Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 1 of 21
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`EDGE, A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
`Daniel A. Rozenblatt (SBN 336058)
`daniel@edgelaw.com
`Seth W. Wiener (SBN 203747)
`seth@edgelaw.com
`1341 La Playa Street 20
`San Francisco, CA 94122
`Telephone: (415) 515-4809
`
`CAPTSTONE LAW APC
`Tarek H. Zohdy (SBN 247775)
`tarek.zohdy@capstonelawyers.com
`Cody R. Padgett (SBN 275553)
`cody.padgett@capstonelawyers.com
`Laura E. Goolsby (SBN 321721)
`laura.goolsby@capstonelawyers.com
`1875 Century Park East, Suite 1000
`Los Angeles, California 90067
`Telephone: (310) 556-4811
`Facsimile: (310) 943-0396
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs
`ANDREW AXELROD and ELIOT BURK
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`
`ANDREW AXELROD and ELIOT BURK,
`individually and on behalf all others similarly
`situated,
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC., a
`Delaware corporation,
`
`
`
`Defendant.
`
` Case No. 4:21-cv-06770-JSW
`
`Assigned to the Hon. Jeffrey S. White
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT LENOVO (UNITED
`STATES) INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
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`
`Date:
`
`Time:
`Courtroom:
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`Complaint Filed: August 31, 2021
`Trial Date:
`None Set
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`January 14, 2022
`9:00 a.m.
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`Case No. 4:21-cv-06770-JSW
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 2 of 21
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
`
`II.
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`INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Sonner does not preclude Plaintiffs from pleading claims for legal and
`equitable relief in the alternative. .......................................................................... 3
`
`There is an issue of fact as to whether there exists an adequate legal
`remedy. .................................................................................................................. 6
`
`The Complaint plausibly alleges the inadequacy of a remedy at law
`with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective injunctive relief. ...................... 7
`
`1.
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`2.
`
`3.
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`Only an injunction can remedy the future harm to Plaintiffs and
`the public caused by Lenovo’s ongoing false advertising. ........................ 7
`
`Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that Plaintiffs have Article
`III standing to seek injunctive relief under the UCL, FAL, and
`CLRA. ....................................................................................................... 9
`
`Sonner does not support the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for
`injunctive relief. ...................................................................................... 10
`
`D.
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`Plaintiffs’ legal claims for damages are not equally as prompt, certain,
`and efficient as their equitable claims for restitution and disgorgement. ............ 11
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`An equally prompt, certain, and efficient legal remedy is not
`available for Lenovo’s violations of section 17501 of the FAL.............. 11
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`There is no adequate legal remedy for Lenovo’s violations of
`the “unlawful” prong of section 17200 of the UCL. ............................... 12
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`There is no adequate legal remedy for Lenovo’s violations of
`the “unfair” prong of section 17200 of the UCL. .................................... 13
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`No adequate legal remedy exists for Lenovo’s violations of the
`“fraudulent” prong of section 17200 of the UCL or section
`17500 of the FAL. ................................................................................... 14
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`E.
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`In the alternative, Plaintiffs request leave to amend. .......................................... 15
`
`III.
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`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 15
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`-i-
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 3 of 21
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`CASES
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Aberin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 16-cv-04384-JST, 2018 WL 1473085
`
`(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) ......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Adams v. Cole Haan, LLC, No. 8:20-CV-00913-JWH, 2021 WL 4907248 (C.D. Cal.
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`Mar. 1, 2021) ......................................................................................................................... 4, 5
`
`Adkins v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-CV-05969-VC, 2017 WL 3491973017 (N.D. Cal.
`
`Aug. 1, 2017) ............................................................................................................................. 4
`
`Aerojet Rocketdyne, Inc. v. Glob. Aerospace, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01515-KJM (AC),
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`2020 WL 3893395 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2020) ........................................................................... 8
`
`Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 773 F. App’x 870 (9th Cir. 2019) .......................................................... 13
`
`Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937) ........................................................................ 3
`
`Andino v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-01628-JAM-AC, 2021 WL 1549667 (E.D. Cal.
