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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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`PRO MUSIC RIGHTS, LLC,
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`Civil Action No.
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`3:20-cv-00309
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`APPLE, INC., AMAZON.COM, INC.,
`GOOGLE, LLC, YOUTUBE, LLC,
`SPOTIFY AB, SPOTIFY USA, INC.,
`SPOTIFY LIMITED, SPOTIFY
`TECHNOLOGY S.A., DIGITAL MEDIA
`ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RELIGIOUS
`BROADCASTERS MUSIC LICENSE
`COMMITTEE, RADIO MUSIC LICENSE
`COMMITTEE, INC., THE NATIONAL
`ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
`WINERIES, TELEVISION MUSIC
`LICENSE COMMITTEE, LLC, 7DIGITAL
`GROUP, INC., 7DIGITAL, INC., 7DIGITAL
`GROUP PLC, 7DIGITAL LIMITED,
`DEEZER, S.A., DEEZER INC.,
`IHEARTMEDIA, INC., CONNOISSEUR
`MEDIA LLC, PANDORA MEDIA, LLC,
`RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
`SOUNDCLOUD LIMITED, and
`SOUNDCLOUD INC.,
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`Defendants.
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`March 9, 2020
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`COMPLAINT
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 2 of 120
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I. NATURE OF ACTION ........................................................................................................... 1
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`II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE .............................................................................................. 8
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`III.
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`PARTIES ............................................................................................................................. 9
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`PRO MUSIC RIGHTS, LLC.................................................................................................. 9
`A.
`APPLE, INC. ..................................................................................................................... 11
`B.
`AMAZON.COM, INC. ......................................................................................................... 12
`C.
`GOOGLE, LLC ................................................................................................................. 13
`D.
`YOUTUBE, LLC .............................................................................................................. 15
`E.
`SPOTIFY DEFENDANTS .................................................................................................... 16
`F.
`DIGITAL MEDIA ASSOCIATION ........................................................................................ 17
`G.
`NATIONAL RELIGIOUS BROADCASTERS MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE............................. 18
`H.
`RADIO MUSIC LICENSING COMMITTEE, INC. ................................................................... 19
`I.
`TELEVISION MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE, LLC.............................................................. 19
`J.
`THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN WINERIES ................................................. 20
`K.
`7DIGITAL DEFENDANTS ................................................................................................... 21
`L.
`M. DEEZER DEFENDANTS ..................................................................................................... 23
`N.
`IHEARTMEDIA, INC. ........................................................................................................ 24
`O.
`CONNOISSEUR MEDIA LLC ............................................................................................. 25
`P.
`PANDORA ........................................................................................................................ 25
`Q.
`RHAPSODY ...................................................................................................................... 26
`R.
`SOUNDCLOUD DEFENDANTS ........................................................................................... 27
`S.
`ANTITRUST CO-CONSPIRATORS ...................................................................................... 28
`T.
`VICARIOUS CONDUCT ..................................................................................................... 29
`U.
`GROUPINGS ..................................................................................................................... 29
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`IV. BACKGROUND FACTS .................................................................................................. 29
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`A. WHAT IS A MONOPSONY?................................................................................................ 29
`B.
`THE LICENSING OF COPYRIGHTED MUSIC ....................................................................... 30
`C.
`THE STRUCTURE OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS MARKET ............................................. 31
`D.
`THE SELL-SIDE OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS MARKET ............................................... 32
`i.
`BMI AND ASCAP ................................................................................... 32
`ii.
`SESAC ...................................................................................................... 33
`iii. GMR ......................................................................................................... 33
`THE BUY-SIDE OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHTS MARKET ................................................ 34
`i.
`Streaming Defendants ............................................................................... 34
`ii.
`iHeartMedia and Connoisseur Media ....................................................... 35
`iii. RMLC ....................................................................................................... 35
`iv.
`TVMLC..................................................................................................... 39
`v.
`NRBMLC .................................................................................................. 42
`THE CARTEL REFUSES TO DEAL WITH PMR.................................................................... 45
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`E.
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`F.
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`V. THE CARTEL’S UNLAWFUL AND ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES ...................... 47
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`i
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 3 of 120
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`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
`E.
`F.
`G.
`H.
