Case 3:22-cv-02746-JD Document 1 Filed 05/09/22 Page 1 of 91
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`HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
`John C. Hueston, State Bar No. 164921
`jhueston@hueston.com
`Douglas J. Dixon, State Bar No. 275389
`ddixon@hueston.com
`620 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1300
`Newport Beach, CA 92660
`Telephone: (949) 229-8640
`
`Joseph A. Reiter, State Bar No. 294976
`jreiter@hueston.com
`Michael K. Acquah, State Bar No. 313955
`macquah@hueston.com
`William M. Larsen, State Bar No. 314091
`wlarsen@hueston.com
`Julia L. Haines, State Bar No. 321607
`jhaines@hueston.com
`523 West 6th Street, Suite 400
`Los Angeles, CA 90014
`Telephone: (213) 788-4340
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Match Group, LLC;
`Humor Rainbow, Inc.; PlentyofFish Media ULC;
`and People Media, Inc.
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`MATCH GROUP, LLC, a Delaware
`Case No.
`corporation; HUMOR RAINBOW, INC.,
`
`COMPLAINT FOR (1) VIOLATIONS
`a New York corporation;
`OF THE SHERMAN ACT;
`PLENTYOFFISH MEDIA ULC, a
`(2) VIOLATIONS OF THE
`Canadian corporation; and PEOPLE
`CARTWRIGHT ACT; (3) UNFAIR
`MEDIA, INC., a Delaware corporation,
`COMPETITION; (4) TORTIOUS
`
`INTERFERENCE WITH
`Plaintiffs,
`CONTRACT; AND (5) TORTIOUS
`
`INTERFERENCE WITH
`v.
`PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC
`
`ADVANTAGE
`GOOGLE LLC; GOOGLE IRELAND
`
`LIMITED; GOOGLE COMMERCE
`
`LIMITED; GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC
`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
`PTE. LIMITED; and GOOGLE
`PAYMENT CORP.,
`
`Defendants.
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`6182535
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`Case 3:22-cv-02746-JD Document 1 Filed 05/09/22 Page 2 of 91
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1
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`PARTIES .................................................................................................................. 13
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ............................................................................... 14
`DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT ................................................................................ 15
`BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................... 15
`A. Match Group Provides Popular Online Dating Services ..................... 15
`B. Google Has Monopolized the Marketplace for Mobile and
`Licensable Operating Systems ............................................................. 19
`C. Google Has Unlawfully Maintained a Monopoly in the
`Market for Distribution of Android Apps ............................................ 21
`D. Google Also Has Market Power in the Market for Dating
`App Distribution ................................................................................... 25
`Google Devises and Uses Exclusionary Contracts, Illegal
`Tying, and Predatory Practices to Block Competitors and
`Ensure Google Play’s Dominance ....................................................... 28
`1.
`Google Uses Exclusionary Contracts with OEMs ..................... 29
`2.
`Google Uses Exclusionary Contracts with App
`Developers ................................................................................. 31
`Google Uses Payment Incentives and Predatory
`Practices ..................................................................................... 32
`Google Uses Technological Roadblocks, Contractual
`Restrictions, and False Information to Make Direct
`App Downloads Impractical ...................................................... 36
`Google’s Anti-Competitive Conduct Destroys
`Competition in the Android App Distribution Market
`or, Alternatively, the Dating App Distribution
`Market ........................................................................................ 39
`Google Unlawfully Seized and Maintains a Monopoly in
`the Market for Android App In-App Payment Processors .................. 41
`Google Uses Illegal Ties and Exclusive Contracts to
`1.
`Mandate Use of Google Play Billing ......................................... 44
`Google Abuses Its Monopoly Power by Imposing an
`Arbitrary and Unconscionable Tax on Consumers
`and App Developers................................................................... 46
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)
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`Page
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`3.
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`I.
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`J.
