`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
`
`
`
`MARK J. PATANE, JULIE HARDING,
`HEATHER HARRIGAN, STEPHEN S.
`SHAPIRO, CATHERINE PORTER, ERICA
`RUSSELL, TINA MORETTI, BRIDGET KOPET,
`JENNIFER S. COLE, BENJAMIN A.
`FLETCHER and DIANE BOGDAN, and
`PARESHKUMAR BRAHMBHATT, Individually
`and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`
`NESTLÉ WATERS NORTH AMERICA, INC.
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 17-cv-01381-JAM
`
`ECF Case
`
`CLASS ACTION
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL
`
`Oral Argument Requested
`
`
`
`
`APRIL 23, 2021
`
`
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`8093981v1/015403
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`Case 3:17-cv-01381-JAM Document 307 Filed 04/23/21 Page 2 of 31
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`
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
`
`Relevant Background .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`III.
`
`Discovery Disputes ............................................................................................................. 2
`
`A. Legal Standard .............................................................................................................. 3
`
`B. Argument ...................................................................................................................... 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`6.
`
`Plaintiffs are Entitled to Discovery Spanning 2003–2013 .......................... 4
`
`Nestlé Must Produce Requested Sales & Pricing Information ................... 8
`
`Nestlé Cannot Evade Financial Document and Deposition Discovery .... 14
`
`Nestlé’s Communications With Third-Party Regulators Are Not Protected
`By the Work Product Doctrine ................................................................. 16
`
`Nestlé Must Cure Its Deficient Document Investigations ........................ 19
`
`A Bilateral Deadline for Substantial Completion of Document Production
`Is Warranted .............................................................................................. 20
`
`IV.
`
`Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 22
`
`
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`Case 3:17-cv-01381-JAM Document 307 Filed 04/23/21 Page 3 of 31
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`A.M. v. Am. Sch. for the Deaf,
`No. 3:13 CV 1337 (WWE), 2016 WL 1117363 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2016) ..............................4
`
`Audet v. Fraser,
`No. 3:16cv940(MPS), 2019 WL 285400 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2019) ........................................18
`
`Braswell v. Bujnicki,
`No. 3:16-cv-01431 (JAM), 2018 WL 1293076 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 2018) ...............................3
`
`Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New Eng.,
`232 F.R.D. 49 (D. Conn. 2005)............................................................................................4, 16
`
`Cadco, Ltd. v. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc.,
`204 A.3d 737 (Conn. Ct. App. 2019) .......................................................................................15
`
`Coale v. Metro N. R. Co.,
`No. 3:09–cv–2065 (CSH), 2011 WL 1870237 (D. Conn. May 16, 2011) ..............................13
`
`Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
`221 F.R.D. 14 (D. Conn. 2003)................................................................................................17
`
`Cochran v. City of Huntington,
`No. 1:05-CV-249, 2006 WL 897443 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2006) .............................................21
`
`Compagnie Francaise d’Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips
`Petroleum Co.,
`105 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) .................................................................................................4
`
`Daval Steele Prods. v. M/V Fakredine,
`951 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1991).....................................................................................................3
`
`Electrified Discounters, Inc. v. MI Techs., Inc.,
`No. 3:13cv1332(RNC), 2015 WL 2383618 (D. Conn. May 19, 2015) .....................................6
`
`Estate of Dabela v. Town of Redding,
`No. 3:16cv534(RNC), 2018 WL 7458278 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2018) .......................................6
`
`Fairchild Heights Residents Ass’n, Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc.,
`310 Conn. 797 (2014) ..............................................................................................................15
`
`Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc.,
`No. 11cv6201 (DLC), 2014 WL 4412388 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2014) ......................................22
`
`8093981v1/015403
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`ii
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`Case 3:17-cv-01381-JAM Document 307 Filed 04/23/21 Page 4 of 31
`
`
`
`Fleisher v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co.,
`No. 11 Civ. 8405(CM)(JCF), 2012 WL 6732905 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2012) ..........................22
`
`Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co.,
`324 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2018) .....................................................................................8
`
`Hilsley v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,
`No. 3:17-cv-02335-GPC-MDD, 2018 WL 4502348 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2018) ......................12
`
`Horn v. City of New Haven,