`
`Apr. 20, 2021) ........................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................................. 15
`
`Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 952 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................... 6
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`Byton N. Am. Co. v. Breitfeld, No. 2:19-CV-10563-DMG-JEMx, 2020 WL 3802700
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`(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020) .......................................................................................................... 4
`
`Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) ......................................................................... 6
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`Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................... 9
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`Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................ 12
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`Deras v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., No. 17-cv-05452-JST, 2018 WL 2267448 (N.D.
`
`Cal. May 17, 2018) .................................................................................................................... 4
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`Elgindy v. AGA Service Company, No. 20-CV-06304-JST, 2021 WL 1176535 (N.D.
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`Cal. Mar. 29, 2021) ............................................................................................................ 6, 13
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`Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ........................................................................ 6
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`In re JUUL Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 3d 552
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`(N.D. Cal. 2020) ........................................................................................................................ 4
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 4 of 21
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`1
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`James ex rel. James Ambrose Johnson, Jr.1999 Tr. v. UMG Recordings, No. C 11-
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`2
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`1613 SI, 2011 WL 5192476 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2011) ............................................................. 4
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`3
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`John Cepelak v. HP Inc., No. 20-CV-02450-VC, 2021 WL 5298022 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
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`4
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`15, 2021)........................................................................................................................ 2, 3, 4, 6
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`5
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`MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d. 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .................................... 12
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`6
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`McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85 (2017) ............................................................................... 9
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`7
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`Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) ................................................................................. 2, 8
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`Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2020) ................................................ 6
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`9
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`Mosqueda v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 3d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2020) ................... 15
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`10
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`Mullins v. Premier Nutrition Corp., No. 13-CV-01271-RS, 2018 WL 510139 (N.D.
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`11
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`Cal. Jan. 23, 2018) ................................................................................................................... 10
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`12
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`Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC, No. 20-CV-07437-EMC, 2021 WL 3487117 (N.D. Cal.
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`13
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`Aug. 9, 2021) ....................................................................................................................... 8, 11
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`14
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`Naeyaert v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., No. 5:17-CV-00950-JAK(JPRx), 2018 WL
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`15
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`6380749 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2018) ......................................................................................... 14
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`Parrish v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2020) ...................... 4
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`Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2020) ......................... 8, 13
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`Rothman v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-09760-CAS, 2021 WL 1627490
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`(C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021) .................................................................................................... 1, 12
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`Sharpe v. Puritan’s Pride, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2020) ..................................... 5
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`Siino v. Foresters Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 20-cv-02904-JST, 2020 WL 8410449
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`(N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2020) ............................................................................................................ 4
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`Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) ....................................... passim
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`Summit Estate, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., No. 4:19-CV-06724 YGR (N.D.
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`Cal. Sep. 10, 2020) .................................................................................................................. 15
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`Stewart v. Kodiak Cakes, LLC, No. 19-CV-2454-MMA (MSB), 2021 WL 1698695
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`(S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2021) ......................................................................................................... 8
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`Williams v. Gerber Products Co., 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................ 14
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 5 of 21
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`1
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`Wycap Marine Corp. v. Wycap Design, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-62226-WPD, 2018 WL
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`2
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`7287086 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2018)........................................................................................ 2, 7
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`3
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`Zeiger v. WellPet LLC, 526 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2021) .......................................... 2, 8, 11
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`STATE CASES
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`In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2009) ........................................................................ 14
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`Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) .............................................................................. 14
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`Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Alameda Cty., 9 Cal. 5th 279
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`(Cal. 2020) ............................................................................................................................... 15
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`OTHER AUTHORITIES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) ............................................................................................................... 2, 6
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`RULES
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`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 ..............................................................................1, 7, 12, 13, 14
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203 ................................................................................................ 1, 8
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17501 .................................................................................... 1, 7, 11, 12
`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17535 ................................................................................... 1, 8, 11 , 12
`Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) ............................................................................................................... 8
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 6 of 21
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This is a class action against Defendant Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo”) for false
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`advertising on its website. Lenovo displays false regular prices on its website and advertises false
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`discounts based on those prices. The regular prices are false because they do not represent the price
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`at which Lenovo actually sells its products. The discounts are false because they do not represent the
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`actual savings obtained by customers. As a result of these and other misrepresentations, Plaintiffs,
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`the putative class members, and the public at large have been, and continue to be, duped into making
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`purchases on Lenovo’s website based on a false sense of savings and value.
