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`HUESTON HENNIGAN LLP
`John C. Hueston, State Bar No. 164921
`jhueston@hueston.com
`Douglas J. Dixon, State Bar No. 275389
`ddixon@hueston.com
`620 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1300
`Newport Beach, CA 92660
`Telephone:
`(949) 229-8640
`
`Joseph A. Reiter, State Bar No. 294976
`jreiter@hueston.com
`Michael K. Acquah, State Bar No. 313955
`macquah@hueston.com
`William M. Larsen, State Bar No. 314091
`wlarsen@hueston.com
`Julia L. Haines, State Bar No. 321607
`jhaines@hueston.com
`523 West 6th Street, Suite 400
`Los Angeles, CA 90014
`Telephone:
`(213) 788-4340
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Match Group, LLC;
`Humor Rainbow, Inc.; PlentyofFish Media ULC;
`and People Media, Inc.
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`MATCH GROUP, LLC, a Delaware
`Case No. 5:22-cv-02746
`corporation; HUMOR RAINBOW, INC., a
`
`PLAINTIFFS MATCH GROUP, LLC’S,
`New York corporation; PLENTYOFFISH
`HUMOR RAINBOW, INC.’S,
`MEDIA ULC, a Canadian corporation; and
`PLENTYOFFISH MEDIA ULC’S, AND
`PEOPLE MEDIA, INC., a Delaware
`PEOPLE MEDIA, INC.’S MEMORANDUM
`corporation,
`OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
`
`SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
`RESTRAINING ORDER
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC; GOOGLE IRELAND
`LIMITED; GOOGLE COMMERCE
`LIMITED; GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE.
`LIMITED; and GOOGLE PAYMENT
`CORP.,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendants.
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`Case No. 5:22-cv-02746
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ISO MOTION FOR TRO
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`6183767
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`

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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 2
`A.
`Google Illegally Ties GPB To Google Play ............................................................. 2
`B.
`Google Knowingly Permitted Match Group To Offer Alternative
`Payment Options For More Than A Decade ............................................................ 3
`Google Seeks to Change The Status Quo To Require That Match
`Group Exclusively Use GPB .................................................................................... 4
`Google Has No Legitimate Reason For Changing The Status Quo ......................... 5
`D.
`Google Only Recently Started Enforcing Its Policy Change .................................... 6
`E.
`ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................ 6
`A.
`Absent An Injunction, Google Will Irreparably Harm Match Group ...................... 7
`1.
`Banning its Apps from Google Play Will Irreparably Harm
`Match Group ................................................................................................. 7
`Complying with Google’s Mandate Will Irreparably Harm
`Match Group ................................................................................................. 8
`Maintaining the Status Quo Will Not Harm Google ................................................ 9
`Match Group is Likely to Succeed on the Merits ................................................... 10
`1.
`Google Continues to Intentionally Interfere with Match
`Group’s Contracts ....................................................................................... 10
`Google’s Conduct Violates the Unfair Competition Law .......................... 14
`2.
`CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... 15
`
`C.
`
`B.
`C.
`
`2.
`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`
`
`Am. Rena Int’l Corp. v. Sis-Joyce Int’l Co.,
`534 F. App'x 633 (9th Cir. 2013) .......................................................................................... 7
`
`Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp.,
`673 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Cal. 2009) .............................................................................. 8, 9
`
`B.D. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc.,
`76 Cal. App. 5th 931 (2022) ............................................................................................... 10
`
`Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct.,
`2 Cal. 4th 1254 (1992) ........................................................................................................ 15
`
`Blizzard Ent. Inc. v. Ceiling Fan Software LLC,
`28 F. Supp. 3d 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ................................................................................ 15
`
`Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co.,
`20 Cal. 4th 163 (1999) .................................................................................................. 14, 15
`
`Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prod. Co.,
`717 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................ 7
`
`Facebook, Inc. v. Brandtotal Ltd.,
`No. 20-CV-07182-JCS, 2021 WL 2354751 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2021) ............. 11, 12, 13, 14
`
`hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.,
`273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017) .................................................................... 9, 14, 15
`
`hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp.,
`No. 17-16783, 2022 WL 1132814 (9th Cir. 2022) ...................................................... passim
`
`Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,
`18 Cal. 2d 33 (1941) ........................................................................................................... 14
`
`Kim v. Allison,
`8 F.4th 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................................... 10
`
`Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
`29 Cal. 4th 1134 (2003) ...................................................................................................... 11
`
`Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
`50 Cal. 3d 1118 (1990) ................................................................................................. 11, 12
`
`Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co.,
`19 Cal. 4th 26 (1998) .................................................................................................... 10, 11
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont.)
