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15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 16 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 17 SAN JOSE DIVISION

18 SOCIÉTÉ DU FIGARO, SAS, a French simplified
 19 joint-stock company; L'ÉQUIPE 24/24 SAS, a
 20 French simplified joint-stock company, on behalf of
 themselves and all others similarly situated; and LE
 21 GESTE, a French association, on behalf of itself, its
 members, and all others similarly situated,

22 Plaintiffs,

23 v.

24 APPLE INC., a California corporation,

25 Defendant.
 26
 27
 28

No.

PLAINTIFFS' CLASS ACTION
 COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
 SHERMAN ACT, CALIFORNIA UNFAIR
 COMPETITION LAW, AND CALIFORNIA
 CARTWRIGHT ACT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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