```
1
    Tina Wolfson (SBN 174806)
    Robert Ahdoot (SBN 172098)
 2
    Bradley K. King (SBN 274399)
    AHDOOT & WOLFSON, PC
 3
    2600 West Olive Avenue, Suite 500
    Burbank, California 91505
 4
    Tel: (310) 474-9111
 5
    Fax: (310) 474-8585
    twolfson@ahdootwolfson.com
 6
    rahdoot@ahdootwolfson.com
    bking@ahdootwolfson.com
 7
    LIDDLE & DUBIN, P.C.
 8
    Nicholas A. Coulson (PHV forthcoming)
 9
    Matthew Z. Robb (PHV forthcoming)
    975 E. Jefferson Ave.
10
    Detroit, Michigan 48207
    Tel: 313-392-0015
11
    Fax: 313-392-0025
    ncoulson@ldclassaction.com
12
    mrobb@ldclassaction.com
13
    Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Putative Class
14
15
                          IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
16
17
     JUSTIN WILLIAM LEMON, individually and
                                                    Case No. 3:20-cv-9328
     on behalf of all others similarly situated,
18
                                                    CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
                         Plaintiff,
19
                                                    JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
20
           v.
21
     ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL LLC, a Delaware
     LLC, and ROBINHOOD SECURITIES, LLC, a )
22
     Delaware LLC,
23
                         Defendants.
24
25
26
27
```



7 8

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff Justin William Lemon ("Plaintiff"), by and through his counsel, files this Class Action Complaint against Robinhood Financial LLC ("Robinhood Financial") and Robinhood Securities, LLC ("Robinhood Securities") (collectively, "Defendants" or "Robinhood") on behalf of himself and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to his own actions, and upon investigation of counsel as to all other matters, as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 2. Robinhood, a multi-billion dollar mobile application and website investment service, has capitalized on a surge of first-time market investors by misleading and luring unsuspecting consumers to execute inferior market trades on the platform under the guise of "commission free" trading.
- 3. Through a process of deceit and omission, Defendants misled consumers and failed to disclose that Robinhood's business operations relied extensively upon "payment for order flow," in which Defendants received payment from market makers in exchange for executing the service's trades.
- 4. These payments often came at the expense of the consumer. While Defendants promoted and advertised an easy-to-use "commission free" trading platform, Defendants profited extensively from unsuspecting consumers who executed trades on Defendants' platform at inferior execution prices compared to what consumers would have received from Robinhood's competitors. For larger value orders, this price differential often exceeded the commission its competitors would have charged. These inferior prices were caused in large part by the unusually high charges Robinhood required from principal trading firms for the opportunity to obtain Robinhood's customer order flow.
- 5. The principal trading firms/electronic market makers in turn passed these costs along to Robinhood's clients on each trade through inferior execution quality—the price at which the requested market orders were executed.
- 6. Effectively, Robinhood charged backdoor commission fees to each of its clients' orders, while concealing and denying the payment for order flow scheme.
- 7. To effectuate this scheme, Defendants published misleading statements and omissions in customer communications relating to the execution of trades and Robinhood's revenue sources. For



though it was Robinhood's single largest source of revenue.

- 8. Robinhood failed to disclose and omitted information regarding this process in numerous ways, including instructing customer service representatives not to mention payment for order flow in response to questions about Robinhood's sources of revenue and omitting it from its website's FAQ section.
- 9. As a broker-dealer that routed customer orders for execution, Robinhood had a duty of best execution to its clients, a duty to seek and obtain the best reasonably available terms for customers' orders. Robinhood knowingly violated its duty of best execution by charging unusually high payment for order flow rates to its vendors and failing to conduct adequate regular and rigorous reviews of the execution quality it was providing on customer orders.
- 10. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals who were victims of Defendants' materially deceptive acts and omissions, relying upon Robinhood's warranties, advertisements, and representations, as well as Robinhood's duty of best execution in executing trades on consumer's behalf.
- 11. Defendants have quietly sought to force its customers to execute trades on Defendants' platform at inferior prices compared to what consumers would have received from Robinhood's competitors, while profiting on the back end of those trades.
- 12. Defendants uniform conduct is equally applicable to the class. Plaintiff brings this class action against Defendants for: (1) Violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5; (2) Violations of California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Civil Code § 1750, et seq.; (3) Violations of California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (4) Violations of California False Advertising Law ("FAL"), Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.; (5) Negligent Misrepresentation; (6) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; and (7) Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
- 13. Plaintiff seeks an order for relief including but not limited to the following: (1) requiring Defendants to pay damages and restitution to Plaintiff and the Class; and (2) enjoining Defendants from further legal violations through Robinhood's payment for order flow collection scheme and requiring



JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 14. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, *et seq*. This Court also has Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(a). CAFA jurisdiction is appropriate as this action's amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000 and is a class action in which there are numerous class members who are citizens of states different from Defendants.
- 15. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants are citizens of California, conduct significant, substantial, and not-isolated business activities in California and a substantial portion of the acts complained of took place in California.
- 16. Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because Defendants conduct business in this District and many of the events that gave rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

PARTIES

- 17. Plaintiff Justin William Lemon is an individual and citizen of New Hampshire.
- 18. Defendant Robinhood Financial LLC is a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business located at 85 Willow Road, City of Menlo Park, County of San Mateo, State of California.
- 19. Defendant Robinhood Securities, LLC is a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business located at 85 Willow Road, City of Menlo Park, County of San Mateo, State of California.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Background

- 20. Robinhood offers self-directed securities brokerage services to customers by means of its website and smartphone applications. Robinhood is a Commission-registered broker-dealer and a member of Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). Robinhood Financial acts as an introducing broker and has a clearing arrangement with Robinhood Securities. When customers open accounts with Robinhood, they enter into a customer agreement with Robinhood Financial and Robinhood Securities.
 - 21. Robinhood was founded in 2013 and began offering retail brokerage accounts to the

12

16

15

18

19

17

20

21 22

23

24 25

26

27

by, among other things, allowing customers to place orders to buy and sell securities without paying a trading commission. It was this price-value proposition that allowed Robinhood to rapidly grow.

22. By June 2019, Robinhood had 9 million approved customer accounts.

B. **Principal Trading Firms and Payment for Order Flow**

- 23. Rather than sending customer orders to buy or sell equity securities directly to national exchanges, Robinhood, like other retail broker-dealers, routed its orders to other broker-dealers (often referred to as "principal trading firms" or "electronic market makers") to either execute those orders or route them to other market centers.
- 24. Principal trading firms attempt to profit from executing large volumes of retail buy and sell orders either by taking the other side of customer orders and exiting the positions at a profit, which is also known as "internalization," or by routing the orders to other market centers.
- Historically, market makers paid fees to regional intermediaries for their services in 25. executing trades with other local firms on behalf of the market maker. In order to grow a guaranteed supply of liquidity in their markets, market makers began offering payments to not only the intermediaries, but also retail firms, including brokers, in exchange for the retail firms routing their orders to the market makers. This practice, which expanded from off-exchange securities (over-thecounter or "OTC" securities) to exchange-traded securities, came to be known as "payment for order flow." Over time, different types of venues, including Electronic Communication Networks ("ECNs") and exchanges, also began making payments for order flow.
- 26. Principal trading firms offer incentives to retail broker-dealers to send them order flow. One such incentive is "payment for order flow," which is defined in Rule 10b-10(d)(8) of the Exchange Act to include any monetary payment, service, property, or other benefit that results in remuneration, compensation, or consideration to a broker-dealer in return for the routing of customer orders.
- Since it began operating as a broker-dealer, Robinhood, like other retail broker-dealers, 27. has received payment for order flow in exchange for routing its customer orders to principal trading firms.
 - SEC rules permit the receipt of payment for order flow by broker-dealers as long as it 28.

DOCKET

Explore Litigation Insights



Docket Alarm provides insights to develop a more informed litigation strategy and the peace of mind of knowing you're on top of things.

Real-Time Litigation Alerts



Keep your litigation team up-to-date with **real-time** alerts and advanced team management tools built for the enterprise, all while greatly reducing PACER spend.

Our comprehensive service means we can handle Federal, State, and Administrative courts across the country.

Advanced Docket Research



With over 230 million records, Docket Alarm's cloud-native docket research platform finds what other services can't. Coverage includes Federal, State, plus PTAB, TTAB, ITC and NLRB decisions, all in one place.

Identify arguments that have been successful in the past with full text, pinpoint searching. Link to case law cited within any court document via Fastcase.

Analytics At Your Fingertips



Learn what happened the last time a particular judge, opposing counsel or company faced cases similar to yours.

Advanced out-of-the-box PTAB and TTAB analytics are always at your fingertips.

API

Docket Alarm offers a powerful API (application programming interface) to developers that want to integrate case filings into their apps.

LAW FIRMS

Build custom dashboards for your attorneys and clients with live data direct from the court.

Automate many repetitive legal tasks like conflict checks, document management, and marketing.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Litigation and bankruptcy checks for companies and debtors.

E-DISCOVERY AND LEGAL VENDORS

Sync your system to PACER to automate legal marketing.