`No. 3:18-CV-1502 (JAM), 2019 WL 3997095 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2019) .............................18
`
`In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig.,
`233 F.R.D. 83 (D. Conn. 2005)..............................................................................................4, 9
`
`In re Scotts EZ Seed Litig.,
`304 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ...............................................................................................8
`
`In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.,
`9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................................18
`
`Kimbro v. I.C. Sys., Inc.,
`No. No. 3:01 CV 1676(DJS), 2002 WL 1816820 (D. Conn. July 22, 2002) .........................3, 6
`
`Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos.,
`897 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2018).......................................................................................................13
`
`Mohegan Lake Motors, Inc. v. Maoli,
`16CV6717, 2018 WL 4278351 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2018) ........................................................13
`
`N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. Multiplan, Inc.,
`325 F.R.D. 36, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ...........................................................................................7
`
`Nat’l Org. for Women, Farmington Valley Chapter v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
`88 F.R.D. 272 (D. Conn. 1980)..................................................................................................3
`
`NL Indus., Inc. v. ACF Indus. LLC,
`No. 10CV89W, 2015 WL 4066884 (W.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) ................................................18
`
`Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
`437 U.S. 340 (1978) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Precision Rx Compounding, LLC v. Express Scripts Holding Co.,
`No. 4:16–CV–69 RLW, 2018 WL 2100281 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2018) ....................................22
`
`Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp.,
`No. 02:07cv1294, 2008 WL 2487835 (W.D. Pa. June 16, 2008) ............................................21
`
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`
`
`Ramsey v. Nestlé Waters N. Am.,
`No. 03 CHK 817 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003) .............................................................................5
`
`Rose v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
`809 N.Y.S. 2d 784 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) .................................................................................15
`
`S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Henkel Corp.,
`No. 3:19CV00805 (AVC), 2020 WL 5640528 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2020) ...............................4
`
`Sandigo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
`17-cv-002727 BLF (NC), 2018 WL 4293339 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2018) ................................22
`
`Seegert v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-01243-JAH (JLB), 2019 WL 12044514 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) .......................11
`
`Seegert v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-01243-JAH (JLB), 2019 WL 3774485 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) ...........................11
`
`Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,
`763 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd.,
`490 F.3d 130,138 (2d Cir. 2007)..............................................................................................10
`
`SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Cent. Props. LLC,
`No. 01 Civ. 9291(JSM), 2002 WL 1334821 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2002) ..................................16
`
`Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc.,
`194 N.J. 212 (2008) .................................................................................................................15
`
`Tucker v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
`No. 3:09–CV–1499 (CSH), 2011 WL 6020851 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 2011) ...............................20
`
`Ulbrich v. Groth,
`310 Conn. 375 (2013) ..............................................................................................................15
`
`United States v. Bilzerian,
`926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 502 U.S. 813 (1991) .....................................................17
`
`Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp.,
`No. C-02-1786JSWEMC, 2005 WL 119868 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005) .......................... passim
`
`WPIX, Inc. v. Broacast Music, Inc.,
`No. CV 11–4052–SJO, 2011 WL 9753912 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011) ......................................12
`
`Xchange Telecom Corp. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P.,
`No. No. 14–CV–54, 2015 WL 773752 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015) ........................................6, 7
`
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`
`
`Rules
`
`Federal Rule of Evidence 401 ..........................................................................................................4
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26 ............................................................................. passim
`
`
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`
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`I.
