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**Electronically
FILED**
by Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo
ON 10/5/2020
By /s/ Una Finau
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16

17 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
18 COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

19 In re SLACK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION)
20 _____)
21 This Document Relates To:)
22 ALL ACTIONS.)
23 _____)
24)
25)
26)
27)
28)

Lead Case No. 19CIV05370
(Consolidated with Nos. 19CIV05411;
19CIV05674; 19CIV05784, 19CIV05840,
19CIV05681 and 20-CIV-02589)

CLASS ACTION

FIRST AMENDED CONSOLIDATED CLASS
ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 Plaintiffs Nicole Farina, Brian Knapp, Andrew R. Norell, Laurent Chardonnet, Martin Ren,
2 Imran Naushahi, Vinodkumar Kazhipurath, and Mason Chu (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), individually
3 and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by Plaintiffs’ undersigned attorneys, allege the following
4 based upon personal knowledge, as to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ own acts, and upon information and
5 belief, as to all other matters, based on the investigation conducted by and through Plaintiffs’
6 attorneys, which included, among other things, a review of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
7 (“SEC”) filings, analyst and media reports, other commentary analysis concerning Slack
8 Technologies, Inc. (“Slack” or the “Company”) and consultations with persons knowledgeable about
9 Slack’s business. Plaintiffs’ investigation into the matters alleged herein is continuing and many
10 relevant facts are known only to, or are exclusively within the custody and control of, the Defendants
11 (defined below). Plaintiffs believe that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the
12 allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for formal discovery.

13 NATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION

14 1. This is a securities class action on behalf of all those who purchased or otherwise
15 acquired Slack common stock pursuant or traceable to the Company’s Registration Statement and the
16 incorporated Prospectus (collectively, the “Offering Documents”) that offered over 283 million shares
17 of Class A common stock issued in connection with Slack’s June 2019 direct public offering (the
18 “Offering”). Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to §§11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the
19 “1933 Act”). The Offering Documents contained untrue statements of material fact and omitted to
20 state material facts required to be stated therein or necessary to make statements therein not
21 misleading.

22 2. Slack is a San Francisco-based technology company that offers a cloud-based
23 collaboration and productivity platform that brings people, applications, and data together into a
24 single, centralized hub where work can be executed — “often . . . replac[ing] the use of email inside
25 the organization.” Slack utilizes “team-based” channels to maintain a record of conversations, data,
26 documents, and application workflows relevant to a project or a specific topic, while also integrating
27 with thousands of third-party applications to ensure critical business information flows, is acted upon
28

1 and transformed, and is then quickly routed to its desired destination. Slack works on a subscription
2 freemium basis, providing users a basic, free version of its service (for an unlimited period of time)
3 or the option to pay for other plans (*e.g.*, Standard, Plus or Enterprise Grid).

4 3. On June 20, 2019, the Company completed a direct listing of its Class A stock on the
5 New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), offering for sale to the public up to 118,429,640 registered
6 shares and 164,932,646 unregistered shares purportedly exempt from registration.

7 4. The public began purchasing Slack stock on the NYSE under the ticker symbol
8 “WORK” on June 20, 2019, at an opening price per share of \$38.50 (the “Offering Price”).

9 5. On September 4, 2019, Slack issued a press release announcing its second quarter
10 fiscal 2020 (“2Q2020”) results and admitted that “[r]evenue was negatively impacted by \$8.2 million
11 of credits related to service level disruption in the quarter.”

12 6. The value of Slack shares dropped precipitously. News outlets such as *Forbes* reacted
13 with headlines such as: “Slack Stock Has Plunged 33%. Here’s What Happened.”¹ The Offering
14 opening price of \$38.50 fell 33% to \$26. As of this filing, Slack shares are trading in the range of
15 \$21 per share.

16 7. Unbeknownst to shareholders, Slack had omitted in its Offering Documents material
17 facts concerning the Company’s excessively punitive contracts with existing customers that were
18 forcing the Company to suffer much higher revenue losses than anticipated. The Company had agreed
19 to award customers credits in the event of even a *de minimis* disruption in its service – that is, service
20 availability that fell below a 99.99% “uptime” threshold. Slack’s internally-known service
21 interruptions as of the Offering were requiring the Company to credit its customers millions of dollars
22 as a result of Slacks “up-time” commitments. Indeed, Slack’s infrastructure could not support the
23 99.99% service level requirement in light of expanding customer needs (including large enterprise
24 customers) in advance of the Offering, and multiple significant outages occurred in the months
25

26 ¹ Sergei Kiebnikov, “Slack Stock Has Plunged 33%. Here’s What Happened.,” *Forbes*, Sept. 11,
27 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2019/09/11/slack-stock-has-plunged-33-heres-what-happened/#6b3e0b18550e> (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).