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`Google’s Conduct Destroys Competition in the
`Android App IAP Market and Harms Consumers and
`App Developers ......................................................................... 51
`G. Match Group Offers Consumers an Alternative and
`Competitive In-App Payment Option .................................................. 53
`H. Google Allows Match Group’s Apps to Remain on Google
`Play, Recognizing That Match Group’s Payment Options
`Do Not Violate Google’s Policies ........................................................ 55
`Abusing its Monopoly Power, Google Abruptly Changed
`Its Policies ............................................................................................ 58
`Google’s Anti-Competitive Conduct Has Irreparably
`Harmed Match Group and its Customers ............................................. 64
`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................... 66
`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION .............................................................................. 68
`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................. 69
`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION .............................................................................. 71
`FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................... 73
`SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................. 75
`SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................ 76
`EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................... 78
`NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................. 79
`TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 81
`ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ......................................................................... 83
`TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................................................... 84
`THIRTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ..................................................................... 86
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................... 87
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`INTRODUCTION1
`This is a case about the strategic manipulation of markets, broken
`1.
`promises, and abuse of power that Google LLC2 has employed to illegally foreclose
`competition in the world’s biggest mobile device ecosystem, Android, and become
`one of the largest, most powerful companies in the world. Google convinced billions
`around the world to use the Android mobile operating system (“Android” or “Android
`OS”) on promises of an open ecosystem, flexibility, and a focus on the user. Through
`those platitudes and promises and the anticompetitive tactics detailed in this
`complaint, Google illegally monopolized the market for distributing apps on Android
`devices with its Google Play Store (“Google Play”)—making it today the only viable
`choice a mobile application (“app”) developer has to reach Android users. Now,
`Google seeks to eliminate user choice of payment services and raise prices on
`consumers by extending its dominance to the separate market for in-app payment
`(“IAP”) processors on Android. It is conditioning app availability on Google Play
`with exclusive use of its own in-app payment processing product, Google Play
`Billing, where it can charge supra-competitive prices and monetize the personal data
`of billions of digital app users.
`Ten years ago, Match Group was Google’s partner. We are now
`2.
`its hostage. Google lured app developers to its platform with assurances that we could
`offer users a choice over how to pay for the services they want. But once it
`monopolized the market for Android app distribution with Google Play by riding the
`coattails of the most popular app developers, Google sought to ban alternative in-app
`
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`1 For the purposes of this complaint, the term “Match Group” includes only the operating entities
`named as Plaintiffs. Match Group LLC; Humor Rainbow, Inc.; PlentyofFish Media ULC; and People
`Media, Inc. are part of the Match Group family of companies with the ultimate parent company
`Match Group, Inc. (“MGI”), a nonoperating holding company. MGI’s other subsidiaries are not
`included in the definition of “Match Group” in this complaint. Match Group asserts the allegations
`in this complaint upon personal knowledge as to itself and its own acts and experiences and, as to all
`other matters, upon information and belief, including an investigation conducted by its attorneys.
`2 Unless noted otherwise, throughout this complaint, “Google” refers to Google LLC and all other
`Google entity defendants.
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`payment processing services so it could take a cut of nearly every in-app transaction
`on Android. This Complaint lays bare Google’s misdeeds that made it possible.
`Google monetizes Android, in part, by operating Google Play and a
`3.
`separate in-app payment processing service called Google Play Billing. Over the last
`decade, through bait and switch tactics that exploited the very app developers it so
`ardently courted and claimed to support and by paying off potential competitors not
`to compete, Google has grown Google Play into the only viable Android app
`marketplace. If a developer wants users to find its app, that app must be on Google
`Play.
`But that was not enough for Google. It also wanted to control the much
`4.
`more lucrative in-app payment processing market on Android. Every year, consumers
`spend tens of billions of dollars on Android apps. And that number increases every
`year. When those transactions involve the purchase of “digital goods or services”
`using Google Play Billing, Google keeps as much as 30% for itself. Google
`disingenuously calls this extortionate tax a “fee” even though it is nearly ten times the
`actual fees other payment processors charge in competitive marketplaces.
`Further, what constitutes a “digital good or service” is ill-defined and
`5.
`arbitrarily applied. Clothing and food delivery and ride sharing apps do not qualify.