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`California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”) expressly prohibits advertising a former price
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`“unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months next
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`immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged
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`former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement.” Bus &
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`Prof. Code § 17501. Under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), it is a violation to
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`engage in “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue
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`or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the FAL].” Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.
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`Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Lenovo violates these statutes and seek, inter alia, the equitable
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`remedies authorized by them. See Bus. & Prof Code §§ 17203 and 17535.
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`In moving to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable claims under the FAL and UCL, Lenovo sets forth
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`a single argument: “because the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at
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`law, Plaintiffs’ equitable claims and equitable remedies must be dismissed.” Dkt. 13 at 1:16–18.
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`Lenovo’s motion should be denied because it is “premature at this stage of the litigation to
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`determine whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries have an adequate remedy at law.” Rothman v. Equinox
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`Holdings, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-09760-CAS, 2021 WL 1627490, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021).
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`Lenovo’s motion relies principally on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sonner v. Premier
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`Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020) (hereinafter, “Sonner”), where after over four years
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`of litigation, on the eve of trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her legal claims in favor of her
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`equitable claims, seeking the exact same amount in restitution as she did in damages. Id. at 837. But,
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 7 of 21
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`as recently explained by a court in this District, “Sonner primarily speaks to the ability of a federal
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`court to award equitable relief at the end of the case.” John Cepelak v. HP Inc., No. 20-CV-02450-
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`VC, 2021 WL 5298022, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2021) (emphasis original). Unlike Sonner, the
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`instant case has just begun, and the appropriate remedy to award Plaintiffs is not at issue. Plaintiffs
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`merely seek to plead their legal and equitable claims in the alternative, which they are entitled to do
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`under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3)).
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`Moreover, it would be premature at this early stage to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable claims on
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`the basis that Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. Plaintiffs’ legal theories are still developing
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`and the underlying facts are still being discovered. As such, there is a factual issue as to whether
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`Plaintiffs’ legal claims are satisfied, and the adequacy of any remedies flowing from those claims
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`should be decided at summary judgment or trial. See Wycap Marine Corp. v. Wycap Design, LLC,
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`Case No. 18-cv-62226-WPD, 2018 WL 7287086, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2018) (denying motion
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`to dismiss because “whether [the plaintiff] has an adequate remedy at law is an issue of fact and
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`therefore dismissal of the equitable claim for rescission at the pleading stage is premature”).
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`Even if Plaintiffs were disallowed from pleading their legal and equitable claims in the
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`alternative, the Complaint plausibly alleges the inadequacy of a remedy at law with respect to
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`Plaintiffs’ equitable claims for (i) prospective injunctive relief and (ii) retrospective restitution and
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`disgorgement. Lenovo’s motion to dismiss fails to distinguish between Plaintiffs’ prospective and
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`retrospective claims for equitable relief, but that distinction is critical because “monetary damages
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`for past harm are an inadequate remedy for the future harm that an injunction under California
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`consumer protection law is aimed at.” See Zeiger v. WellPet LLC, 526 F. Supp. 3d 652, 687 (N.D.
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`Cal. 2021); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288–90 (1977) (“The Supreme Court has
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`often affirmed that retrospective money damages play a markedly different role than prospective
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`injunctive relief.”). Indeed, there is no adequate remedy at law that would remedy the future harm
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`that Plaintiffs seek to prevent through injunctive relief. See ¶¶ 71–74.1
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`1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to “¶__” or “¶¶__” are to Plaintiffs’ Class Action
`Complaint, filed August 31, 2021 (ECF No. 1).