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`Page(s)
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`
`
`Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
`747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................................................................ 8
`
`Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Russolillo,
`162 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2001) .............................................................................. 11
`
`Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co.,
`240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................................ 7
`
`Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc.,
`695 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................................................................................ 8
`
`Statutes
`
`Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code §§ 17200 ............................................................................................ 1, 15
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`TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
`
`Abbreviation
`Term
`California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 UCL
`Declaration of Peter Foster
`Foster Decl.
`Developer Distribution Agreement
`DDA
`Epic Games, Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (“Epic
`Epic Motion
`Motion”) in the related matter of Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC,
`Case No. 3:20-cv-0561-JD at Dkt. Nos. 213-221
`Google Play Billing
`Google Play Store
`The term “Match Group” includes only the operating entities named as
`Plaintiffs. Match Group LLC; Humor Rainbow, Inc.; PlentyofFish
`Media ULC; and People Media, Inc. are part of the Match Group
`family of companies with the ultimate parent company Match Group,
`Inc. (“MGI”), a nonoperating holding company. MGI’s other
`subsidiaries are not included in the definition of “Match Group” in this
`motion.
`Match Group, Inc.
`
`GPB
`Google Play
`Match Group
`
`MGI
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`I.
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`INTRODUCTION
`A temporary restraining order is necessary to preserve the status quo and stop Google from
`ending consumer choice by enforcing an anticompetitive ultimatum that would disrupt millions of
`Match Group’s customer relationships, prevent Match Group from distributing its apps to hundreds
`of millions of potential customers globally, and inflict other irreparable harms. Because of Google’s
`illegal monopolization, Google Play is the only commercially viable marketplace for app developers
`to reach Android device users. Google has abused this power by requiring developers that use Google
`Play to also use a separate Google product (GPB) to process in-app purchases for “digital” content.
`Through this requirement, Google extracts an unconscionable fee (between 15-30%) on each of these
`
`purchases.
`For more than a decade, Google exempted Match Group from this requirement. Match Group
`brought some of the most popular dating apps to Google Play and enabled in-app purchases with the
`assurance that it could offer its alternative payment options that are superior to GPB and preferred
`by customers. Google reaped the rewards of hosting such hugely popular apps, including harvesting
`vast amounts of user data that Google sells for advertising and receiving several hundred million
`dollars in “fees” from transactions by customers who chose to use GPB.
`But that did not satisfy Google’s greed. Google abruptly changed course and now seeks to
`force Match Group to exclusively use GPB to process all in-app purchases. Just recently, because
`Match Group did not accede to Google’s mandate, Google started prohibiting Match Group from
`updating its apps on Google Play. On June 1, 2022, Google will ban Match Group’s apps entirely.
`Google has already irreparably harmed Match Group by preventing it from distributing
`critical app updates to its users. If Google enforces its ban on June 1, Match Group will lose access
`to more than half of its potential customers overnight. The ban will also interfere with Match Group’s
`customer relationships and its apps will quickly cease to function as intended on Android devices,
`precluding users from accessing the services they seek and paid for, permanently damaging Match
`Group’s brand recognition and goodwill, and decreasing the size of its user networks. Match Group
`cannot avoid irreparable harm by complying with Google’s mandate. Beyond the significant financial
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`loss, compliance would require major redesigns of Match Group’s apps and systems, require Match
`Group to put other projects on hold, interfere with Match Group’s customer relationships, prevent
`Match Group from providing payment options that its customers use and prefer, confuse and deter
`customers who are forced to switch to GPB, limit Match Group from resolving customer service
`issues, and deprive Match Group of its relationships with its users and data that it uses to enhance
`user safety and improve its apps. In the fiercely competitive mobile dating market, Google’s mandate
`is a death knell for Match Group. By contrast, if an injunction issues, Google will not suffer any
`harm, and will instead continue to benefit through its monetization of Match Group’s apps.
