Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN JOSE DIVISION
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`STEVEN VANCE, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`GOOGLE LLC, a Delaware limited liability
`company
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 5:20-CV-04696-BLF
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`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
`STAY AND TERMINATING MOTION
`TO DISMISS
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`[Re: ECF 33, 34]
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`Before the Court is Defendant Google LLC’s (“Google”) motion to stay all proceedings in
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`this action until the resolution of Vance v. International Business Machines, Corporation (“IBM
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`action”), currently before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. No. 1:20-
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`CV-0577, ECF 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`On January 24, 2020, Plaintiffs Steven Vance and Tim Janecyk (collectively, “Vance”)
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`filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that International
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`Business Machines, Corporation (“IBM”) violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
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`(“BIPA”). See Opp., ECF 42 at 2. Id. BIPA prohibits private entities from collecting, capturing,
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`obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing, disseminating or profiting from the biometric identifiers or
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`information of an individual without providing written notice and without obtaining a written
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`release from the impacted individual or his authorized representative. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 14/15.
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`BIPA defines biometric identifiers as including a scan of an individual’s facial geometry and
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`biometric information as any information “based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to
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`identify an individual.” Id. § 14/10. BIPA creates a private right of action that allows a plaintiff to
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`recover liquidated damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 2 of 11
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`Id. § 740/20.
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`A. The IBM Action
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`The facts of the IBM action are alleged as follows. In 2008, Vance uploaded photos of
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`himself and his family members to Flickr from his computer in Illinois. Lange Declaration
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`(“Lange Decl.”), ECF 42-1, Ex. B ¶ 23 (“IBM Complaint”). Flickr subsequently made Vance’s
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`photos, as well as millions of other people’s photos, available to IBM in a single downloadable
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`dataset (“Flickr dataset”). Id. ¶ 40. IBM captured biometrics from these photographs by scanning
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`the faces and extracting geometric data relating to the contours of the faces. Id. It used this data to
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`create its own dataset of “frontal-facing images of human faces” (“IBM dataset”). Id. ¶¶ 41-46. In
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`2019, IBM included images from the IBM Dataset into a larger dataset it created known as the
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`“Diversity in Faces” dataset (“DiF dataset”). Id. ¶ 47. Vance alleges IBM used the DiF dataset to
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`profit “from the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiffs and Class Members” in
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`violation of BIPA, among other things. Id. ¶ 52.
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`Vance brought seven causes of action against IBM: (1) violation of BIPA § 14/15(a) by
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`wrongfully possessing Vance’s biometric identifiers; (2) violation of BIPA § 14/15(b) by
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`wrongfully collecting biometric identifiers; (3) violation of BIPA § 14/15(c) by wrongfully
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`profiting from biometric identifiers; (4) violation of BIPA § 14/15(d) by wrongfully disclosing
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`biometric identifiers; (5) violation of BIPA § 14/15(e) by wrongfully failing to protect biometric
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`identifiers from disclosure; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) injunctive relief. IBM Complaint ¶¶ 68-
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`118. On September 15, 2020, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Vance’s causes of action
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`under BIPA § 14/15(a) and for injunctive relief and allowed the other claims to proceed. Vance v.
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`Int’l Bus. Machines, Corp., No. 20 C 577, 2020 WL 5530134, *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2020).
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`Discovery in the IBM action is set to close on July 28, 2021. Lange Decl., ECF 42-1, Ex D.
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`B. Other Related Cases
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`In addition to the IBM action, Vance has filed three other class action BIPA suits. On July
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`14, 2020, Vance filed a BIPA class action against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft action”) in
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`the Western District of Washington. Lange Decl., ECF 42-1, Ex. E. The Microsoft action alleges
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`that Microsoft Corporation obtained the DiF dataset from IBM and used biometric identifiers
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`contained therein in violation of BIPA. Id. ¶ 55. On July 14, 2020, Microsoft Corporation filed a
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`motion to dismiss, which, as of February 8, 2021, has not yet been adjudicated. No. 2:20-CV-
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`01082, ECF 25.
