
`IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................ 6
`
`V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................ 24
`
`VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................... 28
`FIRST CLAIM
`Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. ................................................................................... 28
`SECOND CLAIM
`Violation of the California False Advertising Law
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. ................................................................................... 32
`THIRD CLAIM
`Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act
`Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. .................................................................................................. 33
`FOURTH CLAIM
`Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
`15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. .......................................................................................................... 35
`FIFTH CLAIM
`Breach of Express Warranty
`Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.2(a), 1794 ........................................................................................... 37
`SIXTH CLAIM
`Breach of Implied Warranties
`Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1792, 1794 ...................................................................................... 39
`SEVENTH CLAIM
`Fraud and Deceit ....................................................................................................................... 41
`EIGHTH CLAIM
`Negligent Misrepresentation ..................................................................................................... 43
`NINTH CLAIM
`Unjust Enrichment .................................................................................................................... 43
`TENTH CLAIM
`Negligence ................................................................................................................................ 44
`
`VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .............................................................................................................. 45
`
`VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ................................................................................................... 45
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-05264-AGT Document 1 Filed 09/15/22 Page 3 of 74
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`Plaintiff Dominick Battiato, an individual, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
`(i.e., the members of the Class described and defined within this Complaint), brings this class action
`complaint against Defendants Tesla, Inc., dba Tesla Motors, Inc., Tesla Lease Trust, and Tesla Finance
`LLC (collectively, “Defendants” or “Tesla”), and alleges as follows:
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`1.
`This consumer class action arises out of Tesla’s misleading and deceptive statements
`regarding its advanced driver assistance systems (“ADAS”) technology. Tesla’s ADAS technology is
`deceptively and misleadingly marketed as autonomous driving technology under various names,
`including “Autopilot,” “Enhanced Autopilot,” and “Full Self-Driving Capability” (“FSD”). Tesla
`deceived and misled consumers regarding the abilities of its ADAS technology and by representing
`that it was perpetually on the cusp of perfecting that technology and finally producing a fully self-
`driving car.
`2.
`Tesla has known for years that its statements regarding its ADAS technology were
`deceptive and misleading, but the company made them anyway. Tesla did so to generate excitement
`and interest in the company’s vehicles and thereby improve its financial condition by, among other
`things, attracting investment, increasing sales, avoiding bankruptcy, driving up Tesla’s stock price,
`and helping to establish Tesla as a dominant player in the electric vehicle market.
`3.
`For example, in 2016 Elon Musk tweeted a bold prediction—that a Tesla vehicle
`would complete a fully self-driving trip across the United States by “next year.” Later in 2016, Tesla
`announced on its official blog that “All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving
`Hardware.” The blog post included the misleading October 2016 video of a Tesla car purportedly
`driving itself without incident, and suggested that Tesla was on the cusp of bringing to market cars
`that would be fully “self-driving” and have “full autonomy.”1 When Tesla and Musk made these
`statements, they knew there was no reasonable chance of Tesla being able to meet those promises.
`
`
`1 See The Tesla Team, “All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware,”
`https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-cars-being-produced-now-have-full-selfdriving-hardware (Oct.
`19, 2016).
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`4.
`From approximately 2017 to 2019, Tesla’s website describing its “Full Self-Driving
`Capability” technology represented that consumers who purchased or leased cars with the FSD
`version of its ADAS technology would receive cars capable of “full self-driving in almost all
`circumstances,” including being able to “conduct short and long distance trips with no action required
`by the person in the driver’s seat” and with a “probability of safety at least twice as good as the
`average human driver.” On the same webpage, Tesla went on to state:
`
`
`All you will need to do is get in and tell your car where to go. If you don’t
`say anything, the car will look at your calendar and take you there as the
`assumed destination or just home if nothing is on the calendar. Your Tesla
`will figure out the optimal route, navigate urban streets (even without lane
`markings), manage complex intersections with traffic lights, stop signs
`and roundabouts, and handle densely packed freeways with cars moving
`at high speed.
`
`5.