1 leading up to the Offering. Moreover, Slack was even awarding credits in significant amounts to
2 customers unaffected by service interruptions.

3 8. Days after the Offering, Slack’s platform had three notable service disruptions,
4 resulting in uptime performance of only 99.9%. This triggered the penalties in customers’ contracts
5 for falling below the 99.99% service level requirement. The Company was forced to award millions
6 of dollars’ worth of credits, which deeply offset revenue for that quarter.

7 9. Only after the abysmally high losses were revealed on September 4, 2019, did Chief
8 Executive Officer (“CEO”) Defendant Stewart Butterfield admit that the contract provisions were
9 “*outrageously customer-centric.*” He also admitted that the 99.99% “uptime” requirement is an
10 extraordinary and unusual standard in the industry. He stated that Slack competitors such as
11 Salesforce.com, Inc. (“Salesforce”) or Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) would not have had to
12 pay credits because they have committed to the lower 99.9% (“three nines”) industry standard. He
13 also admitted that the Company’s policy is to *proactively award credits to customers, even those*
14 *unaffected by service outages.* Thus, many customers who experienced no service outage were still
15 awarded credits.

16 10. Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) Defendant Allen Shim further admitted that the
17 Company had committed to an “exceptionally *generous credit payout multiplier*” in customer
18 contracts, which compounded the financial impact of the service disruptions occurring in June and
19 July 2019.

20 11. These “outrageously consumer-centric” policies and contract provisions resulted in a
21 deduction of over \$8 million from revenue in one period alone.

22 12. The Company’s historic inability to maintain the promised 99.99% service-level
23 availability demonstrates that a consumer credit payout was inevitable and that the consumer centric
24 contracts and policies have a material impact on the Company’s financial success. Slack has
25 historically failed to consistently perform at 99.99%. In 2018, the Company performed below the
26 99.99% standard in 7 months out of 12.

27
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1 13. Furthermore, the Offering Documents omitted the significant and intensifying
2 competition Slack was experiencing from Microsoft Teams (or “Teams”) and the inability of the
3 Company to penetrate the lucrative “enterprise” market in light of Slack’s problem scaling its
4 platform to serve enterprise clients without service disruptions.

5 14. Slack has not been able to maintain the 99.99% threshold due to its attempt to reach
6 enterprise customers. As discovered in plaintiffs’ extensive investigation, Slack lacked the
7 infrastructure to support a 99.99% uptime guarantee and was particularly vulnerable because of
8 frequent changes to its codebase, indicating that there could be dozens of new code updates daily. As
9 a result, service outages, including outages on a global scale, occurred with far greater frequency than
10 the near-perfect (“four nines”) reliability guaranteed by Slack.

11 15. In sum, the Offering Documents were false and misleading and omitted to state
12 material facts both required by governing regulations and necessary to make the statements made
13 therein not misleading. More specifically, contrary to the Offering Documents’ hyping of the
14 Company’s “go-to-market” enterprise business growth strategy and product scalability:

15 (a) the Company was experiencing significant and intensifying competition from
16 Microsoft Teams due in part to Microsoft’s bundled business productivity suite;

17 (b) Slack’s attempt to attract and serve enterprise clients was creating
18 vulnerabilities in its platform, including service disruptions, and Slack was having significant
19 technical difficulties preventing adequate scaling of its platform;

20 (c) Slack could not support its non-industry standard **uptime guarantee of**
21 **99.99%** and had failed to satisfy this threshold in 7 months out of 12 in 2018;

22 (d) Slack’s failure to satisfy its uptime guarantee results in the award of credits to
23 customers;

24 (e) the credit award is subject to an ““exceptionally generous credit payout
25 multiplier in [its] contracts,”” requiring Slack, in the event of an interruption in service, to compensate
26 customers **up to 100 times the value of the lost service**;

27 (f) even customers unaffected by service disruptions are granted credits; and
28

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