`But Match Group’s dating apps do qualify, even though they enable users to meet in
`the real world for a date, just like a ride sharing app enables a user to find a driver in
`the real world for a ride.
`Google’s “fee” also bears no relation to the cost or value of services
`6.
`Google provides developers. Indeed, all developers with apps on Google Play benefit
`from the exact same services, and they all pay Google a $25.00 registration fee. Yet
`only the small handful who sell “digital goods and services,” again, as arbitrarily
`defined by Google, pay the Google tax, which results in pure non-competitive profit
`to Google. It also allows Google to collect massive volumes of user data that Google
`can then monetize.
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`Blinded by the possibility of getting an ever-greater cut of the billions of
`7.
`dollars users spend each year on Android apps, Google set out to monopolize the
`market for how users pay for their Android apps. But it had to be sly in the way it
`went about doing so.
`After acquiring Android, Google knew that its growth depended on
`8.
`Android and Google Play offering the most popular apps to users. So to entice
`developers to offer their apps through Google Play, Google historically allowed many
`app developers to offer their own payment processing services for in-app purchases
`or offer those services alongside Google Play Billing. While Google required the
`purchase price to be the same regardless of the payment service employed, this gave
`users and developers a choice. Developers who were satisfied with Google’s one-
`size-fits-all Google Play Billing service could utilize it. But for developers for whom
`Google Play Billing was not a good fit—for example, because it restricted
`subscription payment plans or did not allow developers to provide discounts—they
`could opt to offer their own payment processing system. And such developers spent
`considerable time, effort, and money doing just that, and most users appreciated
`the choice. This included several of Match Group’s brands.
`9. Match Group, LLC; Humor Rainbow, Inc.; PlentyofFish Media ULC; and
`People Media, Inc. (collectively, “Match Group”) operate popular dating apps,
`including Match Group, LLC’s Tinder®, the world’s most popular dating app. Match
`Group started the online dating category back in 1995 and has been instrumental in
`making the dating app industry an important and everyday part of a single’s dating
`experience. Match Group’s platforms are responsible for millions of marriages,
`relationships, and families. And, although Match Group’s dating apps have been
`available on Android for many years, they did not always offer the ability to make in-
`app purchases because Google Play Billing lacked features that are important to
`consumers and that Match Group’s web-based payment solutions had offered for
`years. Google recognized, however, that once Match Group offered in-app purchases
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`through Android apps, even if it was through Match Group’s own payment system,
`customers would become accustomed to paying inside the app, making it difficult for
`Match Group to redirect users to purchase subscriptions and upgrades outside the
`app—e.g., on Match Group websites. This would increase the propensity of users to
`only use the Android app and further entrench the Android ecosystem, all of which
`benefits Google’s bottom line.
`10. So Google assured Match Group that if it enabled in-app purchases in its
`dating apps on Android, Match Group could use its own payment systems for in-app
`purchases, whether on their own or alongside Google Play Billing. And Match Group
`went along. On some apps, Match Group launched in-app purchases on Android
`using both Google Play Billing and its own in-house payment processing system. But
`Match Group learned that users in the United States prefer to use Match Group’s own
`payment services over Google Play Billing a majority of the time, as demonstrated on
`Match Group’s Tinder app.
`11. Similarly, despite building Android on promises of being an “open”
`ecosystem, over time, Google has forced original equipment manufacturers
`(“OEMs”) to accept contractual limitations requiring them to give Google Play
`insurmountable advantages over competing app stores. For example, Google required
`OEMs to pre-install Google Play on the home screen of every Android device in
`exchange for access to essential Google services. Google also developed a program
`whereby OEMs received a percentage of Google’s search and Google Play Billing
`revenue if they provided Google Play exclusively. Google also limits access to
`competing app stores by imposing technological restraints on Android OS users.
`12. Fast-forward to 2022. Android is now the dominant licensable mobile
`operating system (“OS”) in existence and used by nearly 70% of all smart mobile
`devices globally. And Google Play is equally dominant, processing over 90% of all
`Android app downloads across the globe: Android device users downloaded apps
`from Google Play more than 111 billion times last year—translating to nearly $48
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`billion in app revenue through Google Play in 2021.3 No competing Android app
`store has more than 5% of the market.