`Though the balance of harms by itself strongly favors an injunction, Match Group is also
`likely to succeed on the merits because, among other reasons, Google’s mandate (1) interferes with
`Match Group’s contracts with third parties, (2) violates the UCL, and (3) is an illegal tie in violation
`of the Sherman and Cartwright Acts. Finally, the public benefits from consumer choice on payment
`options and being able to continue using Match Group’s apps.
`For these reasons and those discussed below, a temporary restraining order should issue.
`BACKGROUND
`Google Illegally Ties GPB To Google Play
`A.
`As alleged in the Complaint and detailed in the Epic Motion in the related matter of Epic
`Games, Inc. v. Google LLC, Case No. 3:20-cv-0561-JD, Google has monopoly positions that it
`acquired and maintains using exclusionary contracts, predatory practices, “bait and switch” tactics,
`payments not to compete, and erecting barriers to entry. Because of Google’s unlawful conduct,
`Google Play processes more than 90% of all downloads of Android apps and an overwhelming
`proportion of dating apps for mobile devices. Developers of Android apps and/or dating apps are
`effectively required to use Google Play to reach consumers. See Foster Decl. ¶¶ 14-16, 104.
`Google abuses its monopoly power by forcing most developers that use Google Play to
`exclusively use GPB to process in-app payments for “digital” content. Google imposes this
`requirement through its DDA and incorporated “Payments Policy.” Id. ¶¶ 17-20.
`Worse, Google imposes a tax between 15-30% on every transaction that GPB processes. Id.
`¶¶ 22-23. This tax – which Google takes from app developers and results in higher prices for users –
`
`II.
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`bears no relation to any service or value provided by Google. Any argument otherwise is rebutted by
`the facts detailed below that show Google’s Payments Policy is wildly underinclusive and
`inconsistently enforced. Id. ¶¶ 25-53. Other payment processors charge significantly lower fees:
`PayPal, Square, Stripe, and Braintree all charge under 3% of the transaction value. Even Google’s
`Chrome Web Store charges only 5% for each app download. Id. ¶ 24.
`As established in the Epic Motion, Google’s conduct constitutes an illegal tie in violation of
`the Sherman and Cartwright Acts. Match Group hereby joins and incorporates Epic’s arguments.
`Google Knowingly Permitted Match Group To Offer Alternative Payment
`B.
`Options For More Than A Decade
`
`Match Group owns and operates popular dating apps for Android devices, including the
`world’s leading dating app, Tinder®, as well as Match®, OkCupid®, PlentyOfFish®, and
`OurTime®. Match Group pioneered and revolutionized the dating app industry. Its apps are
`responsible for millions of marriages, relationships, and families across the world. Currently, Match
`Group offers dating services and apps in over 40 languages and serves nearly one hundred million
`monthly active users. Id ¶¶ 4-13.
`Most of Match Group’s apps follow a “freemium” model in which users can access basic
`functions for free with the option of paying for upgraded features. For example, Tinder presents
`profile cards of other Tinder users on one user’s screen to give him or her the opportunity to “Like”
`the other user, or alternatively, to decline interest. If two users express mutual interest, they are a
`match and can begin a conversation through a chat feature on the platform. Tinder users can access
`these basic features for free, but also have the option of purchasing various subscription tiers, which
`
`currently include Tinder Plus®, Tinder Gold, and Tinder Platinum®. Each tier offers users
`different enhanced features such as, among others, unlimited “Likes.” Id. ¶ 6. In addition, Tinder
`offers options to purchase enhanced features à la carte. More than ten million users purchased
`Tinder’s subscriptions or à la carte digital services in 2021 alone. Id. Like Tinder, Match, OkCupid,
`PlentyOfFish, and OurTime also offer subscriptions and à la carte features for purchase. Id. ¶¶ 7-12.