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`On July 14, 2020, Vance filed a BIPA class action suit against Amazon.com, Inc.
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`(“Amazon action”) in the Western District of Washington. Lange Decl. ECF 42-1, Ex. F. As in the
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`Microsoft action, Vance claims Amazon.com, Inc. obtained the DiF dataset from IBM and used
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`biometric identifiers in violation of BIPA. Id. ¶ 61. Amazon.com, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss,
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`which, as of February 8, 2021, has not yet been adjudicated. No. 2:20-CV-01084, ECF 18.
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`Finally, also on July 14, 2020, Vance filed a class action BIPA suit against FaceFirst, Inc.
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`(“FaceFirst action”) in the Central District of California. Lange Decl., ECF 42-1, Ex. G. As in the
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`Microsoft and Amazon actions, Vance claims FaceFirst, Inc. obtained the DiF dataset from IBM
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`and used biometric identifiers in violation of BIPA. Id. ¶ 55. Facefirst, Inc. filed a motion to
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`dismiss and a motion to stay, neither of which have been adjudicated as of February 8, 2021. No.
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`2:20-CV-06244, ECF 53, 54.
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`Neither Amazon.com, Inc. nor Microsoft Corporation has requested a stay in their
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`respective action, but FaceFirst, Inc. has requested a stay in the FaceFirst action.
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`C. The Instant Case
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`On July 14, 2020, Vance filed the instant suit against Google. See Compl., ECF 1. Vance
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`seeks to represent a class of “all Illinois residents” whose faces are in or depicted in the DiF
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`dataset photo sharing service which it alleges was passed from IBM to Google in violation of
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`BIPA. See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 40, 55, 82; Lange Decl., ECF 42-1, Ex. A ¶ 44. The complaint alleges
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`four causes of action against Google: (1) violation of BIPA § 14/15(b); (2) violation of BIPA §
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`14/15(c); (3) unjust enrichment; and (4) injunctive relief. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 99,106, 116.
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`II.
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`JUDICIAL NOTICE
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`Google requests the Court judicially notice four documents filed in federal courts outside
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`of the Northern District of California: (A) Vance’s second amended class action complaint in the
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`IBM action; (B) a print out of the docket in the IBM action; (C) Vance’s class action complaint in
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`the Amazon action; and (D) Vance’s class action complaint in the Microsoft action. See ECF 34,
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 4 of 11
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`Exs. A-D.
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`Vance requests the Court judicially notice documents filed in federal courts outside of the
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`Northern District of California as well as six documents filed in state court in Cook County,
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`Illinois: (A) Vance’s class action complaint in the IBM action; (B) Vance’s second amended class
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`action complaint in the IBM action; (C) IBM’s memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss
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`Vance’s complaint in the IBM action; (D) the October 12, 2020 scheduling order in the IBM
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`action; (E) Vance’s class action complaint in the Microsoft action; (F) Vance’s class action
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`complaint in the Amazon action; (G) Vance’s class action complaint in the FaceFirst action; (H)
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`an October 23, 2020 copy of the docket for the Microsoft action; (I) an October 23, 2020 copy of
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`the docket for the Amazon action; (J) the October 21, 2020 scheduling order for the Microsoft
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`action; and (K) which includes: (1) an order from Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., et al., No. 1:20-
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`CV-00512 (N.D. Ill May 19, 2020), ECF 61; (2) Grabawska v. The Millard Group, LLC, No. 2017
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`CH 13730 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Apr. 3, 2018) (Flynn, J.), Order Denying Stay; (3) Fields v. ABRA
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`Auto Body & Glass LP, No. 2017 CH 12271 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Mar. 3, 2018) (Mitchell, J.), Case
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`Management Order; (4) Sharrieff v. Raymond Mgmt. Co., Inc. et al., No. 2018 CH 01496 (Cir. Ct.