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`THE CARTEL’S PURPOSE AND MOTIVATION OF THE ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENT ..... 48
`THE MIC COALITION ...................................................................................................... 58
`CARTEL ENGAGES IN A CAMPAIGN TO COMMUNICATE FALSEHOODS TO MEMBERS ....... 61
`THE CARTEL HAS SUBSTANTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO COMMUNICATE AND COLLUDE ..... 63
`ANTI-COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH PMR .............................................................. 64
`REFUSAL TO DEAL .......................................................................................................... 65
`GROUP BOYCOTT ............................................................................................................ 65
`THE END-USER LISTENERS WILL NOT BE HARMED ....................................................... 66
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`VI. EFFECT OF THE CARTEL’S HORIZONTAL CONSPIRACIES .................................. 66
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`A.
`B.
`C.
`D.
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`INJURY TO COMPETITION................................................................................................. 66
`RESTRICTED SONGWRITER AND PUBLISHER CHOICE ....................................................... 67
`RESTRICTED CONSUMER CHOICE .................................................................................... 67
`ANTITRUST INJURY TO PMR ........................................................................................... 68
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`VII. CONSPIRACY TO MONOPSONIZE .............................................................................. 69
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`VIII. MAINTENANCE OF MONOPSONY BY EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES................. 69
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`IX. CAUSES OF ACTION ...................................................................................................... 70
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`JURY DEMAND ........................................................................................................................ 107
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................. 107
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`SCHEDULE 1 .............................................................................................................................. S-1
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 4 of 120
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`Plaintiff, Pro Music Rights, LLC (“PMR” or “Plaintiff”), through its counsel, Gora LLC,
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`files this Complaint against Defendants Apple, Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Google, LLC, YouTube,
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`LLC, Spotify AB, Spotify USA, Inc., Spotify Limited, Spotify Technology S.A., Digital Media
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`Association, National Religious Broadcasters Music License Committee, Radio Music Licensing
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`Committee, Inc., The National Association of American Wineries, Television Music License
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`Committee, LLC, 7Digital Group, Inc., 7Digital, Inc., 7Digital Group PLC, 7Digital Limited,
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`Deezer, S.A., Deezer, Inc., iHeartMedia, Inc., Connoisseur Media LLC, Rhapsody International,
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`Inc., SoundCloud Limited, and SoundCloud Inc. alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
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`§§ 1 and 2, the Connecticut Antitrust Act and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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`I.
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`NATURE OF ACTION
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`1.
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`PMR entered the performance rights licensing market to provide a modern
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`alternative to copyright holders, who are the writers, composers and publishers creating the
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`musical works played on the radio, television and music streaming services. Unlike other
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`performance rights organizations (“PROs”), which pay royalties for public performances of
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`musical works based on some formula or some royalty pool, PMR pays the entirety of such royalty
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`to the copyright holder. For its services, PMR charges buyers a reasonable, periodic fee for the
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`license to publicly perform musical works. PMR’s competitive advantage is providing better
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`services to writers, composers and publishers of musical works, particularly those just entering the
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`industry without mainstream audiences.
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`2.
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`Despite PMR’s substantial effort and investment to accumulate musical works in
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`its repertory, Defendants have entered into an illegal agreement, combination and/or conspiracy to
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`shut PMR out of the market and to fix prices at infracompetitive levels. They have choreographed
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`a refusal, and continuous refusal, to deal with PMR. No television station, radio station or music
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`1
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`streaming service has entered into a license to perform the musical works in PMR’s repertory, let
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`alone engaged in any substantive negotiations therefor.
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`3.
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`Defendants are not acting in a manner consistent with their respective, individual
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`self-interest. Instead, each Defendant is motivated to maintain, and does maintain, the conspiracy
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`in the buy-side of the market to the detriment of its independent economic interest. Defendants’
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`conspiracy has been, and is, successful because Defendants have complete control of the buyers’
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`market for a license to publicly perform musical works (the “License”).
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`4.
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`The Defendants’ conspiracy and anticompetitive agreement is an illegal
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`monopsony. By conspiring to boycott PMR and to set the price for a License at infracompetitive
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`levels, Defendants have destroyed competition between and among themselves. As a result, they
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`have generated explosive growth in revenue, profits, and goodwill to PMR’s detriment. With their
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`monopsony intact, Defendants have become the conspiratorial stewards of the buy-side of the
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`market that will not deal with PMR, will take whatever means necessary to prevent new PROs
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`from entering or growing a business, and will not enter into License agreements except at an illegal
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`price.
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`5.