`13. With total domination of the Android app distribution market now in
`hand, Google turned to its goal of monopolizing the in-app payment processing
`market. In 2020, Google announced that it would require all apps that sell its vaguely
`defined “digital goods and services” to use Google Play Billing exclusively starting
`in September 2021. No more alternatives to Google Play Billing would be allowed.
`No more user choice. It is Google Play Billing or nothing for users and app
`developers. And the punishment for noncompliance is severe: banishment from
`Google Play.
`14. Google’s policy change eliminated the promised exception that had
`previously enticed Match Group and other popular apps—like streaming services—
`to offer in-app purchases and spend time, effort, and money to develop their own in-
`app payment systems. Now that Google controlled the only real choice for developers
`to market their apps to Android users, Google held all the power and no longer needed
`their support.
`15. Google’s motivation is obvious: monopolizing the Android in-app
`payment processing market allows Google to impose a 15-30% tax on the billions of
`dollars users spend on so-called “digital goods or services” on Android. The timing
`is obvious, too, given Google’s lackluster financial performance in the first quarter of
`2022. That tax comes out of the pockets of consumers in the form of higher prices
`and the revenue that app developers would and should otherwise earn for the sale of
`their services. Monopolizing the in-app payment processing market also allows
`Google to collect reams of sensitive consumer data—such as consumer identities and
`pricing, credit card information, propensity to purchase dating services, etc.—that
`Google can further monetize, as well as use to build competing apps or services.
`
`3 See Statista, Worldwide gross app revenue of Google Play from 2016 to 2021, available online at
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/444476/google-play-annual-revenue/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
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`16. Google further ensures that such transactions only occur on Google Play
`Billing by including onerous, one-sided terms in its developer agreements. Google’s
`developer agreement is an adhesion contract—in other words, Google dictates the
`terms and app developers can either agree to Google’s terms or be excluded. One of
`those terms is an anti-steering provision, which prohibits developers from
`communicating with users inside their apps about a user’s ability to purchase upgrades
`or additional functionality outside the app, including at lower prices, through, for
`example, the developer’s own website.
`17. Google therefore controls it all: the dominant marketplace for Android
`apps; the only means to purchase apps in the marketplace; and the messaging inside
`the marketplace so that consumers cannot learn of lower-priced options elsewhere.
`18. Match Group is not the first to sound the alarm on Google’s unlawful
`conduct, nor is it an isolated voice. Many other app developers, consumers and, more
`recently, a coalition of 37 state Attorneys General, have filed lawsuits condemning
`Google’s actions and seeking to prevent the same illegal conduct.4 Those lawsuits
`followed separate antitrust actions by the Department of Justice and states that
`challenged Google’s abuse of monopoly power in similar contexts.5 Other
`government investigations and entities, including the United States House of
`Representatives Judiciary Committee,6
`the United States Senate Judiciary
`
`
`4 See, e.g., State of Utah et al. v. Google LLC et al., Case No. 3:21-cv-05227-JD (N.D. Cal.); In Re
`Play Store Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 3:21-md-02981-JD (N.D. Cal.); Epic Games, Inc. v. Google
`LLC et al., Case No. 3:20-cv-05671-JD (N.D. Cal.).
`5 United States of America et al. v. Google LLC, Case No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C.); The State
`of Texas et al. v. Google LLC, Case No. 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ (E.D. Tex.).
`6 See Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and
`Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary at 213 (2020).
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`Committee,7 the European Commission,8 the Competition Commission of India,9 the
`French Ministry of Finance,10 the German Federal Cartel Office,11 the Cabinet
`Secretariat of Japan,12 the United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority,13 the
`Competition Commission of South Africa,14 the Australia Competition and Consumer
`Commission,15 and the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets16 all have
`
`
`7 See Executive Business Meeting, U.S. Senate Committee of the Judiciary (Feb. 3, 2022),
`available online at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/03/2022/executive-business-
`meeting-2 (last visited April 26, 2022).
