Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 1 of 23
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`Bobbie J. Wilson, Bar No. 148317
`BWilson@perkinscoie.com
`Sunita Bali, Bar No. 274108
`SBali@perkinscoie.com
`PERKINS COIE LLP
`505 Howard Street, Suite 1000
`San Francisco, CA 94105
`Telephone: 415.344.7000
`Facsimile: 415.344.7050
`Attorneys for Defendants
`GOOGLE LLC and ALPHABET INC.
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`IN RE GOOGLE ASSISTANT PRIVACY
`LITIGATION
`
`
`Case No. 5:19-cv-04286-BLF
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
`MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
`CONSOLIDATED AMENDED CLASS
`ACTION COMPLAINT
`Judge:
`Hon. Beth Labson Freeman
`Date:
`April 9, 2020
`Time:
`9:00 a.m.
`Dept.:
`Courtroom 3 - 5th Floor
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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`I.
`II.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 1 
`A.
`Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act Claims Should be Dismissed ............................................. 1 
`1.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite intent. ........................................... 1 
`2.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged any “oral communications.” ............................. 2 
`3.
`Plaintiffs’ allegations establish the ordinary course of business
`exception. .................................................................................................... 3 
`Plaintiffs have not alleged an unlawful use or disclosure. .......................... 4 
`4.
`Plaintiffs’ SCA Claims Should be Dismissed. ........................................................ 4 
`1.
`Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Section 2701....................................... 4 
`2.
`Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Section 2702....................................... 5 
`Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim under CIPA ............................................................ 6 
`1.
`Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Section 631(a). .................................. 6 
`2.
`Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under Section 632. ................................. 7 
`Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim for Intrusion Upon Seclusion or Invasion of
`Privacy .................................................................................................................... 7 
`Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged a Breach of Contract Claim ....................................... 8 
`1.
`Plaintiffs fail to adequately identify the contract Google allegedly
`breached. ..................................................................................................... 8 
`The conduct alleged by Plaintiffs is not a breach of the TOS or
`Privacy Policy. ............................................................................................ 9 
`Plaintiffs fail to allege damages ................................................................ 10 
`3.
`Plaintiffs Kumandan and Spurr Fail to Allege Breach of Any Warranty ............. 10 
`1.
`Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege the existence or breach of any
`express warranty........................................................................................ 10 
`Plaintiffs do not allege breach of the implied warranty of
`merchantability. ......................................................................................... 11 
`a.
`Google’s disclaimer of the implied warranty of
`merchantability in its Terms of Service is valid and
`enforceable. ................................................................................... 11 
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
`5:19-CV-04286-BLF
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`F.
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`2.
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`2.
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`III.
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`(continued)
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`Page
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`b.
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`c.
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`G.
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`2.
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`Plaintiffs have not alleged a fundamental defect that renders
`their GAEDs unfit for their intended purpose. .............................. 11 
`Plaintiffs do not allege they were in vertical privity with
`Google. .......................................................................................... 12 
`Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under the UCL .................................................... 13 
`1.
`Plaintiffs fail to allege a tangible, economic loss entitling them to
`standing. .................................................................................................... 13 
`Plaintiffs fail to allege that they relied on any misrepresentation or
`omission. ................................................................................................... 14 
`Plaintiffs fail to articulate any unfair conduct. .......................................... 15 
`3.
`Plaintiffs do not state a claim for unlawful conduct under the UCL. ....... 15 
`4.
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 15 
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`Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 4 of 23
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`Page
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`
`CASES
`
`Alkayali v. Hoed,
`No. 3:18-cv-777, 2018 WL 3425980 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2018) ...............................................10
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................................................................................................................8
`
`Baba v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
`No. C 09-05946 RS, 2010 WL 2486353 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2010) ........................................15
`
`Backhaut v. Apple, Inc.,
`74 F. Supp. 3d 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................2
`
`Belluomini v. Citigroup, Inc.,
`No. CV 13-01743 CRB, 2013 WL 3855589 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2013) .....................................8
`
`C.M.D. v. Facebook, Inc.,
`No. C 12-1216 RS, 2014 WL 1266291 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014), aff’d sub
`nom. C.M.D. ex rel. De Young v. Facebook, Inc., 621 F. App’x 488 (9th Cir.