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`Cook Cty. May 8, 2018) (Cohen, J.), Order Granting Motion to Submit Excess Pages and Denying
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`Motion to Stay; (5) Thome v. Flexicorps, Inc., No. 2018 CH 01751 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. May 8,
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`2018) (Demacopoulos, J.), Order Denying Motion to Stay; (6) Freeman v. Alliance Ground Int’l,
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`No. 2017 CH 13636 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. May 8, 2018) (Demacopoulos, J.), Order Denying Motion
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`to Stay; and (7) Morris v. Wow Bao LLC, No. 2017 CH 12029 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. May 8, 2018),
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`(Valderrama, J.), Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Respond to Motion for Stay.
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`See ECF 42-1, Exs. A-K.
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`Courts may properly take judicial notice of other court filings and matters of public record.
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`Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank-
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`Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)). The
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`parties have neither opposed the requests for judicial notice nor disputed the authenticity of the
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`documents. The Court GRANTS both requests for judicial notice.
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 5 of 11
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`District courts have the “discretionary power to stay proceedings.” Lockyer v. Mirant
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`Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. No. American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254
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`(1936)). The power to stay is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
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`disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, counsel, and for
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`litigants.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The Court may “find it is efficient for its own docket and the
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`fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of
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`independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v.
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`Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Leyva v. Certified Grocers of
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`Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)). “This rule applies whether the separate proceedings
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`are judicial, administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that the issues in such
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`proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action before the court.” Leyva, 593 F.2d at 863-64.
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`Courts in this district have routinely granted stays where there are overlapping issues of
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`fact or law with a case before different district courts or on appeal. See, e.g., McElrath v. Uber
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`Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-07241-JSC, 2017 WL 1175591 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2017) (granting a stay
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`pending appeal of another case with similar factual and legal issues); Robledo v. Randstad US,
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`L.P., No. 17-CV-01003-BLF, 2017 WL 4934205 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017) (same); Zurich Am.
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`Ins. Co. v. Omnicell, Inc., No. 18-CV-05345-LHK, 2019 WL 570760 (N.D. Cal. Feb 12, 2019)
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`(granting a stay pending resolution of another underlying action).
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`In determining whether to grant a stay, “the competing interests which will be affected by
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`the granting or refusal to stay must be weighed.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir.
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`1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). “Among these competing interests are [1] the possible
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`damage which may result from the granting of the stay, [2] the hardship or inequity which a party
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`must suffer in being required to go forward, and [3] the orderly course of justice measured in
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`terms of the simplifying or complicating the issues, proof, and questions of law which could be
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`expected to result from the stay.” Id. (brackets in original). In addition, the “proponent of a stay
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`bears the burden establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (citing Landis,
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 6 of 11
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`299 U.S. at 255). “If there is even a fair possibility that a stay will work damage to someone else,
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`the stay may be inappropriate absent a showing by the moving party of hardship or inequity.”
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`Dependable Highway, 498 F.3d at 1066 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Landis, 299
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`U.S. at 255).
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`IV. DISCUSSION
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`A. Motion to Stay
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`The Court now weighs the Landis factors: the possible damage to the non-moving party,
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`the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly
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`course of justice. CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268 (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55).
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`1. Possible Damage from Granting Stay
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`The Court first determines the possible damage to the non-moving party that could arise
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`from a stay. Harm may occur when a court asks one litigant, “to stand aside while a litigant in
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`another court settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255.
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`“Courts, however, are generally unwilling to presume delay is harmful without specific supporting
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`evidence. For example, courts have relied on delay as a reason to deny a stay where the plaintiff is
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`seeking injunctive relief and a delay of months or years would allow the defendant to continue
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`infringing a patent. Similarly, courts have found persuasive the opposing party's argument that a
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`delay will result in the loss of documentary or testimonial evidence.” Aliphcom, 154 F. Supp. 3d at
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`938 (internal citations omitted).