`For more than a decade, until recently, Google did not require Match Group’s apps to use
`GPB at all, much less exclusively. Id. ¶¶ 29-37. In fact, Google’s DDA previously included an
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`express exemption for the purchase of “digital content that may be consumed outside the app itself.”
`Id. ¶ 29; Ex. 5. That policy applied to Match Group for two independent reasons. First, each app
`offers a website that users can access through a desktop computer or laptop to consume the digital
`content they paid for “outside the app itself.” Id. ¶ 30. Second, the digital content users pay for
`facilitates face-to-face, in-person interactions with the individuals with whom they match. Id. ¶ 31.
`For example, when Tinder users pay for premium features, they buy digital content to facilitate and
`enhance their ability to have in-person interactions with other users. Id.
`Consequently, with Google’s full knowledge, some of Match Group’s apps have never
`offered GPB as a payment option, while others have given consumers the choice of paying through
`GPB or alternative payment options, including credit card or Paypal. Id. ¶¶ 32-37. Specifically, the
`Match app (published in 2010), PlentyOfFish (2010), and OurTime (2014) have never offered GPB.
`Id. ¶¶ 33, 35, 36. Since 2010, OkCupid has offered a variety of payment options, including GPB. Id.
`¶ 34. Tinder offers GPB but has provided alternative payment options since 2019. Id. ¶ 37.
`Google Seeks to Change The Status Quo To Require That Match Group
`C.
`Exclusively Use GPB
`
`For years, Google was happy to reap the considerable benefits of hosting Match Group’s
`hugely popular dating apps even if they did not exclusively use GPB. The apps helped popularize
`Google Play, and Match Group sent several hundred million dollars to Google in “fees” from in-app
`purchases made by users who chose GPB. Id. ¶ 28. Google further monetized Match Group’s apps
`by gathering valuable consumer data, which Google uses to sell targeted advertising. Id.
`But Google’s greed took over. Google could not resist forcing more app developers to pay
`Google’s fees. In 2019, after Tinder began offering an alternative payment option, Google
`complained to Tinder’s parent, MGI. Tinder stood its ground because its alternative payment options
`complied with Google’s DDA and were better for users – a majority of whom in the United States
`chose it over GPB. Id. ¶¶ 38, 75-86. Without recourse, Google backed down and continued to let
`Tinder provide users with that choice. Id. ¶ 38.
`On September 28, 2020, however, Google abruptly changed its Payments Policy to require
`the exclusive use of GPB for in-app purchases of digital content. Id. ¶ 39. In announcing this change,
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`Google claimed it had merely “clarified” its Payments Policy. Id. ¶40; Ex. 6. Not so. As explained
`above, Google’s Payments Policy previously did not require the use of GPB when users purchased
`“digital content that may be consumed outside the app itself.” Id. ¶ 41; Ex. 5. Google removed that
`exception and added entirely new language that targets Match Group’s apps by requiring the
`exclusive use GPB for “in-app purchase of . . . subscription services (such as . . . dating).” Id.; Ex. 2.
`Google Has No Legitimate Reason For Changing The Status Quo
`D.
`Google has no legitimate or lawful justification for changing its Payments Policy. Any
`argument to the contrary is pretextual and contradicted by the facts:
`First, Google long permitted Match Group to offer alternative payment options without issue.
`Second, and relatedly, Match Group offers better payment options to users that GPB does not
`support, including the ability to pay with installments and more flexible subscription plans. Id. ¶¶ 75-
`86. Match Group’s data suggests that consumers prefer its payment options over GPB. Id. ¶¶ 38, 75,
`86. Further, users that chose to use GPB have lodged myriad complaints with Match Group about
`GPB, ranging from cancellations that were never processed to fraudulent charges. Id. ¶ 88.
`Third, Google’s Payments Policy is wildly underinclusive. It does not require huge categories
`of apps to use GPB, including those that sell what Google has arbitrarily labeled “physical” goods or
`services. This exemption covers some of the largest and most popular apps on Google Play, including
`Uber, Doordash, Facebook, and Amazon, which pay only $25 to use Google Play, while Match
`Group pays hundreds of millions in fees for the same services. Id. ¶¶ 21, 25-48. Even today, Google
`admits that only “3% of developers on Google Play are subject to a service fee” at all. Id.; Ex. 4.