`2015) ...........................................................................................................................................6
`
`Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics. Corp.,
`169 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008) .............................................................................................12, 13
`
`Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
`534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................11, 12
`
`Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp.,
`6 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 2014) ......................................................................................5
`
`Cullen v. Netflix, Inc.,
`880 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ....................................................................................15
`
`Flanagan v. Flanagan,
`27 Cal.4th 766 (2002) .................................................................................................................7
`
`Hauck v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
`No. 18-CV00447-LHK, 2019 WL 1493356 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2019) .....................................11
`
`Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.,
`47 Cal.4th 272 (2009) .................................................................................................................8
`
`Hernandez v. Lopez,
`180 Cal. App. 4th 932 (2009) ...................................................................................................10
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`Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 5 of 23
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page
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`In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.,
`No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) .................................14
`
`In re Carrier IQ, Inc.
`78 F. Supp. 3d 1051 (2015) .................................................................................................12, 13
`
`In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig.,
`402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ................................................................................13, 14
`
`In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig.,
`No. 11-MD-02264 JSW, 2014 WL 988889 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) ...................................14
`
`In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig.,
`No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) ..............................3, 7
`
`In re iPhone Application Litig.,
`844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ................................................................................5, 15
`
`In re Nexus 6P Prods. Liab. Litig.,
`293 F. Supp. 3d 888 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ......................................................................................11
`
`In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig.,
`827 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................................8
`
`In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig.,
`329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................................................2
`
`In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,
`7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ..........................................................................................8
`
`Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.,
`567 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................13, 14
`
`Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct.,
`51 Cal. 4th 310 (2011) ..............................................................................................................14
`
`Low v. LinkedIn Corp.,
`900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012) ......................................................................................8
`
`McDonald v. Kiloo ApS,
`385 F. Supp. 3d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ......................................................................................8
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`Minkler v. Apple, Inc.,
`65 F. Supp. 3d 810 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ........................................................................................12
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page
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`Moore v. Apple, Inc.,
`73 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ......................................................................................15
`
`Noel v. Hall,
`568 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2009) .......................................................................................................4
`
`People v. Buchanan,
`26 Cal. App. 3d 274 (1972) .........................................................................................................7
`
`Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc.,
`No. 1:17-cv-00624, 2017 WL 4340349 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017) ............................................3
`
`Ribas v. Clark,
`38 Cal.3d. 355 (1985) .................................................................................................................7
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`Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc.,
`234 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2017) ........................................................................................3
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`Svenson v. Google, Inc.,
`65 F. Supp. 3d 717 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ....................................................................................5, 10
`
`Svenson v. Google Inc.,
`No. 13-CV-04080-BLF, 2015 WL 1503429 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015).....................................10
`
`Tavernetti v. Superior Court,
`22 Cal.3d 187 (1978) ..............................................................................................................6, 7
`
`Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
`359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Thompson v. Dulaney,
`970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992) .....................................................................................................4
`
`U.S. v. Townsend,
`987 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................2
`
`Young v. Facebook, Inc.,
`790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ......................................................................................9
`
`STATUTES
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2510 ...............................................................................................................................3
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2701 ...........................................................................................................................4, 5
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`18 U.S.C. § 2702 ...............................................................................................................................5
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
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`Page
`Cal. Penal Code § 631 ...................................................................................................................6, 7
`
`Cal. Penal Code § 632 .......................................................................................................................7
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`RULES
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ...................................................................................................................2, 8
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiffs’ Opposition, like their Consolidated Amended Complaint (“CAC”), is replete
`with inflammatory rhetoric, but that does not change the fact that Plaintiffs have not alleged
`sufficient facts to state a claim under any legal theory.
`All of Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the rare instances when the Google Assistant
`(“the Assistant”) experiences a “false accept,” meaning that it identifies other words or sounds as
`a hotword and begins recording although no hotword was spoken. But it is unreasonable to expect
`a voice activated device like the Assistant to never experience an unintentional activation, and it
`certainly does not amount to a violation of federal or state privacy laws or a breach of Google’s
`Terms of Service (“TOS”) or Privacy Policy. On Plaintiffs’ theory, no voice activated technology
`could exist in any consumer product without exposing technology companies to extensive
`criminal and civil liability, as no such technology is perfect. This is reason enough to dismiss
`Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, the use of these recordings to improve Google’s speech recognition
`technology also does not give rise to any claim as it is expressly permitted under Google’s
`Privacy Policy. Plaintiffs cannot, on the one hand, complain that the Assistant does not function
`perfectly, and, on the other hand, complain about Google’s efforts to improve it.