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`Google argues this factor favors granting a stay because “this is not a scenario where
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`Plaintiffs must sit idly by while other parties litigate issues that bear upon their legal rights.” Mot.
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`7. In this instance, Plaintiffs and their attorneys are identical in both actions. Google also argues
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`there is little risk of evidence loss if a stay is granted because “the vast majority of evidence
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`relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims and Google’s defenses in this case is in the possession of IBM and
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`Flicker/Yahoo!” and it will take reasonable steps to preserve any relevant evidence in its
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`possession. Id. 8. Vance responds that an indefinite stay will allow Google to “continue[] to use
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`and profit from [Vance’s] biometric data” in violation of BIPA and that Google cannot prevent the
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`degradation of testimonial evidence. Opp’n 6-10. The parties also dispute whether Vance’s request
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`for an injunction prevents the Court from issuing stay. See Opp’n 6; Reply, ECF 55 at 4.
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`As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Google that a party’s prayer for an injunction
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`does not preclude a court from issuing a stay. The facts of Lockyer diverge sharply from the ones
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`before the Court. Lockyer involved the California Attorney General's antitrust lawsuit against an
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`electric-power producer. The defendant had filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Texas, and
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`sought to stay the ongoing antitrust proceedings in the California district court pursuant to the
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`district court's inherent discretionary power. Importantly, the automatic bankruptcy stay did not
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`apply to the case, given that the action involved the state's “police or regulatory power” within the
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`meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 398 F.3d at 1107-09.
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`The Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by granting the
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`discretionary stay, explaining that if the antitrust action was stayed, the attorney general and the
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`affected citizens would be harmed by the “ongoing illegal concentration of market power that
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`threatens economic harm to electricity consumers.” Id. at 1112. Meanwhile, the defendant would
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`suffer no hardship or inequity if the litigation proceeded. Id. Notably, the Ninth Circuit explained
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`that it was “highly doubtful that the bankruptcy court in Texas will provide a legal resolution” to
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`the parties' antitrust dispute because the antitrust dispute was not likely to be included as part of
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`the defendant's reorganization plan, and the state attorney general had not filed an adversary action
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`in the Texas bankruptcy court. Id. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the discretionary stay was
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`“improper in the circumstances of this case—where the power of the district court to decide
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`whether the automatic stay applies is clear, where the inapplicability of the automatic stay is also
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`clear, and where the proceeding in the bankruptcy court is unlikely to decide, or to contribute to
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`the decision of, the factual and legal issues before the district court.” Id. at 1113 (emphasis added).
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`Lockyer does not prohibit the Court from issuing a stay here. Unlike in Lockyer, the IBM
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`action and instant action share many factual and legal issues. And in Lockyer, the California
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`attorney general was acting on behalf of the aggrieved citizens of California. In contrast, while the
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`instant complaint is stylized as a class action, Plaintiffs have not yet achieved class status; the
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`Plaintiffs here—that is, the actual Plaintiffs, not the non-party members of the putative class—will
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`not be harmed by a stay of proceedings. See Morales v. Lexxiom, Inc., No. CV096549SVWDTBX,
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`2010 WL 11507515, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010). Finally, the Ninth Circuit explicitly cabined
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`its holding to the exceptional circumstances present in Lockyer.