`Indeed, in every year since 2016, Tesla has repeatedly made deceptive and misleading
`statements to consumers indicating that a fully self-driving, fully autonomous Tesla vehicle was just
`around the corner, often expressly stating that would occur by the end of that calendar year or within
`the “next year.”2 For example, in May 2019, after years of failing to deliver on prior promises, Musk
`again promised consumers that a fully self-driving Tesla car would be available by the end of that
`year, tweeting that “everyone with Tesla Full Self-Driving will be able” to take a fully automated trip
`in their Tesla from Los Angeles to New York.3 While tens of thousands of U.S. and California
`consumers have purchased or leased new Tesla vehicles with ADAS technology in 2019 and every
`year since, Tesla has yet to deliver on its repeated promises of a fully self-driving car at any
`distance—much less a fully automated three-thousand-mile journey across the country.
`6.
`The reality of Tesla’s ADAS technology is far different from what Tesla and Musk have
`spent years telling consumers. Instead of providing its customers the “Full Self-Driving Capability”
`they paid for, Tesla uses them as guinea pigs to test drive its experimental FSD Beta software on
`public roadways, which generates data that Tesla can use to improve its software. Along the way,
`
`
`2 See, e.g., The Dawn Project, “Elon Musk’s broken promises,” https://dawnproject.com/wp-
`content/uploads/2022/06/The-Dawn-Project-Musk-promises-1min-NA.mp4?_=2 (collecting video
`clips of Musk making such promises from 2014 to 2021).
`3 Elon Musk, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1126611407984779264 (May 9, 2019, 3:14 pm).
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`scores of Tesla owners who believed Tesla’s deceptive and misleading statements about the
`capabilities of Tesla’s ADAS technology have been killed and seriously injured when that technology
`failed, often in the face of routine roadway scenarios.
`7.
`Even Tesla itself has admitted that “Full Self-Driving” is an inaccurate name. In
`response to California regulators’ concerns about Musk’s public announcements in late 2020 indicating
`that a new FSD Beta update would make Tesla vehicles autonomous, Tesla attorneys sent private
`emails to those regulators (later disclosed in response to Public Records Act requests) walking those
`statements back and making clear they were false. Tesla attorneys told the regulators that Tesla
`vehicles equipped with so-called “Full Self-Driving Capability” were not fully self-driving at all, but
`still required the driver to steer, brake, and accelerate as needed. In the meantime, Tesla and Musk
`continued their deceptive marketing to consumers.
`8.
`Plaintiff Dominick Battiato is California resident, who owns a 2021 Tesla Model 3
`Performance and a 2022 Tesla Model Y Performance.
`9.
`Plaintiff brings this class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and fellow consumers who
`purchased or leased a new Tesla vehicle with Tesla’s ADAS technology but never received the self-
`driving car that Tesla promised them. Plaintiff brings claims against Tesla for violations of the federal
`Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and California’s False Advertising Law, Consumers Legal Remedies
`Act, and Unfair Competition Law, as well as common law claims for fraud and deceit, negligent
`misrepresentation, negligence, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff seeks various relief on behalf of
`himself and the proposed Class, including injunctive relief prohibiting Tesla from continuing its
`deceptive and misleading marketing of its ADAS technology, restitution of the money Plaintiff and
`Class members paid for technology that Tesla promised but never delivered, and all available damages
`including punitive damages to punish Tesla for years of using deceptive and misleading marketing to
`eventually establish itself as a dominant player in the electric vehicle market.
`10.
`Based on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that at all times mentioned herein,
`Defendants and all unknown co-conspirators were an agent, servant, employee and/or joint venture of
`each other, and were at all times acting within the course and scope of said agency, service,
`employment, and/or joint venture with full knowledge, permission, and consent of each other. In
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`addition, each of the acts and/or omissions of each Defendant and unknown co-conspirator alleged
`herein were made known to, and ratified by, Defendants. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend
`this Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of the unknown co-conspirators when such
`identities become known.
`11.