`8 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal
`Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine
`(July
`18,
`2018),
`available
`online
`at
`https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4581 (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`9 See Economic Times, CCI to complete probe into Google Play Store policy within 60 days (Jan. 5,
`2022), available online at https://m.economictimes.com/tech/technology/cci-to-complete-probe-
`into-google-play-store-policy-within-60-days/articleshow/88717171.cms (last visited Apr. 26 2022);
`Economic Times, CCI probe finds Google’s Play Store billing guidelines ‘unfair’ and
`‘discriminatory’
`(Mar.
`31,
`2022),
`available
`online
`at
`https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/technology/cci-probe-finds-googles-play-store-billing-
`guidelines-unfair-and-discriminatory/articleshow/90550596.cms (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`10 See Bloomberg, Google Slapped with French Fine Over Abusive App Store Practices (March 29,
`2022), available online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-29/google-slapped-
`with-french-fine-over-abusive-app-store-practices (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`11 See Bloomberg Law, Google Subject to New, Tougher Supervision by German Regulator, available
`online
`at
`https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/google-subject-to-new-
`tougher-supervision-by-german-regulator (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`12 See Nikkei Asia, Apple and Google under Antitrust Scrutiny in Japan for Mobile OS, available
`online at https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Apple-and-Google-under-antitrust-scrutiny-
`in-Japan-for-mobile-OS (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`13 See United Kingdom Competition & Markets Authority, Mobile Ecosystems Market Study Interim
`Report
`(Updated
`Jan.
`26,
`2022),
`available
`online
`at
`https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mobile-ecosystems-market-study-interim-
`report/interim-report (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`14 See George Herald, SA Publishers to Challenge Google and Meta Competition Commission,
`available
`online
`at
`https://www.georgeherald.com/News/Article/Business/sa-publishers-to-
`challenge-google-and-meta-at-competition-commission-202112070346 (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`15 See Reuters, Google Misled Consumers Over Data Collection—Australian Watchdog, available
`online at https://www.reuters.com/technology/australia-finds-google-misled-customers-over-data-
`collection-regulator-2021-04-16/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022); Reuters, Australia Plans to Make
`Google Offer Alternative Search Engines on Smartphones,
`available online
`at
`https://www.reuters.com/technology/australia-plans-make-google-offer-alternative-search-engines-
`smartphones-2021-10-28/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`16 See Reuters, With Apple Fight Ongoing, Dutch Watchdog ACM to Investigate Google Play Store
`Practices, available online at https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-watchdog-acm-
`investigate-google-play-store-practices-2022-05-04/ (last visited May 9, 2022).
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`scrutinized Google’s business practices and likewise concluded that Google has
`monopolized the Android app distribution market and engaged in improper tying and
`other anti-competitive acts.
`19. Many countries around the world have taken action in direct response to
`Google’s anti-competitive behavior. For example, the European Union recently
`reached agreement on the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). Hailed as the “most
`sweeping legislation to regulate tech since the European privacy law was passed in
`2018,”17 the DMA places limitations and restrictions on “gatekeeper” platforms like
`Google by, among other things, requiring them to allow third-party payment options
`for in-app payments and alternative app stores and prohibiting discriminatory fees.
`Similarly, the government of Republic of Korea targeted Google’s exercise of
`monopoly power in the mobile app market by, among other things, amending the
`Telecommunications Business Act to prohibit platform operators like Google from
`forcing its IAP systems and levying discriminatory fees on app developers.
`20. Through all the enforcement actions and new regulation across the globe,
`it is clear that Google’s business model has either already been or soon will be
`declared illegal in roughly half the world. The entire world is recognizing that Google
`has manipulated laws passed to protect innovation, competition, and a free market in
`the most calculated manner to destroy innovation and competition.
