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12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
13
14 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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REILLY, JOSHUA LODGE, ERIC ROMERO,
18 JONATHAN CLAY, JOHN HICKS, MARY
STOCKTON, ZACHARY PRATER, and
19 BENJAMIN ANDERSON, individually and on
20 behalf of all others similarly situated,

21 Plaintiffs,

22 v.

23 MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICRON
SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS, INC.,
24 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,
SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., SK
25 HYNIX, INC., and SK HYNIX AMERICA,
26 INC.,

27 Defendants.
28

Case No. _____

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

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