`To the extent that there are any statutes of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s and Class
`members’ claims, the running of the limitations periods has been tolled by, inter alia, the following
`doctrines or rules: equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment rules, equitable
`estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling.
`II.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`Subject Matter Jurisdiction. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this
`12.
`action under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), as Plaintiff seeks
`damages and other relief on behalf of a class consisting of hundreds of thousands of individuals. This
`action meets CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements because the sum or value of the relief sought
`exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and because at least one Class member is a citizen
`of a state different from Defendants under § 1332(d)(2)(A) and/or a citizen of a foreign state under §
`1332(d)(2)(B). The Court also has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss
`Warranty Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
`claims under § 1367.
`Personal Jurisdiction. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because
`13.
`they have conducted and continue to conduct substantial business in California, and have sufficient
`minimum contacts with California in that (1) from the beginning of the Class Period (as defined
`herein) until December 2021, Defendant Tesla, Inc. was headquartered in Palo Alto, California, and
`thus designed, developed, manufactured, tested, and marketed its vehicles and ADAS technology at
`issue in this action in California throughout that period; (2) throughout the Class Period, Tesla, Inc.
`tested and manufactured a substantial percentage of the Class Vehicles (as defined herein) at its factory
`in Fremont, California; (3) throughout the Class Period, Tesla, Inc. has been the direct or indirect
`owner and operator of dozens of retail Tesla stores in California (accounting for more than a quarter of
`Tesla stores nationwide) that market and sell or lease new Tesla vehicles, including a substantial
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`percentage of Class Vehicles; (4) throughout the Class Period, California has been by far the largest
`U.S. market for sales and leases of new electric vehicles, including sales and leases of new Tesla
`vehicles and Class Vehicles; (5) throughout the Class Period, Defendants developed the marketing
`scheme at issue in this action in California and targeted California consumers with that marketing
`scheme, including deceptive and misleading statements about Tesla’s vehicles and ADAS technology
`on Tesla’s website and Musk’s Twitter feed; (6) Tesla, Inc. is registered with the California Secretary
`of State to do business in the State of California, and is licensed by the California Department of Motor
`Vehicles as a vehicle dealer and a vehicle manufacturer; and (7) Defendant Tesla Finance LLC has its
`principal place of business in California.
`Venue. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
`14.
`California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendants are subject to the Court’s personal
`jurisdiction with respect to this action and therefore reside in this District for purposes of venue, under
`§ 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims
`occurred in this District (including both Defendants’ wrongful conduct and the resulting harm to
`Plaintiff and Class members residing in this District), and under § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial
`part of the property that is the subject of this action is situated in this District.
`III.
`PARTIES
`A.
`Plaintiff
`15.
`Plaintiff Dominick Battiato is a resident of Valencia, California. In June 2021, Plaintiff
`purchased a new 2021 Tesla Model 3 Performance. In March 2022, he purchased a new 2022 Tesla
`Model Y Performance. Plaintiff made the decision to purchase these vehicles after researching,
`viewing, and relying on Tesla’s online and other public statements, including those made by Musk,
`which were disseminated to consumers throughout the State of California, the U.S., and the world.
`Plaintiff has experienced sudden and unexpected braking in both vehicles as a result of defects related
`to Tesla’s ADAS technology.
`B.
`Defendants
`Tesla, Inc. Defendant Tesla, Inc., dba Tesla Motors, Inc., is a Delaware corporation
`16.
`that had its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California, from approximately 2003 until
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:22-cv-05264-AGT Document 1 Filed 09/15/22 Page 8 of 74
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`December 1, 2021, at which point it moved its principal place of business to Austin, Texas. Defendant
`designs, develops, manufactures, tests, markets, distributes, sells, and leases electric vehicles under
`the brand name “Tesla.” Defendant also offers services related to those vehicles, including designing,
`developing, and periodically sending over-the-air updates for the ADAS software in Tesla vehicles.
`17.
