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`THOMAS E. MONTGOMERY, County Counsel
`County of San Diego
`By MELISSA M. HOLMES, Senior Deputy (SBN 220961)
` STEVEN P. INMAN, II, Senior Deputy (SBN 227748)
`1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355
`San Diego, California 92101-2469
`Telephone: (619) 531-5836
`Exempt From Filing Fees Per Gov’t Code §6103
`Attorneys for Defendants County of San Diego, Ricardo Andrade, Steve Bodine, Justin
`Moore, Christopher Perez and Dwayne Prickett
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Case No. 20-cv-2082-JAH (KSC)
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
`AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
`DEFENDANTS COUNTY OF SAN
`DIEGO, STEVE BODINE, JUSTIN
`MOORE, DWAYNE PRICKETT,
`CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, AND
`RICARDO ANDRADE’S MOTION TO
`DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST
`AMENDED COMPLAINT
`Date: January 27, 2021
`Time: 10:30 a.m.
`Judge: Hon. John A. Houston
`Department: 13B
`NO ORAL ARGUMENT UNLESS
`REQUESTED BY COURT
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`AGRO DYNAMICS, LLC a Wyoming
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`Limited Liability Company,
`)
`)
`Plaintiff,
`)
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`v.
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`DRUG ENFORCEMENT
`)
`ADMINISTRATION, SAN DIEGO
`)
`
`COUNTY, and SPECIAL AGENTS PAUL )
`GELLES, ERIC BALL, KIERAN
`)
`GARCIA, MARSHA DAWE, ROSS VAN
`)
`NOSTRAND, AND JEREMY FEUZ;
`)
`FRANK HASKELL, ANDREW
`)
`AGUILAR, JASON STEIN, TIMOTHY
`)
`SMITH, MICHAEL ASTORGA,
`)
`CHRISTOPHER MORRIS, SGT. STEVE
`)
`BODINE, DET. JUSTIN MOORE, DET.
`)
`DWAYNE PRICKETT, DET.
`)
`CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, AND DET.
`)
`
`RICARDO ANDRADE; and DOES 1 to 50 )
`inclusive,
`)
`)
` Defendants.
`)
`)
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`))
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` TABLE OF CONTENTS
`I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
`II. ALLEGATIONS IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ............................................. 2
`III. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS ................................................................ 2
`IV. ARGUMENT............................................................................................................... 4
`A. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against the County Fails Because Plaintiff
`Fails to Allege a Policy, Custom or Practice ........................................................... 4
`B. Qualified Immunity Shields the Deputies from Liability Under Section
`1983 in this Matter .................................................................................................. 5
`C. Plaintiff’s Claims for Violation of U.S. Constitution Fails Because No
`Direct Claim Exists for Violation of the U.S. Constitution ...................................... 6
`D. The County Defendants are Immune from Liability for Plaintiff’s State
`Law Claims ............................................................................................................. 6
`E. Plaintiff’s Bane Act Claim also Fails Because Plaintiff Has Not Plead
`Facts to Show Intentional Interference, Threats, Intimidation or Coercion .............. 9
`F. Plaintiff’s Violation of California Constitution Claim Separately Fails
`Because Property Damaged During Execution of a Warrant is Not a Taking
`and No Private Right of Action Exists under Article I, Sections 7 & 13 ................ 10
`V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 12
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases Page(s)
`Act Up!/ Portland v. Bagley,
`988 F.2d 868 (9th Cir.1993) ....................................................................................... 5
`Allen v. City of Sacramento,
`234 Cal. App. 4th 41 (2015) ....................................................................................... 9
`Armstrong v. Sexson,
`2007 WL 2288297 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) ...................................................... 10, 11
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................. 3, 10
`Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
`973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................... 6
`Baughman v. State of California,
`38 Cal.App.4th 182, (1995) .................................................................................... 6, 8
`Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., v. Brown
`520 U.S. 397 (1997) ................................................................................................ 4, 6
`Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................................................... 3
`Bradley v. Med. Bd.,
`56 Cal. App. 4th 445 (1997) ..................................................................................... 11
`Buzayan v. City of Davis Police Dep’t,
`2007 WL 2288334 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) ............................................................ 11
`Cholla Ready-Mix Inc. v. Civish,
`382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................... 3
`Cty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
`181 Cal. App. 4th 218 (2009) ..................................................................................... 7
`Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento,
`10 Cal.4th 368 (1995) ............................................................................................... 10
`Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland,
`96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................... 4
`Gillan v. City of San Marino,
`147 Cal. App. 4th 1033 (2007) ................................................................................... 7
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`Gompper v. Visx, Inc.,
`298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................... 3
`Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,
`349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................................................................... 2
`Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,
`673 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................... 3
`Liston v. Cty. of Riverside,
`120 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................... 5
`Monell v. Department of Social Services,
`436 U.S. 658 (1978) .................................................................................................... 4
