UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VLADI ZAKINOV, et al., Plaintiffs,

٧.

RIPPLE LABS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-06753-PJH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 102, 103, 109

Before the court is Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc.'s ("Ripple"), defendant XRP II, LLC's ("XRP II"), and Ripple's Chief Executive Officer, Bradley Garlinghouse ("Garlinghouse") (collectively, "defendants") motion to dismiss plaintiff Bradley Sostack's ("plaintiff") consolidated first amended complaint. Dkt. 102. Having read the parties' papers and carefully considered their argument and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby **GRANTS** in part and **DENIES** in part defendants' motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

This order addresses defendants' second motion to dismiss in a consolidated putative class action ("In re Ripple") that arises out of the creation, dispersal, circulation, and sale of "XRP," which is a sort of "cryptocurrency." This action's procedural posture is nuanced and, except as noted below, does not bear on the instant motion.

On February 26, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part defendants' first motion to dismiss plaintiff's consolidated class action complaint (the "prior order"). Dkt.

85. The court denied that motion with respect to plaintiff's claims for defendants' alleged



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at 40. However, the court granted that motion with respect to the following claims alleged in plaintiff's initial complaint:

- Violation of California Corporations Code § 25501 against Ripple and XRP II, as well as a parallel material assistance claim under § 25504.1 against Ripple and Garlinghouse, for misleading statements made in connection with the offer or sale of securities as prohibited by § 25401 (the "fourth cause of action").
- Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17500 against defendants for misleading advertisements concerning XRP (the "sixth cause of action").
- Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 against defendants for their unregistered offer or sale of securities in violation of federal and state law, false advertising practices, misleading statements, and offense to established public policy (the "seventh cause of action").

The court dismissed these three causes of action (collectively, the "fraud claims") because plaintiff failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirements as they pertain to the alleged misstatements underlying such claims. Dkt. 85 at 32-36. At core, the court reasoned that plaintiff failed to explain how and why the subject statements were false. Id. While the court generally dismissed the fraud claims without prejudice, it dismissed the sixth and seventh of causes of action (jointly, the "Business & Professions Code fraud claims") with prejudice to the extent they rested on the theory that XRP was a security. Id. at 37-40. The court based that determination on established state decisional law finding that claims brought under those sections may not extend to actions that relate to securities transactions. Id. Having drawn that distinction, the court nonetheless permitted plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings to comply with Rule 9(b)'s requirements for claims brought under those sections, provided that he do so under the alternative theory that XRP is not a security. Id. at 40.

On March 25, 2020, plaintiff filed his consolidated first amended complaint. Dkt. 87 ("CFAC"). Aside from further detailing the purported misstatements underlying the



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plaintiff's initial complaint. Dkt. 87-1 (redline demarcating pleading changes). In his CFAC, plaintiff identifies 17 alleged misstatements to substantiate his fraud claims. Those statements fall into one of the following four categories of purported fraud:

- Defendants misrepresented XRP's "utility." CFAC ¶¶ 41-42, 47-48.
- Defendants conflated the adoption and use of their enterprise solutions software with that of XRP. Id. \P 64-75.
- Ripple misstated its XRP sales activity during the December 2017 through January 2018 period. <u>Id.</u> ¶¶ 56-57.
- Garlinghouse misrepresented the scope and character of his XRP holdings. Id. ¶¶ 51-53.

The particular wording of all 17 alleged misstatements is critical to decide this motion. Rather than listing them here, the court will detail each statement in its analysis.

DISCUSSION

Α. Legal Standard

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 8 requires that a complaint include a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal "is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The complaint must proffer sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558-59 (2007).

As a general matter, the court should limit its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis to the

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the plaintiff's pleading." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005); Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007) ("a court can consider a document on which the complaint relies if the document is central to the plaintiff's claim, and no party questions the authenticity of the document"). The court may also consider matters that are properly the subject of judicial notice, Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001), exhibits attached to the complaint, Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1989), and documents referenced extensively in the complaint and documents that form the basis of the plaintiff's claims, No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Jt. Counsel Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 925 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

Lastly, a district court "should grant [a] plaintiff leave to amend if the complaint can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations," however, dismissal without leave "is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment." Somers, 729 F.3d at 960. Relevant here, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that in circumstances "where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint," the district court's discretion to deny further leave "is particularly broad." Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Rule 9(b)

For actions alleging fraud, "a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff must allege "the 'time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations." Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). "Averments of fraud must be accompanied by 'the who, what, when, where, and how' of the misconduct charged," and "a plaintiff must set forth *more* than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false." Vess v. Ciba-Geigy



allegations of fraud "must be specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764.

B. Analysis

In their motion, defendants move to dismiss only the fraud claims, which, as previously noted, comprise the CFAC's fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action. Defendants principally argue that plaintiff again failed to show how or why each of the alleged misstatements is false. Dkt. 102 at 10-11. The court analyzes each alleged misstatement per category of fraud below.

1. Statements Concerning XRP's Utility

To substantiate the first basis for his fraud claims, plaintiff relies on five statements by defendants concerning XRP's utility. Plaintiff's theory of falsity for all five statements is the same. It rests on only two allegations, paragraph 43 and paragraph 48. In paragraph 43, plaintiff alleges that the subject statements are false because, when made, approximately 60 percent of XRP was owned by Ripple and the "vast majority, if not all" of the remaining forty percent of XRP was "not used for bridging international transactions but for investment purpose." In paragraph 48, plaintiff adds that "demand for XRP from financial institutions did not represent a significant portion of the demand for XRP and little, if any, XRP was used to 'help financial institutions source liquidity for payments into and out of emerging markets."

It is important to clarify that this theory does not assert that the subject statements are false because XRP could not, theoretically, serve a useful purpose (e.g., as a surrogate for traditional currency). Instead, as alleged in paragraphs 43 and 48, plaintiff asserts that the subject statements are false because they impart the misleading impression that XRP was, in practice, being widely used for such purposes. Plaintiff doubles down on that theory in his opposition brief. Dkt. 105 at 9 ("Thus, Ripple touted")



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