`
`A.
`
`II.
`ARGUMENT
`Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act Claims Should be Dismissed
`1.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged the requisite intent.
`Plaintiffs acknowledge that to state a claim under the federal Wiretap Act, they must
`allege that Google acted intentionally. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 58, (“Opp.”) at
`3-4. Plaintiffs plainly have not done so. Rather, Plaintiffs’ own allegations, and the sources on
`which they are based, all make clear that any recordings not preceded by a hotword or a manual
`activation were the result of an error in hotword detection. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF
`No. 56, (“Mot.”) at 5; Decl. of Sunita Bali ISO Mot., ECF No. 56-1 (“Bali Decl.”), Exs. A and B;
`see also, e.g., CAC ¶38 (alleging that GAEDs “record anything said that is preceded by anything
`that remotely sounds like a hot word”). This is fatal to their claims. In re Pharmatrak, Inc.
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`Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2003) (“inadvertent interceptions are not a basis for
`criminal or civil liability under the [Wiretap Act]”).
`Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately alleged intent because they allege that Google
`had knowledge that the Assistant sometimes records communications when no hotword is uttered.
`Opp. at 4-5. But knowledge that the Assistant may sometimes misinterpret other words or sounds
`as a hotword does not establish intent under the Wiretap Act. “As used in the [Wiretap Act], the
`term ‘intentional’ [requires] that [s]uch conduct or the causing of the result must have been the
`person’s conscious objective.” In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 23 (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-541, at
`23 (1986)); U.S. v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs cite to Backhaut v.
`Apple, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2014) for support, but that case is
`distinguishable. In Backhaut, the plaintiffs alleged that Apple was aware that it was intercepting
`consumers’ text messages for years, had been notified of the problem and failed to remedy it, and
`even charged consumers to fix the problem. Id. No such allegations are present here.
`Finally, Plaintiffs’ argument that intent is established because Google allegedly obtained
`users’ recordings for its own commercial and financial benefit also fails. Opp. at 4. Plaintiffs have
`not alleged how recording communications that were not intended for the Assistant benefits
`Google financially or otherwise serves Google’s interest.
`
`2.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged any “oral communications.”
`Google argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege any “oral communications” that were
`intercepted by Google. Mot. at 5-6. In response, Plaintiffs cite to the VRT NWS Article, which
`reported that certain audio recordings “should never have been recorded [because] the command
`‘Okay Google’ was clearly not given.” Opp. at 5-6 (citing CAC ¶36). But reciting language from
`a news article is not a substitute for alleging facts regarding the named Plaintiffs. See Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
`to relief”) (emphasis added).
`Plaintiffs further argue that they have alleged sufficient facts to establish a reasonable
`expectation of privacy based on “the context and setting” in which their “private conversations”
`occurred, but the CAC is devoid of any such facts specific to Plaintiffs. Opp. at 6 (citing CAC
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`¶¶30-33, 250). Plaintiffs also argue that their expectation of privacy is based on Google’s
`affirmative assurances in its TOS and Privacy Policy that audio recordings will not be shared with
`third parties. Opp. at 6. But Google makes no such assurances. And whether Plaintiffs have a
`reasonable expectation that their audio recordings will not be shared has no bearing on whether
`they have alleged “oral communications,” which require a reasonable expectation that the
`“communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation . .
`.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (emphasis added).
`Plaintiffs cite Rackemann v. LISNR, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00624, 2017 WL 4340349, at *5
`(S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017) to argue that they need not “pinpoint the precise dates and times” that
`their communications were allegedly intercepted. Opp. at 6. But in Rackemann, the plaintiff
`alleged that “he carried [his smartphone] on his person, and would take his smartphone to places
`where he would not invite other people, and to places where he would have private
`conversations,” as well as when the alleged private communications occurred. Rackemann, 2017
`WL 4340349, at *5. Plaintiffs do not allege any such facts here, and even if they had, similar
`allegations have been found inadequate in this District. See Satchell v. Sonic Notify, Inc., 234 F.
`Supp. 3d 996, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
`
`3.
`Plaintiffs’ allegations establish the ordinary course of business exception.