`Navarro v. Block,
`250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 3
`Neely v. Feinstein,
`50 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir.1995) ................................................................................... 5, 6
`Ogborn v. City of Lancaster,
`101 Cal. App. 4th 448, 458 at n.5 (2002) .................................................................. 11
`Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
`475 U.S. 469 (1986) ................................................................................................... 4
`Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento,
`888 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 9, 10
`San Jose Charter of The Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose,
`1999 WL 1211672 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1999) .............................................................. 8
`Shoyoye v. Cty. of Los Angeles,
`203 Cal. App. 4th 947 (2012) ..................................................................................... 9
`Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
`266 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................... 3
`Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich,
`92 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................... 4, 6
`Varlitskiy v. Cty. of Riverside,
`2020 WL 4187769 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23) ....................................................................... 6
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`RULES/STATUES
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`California Civil Code
`Section 52.1 ............................................................................................................ 1, 6, 9
`California Government Code
`Section 815.2 ............................................................................................................ 1, 8, 9
`Section 821.6 ........................................................................................................... passim
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
`Rule 12(b)(6) .................................................................................................................. 2
`Article I of the California Constitution
`Section 7 ............................................................................................................. 1, 10, 11
`Section 13 ........................................................................................................... 1, 10, 11
`Section 19 ..................................................................................................................... 11
`Title 42 Unites States Code
`Section 1983 ....................................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 6
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`Defendant County of San Diego (the “County”) and Defendants Steve Bodine,
`Justin Moore, Dwayne Prickett, Christopher Perez, and Ricardo Andrade (the “Deputy
`Defendants,” and together with the County, the “County Defendants”) bring this Motion
`to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC’) filed by Plaintiff Agro Dynamics, LLC
`(“Plaintiff”) because the FAC contains no viable claims. Plaintiff’s claim against the
`County under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (“Section 1983”) fails because no vicarious liability
`exists under Section 1983 and Plaintiff has not alleged that the County had a policy,
`custom, or practice that was the moving force behind an alleged constitutional violation.
`Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Deputy Defendants likewise fails because
`Plaintiff has not plead facts that would cause a reasonable law enforcement officer to
`doubt the validity of the search warrant at issue or the contents of the affidavit from the
`Drug Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”) upon which the warrant was based.
`Thus, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff’s claim for
`violation of the U.S. Constitution fails on these same bases and also because no direct
`right of action exists for violation of the U.S. Constitution.
`Plaintiff’s state law claims are also fatally defective. The Deputy Defendants are
`immune from liability for Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to California Government
`Code Section 821.6 (“Section 821.6”). This immunity extends to the County pursuant to
`Government Code Section 815.2 because under that section a public entity is not liable
`where its employee is immune from liability. Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim (Civil Code
`Section 52.1) fails on the independent basis that Plaintiff has not alleged any threat,
`intimidation or coercion and, separately, has not alleged that any of the County
`Defendants acted intentionally in interfering with, or attempting to interfere with
`Plaintiff’s rights. Finally, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the California Constitution is
`defective because no “taking” for public improvements or public works occurred and
`because no private right of action exists under Article I, Sections 7 & 13 of the California
`///
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`Constitution. And even if a right of action did exist, Plaintiff has not pled facts to show
`that the County Defendants acted unreasonably.
`Accordingly, each of the claims against the County Defendants are deficient and
`should be dismissed with prejudice.
`II. ALLEGATIONS IN FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
`Plaintiff’s claims against the County Defendants pertain to the Deputy Defendant’s
`actions during the execution of a search warrant obtained by the United States Drug
`Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”). Plaintiff alleges that it received a registration
`issuance to cultivate and grow industrial hemp in Fallbrook, California, and that it did so
`from August 2019 to September 12, 2019. FAC at ¶¶ 35-37. Plaintiff possessed
`approximately 3,000 plants. On September 12, 2019, a court issued a search warrant
`based on an affidavit by DEA Special Agent, Defendant Paul Gelles. Id. at ¶ 42.
`Plaintiff alleges that the affidavit contained misrepresentations and omissions that
`Defendant Gelles made intentionally and with reckless disregard of truth. Id. at ¶¶ 41-50
`& 54. The warrant authorized the seizure of, among other things, marijuana plants,
`seeds, and derivatives of marijuana but allegedly not the seizure of industrial hemp. Id. at
`¶ 52.
`Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “acting under the invalid warrant and false color
`of law seized Plaintiff’s industrial hemp plants despite being advised by the tenant that
`the hemp plants were a legal cultivation duly registered by the County of San Diego, and
`without testing the plants to determine whether they were hemp or marijuana. Id. at ¶¶
`55-59. Plaintiff asserts that the plants seized and destroyed were worth $3,450,671 and
`that Plaintiff also lost revenue streams from hemp products as a result of the plants’
`destruction. Id. at ¶¶ 66-73.
`III. STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be
`dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6)
`motion challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d
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`1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). A complaint may be dismissed if it lacks a cognizable
`legal theory, or lacks sufficient facts under a cognizable theory. Navarro v. Block, 250
`F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
`In reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must assume the truth of all factual
`allegations in the complaint and must construe them in the light most favorable to the
`non-moving party. Gompper v. Visx, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However,
`a complaint’s allegations must show that the plaintiff is entitled to more than merely
`speculative relief. In fact, “some threshold of plausibility must be crossed at the outset”
`before a case can go forward. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). To
`meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a complaint must contain “factual content that
`allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
`misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard “asks for
`more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” and requires facts
`that are more than “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability. Id.
`In addition, vague and conclusory allegations concerning government involvement
`in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Ivey v. Bd. of
`Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Nor is the court required
`to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted, deductions of fact,
`or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 969, 988 (9th
`Cir. 2001). Finally, the court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as
`factual allegations, if those conclusions cannot be reasonably drawn from the alleged
`facts. Cholla Ready-Mix Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). The
`complaint will not survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion “if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
`further factual enhancement” or if it contains a merely “formulaic recitation of the
`elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
`///
`///
`///
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against the County Fails Because
`Plaintiff Fails to Allege a Policy, Custom or Practice.
`Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the County (a Monell claim) is fatally
`deficient because Plaintiff has failed to allege a policy, custom, or practice that was the
`moving force behind the constitutional violations Plaintiff alleges. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs
`of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“[I]n Monell and subsequent
`cases, we have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under §
`1983 to identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff's injury.”).
`Municipalities are only liable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations resulting
`from an official “policy or custom.” Fed’n of African Am. Contractors v. City of
`Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social
`Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely
`because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
`under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Pembaur v.
`Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“The official policy requirement was intended to
`distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
`thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality
`is actually responsible.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the County has no
`vicarious liability under Section 1983 for the deputies’ actions; and Plaintiff has not
`separately alleged any conduct by the County that could give rise to liability.
`To bring a valid claim for municipal liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
`establish four elements: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which
`he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to
`deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the
`‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92
`F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). Having failed to plead the second, third, and fourth
`required elements of a Section 1983 claim for municipal liability by failing to allege a
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`policy, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the County is deficient and must be
`dismissed.
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`B. Qualified Immunity Shields the Deputies from Liability Under Section
`1983 in this Matter.
`Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Deputy Defendants likewise fails
`because, even accepting the facts as pled, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified
`immunity. In cases involving the execution of a search warrant “[l]aw enforcement
`officers enjoy qualified immunity from civil damage claims unless their conduct violates
`clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
`Liston v. Cty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 9, 1997),
`citing, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that
`government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
`liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
`statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
`Courts use a two-step analysis (two questions) to determine whether qualified
`immunity applies: “(1) Was the law governing the official's conduct clearly established?
`(2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful?”
`Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1507 (9th Cir.1995). A government official is entitled
`to qualified immunity even where reasonable officers may disagree as to his or her
`conduct, as long as the conclusion is objectively reasonable. Act Up!/ Portland v. Bagley,
`988 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir.1993).
`In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that could show even a plausibility that
`the Deputy Defendants acted unreasonably. Specifically, Plaintiff has not plead any facts
`to show that a reasonable deputy would have doubted the validity of the search warrant,
`would have had any reason to doubt the contents of the affidavit that a DEA agent
`submitted for the warrant, or would have had any other reason to believe that their
`conduct was unlawful. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against the Deputy
`///
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`Defendants should be dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity. Neely, 50 F.3d at
`1507.
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`C.
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`Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of U.S. Constitution Fails Because No
`Direct Claim Exists for Violation of the U.S. Constitution.
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`Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the U.S. Constitution should also be dismissed
`because no direct claim exists for violation of the U.S. Constitution. Azul-Pacifico, Inc.
`v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Plaintiff has no cause of
`action directly under the United States Constitution. We have previously held that a
`litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. §
`1983.”). Further, to the extent the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim for violation of the
`U.S. Constitution as a Section 1983 claim for the alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth,
`and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff’s claim against the County and the Deputy
`Defendants fails for the reasons discussed above, including that Plaintiff has not alleged
`that the County had any custom, policy, or wide-spread custom or practice and the
`Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan
`Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 835; Neely, 50 F.3d at 1507.
