Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.97 Page 1 of 7
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`TAIJIN PARK, individually and on behalf
`of all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC., and
`DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,
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`Defendants.
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` Case No.: 3:20-cv-1738 GPC (BLM)
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`ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS WITHOUT
`PREJUDICE
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`[ECF No. 5.]
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`Plaintiff Taijin Park (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action alleging various
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`state law labor and wage violations arising from his employment with LG Electronics,
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`U.S.A, Inc. Defendant LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. (“Defendant”) has filed a Motion to
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`Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 5. The Motion has been fully briefed. ECF
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`Nos. 7, 9. The Court finds this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument
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`pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
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`3:20-cv-1738 GPC (BLM)
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`Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.98 Page 2 of 7
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`Defendant’s Motion and dismisses the Complaint without prejudice. The Court further
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`VACATES the hearing on this matter scheduled for November 27, 2020.
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`I. Background
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`On June 9, 2020, Plaintiff filed a putative class action in the Superior Court of
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`California for Imperial County against Defendant LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., and Does
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`1 through 10 inclusive, alleging a number of violations of the California Labor Code
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`(“CLC”) and unfair business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). ECF
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`No. 1, Ex. A (“Complaint”). On September 4, 2020, Defendant removed the action to
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`this Court. ECF No. 1. The instant Motion followed. ECF No. 5.
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`Plaintiff alleges that he “is an individual who, during the time periods relevant to
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`this Complaint, was employed by Defendant LG U.S.A., Inc. . . . located in Calexico,
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`California.” Complaint ¶ 1. Plaintiff states he was employed in a non-exempt position
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`from approximately May 2014 to February 17, 2020, in a position that involved
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`“collecting and inputting data, setting up project management improvement plans based
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`on [LG’s] policies/procedures, and scheduling, collecting, and logging total preventative
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`maintenance (‘TPM’) plans.” Id. ¶ 9. According to Plaintiff, he and other members of
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`the putative class were “[n]ot paid for all hours worked in violation of the California
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`Labor Code; [n]ot paid for missed meals and/or rest periods in violation of the California
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`Labor Code; [n]ot paid for all overtime wages at correctly computed rates in violation of
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`the California Labor Code; [n]ot paid all unused accrued vacation wages in violation of
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`the California Labor Code; and [n]ot provided with accurate itemized wage statements in
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`violation of the California Labor Code.” Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff also alleges that these
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`violations of the CLC constitute violations of the UCL. Id. ¶ 97.
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`II. Legal Standard
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to
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`state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal
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`Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.99 Page 3 of 7
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`under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or
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`sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
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`Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2),
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`the plaintiff is required only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
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`that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
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`claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`544, 555 (2007).
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`A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded
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`factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
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`plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
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`550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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`content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
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`for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
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`non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be
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`plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
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`572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). The Court must accept as true all
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`facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
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`al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).
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`Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless
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`the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
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`pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
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`957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
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`Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would
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`be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend.
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`Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.100 Page 4 of 7
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`III. Discussion
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`A. Failure to State a Claim
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`Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) on
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`the basis that Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to show that California employment
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`law applies to Plaintiff’s employment, which Defendant contends occurred solely in
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`Mexicali, Mexico. Plaintiff opposes, arguing that he has pled facts sufficient to show
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`Plaintiff performed work in California and that, accordingly, the provisions of the CLC
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`apply.
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`In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must “begin by taking
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`note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675. To
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`state a claim for relief under the provisions of the CLC, a plaintiff must allege facts to
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`meet the threshold requirement that he or she is an employee covered by the provisions.
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`The California Supreme Court has noted that California’s “employment laws apply to ‘all
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`individuals’ employed in this state.” Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1197
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`(2011) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 1171.5(a)). However, the California Supreme Court
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`has explicitly declined to hold that particular labor provisions, like minimum wage
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`orders, “never [apply] to employment outside of California.”1 Tidewater Marine W., Inc.
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`v. Bradshaw, 14 Cal. 4th 557, 578 (1996). But while there may be “limited
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`extraterritorial application of California’s employment laws,” Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at
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`1197, a case must present the “kinds of California connections [that] will suffice to
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`trigger the relevant provisions of California law,” Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 9 Cal.
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`5th 732, 752, 466 P.3d 309, 319 (2020). Whether a particular California employment law
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`1 Specifically, the court suggested that “California law . . . might follow California resident employees
`of California employers who leave the state “‘temporarily . . . during the course of the normal
`workday.’” Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1199 (quoting Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 578).
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`Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.101 Page 5 of 7
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`will apply to an interstate employment relationship is a matter of statutory interpretation
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`of the provision at issue. Id.