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`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 8 of 21
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`With respect to retrospective relief, Lenovo’s motion fails to distinguish between the
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`differing factual elements required to prove Plaintiffs’ legal and equitable claims. Contrary to
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`Lenovo’s assertion, the existence of an overlap among the factual predicates underlying Plaintiffs’
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`legal and equitable claims does not necessarily render the legal claims adequate to exclude the
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`equitable claims. As explained by the Supreme Court, “[a] remedy at law does not exclude one in
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`equity unless it is equally prompt and certain and in other ways efficient.” Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
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`Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 214 (1937) (“Stewart”). Because the legal remedies potentially available to
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`Plaintiff are not as equally prompt, certain, and efficient as the available equitable remedies, the
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`Complaint plausibly alleges that Plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law.
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`II.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Plaintiffs’ equitable claims should not be dismissed. First, Sonner does not preclude pleading
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`legal and equitable claims in the alternative. Second, whether Plaintiffs have an available remedy at
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`law necessarily depends on their ability to prove their legal claims, which is a factual issue that
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`should not be decided on a motion to dismiss. Third, there is no adequate legal remedy with respect
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`to Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective injunctive relief. Fourth, Plaintiffs’ available legal remedies are
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`not as equally prompt, certain, and efficient as their equitable remedies for restitution and
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`disgorgement.
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`A. Sonner does not preclude Plaintiffs from pleading claims for legal and equitable
`relief in the alternative.
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`Lenovo asserts that “the Ninth Circuit recently made clear in Sonner . . . a plaintiff cannot
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`pursue equitable claims or remedies if he has an adequate remedy at law.” Dkt. 13 at 1:15–16
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`(emphasis added). However, as recently noted by a court in this District, that is a misreading of the
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`holding of Sonner. In John Cepelak v. HP Inc., No. 20-CV-02450-VC, 2021 WL 5298022, at *2
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`(N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2021) (“Cepelak”), Judge Chhabria shed light on the confusion that has
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`percolated in some of the lower courts since Sonner was decided:
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`Some courts have suggested that Sonner prevents parties from pleading claims for
`legal and equitable relief in the alternative. [Citation.] This may be a plausible reading
`of Sonner, but it is not the best reading. Sonner primarily speaks to the ability of a
`federal court to award equitable relief at the end of the case. The ultimate holding
`of Sonner is that a plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate remedy at law
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 9 of 21
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`before securing” equitable relief under the UCL and CLRA. [Sonner,] 971 F.3d at 844
`(emphasis added). While Sonner recognized that a complaint seeking equitable relief
`must “plead ‘the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief’ including ‘the
`inadequacy of remedies at law,’” nothing in Sonner precludes plaintiffs from doing so
`in the alternative to remedies at law. Id. at 844 [citation]. Indeed, the Federal Rules of
`Civil Procedure permit demands for relief in the alternative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3).
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`Cepelak, 2021 WL 5298022, at *2 (emphasis original).2
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`Sonner stands for the mere proposition that “a federal court must apply traditional equitable
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`principles before awarding restitution under the UCL and CLRA” Sonner, 971 F.3d at 841
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`(emphasis added). Sonner does not speak to a plaintiff’s ability to plead—and litigate—legal and
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`equitable claims in the alternative. And, in fact, in Sonner that is exactly what occurred.
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`In Sonner, the plaintiff pleaded legal and equitable claims and litigated both types of claims
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`for over four years. Sonner, 971 F.3d at 837. Then, “[o]n the brink of trial,” the plaintiff voluntarily
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`dismissed her legal claim for damages with the “singular and strategic purpose” to try the case as a
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`bench trial rather than to a jury. Id. Important to the court’s decision was the fact that the plaintiff
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`2 Several courts agree that legal and equitable remedies may be plead in the alternative. See, e.g., In
`re JUUL Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 497 F. Supp. 3d 552, 638 (N.D. Cal.