`Tesla, Inc. has a vertically integrated business model. (a) Tesla designs, develops,
`manufacturers, and tests its electric vehicles and the ADAS software on those vehicles. This includes
`all versions of Tesla’s ADAS technology (e.g., Autopilot, Enhanced Autopilot, FSD), which were and
`are designed, developed, manufactured, and tested by Tesla in the State of California at its Palo Alto
`offices, Fremont factory, and other California offices and facilities. On information and belief, all or a
`substantial majority of the Class Vehicles (as defined herein) were manufactured and tested in
`California. (b) Tesla markets its vehicles on its website, in marketing materials, in its brick-and-
`mortar galleries and showrooms, and through the tweets, media interviews, news conferences,
`earnings calls, conferences, forums, and other public events and statements by its representatives and
`agents, including Elon Musk, all of which are intended and designed to generate media coverage, and
`have been historically successful at doing so. (c) Tesla sells and leases its electric vehicles directly to
`consumers, including through its website and retail stores, which Tesla owns and operates.
`Tesla Lease Trust. Defendant Tesla Lease Trust is a Delaware statutory trust, and its
`18.
`initial beneficiary is Tesla Finance LLC. Tesla Lease Trust is the title holder to the Tesla vehicles that
`are leased under a leasing program managed by Tesla Finance LLC.
`Tesla Finance LLC. Defendant Tesla Finance LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of
`19.
`Tesla, Inc., and is the beneficial owner of the leasing assets held in Trust by Tesla Lease Trust and, as
`an agent of the Tesla Lease Trust, originates, services, administers, and collects leases for Tesla Lease
`Trust. Tesla Finance LLC is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in
`California.
`IV.
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`A.
`The Technology of Autonomous Vehicles
`20.
`SAE International, formerly the Society of Automotive Engineers, is a U.S.-based
`professional association and standards development organization founded in the early 20th century.
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`In 2014, SAE International took a leading role in the development of autonomous vehicle technology
`standards by publishing the initial version of SAE J3016 Recommended Practice: Taxonomy and
`Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles,
`commonly referred to as the SAE Levels of Driving Automation (“SAE Levels”). Following this,
`SAE International published revised versions of the SAE Levels in 2016, 2018, and 2021.4
`21.
`The SAE Levels provide a taxonomy of vehicle driving automation systems with
`detailed definitions for six levels for driving automation, ranging from no driving automation (SAE
`Level 0) to full driving automation (SAE Level 5). The SAE Levels can be summarized as follows:
`Level 0: No Driving Automation. The human driver performs all driving tasks (steering,
`acceleration, braking, etc.), although vehicles may have safety features like automatic emergency
`braking and forward collision warning. Level 1: Driver Assistance. The vehicle has features that
`provide a small degree of automation over the vehicle’s acceleration, braking, or steering (e.g.,
`adaptive cruise control, lane-keeping assistance). Level 2: Partial Driving Automation. The vehicle
`can perform multiple driving tasks (e.g., acceleration, steering) but remains under the human driver’s
`constant supervision, responsibility, and control. Level 3: Conditional Driving Automation. The
`vehicle can take full control of certain driving tasks such that the human driver need not remain
`constantly alert but must be ready to intervene upon request from the vehicle. Level 4: High Driving
`Automation. The vehicle can perform all driving tasks in specific locations or environments, but
`human override is still an option. Level 5: Full Driving Automation. The vehicle can perform all
`driving tasks under all conditions, with zero human attention or interaction required.
`22.
`The SAE Levels are a widely accepted international standard and have been adopted
`by regulatory agencies such as the National Transportation Safety Board (“NTSB”), National
`Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and U.S. Department of Transportation.
`23.
`SAE International refers to SAE Level 1 and 2 technologies as systems or features that
`provide “driver support,” whereas it refers to SAE Level 3, 4, and 5 technologies as systems or
`features that provide “automated driving.” When SAE International published the current version of
`
`4 See SAE International, “Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation
`Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles” (revised Apr. 30, 2021), https://www.sae.org/
`standards/content/j3016_202104.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`the SAE Levels in 2021, it noted that for SAE Level 2 driver-support features, “You are driving
`whenever these driver support features are engaged” and “You must constantly supervise these
`support features.”5
`
`24.