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`Google has submitted sufficient evidence and argument to demonstrate that the harm to
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`Vance is not significant enough to outweigh the other Landis factors. Because Vance is the
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`plaintiff in both the instant case and in the IBM action, Google’s request for a stay does not require
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`that Vance’s claims be litigated by another party. Any generalized risk of delayed litigation is
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`minimized by the fact that the IBM action is moving quickly, with discovery set to end in July
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`2021, and therefore any delay will likely be minimal. See Aliphcom, 154 F. Supp. 3d at 938
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`(“[A]ny generalized risk of delayed litigation is minimized by the fact that the ITC proceeding is
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`moving forward on a comparatively expedited schedule[.]”). Moreover, Vance is currently
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`actively engaged in discovery in the IBM action and Google is on notice of the need to preserve
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`any additional evidence it may have. Google’s assurances of evidence preservation are sufficient,
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`and any failure to live up to the obligations it takes on will have significant negative effects on
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`Google later in the litigation. While Vance contends that he will be harmed by the degradation of
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`testimonial evidence, he has not identified any witnesses or areas of testimony that need to be
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`preserved, nor has he requested a limited discovery carve out from the proposed stay. The Court
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`credits Vance’s concern regarding an indefinite stay, however, and finds it appropriate to limit the
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`scope of Google’s request to one year from the date of this Order—or sooner should the IBM
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`action reach a quicker conclusion. See Dependable Highway, 498 F.3d at 1066 ("Generally, stays
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`should not be indefinite in nature.").
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`In sum, the possibility that a stay will cause Vance harm is marginal.
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`2. Possible Hardship or Inequity from Denying Stay
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`The second Landis factor considers the possible harm that could arise from the case going
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`forward. CMAX, 300 F.2d 265, 268. “[B]eing required to defend a suit, without more, does not
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`constitute a clear case of hardship or inequity for purposes of a stay.” Hawai’i v. Trump, 233 F.
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`Supp. 3d 850 (D. Haw. 2017) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Lockyer, 393 F.3d at 1112).
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`Although it is not necessarily hardship for a party to “litigate similar claims on a mere two fronts”
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`hardship may nonetheless occur where there is “the potential for inconsistent rulings and resulting
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`confusion.” Id. at 854. Where a denial of stay would cause both parties to incur significant
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`expenses on litigation that may be rendered moot, “the potential hardship from denying the stay
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`weighs slightly in favor of granting it.” Lal v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 16-CV-00674-BLF,
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`2017 WL 282895 (N.D. Cal. Jan 23, 2017).
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`Google argues the instant case shares significant factual and legal questions with the IBM
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`action, such as whether Vance’s photos were included in the dataset allegedly used by Google and
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`IBM, the nature of contractual agreements between Vance and IBM, whether IBM’s actions
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`violate BIPA, and whether Vance consented to the use of his photos. Mot. 8. To this end, Google
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`explains that "given the overlap in the allegations and claims at issue, there is a significant risk of
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`inconsistent rulings." Id. at 9 (citing SST Millennium LLC v. Mission St. Dev. LLC, No. 18-cv-
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`06681-YGR, 2019 WL 2342277, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 3, 2019)). Google also notes that a denial
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`of stay will force it to engage in substantial third-party discovery that could be rendered moot by
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`rulings in the IBM action. Mot. 8. Vance responds that Google “overstate[s]” the legal and factual
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`overlap between the two cases,” but concedes, “there is undeniably some preliminary overlap
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`between IBM and this case.” Opp’n 10. Vance also argues that “while Google seeks to stop this
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`case in its tracks on the claim that it overlaps significantly with the IBM action, it has not
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`sought to transfer venue to the Northern District of Illinois in order to consolidate this matter with
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`the IBM action.” Id. at 11.
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`This factor weighs in favor of staying the action. Although Google is not being asked to
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`litigate on two fronts, it will nonetheless shoulder additional burdens if a stay is not granted. The
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`differences between the IBM action and this action do not negate the presence of substantial
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`overlapping factual and legal questions, which need not be litigated twice, causing burden to
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`Google. The Court also highlights that many of the overlapping legal issues pose significant
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`constitutional questions, increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings and confusion. Finally, without
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`a stay there will be significant overlap in the discovery in both cases, creating additional expenses.
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`See Arris Enterprises LLC v. Sony Corp., No. 17-CV-02669-BLF, 2017 WL 3283937 (N.D. Cal.