`2020) (finding “the facts of Sonner – where the plaintiff on the eve of trial sought to secure a bench
`trial under the UCL by foregoing CLRA damages claims that had to be tried to a jury – [] inapposite
`considering the allegations and the posture of the [case]”); Siino v. Foresters Life Ins. & Annuity
`Co., No. 20-cv-02904-JST, 2020 WL 8410449, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2020) (dispensing with the
`argument that UCL claim must be dismissed where plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law because
`there is “no bar to the pursuit of alternative remedies at the pleadings stage”) (citing Deras v.
`Volkswagen Grp. of Am., No. 17-cv-05452-JST, 2018 WL 2267448, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2018)
`and Aberin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 16-cv-04384-JST, 2018 WL 1473085, at *9 (N.D.
`Cal. Mar. 26, 2018)); Adkins v. Comcast Corp., No. 16-CV-05969-VC, 2017 WL 3491973017, at *3
`(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2017) (finding “no basis in California or federal law for prohibiting the plaintiffs
`from pursuing their equitable claims in the alternative to legal remedies at the pleadings stage”);
`James ex rel. James Ambrose Johnson, Jr.1999 Tr. v. UMG Recordings, No. C 11-1613 SI, 2011
`WL 5192476, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding the complaint sufficiently alleged
`alternative equitable and legal remedies, “and that questions about the appropriateness of specific
`remedies are premature at this stage of the litigation”); Adams v. Cole Haan, LLC, No. 8:20-CV-
`00913-JWH, 2021 WL 4907248, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (permitting plaintiff to plead
`equitable claims in the alternative and declining to dismiss them at the pleading stage); Parrish v.
`Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (agreeing “with the
`other district courts that have noted that barring claims for equitable relief at the pleading stage is
`inconsistent with the federal rules that permit pleading in the alternative); Byton N. Am. Co. v.
`Breitfeld, No. 2:19-CV-10563-DMG-JEMx, 2020 WL 3802700, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020)
`(agreeing “with those courts that allow plaintiffs to plead UCL claims in the alternative, even when
`other adequate remedies [at law] may exist”).
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`-4-
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`Case No. 4:21-cv-06770-JSW
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 10 of 21
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`sought the same sum in equitable restitution as she requested in damages to compensate her for the
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`same past harm. Id. at 844. Because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to explain how the same amount of money
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`[in damages] for the exact same harm [was] inadequate or incomplete,” the court found that the
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`plaintiff had failed to establish she lacked an adequate remedy at law. Id.
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`Here, unlike in Sonner, the case is not on the eve of trial; on the contrary, it is just beginning.
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`And unlike in Sonner, Plaintiffs are not seeking the same amount in damages and restitution. Indeed,
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`Plaintiffs do not know the amount of damages and restitution that will adequately compensate them
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`for their losses, nor are they required to on a motion to dismiss. See Adams v. Cole Haan, LLC, No.
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`8:20-CV-00913-JWH-DFMx, 2021 WL 4907248, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (finding plaintiff
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`lacked an adequate remedy at law with respect to her claim for restitution because “Plaintiff does
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`not know at this juncture, and is certainly not required to set forth evidence, whether a model for
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`legal damages (as opposed to equitable restitution) will be viable or will adequately compensate
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`Plaintiff’s losses.”).3
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`The unique procedural posture of Sonner is significant because, generally speaking, plaintiffs
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`do not dismiss viable claims the eve before trial, and defendants do not move to dismiss after more
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`than four years of litigation. As explained by one court:
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`The Court finds it premature at this stage of the litigation to determine whether
`plaintiff’s alleged injuries have an adequate remedy at law. While acknowledging
`that Sonner was decided on the pleadings, the Court notes that, unlike Sonner, this
`matter is not currently on the eve of trial and that there is, at present, no pending motion
`for injunctive relief that would require the Court to determine the adequacy of
`plaintiff’s legal remedies.
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`Rothman v. Equinox Holdings, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-09760-CAS-MRWx, 2021 WL 1627490, at *12
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`(C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021).
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`Thus, Sonner must be read in context. Rather than categorically barring the pleading of both
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`legal and equitable claims, the court merely found the plaintiff had “fail[ed] to explain how damages
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`3 For an example of the differing measures of restitution and damages, see Sharpe v. Puritan’s
`Pride, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1074, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (whereas UCL and FAL restitution
`is based on what a purchaser would have paid at the time of purchase had the purchaser received all
`the information, damages may be calculated by looking to the expected discount—i.e., the benefit-
`of-the-bargain).