`In May 2022, the NHTSA published a graphic summarizing the SAE Levels, which
`drives home many of the same points as the 2021 SAE International graphic—i.e., that at SAE Levels
`0 to 2, the driver is fully responsible for driving the car (“You drive, you monitor”), whereas
`autonomous technology does not begin until SAE Level 3 (“System drives, you must be able to take
`over upon request”), and fully self-driving technology does not occur until SAE Levels 4 and 5
`(“System drives, you ride”).6
`25. While Tesla and Musk have routinely promised Tesla’s SAE Level 2 ADAS
`technology (including Autopilot and FSD) would rapidly advance to SAE Level 5 abilities within a
`year or other short period of time, Tesla’s technology has never advanced beyond SAE Level 2.
`26. While Tesla has spent year after year stuck at SAE Level 2, other vehicle
`manufacturers have successfully designed and developed SAE Level 3 features, including Audi in
`2017, Honda in 2021, and Mercedes-Benz in 2021. Honda and Mercedes-Benz both currently offer
`automobiles with Level 3 features for sale or lease to the public in their respective home markets of
`Japan and Europe. Meanwhile, Waymo has been operating limited SAE Level 4 taxi service on public
`roadways in some areas of Phoenix (since 2018) and San Francisco (since 2021).
`27. Whereas Tesla’s Level 2 technology relies heavily on cameras (with limited assistance
`from a single forward-facing radar unit), the successful design and development of safer and more
`advanced Level 3 and 4 systems to date has universally relied on a more robust and expensive
`combination of cameras, multiple radar units, and one or more lidar units. The general consensus
`among autonomous vehicle experts is that truly autonomous, self-driving cars cannot be achieved
`without some reliance on lidar technology, which Tesla has always refused to use because of
`considerations related to expense and aesthetics.
`
`5 SAE International, “SAE Levels of Driving Automation Refined for Clarity and International
`Audience” (May 3, 2021), https://www.sae.org/blog/sae-j3016-update.
`6 NHTSA, “Levels of Automation” (May 2022), available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/
`files/2022-05/Level-of-Automation-052522-tag.pdf.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`B.
`Tesla’s “Autopilot”
`28.
`In 2014, Tesla began equipping its Model S sedan with hardware that (although the
`necessary software was not yet active) was intended to allow vehicles to automate some steering,
`braking, and acceleration functions. Consistent with widely used industry terminology, Tesla
`originally called this feature “advanced driver assistance” before Tesla executives led by Musk
`decided to change the name to “Autopilot.” Tesla engineers expressed concerns that the name was
`misleading and suggested less misleading options such as “Copilot,” which Tesla rejected.7
`29.
`In October 2015, Tesla released its version 7.0 software, which enabled Autopilot on
`Model S vehicles. Robert Rose, the head of the Autopilot project, left Tesla shortly before the release.
`Evan Nakano, a Tesla Autopilot engineer who had worked on safety features, objected that Autopilot
`was not ready for release. When Tesla ignored his concerns, Nakano resigned in protest and wrote a
`resignation letter, circulated widely among Tesla employees, that called Autopilot’s development
`based on “reckless decision making that has potentially put customer lives at risk.”8
`30.
`By December 2015, Musk was publicly stating that Tesla vehicles would drive
`themselves within about two years. He told Fortune magazine, “I think we have all the pieces, and it’s
`just about refining those pieces, putting them in place, and making sure they work across a huge
`number of environments—and then we’re done. It’s a much easier problem than people think it is.”9
`31.