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`PMR, as the newest entrant into the market, has flown under the radar to accumulate
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`both whole and fractional rights to a substantial number of popular and less-than popular musical
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`works. For those musical works to which PMR has fractional rights, another PRO may hold the
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`balance of the rights. Compared to the number of musical works in the other PROs’ repertoire,
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`PMR has the third-largest supply in the market. As the third-largest supplier, PMR expected to
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`enter into at least one License agreement with at least one of the Defendants, as the other PROs
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`have done. To PMR’s surprise, all of the Defendants with whom PMR actively tried to negotiate
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`a License uniformly refused to deal with PMR. In explaining why, the Defendants peddled nearly-
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`verbatim excuses and language to PMR.
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`6.
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`Without a License from PMR, Defendants’ insolence only got worse. All of the
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`Defendants continued to publicly perform PMR’s repertory. All of the Defendants knew they did
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`not have a License to do so. All of them did so while knowing about their liability for copyright
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`infringement. Shocked, PMR did what every other PRO would do upon learning of such willful
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`copyright infringement, it double-downed on its efforts to secure a License agreement from various
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`Defendants.
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`7.
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`Sticking to their illegal agreement, however, Defendants lobbed the same excuses
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`at PMR, such as, for example, that a License for PMR’s musical works is not necessary or PMR’s
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`repertory is not available online. PMR’s repertory was, and remains, prominently featured and
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`available for search and download on its website, including for more than one search term at a
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`time. Faced with no other choice, PMR filed lawsuits against various Defendants seeking statutory
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`damages for their willful copyright infringement.
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`8.
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`From its extensive efforts to License its repertory to nearly all the Defendants and
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`certain of their co-conspirators, PMR has learned that Defendants have, for years now, been
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`relentlessly carrying out their illegal agreement to choke all vestiges of legitimate competition
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`from the buy-side of the market. They have deployed several tools against PROs to maintain their
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`monopsony, including by taking turns to lodge antitrust claims against any PRO having, as some
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`Defendants describe it, a “must-have” repertory and reducing demand in the market (which, in
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`turn, reduces sell-side outputs––there are fewer musical works for public consumption).
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`9.
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`That is why Global Music Rights, LLC (“GMR”) and SESAC LLC (“SESAC”),
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`PMR’s competitors, were sued for engaging in allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Defendants are
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`now putting PMR through their wringer by uniformly refusing to enter into a License with it
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`despite using the musical works in its repertory. In trying to legitimize their monopsony, one
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`Defendant says, PMR “appears to be following the anticompetitive playbook established by
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`SESAC.” That is false; PMR is trying to build a business in a market that the Defendants have
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`rigged and continue to rig.
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`10.
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`They uniformly and publicly vilify the PROs and their respective business practices
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`with strategic propaganda aimed at music listeners, customers, regulators, courts and other market
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`participants. Defendants have sustained and exploited their conspiracy due to the multi-billion-
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`dollar market’s unique characteristics:
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`a.
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`First, the two largest PROs, which in the aggregate control over 90% of the
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`Licenses, have been subject to consent decrees for nearly eighty years, since the 1940s (generally,
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`the “consent decrees”). Defendants brandish those consent decrees at every turn to cast every
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`PRO, new or old, as a villain on the unbelievable theory that having one musical work renders
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`such PRO a monopolist.
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`b.
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`Second, Defendants cannot lawfully publicly perform copyrighted musical
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`works without License. Doing so results in copyright infringement. Worse yet, willful copyright
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`infringement is remedied with statutory damages and also punishable by up to ten years in prison.
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`While Defendants publicly say (as they must) they respect performance rights, they then cavalierly
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`infringe PMR’s works without License and without paying royalties. Then, when PMR’s copyright
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`holders hear their works on television, radio or online, they ask PMR for royalty payments. But,
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`no royalty payments are forthcoming because Defendants refuse to deal with and have not paid
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`PMR. Then, PMR is forced to file a copyright infringement lawsuit, as it has done, against those
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`Defendants.
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`c.
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`Third, copyright holders have traditionally conferred administration and
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`licensing of their respective musical works to the sell-side of the market: (i) PMR, (ii) GMR, (iii)
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`SESAC, (iv) American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) and (v)
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`Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”). Those PROs control, in the aggregate, virtually all of the PRO
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`sell-side of the market. Under their conspiracy, Defendants have not refused to deal with BMI and
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`ASCAP because those PROs license over 90% of the public performance rights administered by
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`the PROs. Since the rules with BMI and ASCAP are set under the consent decrees, Defendants act
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`against their self-interest in refusing to deal with PMR, as they have done with other PROs entering
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`the market before PMR, such as SESAC and GMR.
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`d.
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`Fourth, the Defendants’ historical context of the industry focuses on
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`allegedly anticompetitive conduct by the sell-side of the market, mainly against BMI and ASCAP.