`
`Introduction
`
`Since summer 2019, Nestlé has dodged Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain straightforward,
`relevant discovery to which they are entitled regarding the merits of their claims, their price-
`premium damages theory, and the maintenance of this case as a class action. At every turn,
`Nestlé has avoided its discovery obligations by asserting incredulous claims of irrelevance, and
`burden; contending wrongly that Plaintiffs’ discovery requests are better suited to another
`“stage” of litigation; and delaying the potential resolution of discovery disputes by refusing to
`cooperate with Plaintiffs. Nestlé’s challenges to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests ring hollow.
`Now, nearly four years after this lawsuit was initiated and over eight months since the Court
`denied summary judgment, Nestlé’s stonewalling is preventing this case from moving forward.
`Plaintiffs’ efforts to resolve the parties’ discovery disputes informally have proven futile.
`Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request that Your Honor (1) order Nestlé to produce the
`requested documents at issue and designate Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses to testify regarding the
`disputed topics; (2) schedule a Court-supervised discovery conference regarding Nestlé’s
`document investigations and search terms; and (3) set a bilateral deadline for substantial
`completion of document production to keep this case moving toward resolution.
`
`II.
`
`Relevant Background
`
`Plaintiffs sued Nestlé Waters North America, Inc. (“Nestlé”) on August 15, 2017 in
`connection with the false and misleading labeling of its Poland Spring brand bottled water as
`“100% Natural Spring Water” despite knowing that the product is not in fact “spring water”
`under the FDA’s standard of identity. See Dkt. 1; Dkt. 160 (“Compl.”) at ¶ 101; Dkt. 179 at 2.
`Plaintiffs allege causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, and violations of state consumer
`statutes of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
`Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island (collectively, the “Class States”). See Compl. at ¶¶ 836–954,
`978–1036. These claims are based on Nestlé’s unlawful conduct from November 5, 2003 to
`present. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 22, 812, 819–20.
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`Nestlé sells the offending bottled water products through third-party retailers and
`distributors, as well as through its own direct-to-consumer bottled-water delivery service known
`as ReadyRefresh. ReadyRefresh delivers “a variety of sizes” of Nestlé’s bottled water products,
`including Poland Spring’s bottled “spring water” and other relevant products, “right to
`[consumers’] door[s],” including in the Class States. Ex. U at 1.1 In addition to its own direct-
`to-consumer program, Nestlé sells bottled-water products through retailers and distributors and
`has licensed bottled-water retail pricing and sales data from third parties Nielsen Company (US),
`LLC (“Nielsen”) and Information Resources, Inc. (“IRI”) since at least as early as 2013. See Ex.
`I at 7–8.
`Plaintiffs have diligently pursued document and deposition discovery in support of their
`claims and price-premium damages theory, including with respect to the requests at issue here.
`See Ex. A at RFP 9 (served June 2019); Ex. B at RFPs No. 17, 18, 29–31 (same); Ex. G at RFP
`No. 59, 61–63 (served December 2020); Ex. E at Topics 10–13, 20 (same).
`
`III. Discovery Disputes
`
`The parties’ document and deposition discovery disputes boil down to six main issues:
`(1) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to discovery spanning the full period of Nestlé’s alleged misconduct;
`(2) Plaintiffs’ requests for actual and recommended wholesale and retail prices for bottled water
`and the sales volume of such products in the Class States dating back to 2003; (3) Plaintiffs’
`document and deposition requests regarding Nestlé’s financial condition and the profitability and
`
`
`1 Citations to “Ex.” refer to the exhibits attached to the Declaration of Jesse-Justin Cuevas In
`Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel (“Cuevas Decl.”) that accompanies this Motion. The
`ReadyRefresh webpage cited now indicates that it operates under BlueTriton Brands, Inc.,
`Nestlé’s new corporate name. See Ex. V at 1 (reporting that Nestlé “has begun operating under a
`new corporate name, BlueTriton Brands” following “the completion of its acquisition by One
`Rock Capital Partners, LLC…, in partnership with Metropoulos & Co., from Nestlé S.A., on
`March 31, 2021). This has not altered Nestle’s ReadyRefresh business. See Ex. W (explaining
`that since the acquisition, ReadyRefresh is “still the same convenient beverage delivery service
`you know and love” and telling customers that “there will be no immediate changes to [their]
`ReadyRefresh service or the products… offer[ed]”).