`In January 2016, Musk announced on a conference call with reporters that Autopilot
`was “probably better” than a human driver. He stated that Tesla vehicles would be able to drive
`significantly better than humans within two to three years, and that within approximately two years
`drivers would be able to use Tesla’s “Summon” feature, which allows drivers to remotely instruct
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`7 Cade Metz & Neal E. Boudette, “Inside Tesla as Elon Musk Pushed an Unflinching Vision for Self-
`Driving Cars,” The New York Times (Dec. 6, 2021), available at https://www.nytimes.com/
`2021/12/06/technology/tesla-autopilot-elon-musk.html Tesla, “Tesla Self-Driving Demonstration”
`(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/videos/autopilot-self-driving-hardware-neighborhood-long.
`8 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Mike Spector, “Tesla’s Push to Build a Self-Driving Car Sparked Dissent
`Among Its Engineers,” The Wall Street Journal (Aug. 24, 2017), available at
`https://www.wsj.com/articles/teslas-push-to-build-a-self-driving-car-sparks-dissent-among-its-
`engineers-1503593742.
`9 Kristen Korosec, “Elon Musk Says Tesla Vehicles Will Drive Themselves in Two Years,” Fortune
`(Dec. 21, 2015), available at https://fortune.com/2015/12/21/elon-musk-interview/.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`their vehicle to drive to a specified location, to summon a vehicle from the other side of the country.10
`32.
`Ten days later, on January 20, 2016, 23-year-old Gao Yaning, who had a history of
`relying on Autopilot to drive, was killed in China on the way home from a family wedding when his
`Tesla Model S crashed at full speed on a highway into the back of a large street sweeper. The facts of
`the accident strongly indicate that Autopilot was engaged at the time of the crash.11
`33.
`In February 2016, Consumer Reports tested Tesla’s new Summon feature, which Tesla
`claimed makes the car able to drive itself for short distances without anyone in the car, such as to
`enter or leave a parking space or garage. Although Consumer Reports had previously given Tesla
`vehicles rave reviews (scoring Tesla’s Model S a 99 out of 100 and calling it “the best car we have
`every tested” in 2013, and scoring another version of the Model S even higher in 2015), this time
`Consumer Reports’ testing revealed that the Summon feature failed to detect “several large objects
`that a homeowner might leave in a driveway or on the floor of a garage—such as a duffel bag and
`bicycle—and the car failed to stop before hitting them.” Consumer Reports’ testers also encountered
`other problems related to difficulties they had remotely stopping the car, which resulted in damage to
`one of the car’s wheels and raised significant safety concerns.12
`34.
`On May 7, 2016, Tesla driver Joshua Brown was killed in Florida when the Autopilot
`on his Tesla Model S failed to recognize a tractor-trailer crossing in front his car, which resulted in
`Brown’s car striking and passing under the trailer at 74 mph.13 The top third of Brown’s car was
`sheared off. Brown was a Tesla enthusiast who had previously made videos of himself using
`Autopilot, one of which was retweeted by Elon Musk just a few weeks earlier.14 Tesla later publicly
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`10 Elon Musk, https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/686279251293777920 (Jan. 10, 2016, 12:11 pm).
`11 Neal Boudette, “Autopilot cited in Death of Chinese Tesla Driver,” The New York Times (Sept. 14,
`2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/business/fatal-tesla-crash-in-china-involved-
`autopilot-government-tv-says.html.
`12 Jake Fisher, “Tesla to Fix Self-Parking Feature After Consumer Reports Raises Safety Concern,”
`Consumer Reports (Feb. 10, 2016), available at https://www.consumerreports.org/car-safety/tesla-
`fixes-self-parking-feature-after-consumer-reports-raises-safety-concern/.
`13 NTSB, Investigation No. HWY16FH018, Dkt. No. 2, “Crash Summary Report” (June 19, 2017),
`available at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40453253&FileExtension
`=.PDF&FileName=Crash%20Summary-Master.PDF.
`14 Rachel Abrams & Annalyn Kurtz, “Joshua Brown, Who Died in Self-Driving Accident, Tested
`Limits of His Tesla,” The New York Times (July 1, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes.com/
`2016/07/02/business/joshua-brown-technology-enthusiast-tested-the-limits-of-his-tesla.html.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`stated that the Autopilot software on Brown’s car failed to detect the