`Fourth, Google has granted arbitrary exceptions to its Payments Policy. Google recently
`announced an exception coined “User Choice Billing,” which allows app developers to offer
`alternative payment options in addition to GPB. But Google rejected Match Group’s request to
`participate, calling this a “pilot program” with restricted access. So far, only Spotify has been publicly
`announced. Id. ¶ 47. Google’s disparate treatment of Match Group and Spotify is telling. Google
`previously tried to deter Jared Sine, Chief Business Affairs and Legal Officer of MGI, from giving
`testimony that critiqued Google’s unilateral policy change before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
`on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights. See id. ¶¶ 48-53. By contrast, Spotify also
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`testified at the hearing but said nothing about Google. Spotify then received an offer to participate in
`“User Choice Billing.” Match Group did not. Id. ¶ 53.
`In sum, Google cannot argue that forcing Match Group to use GPB is required for any
`legitimate reason – such as a technical requirement, user safety, or to cover Google’s costs – because
`if any of those reasons were valid, Google would not have made so many exceptions over the years
`for Match Group and others, allow Spotify to participate in “User Choice Billing,” or allow 97% of
`its developers to not use GPB.
`Google Only Recently Started Enforcing Its Policy Change
`E.
`Google initially set an enforcement date of September 30, 2021. On July 16, 2021, Google
`announced a global extension to March 31, 2022. Id. ¶ 44; Ex. 7. This was an attempt to avoid
`scrutiny from antitrust authorities across the world. For example, the Assembly of the Republic of
`Korea passed a law that forbade Google’s Payments Policy. And Google extended the deadline in
`India twice after pressure from the Indian government and developer community. Id. ¶¶ 44-45.
`At first, the March 31, 2022, deadline passed without event. Match Group frequently updates
`its apps on Google Play, and Google continued to accept and publish those apps after March 31. Id.
`¶¶ 54-55. The rejections did not start until almost a month later. Id. ¶¶ 56-59. On April 20, 2022,
`Google rejected an update by OkCupid for not complying with the Payments policy. Id. ¶ 57; Ex. 8.
`On April 25, 2022, Google rejected updates by OurTime and Match for the same reason. Id. ¶ 58;
`Ex. 9. And on May 4, 2022, Google likewise rejected a Tinder update. Id. ¶ 59; Ex. 10.
`Google has threatened to remove Match Group’s apps from Google Play on June 1, 2022,
`unless they exclusively offer GPB. Id. ¶ 64. Injunctive relief is needed to maintain the status quo.
`III. ARGUMENT
`A temporary restraining order should issue because (1) Match Group is “likely to suffer
`irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (2) Match Group is “likely to succeed on the
`merits,” (3) the “balance of equities tips in [Match Group’s] favor,” and (4) an “injunction is in the
`public interest.” hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-16783, 2022 WL 1132814, at *5 (9th Cir.
`2022). Under the Ninth Circuit's “sliding scale” approach, “a stronger showing of one element may
`offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. (citation omitted). Match Group meets each factor.
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`Case No. 5:22-cv-02746
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ISO MOTION FOR TRO
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`Absent An Injunction, Google Will Irreparably Harm Match Group
`A.
`Match Group has only two alternatives: (1) lose access to Google Play or (2) comply with
`Google’s mandate. Either will irreparably harm Match Group in ways impossible to reduce to a
`monetary payment and will also disrupt Match Group’s contracts, see § III.C.1 infra. The irreparable
`harms resulting under each scenario are addressed in turn.
`Banning its Apps from Google Play Will Irreparably Harm Match Group
`1.
`Inability to reach Android users. If Google implements its ban, more than one billion
`Android device users around the world would be prevented from downloading Match Group’s apps
`from Google Play, leaving Match Group with no viable alternative to reach those consumers. Foster
`Decl. ¶¶ 64-67. Google’s ban would cause Match Group to lose access to more than half its potential
`customers, as well as current customers. This constitutes irreparable harm. See hiQ Labs, 2022 WL
`1132814 at *6 (affirming preliminary injunction where plaintiff’s business relied on access to
`LinkedIn profiles and there was “no current viable alternative”); Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D.
`Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Evidence of threatened loss of prospective
`customers [] certainly supports a finding of the possibility of irreparable harm.”).
`Loss of market share. “[M]ere damages will not compensate for a competitor’s increasing
`share of the market.” Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prod. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
`2013). The dating app market is highly competitive, with many competing options available to users.
`Foster Decl. ¶ 71. There is low cost to a user who wants to switch products, and a consistent stream
`of new entrants. If Google bans Match Group’s apps from Google Play, users will switch to
`competitor dating apps for myriad reasons explained herein. Id.
`Loss of network effects. Generally, dating apps that have more users are more attractive,
`because they can offer users a better chance of a romantic match. Id. ¶ 69. The absence of Match
`Group apps on Google Play would significantly diminish Match Group’s apps’ pools of users,
`making those apps less attractive, which in turn will lead to even more users (both Android and iOS)
`leaving the apps’ dating pools. This downward spiral will be incredibly difficult, if not impossible,
`to reverse. Id. ¶¶ 69-71; see also Am. Rena Int’l Corp. v. Sis-Joyce Int’l Co., 534 F. App'x 633, 636
`(9th Cir. 2013) (finding irreparable harm based on “threatened loss of . . . customers”).
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`Loss of app functionality. Android users will be unable to obtain critical updates and bug
`fixes, which would quickly cause their apps to lose functionality and compatibility, cease to function
`as intended, degrade the user experience, and deprive users of features they expect and paid for.
`Foster Decl. ¶ 68. This will interfere with Match Group’s contracts with customers and cause further
`loss of customers. Id. ¶ 68, 72; see also Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948–49
`(N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding irreparable harm where defendant caused consumers to associate
`“decreased functionality and quality” of software with “Apple’s operating system”).
`Damage to reputation and goodwill. In the crowded dating app market, Match Group’s apps’
`reputations for providing an enjoyable, safe, and seamless dating experience is crucial. Foster Decl.
`¶ 91. If Google removes the Match Group apps from Google Play, increased functionality issues,
`version discord, and user discontent will irreparably harm Match Group’s hard-fought goodwill
`developed over more than a decade. Id. When reputation and goodwill are diminished through
`anticompetitive activity, the resulting harm is irreparable. Stuhlbarg, 240 F.3d at 84; Regents of Univ.
`of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[I]ntangible injuries,
`such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill, qualify as irreparable harm.”).
`Complying with Google’s Mandate Will Irreparably Harm Match Group
`2.
`Compliance with Google’s mandate likewise would irreparably harm Match Group.
`Loss of significant investments and substantial redesign. Match Group will have to abandon
`its prior investments and incur substantial, additional, and otherwise unnecessary costs, time, and
`effort to redesign its apps, ensure continuity of service for its users, alter its payment methodologies,
`and restructure its subscription plans and price offerings. Foster Decl. ¶ 74. Match Group will also
`have to delay other projects, including updating apps and adding features. Id. In short, Match Group
`would have to substantially change how it has done business for over a decade. See Stuller, Inc. v.
`Steak N Shake Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.3d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding irreparable harm where
`a mandated pricing policy “would be a significant change to [franchisor’s] business model”).
`Inability to offer better and customer-preferred payment options. GPB is inflexible and does
`not support payment features that Match Group provides. Foster Decl. ¶¶ 75-85. For example, GPB
`(i) does not allow developers to choose payment forms; (ii) offers limited flexibility in the design of
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`subscription plans, which precludes Match Group from giving consumers additional options on
`subscription lengths; (iii) does not allow users to make recurring installment payments and instead
`requires lump sum payments, which deters customers; (iv) limits Match Group’s ability to make
`special offers to its users, such as discounted subscriptions; (v) does not allow Match Group to offer
`retention discounts to incentivize existing users to renew or purchase added products; and (vi) does
`not provide an easy way to offer groupings of products together. Id.
`Match Group’s data shows that consumer

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