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`costs of bottled water products; (4) Nestlé’s refusal to provide deposition testimony regarding its
`post-December 1, 2015 communications with regulators and government officials regarding this
`litigation and the facts underlying it; (5) Nestlé’s deficient search for responsive documents and
`refusal to meet and confer regarding search terms used in such investigations; and (6) Nestlé’s
`unwarranted delay in completing its responsive document production.
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard
`
`As Judge Meyer has explained, “Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets
`forth the proper scope of discovery. Parties ‘may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
`matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”
`Braswell v. Bujnicki, No. 3:16-cv-01431 (JAM), 2018 WL 1293076, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 13,
`2018) (Meyer, J.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). In this Circuit, the “obviously broad” Rule
`26(b)(1) is “liberally construed” to encompass not only issues raised expressly by a plaintiff’s
`complaint but also other non-merits issues, such as damages and class-action maintainability
`under Rule 23. Kimbro v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. No. 3:01 CV 1676(DJS), 2002 WL 1816820, at *1
`(D. Conn. July 22, 2002) (quoting Daval Steele Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1357
`(2d Cir. 1991)); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 & n.13 (1978)
`(explaining that “[c]onsistently with the notice-pleading system established by the Rules,
`discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help
`define and clarify the issues. Nor is discovery limited to the merits of a case, for a variety of fact-
`oriented issues may arise during litigation that are not related to the merits,” such as “issues upon
`which a district court must pass in deciding whether a suit should proceed as a class action under
`Rule 23”); Nat’l Org. for Women, Farmington Valley Chapter v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D.
`272, 277 (D. Conn. 1980) (“The discovery permitted must be sufficiently broad in order that the
`plaintiffs have a realistic opportunity to meet the[] requirements [of Rule 23]; at the same time,
`the defendant must be protected from discovery which is overly burdensome, irrelevant, or
`which invades privileged or confidential areas.”).
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`“Relevance” for purposes of discovery is construed more broadly than for the purposes of
`trial, following the “any tendency” standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 401. See, e.g., A.M. v.
`Am. Sch. for the Deaf, No. 3:13 CV 1337 (WWE), 2016 WL 1117363, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 22,
`2016); see also Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New Eng., 232 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Conn.
`2005) (“Relevancy continues to be ‘broadly construed, and a request for discovery should be
`considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the
`claim or defense of any party.’” (citations omitted)). Once the party seeking discovery
`establishes its relevance, the party resisting discovery must show why it should be denied. E.g.,
`S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., No. 3:19CV00805 (AVC), 2020 WL 5640528, at *2
`(D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2020). More specifically, “[t]he party resisting discovery bears the burden of
`demonstrating that its objections should be sustained, and pat, generic, non-specific objections,
`intoning the same boilerplate language, are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” In re Priceline.com Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 83, 85 (D.
`Conn. 2005). Rather, “the objecting party must ‘show specifically how, despite the broad and
`liberal construction afforded the federal discovery rules, each [request] is not relevant or how
`each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering
`evidence revealing the nature of the burden.’” Id. (quoting Compagnie Francaise d’Assurance
`Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
`
`B.
`
`Argument
`1.