`21. Despite scrutiny from governments, private plaintiffs, and antitrust
`authorities throughout the world, Google has continued to flout official sanctions with
`its anti-competitive and illegal conduct—displaying a disturbing disregard for
`consumers, developers, regulators, and established antitrust law alike. Google’s
`power, based on its own actions, is apparently unmitigated: Google has found it more
`profitable to pay fines or evade them through lengthy appeals, choosing to continue
`
`
`17 See The NYTimes, E.U. Takes Aim at Big Tech’s Power With Landmark Digital Act (March 24,
`2022), available online at https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/24/technology/eu-regulation-apple-
`meta-google.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
`
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`6182535
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`COMPLAINT
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`to engage in anti-competitive conduct by collecting its fees up to the last possible
`moment, rather than revise its policies that have been internationally rebuked for
`harming consumers.18
`Initially, it appeared that Google may have paid heed to its sinking
`22.
`reputation on the global stage. Google originally postponed its September 2021
`ultimatum for app developers to exclusively use Google Play Billing until March 31,
`2022. But as this new deadline approached, Google dug in its heels even as public
`lawsuits, investigations, regulatory orders, and new legislation cascaded against
`Google’s anti-competitive practices. Instead of changing its policies, it resorted to
`offering hush money to developers, including Match Group, in the form of hundreds
`of millions of dollars in credits and rebates (with myriad strings attached) to give up
`its own payment processor and stop advocating that government officials protect
`consumers and developers from Google’s harmful conduct. In fact, Google
`threatened to retract such an offer from Match Group, Inc. (“MGI”) on the eve of an
`MGI officer’s planned testimony about Google’s stranglehold on app developers
`before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and
`Consumer Rights.
`23. Less than a week before Google’s March 31, 2022, deadline, Google
`announced a new “pilot program” (misleadingly) labeled “User Choice Billing.”
`Under this new “pilot program,” developers may offer a “choice” of billing platforms
`but with a catch: one of those options must be Google Play Billing and only Google
`determines who can participate in this new program. So far, the only developer
`Google selected appears to be Spotify, the popular music streaming service with
`hundreds of millions of active users. Match asked to participate, but, despite the fact
`that Match has offered users a choice of payment systems in its Android apps for
`
`
`18 The Associated Press, Google is Appealing a $5 Billion Antitrust Fine in the EU (Sept. 27, 2021),
`available online at https://www.npr.org/2021/09/27/1040889789/google-eu-android-appeal-antitrust
`(last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (citing the multi-year litigation and Google’s record-breaking penalty).
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`COMPLAINT
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`nearly a decade, Google refused, telling Match that User Choice Billing is only a pilot
`program at a “very early stage” and that it could not confirm when or whether it would
`be expanded beyond Spotify. That is pretext.
`In reality, the User Choice Billing “pilot program” is nothing more than
`24.
`a political stunt designed to thwart regulatory scrutiny of Google Play Billing and a
`thinly veiled attempt to lure certain hold-out developers, like Spotify, to begin using
`Google Play Billing. To understand why Google has only offered this option to
`Spotify, all one has to do is follow the money. Spotify previously did not allow
`purchases on Android through its app because it refused to pay Google’s tax; instead,
`users who wished to purchase a Spotify subscription had to do so through Spotify’s
`website or desktop app. Now, through User Choice Billing, Google will be able to
`impose its tax on some portion of the hundreds of millions of dollars of Spotify
`subscriptions that will happen inside the Spotify Android app, where Google
`previously received nothing. With this context, it’s clear that User Choice Billing is
`nothing more than a Potemkin village erected to project the appearance of competitive
`freedom to regulators without presenting a genuine option to developers while finally
`giving Google access to revenues from Spotify’s highly valuable music streaming
`business. In truth, User Choice Billing demonstrates how little Google values
`transparency to consumers, developers, or regulators, let alone real market choice.
`25. And this is an old trick. As previously mentioned, Google has allowed
`developers like Match Group to offer users a choice of billing platforms for nearly a
`decade—and it continues to allow apps like Uber and Lyft to operate their own
`payment processors, despite the very limited differences between the services their
`apps offer (digitally connecting a driver and passenger for an in-real-life trip) and
`those offered by Match Group apps (digitally connecting two potential daters for an
`in-real-life date). Google’s announcement of a new exception less than eight days
`before its new general policy went into effect disallowing d