`Plaintiffs contend that the ordinary course of business exception does not apply because
`Google is not responding to users’ commands where a user does not utter a hotword or manually
`activate the device. Opp. at 7. But Plaintiffs overlook that even in such instances, the Assistant
`“detects” a hotword (even if it does so in error), and thus “begins recording and transmitting
`audio to Google for analysis” for the “purpose of . . . respond[ing] to the user command[].” CAC
`¶24. Thus, “the interception facilitated the communication service or was incidental to the
`functioning of the communication service” because the alleged interception is nothing more than
`the Assistant preparing to respond to what it perceives to be a legitimate user command. See In re
`Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2013 WL 5423918 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
`2013).
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`Plaintiffs also claim that the exception cannot apply to Google because it only applies to a
`provider of an “electronic communication service.” Opp. at 7. But Plaintiffs themselves allege
`that Google is a provider of an electronic communication service. CAC ¶112. And Plaintiffs’
`argument that the ordinary course of business exception does not apply because Google exceeded
`the scope of its own Privacy Policy also fails, as all of Google’s conduct was expressly permitted
`under its Privacy Policy. See Mot. at 11, 17.
`
`4.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged an unlawful use or disclosure.
`Plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful use or disclosure fails because Plaintiffs have not alleged
`any unlawful interception. See Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 2009).
`Moreover, liability for use or disclosure of the contents of an intercepted communication
`“requires more” than intentional conduct. Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d 744, 749 (10th Cir.
`1992). A plaintiff must also show that the defendant knows “1) the information used or disclosed
`came from an intercepted communication, and 2) sufficient facts concerning the circumstances of
`the interception such that the defendant could, with presumed knowledge of the law, determine
`that the interception was prohibited [under the Wiretap Act].” Id. Plaintiffs do not come close.
`Plaintiffs claim that Google knows that at least some recordings are not preceded by the
`utterance of a hotword or a manual activation of the device, and cite to a news article from 2017
`in which Google’s CEO states that its speech recognition technology has an error rate of less than
`5%. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs cannot cite to a news article in their Opposition as a substitute
`for facts that are not alleged in the CAC. Moreover, nothing in the article or the CAC establishes
`that Google knew that the recordings allegedly disclosed to Google’s subcontractors included any
`recordings that were not preceded by a hotword or manual activation of the device or that such
`recordings constituted unlawful interceptions under the Wiretap Act (which they do not).
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiffs’ SCA Claims Should Be Dismissed
`1.
`Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Section 2701.
`Plaintiffs’ Section 2701 claims fail because they do not allege that Google accessed an
`electronic communications “facility” without authorization. 18 U.S.C. §2701(a). Plaintiffs
`acknowledge that a facility is a physical server used to provide an electronic communications
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 12 of 23
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`service. See Opp. at 9 (recognizing that web servers and computer servers generally qualify as a
`“facility”). Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that the Assistant is a facility. But Plaintiffs’ argument is
`directly contradicted by their characterization of the Assistant as “a software program” that
`transmits communications to Google’s servers for storage, rather than a “facility” that physically
`stores communications. CAC ¶¶112, 116; cf. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072, 1077
`(9th Cir. 2004); Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1174-75 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
`Plaintiffs try to salvage their claims by arguing that Google gained unauthorized access to
`Plaintiffs’ communications while they were temporarily stored on their GAEDs “RAM.” Opp. at
`9. But Plaintiffs’ claims still fail under this theory because neither Plaintiffs’ personal GAEDs nor
`their RAM qualify as a “facility.” See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040,
`1058 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Courts have reasoned that interpreting “facility” to include users’ personal
`devices “would render other parts of the statute illogical” because “[a]nother provision of the
`statute authorizes access to a “facility” by a provider of an electronic communication service. Id.
`And Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that Google’s own servers are the “facility” that
`Google accessed without authorization fails as a matter of law. Plaintiffs plainly allege that
`Google provides the electronic communications service at issue. CAC ¶¶115, 116. And Section
`2701(c)(1) exempts conduct authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
`communications service.” See also Svenson v. Google, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 717, 726-27 (N.D.
`Cal. 2014). Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Svenson on the grounds that the plaintiff there
`“willingly” provided her information to Google. See Opp. at 10-11. The question under Section
`2701(c)(1) is whether the conduct was authorized by the entity providing the electronic
`communications service; if the answer is yes, then the provider cannot be liable under Section
`2701(a). Svenson, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 727.