`
`Plaintiffs are Entitled to Discovery Spanning 2003–2013
`
`Plaintiffs’ claims concern Nestlé’s deceptive labeling of its Poland Spring bottled “spring
`water” (“PSW”) products from November 5, 2003 through the date of trial. Yet, Nestlé refuses
`to produce requested document and deposition discovery spanning November 5, 2003–August
`15, 2013 based on supposedly applicable, mostly unspecified statutes of limitations.2 Nestlé
`
`2 Nestlé originally contended that discovery requests seeking information post-dating the
`August 15, 2017 filing of this lawsuit were also irrelevant, but Nestlé has since abandoned that
`challenge. See Ex. S at 1. Notably, however, Nestlé has yet to supplement its document
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`claims that the four-year statute of limitations under the UCC (for Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract
`claims) and unidentified “shorter statutes of limitations” (for the remaining claims) foreclose
`Plaintiffs’ right to pre-August 2013 discovery. Ex. S at 1; see also Ex. T at 2, 3 (stating that
`Nestlé “stands on its objections” to Plaintiffs’ Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice regarding the
`appropriate time period in this case and refusing to prepare, or even attempt to prepare, any
`corporate designees regarding the November 2003–August 2013 timeframe). Nestlé’s time-
`limitations objections fail for at least three reasons.
`First, Plaintiffs have demonstrated the relevance of the time period covering their
`requests, and Nestlé has not carried its burden to show that the discovery is improper under the
`framework of Rule 26. It is undisputed that the November 2003–present period of Plaintiffs’
`document requests and deposition Topics covers Nestlé’s misconduct as alleged in Plaintiffs’
`Complaint. See, e.g., Dkt. 142 at 7 (“[T]he current action involves purchasers of Poland Spring
`water after November 5, 2003.”), id. (“Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries here are caused by Nestlé’s
`purported ongoing, post-Ramsey [Nov. 5, 2003] course of deceptive conduct….”), 8 (“[T]he
`present plaintiffs and proposed class include only purchasers after November 5, 2003.”), 11
`(“[P]laintiffs’ claims are wholly based on alleged ongoing conduct that post-dates the [Nov. 5,
`2003] Ramsey settlement….”).3 There is no question here that information spanning the time
`period alleged in Plaintiffs’ putative class action Complaint has a tendency to make Plaintiffs’
`allegations covering that period more or less probable.
`Nestlé’s sole basis for opposing this discovery is the supposed strength of its statute-of-
`limitations defense and the resulting “irrelevance” of Plaintiffs’ requests. But the applicability of
`
`
`production with responsive documents covering August 2017–present despite its written
`agreement to do so.
`
`3 The Ramsey settlement resolved a similar class action lawsuit filed against Nestlé in Illinois
`concerning purchasers of Poland Spring water prior to November 5, 2003. See Ramsey v. Nestlé
`Waters N. Am., No. 03 CHK 817 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003), filed on the docket in this litigation
`at Dkt. 53-2 (pages 5–72).
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`any statute-of-limitations in this case is an open question, as explained below, and Nestlé is not
`the party that can determine the answer. Nestlé cannot use its failure to seek a ruling on this
`defense as a basis to evade discovery spanning the full relevant time period.
`Second, Nestlé’s self-perceived strength of its defense is not a justifiable basis for
`withholding discovery in this District. It is black-letter law that Nestlé’s subjective beliefs about
`the merits of its affirmative defenses are irrelevant to the proper scope of discovery in this case.
`Nestlé does not “possess the unilateral ability to dictate the scope of discovery based on [its] own
`view of the parties’ respective theories of the case. Litigation in general and discovery in
`particular… are not one sided.” Sentis Grp., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 763 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir.
`2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). Rather,
`it matters not for the purpose of discovery which side’s theory of the case might
`ultimately be proven correct. What matters is that each side is entitled to pursue
`intelligible theories of the case and [Nestlé] cannot, by [its] sole insistence,
`declare evidence undiscoverable and irrelevant merely because it does not fit into
`[Nestlé’s] own theory of the case.
`
`Id.; accord Xchange Telecom Corp. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. No. 14–CV–54 (GLS/CFH),
`2015 WL 773752, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2015).