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`Aug. 1, 2017). Because significant discovery and litigation could be rendered moot by the IBM
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`action, and because parallel proceedings could create inconsistent and confusing outcomes, the
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`9
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 10 of 11
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`potential hardship to Google weighs in favor of granting the stay.
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`3. Orderly Course of Justice
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` Judicial economy, which furthers the third Landis factor, is the primary basis courts
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`consider when ruling on motions to stay. Fuller v. Amerigas Propane, Inc., No. 09-2493 TEH,
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`2009 WL 2390358 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009). “Duplication of case management tasks by
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`multiple courts is not an economical use of judicial resources.” Id. Preserving the resources of the
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`court “will also preserve those of both parties involved while simultaneously allowing them to
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`tailor discovery and avoid duplicative or unnecessary tasks.” Id.
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`Vance argues that the divergent factual nature of the two actions requires “at most”
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`informal discovery coordination. Opp’n 13. Google counters that judicial economy favors a stay
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`because there are threshold questions across both cases, such as whether IBM collected Vance’s
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`biometric identifiers or information in violation of BIPA. Reply 10.
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`The Court agrees with Google. The factual issues to be resolved in both cases are similar
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`and predicated on the issues in the IBM action as Vance must first establish that IBM wrongfully
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`acquired and used Vance’s biometric information in violation of BIPA. Compl. ¶ 55. In addition to
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`the overlapping factual issues, there are overlapping constitutional questions raised by Google and
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`IBM in their respective cases. Vance v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Corp., No. 20 C 577, 2020 WL
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`5530134 at *6-7; Defendant Google LLC’s Notice of Constitutional Question, ECF 36. Because
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`there are predicate constitutional questions and predicate factual questions as to how IBM
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`acquired the photographs at the heart of this case, judicial efficiency counsels that a stay is
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`appropriate pending the resolution of issues in the IBM action. By allowing the Illinois court to
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`resolve some of these overlapping issues, significant efficiencies are gained because the Court
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`avoids issuing inconsistent rulings and expending unnecessary judicial resources on mooted
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`issues.
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`Although there are no dispositive motion deadlines set in the IBM action, a one-year stay is
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`appropriate as it will allow the IBM parties to complete discovery and provide them with a
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`meaningful amount of time to resolve some of the overlapping issues. Because trial in the instant
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`action is currently set for February 2023, the parties will have ample time to complete discovery
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`Case 5:20-cv-04696-BLF Document 66 Filed 02/12/21 Page 11 of 11
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`even in light of a one-year stay.
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`B. Motion to Dismiss
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`Google concurrently filed its Motions to Dismiss and to Stay. See ECF 33, 34. Google did
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`not, however, indicate the order in which it preferred the Court consider the motions. The
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`circumstances of this case counsel that the Court rule on the Motion to Stay first and terminate the
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`Motion to Dismiss without prejudice to refiling after the stay if lifted. It appears likely that once
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`the IBM Court rules on the overlapping legal and factual issues, Plaintiffs will choose to amend
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`the Complaint in this action in order to move forward rapidly upon lifting the stay. Plaintiffs may
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`identify additional theories or issues to litigate in this case with the benefit of the IBM action. It
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`would be inefficient to use this Court’s time to delve into the pleadings under these circumstances,
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`particularly given that Google’s Motion to Stay is broad. See Reply at 1. For these reasons, the
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`Court TERMINATES the pending Motion to Dismiss.
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`V.
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`ORDER
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`For the foregoing reason, the Court finds the Landis factors weigh in favor of a stay. The
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`Court GRANTS Google’s Motion to Stay and STAYS the case until February 12, 2022, or sooner
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`should the IBM action be resolved before that date. The parties SHALL submit a joint status report
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`to the Court within 14 days of the resolution of the IBM Action or on February 12, 2022,
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`whichever is earlier. The Court TERMINATES the pending motion to dismiss at ECF 34.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: February 12, 2021
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`______________________________
`BETH LABSON FREEMAN
`United States District Judge
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