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`D. The County Defendants are Immune from Liability for Plaintiff’s State
`Law Claims.
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`The Deputy Defendants are immune from liability for Plaintiff’s state law claims
`for conversion, negligence, trespass to chattels, violation of the Bane Act (Civil Code
`Section 52.1) and violation of the California Constitution. California Government Code
`Section 821.6 broadly shields public employees from liability for injuries caused in
`instituting and prosecuting judicial proceedings; and executing a search warrant is part of
`the investigative step in instituting and prosecuting judicial proceedings. Baughman v.
`State of California, 38 Cal.App.4th 182, (1995) (holding that Section 821.6 cloaks
`officers executing a search warrant with immunity for damage to property). Varlitskiy v.
`Cty. of Riverside, 2020 WL 4187769, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020) (holding that
`///
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`execution of a search warrant was part of the investigation and prosecution process and
`deputies were immune from liability under Section 821.6). Section 821.6 states,
`A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or
`prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his
`employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.
`Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. California courts have broadly interpreted this statute to
`provide immunity for acts taken in preparation for formal proceedings, such as
`investigations of suspected crimes, in order “to protect public employees in the
`performance of their prosecutorial duties from the threat of harassment through
`civil suits.” Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1048 (2007)
`(“California courts construe section 821.6 broadly in furtherance of its purpose to
`protect public employees in the performance of their prosecutorial duties from the
`threat of harassment through civil suits.”).
`Investigations, including by executing search warrants, are part of the institution
`and prosecution of judicial proceedings that are protected by Section 821.6 because
`investigations are an essential step toward the institution of formal proceedings. Cty. of
`Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 4th 218, 230 (2009), as modified (Jan. 22,
`2010) (holding that Section 821.6 applied to conduct in “investigating, obtaining the
`warrant, searching, seizing, retaining, and even damaging plaintiffs’ property.”). For
`example, in County of Los Angeles, a district attorney obtained a search warrant and
`seized computer hard drives, a network server, and a laptop; then the case was closed
`without charges being filed. Id. at 223–224. The plaintiffs brought an action against the
`county and the district attorney alleging injury from the search and from the seizure of,
`and damage to, their property, asserting that defendants irreparably destroyed computer
`data and failed to return some property until after plaintiffs filed their complaint. Id. at
`224–225. In considering the plaintiff’s Bane Act claim, a California appellate court held
`that the defendants’ actions were shielded by section 821.6 because there was a “causal
`///
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`relationship between the act and the prosecution process,” even though no charges were
`ever filed. Id. at 229. The court explained its holding stating,
`Here, based on the undisputed evidence, the unnamed investigators on the
`District Attorney's staff are immune from liability for their conduct alleged
`in the first cause of action because all of the acts—investigating, obtaining
`the warrant, searching, seizing, retaining, and even damaging plaintiffs’
`property—were committed as part of an investigation of crimes leading to
`prosecution in a judicial proceeding. This conduct fell within the scope of
`the investigating staff members’ employment with the County. Hence, the
`elements of Government Code section 821.6 immunity are present, even if
`the District Attorney’s investigating staff “act[ed] maliciously and without
`probable cause” (§ 821.6.).
`Id. at 230. Consequently, each of Plaintiff’s state law claims against the Deputy
`Defendants are precluded under Section 821.6. See e.g., Varlitskiy, 2020 WL 4187769, at
`*8 (“The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s negligence claims should be dismissed because it
`appears that Plaintiff’s negligence claim, like his other state law claims, is founded solely
`on allegations of destruction of property pursuant to the execution of a search warrant.”);
`San Jose Charter of The Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 1999 WL
`1211672, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1999) (“Because the dogs were shot during the
`prosecution of the search warrants, the conversion claims must be DISMISSED WITH
`PREJUDICE pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6.”); and Baughman, 38 Cal. App 4th.
`182 (holding that Section 821.6 immunized police officers from liability for a claim of
`conversion based on destruction of computer disks during execution of a search warrant).
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`Additionally, since the Deputy Defendants are immune from liability for Plaintiff’s
`state law claims, the County is also immune from liability. Under California Government
`Code section 815.2, “[e]except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not
`liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity
`where the employee is immune from liability.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(b). Because
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`“all of the acts of which plaintiff complains were triggered by allegations of criminal
`activity and were part of the investigation and prosecution process . . . [the Deputy
`Defendants] are barred from liability [for Plaintiff’s claims] by sovereign immunity under
`section 821.6. Furthermore, because its employees are immunized so is the County. Cal
`Gov. Code § 815.2(b).” Varilitsky, 2020 WL 4187769, at *8.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims against all of the County Defendants for
`conversion, negligence, trespass to chattels, violation of the Bane Ac