`Sister district courts in this jurisdiction have followed this rule, overruling merits-based
`objections to discovery like those Nestlé advances here. See Kimbro, 2002 WL 1816820, at *1
`(granting plaintiff’s motion to compel over defendant’s objections based on its “optimistic
`speculation” regarding the success of its defense); see also Estate of Dabela v. Town of Redding,
`No. 3:16cv534(RNC), 2018 WL 7458278, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 18, 2018) (“The defendants
`argue that the information sought is not relevant because the plaintiffs’ claims are deficient.
`Their objections based on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims are misplaced.”); Electrified
`Discounters, Inc. v. MI Techs., Inc., No. 3:13cv1332(RNC), 2015 WL 2383618, at *6 (D. Conn.
`May 19, 2015) (calling plaintiff’s merits-based objections to defendant’s document requests
`“unavailing” and explaining that “it is no objection to a discovery request that it relates to a
`defense or claim which is insufficient in law” (cleaned up)). Nestlé cannot dictate Plaintiffs’
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`entitlement to discovery in this case based on its subjective and untested views of its statute-of-
`limitations defense.
`Third, a discovery motion is not the proper vehicle for evaluating the merits of Nestlé’s
`defenses. Rather, Nestlé must make that application to the District Court in a dispositive motion.
`See N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. Multiplan, Inc., 325 F.R.D. 36, 48
`(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Because [plaintiff] lacks a viable fraud claim, the logic goes, information
`relevant only to that claim is not discoverable within the scope of Fed[eral] R[ule of] Civ[il]
`P[rocedure] 26. However, and as [plaintiff] points out, [defendant]’s opposition to a discovery
`motion is not the proper forum for raising challenges to the viability of [plaintiff]’s claims, nor
`are such challenges proper grounds to preclude otherwise appropriate discovery.”); Xchange
`Telecom, 2015 WL 773752 at *3 (“[I]t is not presently appropriate given the pending motion [to
`compel], or within the jurisdiction of the undersigned [Magistrate Judge], to determine whether
`the substantive issues raised during the briefing should lead to the decision that various claims or
`defenses need to be striken [sic] and that, by extension, the discovery demands are inappropriate.
`Instead such arguments regarding the viability of the remaining claims and defenses should be
`properly presented, in a dispositive motion, before the District Judge.”). Nestlé cannot use
`discovery, or the special-master procedure, to test its defense theories before raising the issue in
`a dispositive motion, and Nestlé cannot rely on merits defenses not decided by a court to
`frustrate discovery.
`In sum, Nestlé’s objections to the time period of Plaintiffs’ document and deposition
`requests present a merits question, not a discovery question, and Nestlé cannot withhold
`discovery simply because it disagrees with Plaintiffs’ theory of the case. Plaintiffs’ requests for
`pre-August 2013 discovery are squarely relevant, and Nestlé cannot carry its burden to resist
`such discovery. Nestlé’s time-limitations objections must be overruled.
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`Case 3:17-cv-01381-JAM Document 307 Filed 04/23/21 Page 14 of 31
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`2.
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`Nestlé Must Produce Requested Sales & Pricing Information
`
`For nearly two years, Plaintiffs have sought sales and pricing information from Nestlé in
`connection with PSW and other bottled water products.4 Plaintiffs now move to compel Nestlé
`to produce the following documents and related deposition testimony:
`(a) Data Nestlé has purchased from third-parties Nielsen and IRI showing retail
`prices for and sales volume (by bottle size, packaging combination, or other
`product unit) of bottled water in the Class States from November 2003–present;
`
`(b) Nestlé’s wholesale and Home & Office (i.e., ReadyRefresh) sales data for bottled
`water purchases in the Class States from November 2003–present showing
`(i) products purchased, (ii) product prices and quantities sold, (iii) dates of
`purchase, and (iv) identity and address of the Home & Office purchaser;
`
`(c) Documents showing Nestlé’s manufacturer suggested retail prices (“MSRP”) for
`certain bottled water products sold in the Class States from November 2003–
`present, and any studies or underlying data used to determine the MSRP values
`for such products.