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`-5-
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`Case No. 4:21-cv-06770-JSW
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`

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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 11 of 21
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`[we]re any less prompt, certain, or efficient than restitution, particularly when a jury trial for
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`damages was just two months away when she amended her complaint.” Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 n.8
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`(emphasis added). As explained by Judge Chhabria in Cepelak:
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`Sonner, therefore, should not be understood as a categorical bar to pleading claims for
`equitable relief under the UCL and damages under the CLRA in a single complaint, as
`plaintiffs can bring claims in the alternative under different legal theories. For example,
`a plaintiff may be able to state a claim for equitable relief under the unfair prong of the
`UCL alongside a claim for damages based on a theory of fraud under the CLRA.
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`Cepelak, 2021 WL 5298022, at *2 (citing Elgindy v. AGA Service Company, No. 20-CV-06304-
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`JST, 2021 WL 1176535, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021)). This is precisely what Plaintiffs seek to
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`do here by stating claims for restitution under the UCL and FAL, and for damages under the CLRA
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`and other common law theories. Cf. Moore v. Mars Petcare US, Inc., 966 F.3d 1007, 1021 n.13 (9th
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`Cir. 2020) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiffs could not seek equitable relief under the
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`UCL or FAL, given an adequate legal remedy under the CLRA because “[t]he UCL, FAL and
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`CLRA explicitly provide that remedies under each act are cumulative to each other.”).
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`In sum, at this stage of the litigation, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiffs have an
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`adequate remedy at law “before awarding restitution under the UCL and CLRA.” Sonner, 971 F.3d
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`at 841 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs simply seek to plead legal and equitable claims in the alternative,
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`which under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they are permitted to do. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
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`8(a)(3).
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`B.
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`There is an issue of fact as to whether there exists an adequate legal remedy.
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`Lenovo’s argument that “a plaintiff cannot pursue equitable claims or remedies if he has an
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`adequate remedy at law” (Dkt. 13 at 1:15–16) conflates the concepts of claims and remedies, but in
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`they are distinct. For example, a plaintiff that asserts a claim for breach of contract may seek the
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`remedy of damages (a legal remedy) or specific performance (an equitable remedy). The adequate-
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`remedy-at-law principle speaks to the court’s ability to award remedies—not the plaintiff’s ability
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`to assert claims. See, e.g., Barranco v. 3D Sys. Corp., 952 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing
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`Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) and Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S.
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`99, 105 (1945), 326 U.S. at 105) (“‘The necessary prerequisite’ for a court to award equitable
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`-6-
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`Case No. 4:21-cv-06770-JSW
`OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS
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`

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`Case 4:21-cv-06770-JSW Document 16 Filed 12/06/21 Page 12 of 21
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`remedies is ‘the absence of an adequate remedy at law.’”) (emphasis added). Thus, in the breach-of-
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`contract example, the plaintiff would be entitled to seek both damages and specific performance, but
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`the court would not be able to award specific performance unless monetary damages proved
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`inadequate.
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`Importantly, in determining whether a court can award equitable relief, it is generally
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`presumed that the plaintiff will have prevailed on the underlying claim, as in the example above.
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`Here, however, no such presumption can be made. Plaintiffs’ legal and equitable claims have
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`distinct factual requirements, and whether Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law will necessarily
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`depend on whether they can prevail on their legal claims. But whether Plaintiffs can prevail on their
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`legal claims is a factual issue that is more appropriately decided at the summary judgment stage or at
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`trial. See Wycap Marine Corp. v. Wycap Design, LLC, Case No. 18-cv-62226-WPD, 2018 WL
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`7287086, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss on the grounds that “whether
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`[the plaintiff] has an adequate remedy at law is an issue of fact and therefore dismissal of the
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`equitable claim for rescission at the pleading stage is premature”).
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`C.
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`The Complaint plausibl