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`2.
`Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Section 2702.
`First, Plaintiffs do not even address Google’s argument that Plaintiffs have not alleged a
`disclosure to any third party as required to state a claim under Section 2702. Mot. at 10-11, n.3.
`Plaintiffs consented to any alleged disclosure.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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`Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 13 of 23
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`Second, Plaintiffs’ argument that the Privacy Policy is too general to establish consent is
`undermined by its the plain language. See Opp. at 12. First, the Privacy Policy expressly states
`that Google collects information about users’ activity in Google services, including “voice and
`audio information.” Bali Decl., Ex. D at 21-22. Second, the Privacy Policy makes clear that
`Google uses its users’ information to “ensure [its] services are working as intended” and “to make
`improvements to [its] services.” Id. at 24. Third, the Privacy Policy states that Google may share
`users’ personal information with “Google employees, contractors, and agents” as well as with
`Google’s “affiliates and other trusted businesses or persons” for processing. Id. at 31-32. There is
`nothing ambiguous about this language.1 Plaintiffs thus consented to the alleged disclosure.
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`C.
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`Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Under CIPA
`1.
`Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Section 631(a).
`Section 631(a) does not apply to in-person verbal communications, and none of the cases
`cited by Plaintiffs state otherwise. Indeed, Tavernetti v. Superior Court, which Plaintiffs cite,
`expressly states that Section 631(a) prohibits: “[1] intentional wiretapping, [2] willfully
`attempting to learn the contents or meaning of a communication in transit over a wire, and [3]
`attempting to use or communicate information obtained as a result of engaging in either of the
`previous two activities.” 22 Cal.3d 187, 192 (1978). Here, Plaintiffs allege that in-person oral
`communications were recorded by GAEDs, that those recordings were transferred to Google’s
`servers, and that Google later “transferred those communications to third parties for analysis for
`the purpose of reading or learning the content of [those] communications.” CAC ¶¶134-136. This
`is not the conduct prohibited by Section 631(a). See Tavernetti, 22 Cal.3d at 192. And none of the
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`1 Plaintiffs also have not shown that the Privacy Policy and TOS do not apply to the putative
`subclass of minors, as they do not fall into one of the three narrow categories of contracts that
`minors cannot enter under Family Code Section 6701. C.M.D. v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 12-1216
`RS, 2014 WL 1266291, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014), aff’d sub nom. C.M.D. ex rel. De Young
`v. Facebook, Inc., 621 F. App’x 488 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that Facebook’s Statement of Rights
`and Responsibilities was binding on minors).
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`5:19-CV-04286-BLF
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`Case 5:19-cv-04286-BLF Document 61 Filed 01/31/20 Page 14 of 23
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`cases that Plaintiffs cite say otherwise. See In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., 2013 WL 5423918 at
`*20 (Section 631(a) “is not limited to communications passing over ‘telegraphic or telephone’
`wires, lines, or cables”); Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d. 355, 359 (1985) (defendant’s act of
`eavesdropping on the plaintiff’s telephone conversation with his wife qualified as an attempt to
`read or learn the contents of the communication while it was “‘in transit’ or was ‘being sent from’
`and ‘received at’ a place within this state.”).
`Finally, even if the Court finds that Section 631 can be applied here, Plaintiffs’ claim still
`fails because they have not alleged the requisite intent. See supra at II.A.1.; People v. Buchanan,
`26 Cal. App. 3d 274, 288 (1972) (claims under both Sections 631(a) and 632(a) require
`intentional wiretapping and eavesdropping).
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`2.
`Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under Section 632.
`As with Plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claims, Plaintiffs’ claims under Section 632 fail because
`Google lacked the requisite intent. See supra at II.A.1; see also Buchannan, 26 Cal. App. 3d at
`288; Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766, 776 (2002).
`Plaintiffs also have not alleged a confidential communication. Plaintiffs correctly observe
`that they must allege that they had an objectively reasonable expectation that the communication
`would not be overheard or recorded. Opp. at 15 (citing Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th at 776-77). Not
`only are Plaintiffs’ allegations conclusory on this score, they are belied by the fact that GAEDs
`display a visual cue when recording is in progress. See CAC ¶31. Under these circumstances,
`Plaintiffs could not reasonably contend that they did not know their device was recording.
`Finally, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to point to paragraphs in the CAC in which they
`allege facts showing that the p