`
`See Ex. B at RFPs No. 17, 18, 29, 31; Ex. G at RFP No. 59, 61–63; see also Ex. E at Topic 11
`(seeking testimony regarding bottled water sales and pricing). Nestlé refuses to produce this
`important data. Nestlé’s objections are meritless.
`The requested information is indisputably relevant to Plaintiffs’ contention that
`consumers in the Class States pay a price premium for PSW as a result of Nestlé’s false labeling
`of the product as “100% Natural Spring Water.” See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 2, 15; see also In re Scotts
`EZ Seed Litig., 304 F.R.D. 397, 409, 413–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining plaintiffs’ price
`premium theory in deceptive labeling case and certifying Rule 23(b)(3) class advancing a price
`premium theory of classwide damages). Federal district courts across the country have
`acknowledged the relevance of pricing and sales information when certifying class actions
`bringing deceptive-labeling claims under a price-premium theory. See, e.g., Hadley v. Kellogg
`
`
`4 In addition to PSW, Plaintiffs seek pricing and sales information regarding other Nestlé
`bottled water products such as Pure Life (Nestlé’s bottled purified water), Poland Spring brand
`distilled and sparkling waters, Deer Park brand spring water, and non-Nestlé brand bottled water.
`Nestlé’ has agreed to produce these materials, see Ex. S at 2; Ex. T at 1, but has yet to produce
`any additional materials for bottled water products other than PSW or Pure Life.
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`Sales Co., 324 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing the use of product prices that
`“reflect the actual market prices that prevailed during the class period” and sales quantities that
`“reflect the actual quantities of products sold during the class period”). In addition, the requested
`MSRP information, by virtue of setting a recommended price, sheds light on how Nestlé values
`its various bottled water products and perceives consumer willingness-to-pay for such products,
`regardless of whether Nestlé actually shared these suggested prices with its wholesale customers
`at any time. Plaintiffs’ request for Home & Office purchaser identity information in addition to
`the raw product sales and pricing data is also relevant to Plaintiffs’ ability to maintain this case
`as a class action. For example, Plaintiffs will use that information to show that it can satisfy
`Rule 23’s numerosity requirements for each of the Class State sub-classes as well as the implied
`requirement of ascertainability that applies in this Circuit.
`The requested information is also proportional to the needs of this case under the
`discovery framework of the Federal Rules. Nestlé’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing:
`First, Nestlé’s boilerplate objections regarding burden and proportionality do not specify
`how Plaintiffs’ targeted requests for wholesale and retail pricing and product sales information in
`the Class States are disproportional to the needs of the case. See Ex. I at 6 ¶¶ 3–4 (RFP 17), 8–9
`¶¶ 3–4 (RFP 18), 24–25 ¶¶ 1, 3, 4 (RFP 29), 28–29 ¶¶ 1, 3 (RFP 31); Ex. H at 10–11 ¶¶ 1,4 (RFP
`59), 14 ¶¶ 1, 3 (RFP 61), 16 ¶¶ 1, 5 (RFP 62), 18 ¶¶ 1, 3 (RFP 63). The suggestion that it is too
`difficult for Nestlé—which sells bottled-water products to retailers and distributors, owns and
`operates a direct-to-consumer bottled-water delivery service, and purchases retail bottled-water
`pricing and sales data directly from third parties—to investigate its own records and produce
`information containing (1) the actual and recommended prices of specific bottled water products,
`(2) the number of each product unit sold at that price, and (3) the volume of such sales, over a
`specific, finite period of time in a specific, finite number of states, defies credulity and common
`sense. Nestlé cannot carry its burden in opposing the requested discovery on the basis of
`disproportionality. See, e.g., In re Priceline.com, 233 F.R.