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`Plaintiff alleges a number of different CLC violations arising from his employment
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`with LG, including minimum wage violations, failure to pay overtime, meal and rest
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`break violations, and failure to provide CLC-compliant wage statements. These
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`provisions may apply to non-California conduct to different extents, but none can be
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`interpreted to apply to work with no connection to California other than the location of
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`the employer. At a minimum, the employment violations at issue must have some
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`connection to California. See Ward, 9 Cal 5th at 755 (finding wage statement provisions
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`in Section 226 applied to workers who do not work a majority of their time in any state,
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`“provided that California is the state that has the most significant relationship to the
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`work”); Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 762, 775 (2020) (applying Ward and
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`declining to “allow[] any work in California, no matter how fleeting, to effectively
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`impose California law on documentation of all work in a pay period”); Sullivan, 51 Cal.
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`4th at 1197–98 (considering location of the nonexempt overtime work performed to
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`determine that CLC overtime provisions could apply to nonresidents who worked full
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`days or weeks in California). Several district court decisions, though decided before
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`Ward emphasized that there is no one-sized-fits-all test for determining the extent of
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`California employment law’s extraterritorial reach, looked to the relationship of the
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`employee’s claims to California to determine whether the CLC could apply. Bernstein v.
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`Virgin Am., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (finding plaintiffs had
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`failed to rebut presumption against extraterritorial application of meal period and rest
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`break provisions for breaks occurring outside of California, as plaintiffs did not show
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`policy originated from California headquarters); Yoder v. W. Express, Inc., 181 F. Supp.
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`3d 704, 724–25 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (considering location of work and employee’s residence
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`to determine if employee could claim protection under various CLC provisions and
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`UCL); Sarviss v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 2d 883, 900–01 (C.D.
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`Cal. 2009) (considering location of work to determine if California resident employee
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`was covered by minimum wage provisions). Although at this stage of the case the Court
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`does not attempt to identify precisely how far, if at all, each provision of the CLC extends
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`beyond California’s borders, as the California Supreme Court has noted, “the central
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`insight that has long guided courts seeking to discern the geographic scope of legislative
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`enactments [is] that the Legislature ordinarily does not intend for its enactments to create
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`conflicts with other sovereigns.” Ward, 9 Cal. 5th at 755. Were any of the CLC
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`provisions that Plaintiff raises here to apply regardless of the claims’ connection to
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`California, serious concerns regarding interstate comity would arise.
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`Plaintiff has not alleged facts that indicate whether or not he worked or lived in
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`California during his employment with LG, nor has he alleged that any of the unlawful
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`conduct referred to in the Complaint occurred in California. After leaving aside legal
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`conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, the sole factual allegation suggesting a
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`connection to California is the statement that his employer, LG Electronics, U.S.A., Inc.,
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`is located in Calexico, California. Complaint ¶ 1. Although this assertion leaves open
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`the possibility that Plaintiff performed work in California or that other relevant events
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`occurred in the state, the Court cannot supply necessary facts where Plaintiff has failed to
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`do so. It is not “enough that the complaint is ‘factually neutral’; rather, it must be
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`‘factually suggestive’” of a claim for relief. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 960
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`(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n. 5). Nor can the Court infer that
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`Plaintiff performed work in the state from the Complaint’s assertion that Plaintiff’s
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`claims are typical of the claims of the class of California employees he purports to
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`represent, Complaint ¶¶ 41, 42, 55, as that is a legal conclusion, rather than a factual
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`allegation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
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`(1986)) (“[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
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`Case 3:20-cv-01738-GPC-BLM Document 11 Filed 11/16/20 PageID.103 Page 7 of 7
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`allegation.’”).
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`Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not alleged where he worked or any other
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`relationship with California beyond the location of the Defendant, the Complaint has not
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`plausibly alleged a claim under the CLC or UCL. The Court therefore GRANTS
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`Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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`B. Leave to Amend
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`Defendant urges the Court to deny Plaintiff leave to amend, citing materials
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`outside of the Complaint to support its assertion that Plaintiff cannot successfully amend
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`to allege facts that would entitle him to the protections of California wage and hour law.
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`ECF No. 5-1 at 10. Plaintiff asserts in his opposition that he performed work in
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`California. ECF No. 7 at 5–7. The Court will not wade into disputed factual issues at the
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`motion to dismiss stage. As Plaintiff could conceivably cure the deficiencies in the
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`Complaint and “requests for leave should be granted with extreme liberality,” Moss, 572
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`F.3d at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to
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`amend the Complaint.
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`IV. Conclusion
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`For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
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`Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend
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`the Complaint. The Court further VACATES the hearing currently scheduled for
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`November 27, 2020.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: November 16, 2020
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