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`More recently, they have focused and continue to focus on antitrust lawsuits against PMR’s other
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`competitors: SESAC and GMR. In their never-ending strategy to maintain a narrative that every
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`PRO is a monopolist so long as such PRO has at least one musical work, Defendants have averted
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`scrutiny by falsely painting themselves as the perpetual victim in a market run by, in their words,
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`monopolist PROs.
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`e.
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`Fifth, the Defendants publicly communicate the purpose of their illegal
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`agreement: eviscerate PMR from the market. One Defendant has explicitly stated, PMR and GMR
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`should not “exist alongside ASCAP and BMI” because each “distorts competition.” Defendants
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`then direct that no buyer conduct any business with PMR because if “composers and music
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`publishers” move their rights to “an unregulated PRO,” such as PMR, then it “can offer to pay [its]
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`affiliated composers and publishers at higher levels” and then the Defendants lose “the protections
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`afforded . . . by the Consent Decrees[.]” These public statements illustrate that the Defendants’
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`5
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`conspiracy mandates no Licenses or payments be made when a new PRO (such as PMR)
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`accumulates musical works in its repertory (as PMR has done).
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`f.
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`Sixth, Defendants’ motivation to cease PMR’s and “other unregulated
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`PROs’” existence “alongside ASCAP and BMI” is for the deliberate purpose to maintain, at all
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`costs, the “two-stop shopping” at the repertoire-stores of BMI and ASCAP. One Defendants says,
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`“Rather than secure all of the rights necessary to publicly perform music through two-stop
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`shopping, and under conditions in which the potential for abuse of market power is mitigated,
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`music users [i.e., the Defendants] need to secure licenses from every [new] PRO that has become
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`sufficiently large such that using its music is unavailable.”
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`g.
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`Seventh, Defendants are doing all they can to avoid fractionalizing
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`performance rights in musical works. By maintaining “two-stop shopping,” Defendants need to
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`obtain only two Licenses, one from BMI and one from ASCAP. Whenever a new PRO enters the
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`market, such as SESAC, GMR and PMR, Defendants are subject to an additional cost, which
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`occurs when, as here, PMR administers a License for a fractional right in a musical work, the
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`remainder of which is administered by another PRO. With that result, each Defendant must obtain
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`another License.
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`11.
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`Defendants have unlawfully exploited the uniqueness of the buy-side market. With
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`the consent decrees setting the rules of the game for BMI and ASCAP, the Defendants have
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`virtually pinpoint clarity in how BMI and ASCAP must operate in the market. For instance, if
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`Defendants take issue with BMI’s or ASCAP’s prices or price increases, they initiate litigation in
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`the “rate court” venued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
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`(generally, the “rate court”). Years of litigation and millions of dollars later, the rate court
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`supposedly “resolves” the dispute by setting the “price” of the License. While Defendants tout the
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`6
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 10 of 120
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`resulting decision as “reasonable,” “nondiscriminatory” and establishing the fair market value for
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`a License, the decision does not reflect the price at which a willing seller would sell, or a willing
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`buyer would buy, a License. That is because the Defendants have rigged the data set, including the
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`price, on which the analysis and decision is based. In other words, the rate court’s decisions have
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`not accounted for the Defendants’ market-distorting power or other relevant market data.
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`12.
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`PMR, GMR and SESAC are not subject to the consent decrees. Any PRO not
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`subject to a consent decree is disparaged by the Defendants, saying each such PRO is engaged in
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`anticompetitive conduct. Furthermore, in August 2019, matching their actions with their words,
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`Defendants Radio Music Licensing Committee, Inc. (“RMLC”) and Digital Media Association
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`(“DiMA”) publicly refused to acknowledge any PRO other than BMI and ASCAP as a
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`“legitimate” sell-side competitor.
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`13.
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`Defendants’ position is hardly surprising. If Defendants acknowledge the
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`legitimacy of another PRO, it would render the consent orders unnecessary and songwriters,
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`composers and publishers might move en masse to PMR.
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`14.
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`To ensure the viability of the consent orders, Defendants downplay new PROs,
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`construct unlawful and substantial barriers to enter the market, and do all they can, regardless of
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`legality, to block redistribution of market share. It is undeniable that the market has transformed
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`with the advent of the Internet. The concerns giving rise to the consent decrees are ceasing, or have
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`already ceased, to exist.
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`15.
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`Against this backdrop, the Defendants unlawfully agreed to act in unison,
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`collectively and collaboratively as a buyers’ cartel (the “Cartel”), throwing their individualized
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`self-interest into the wind, for the long term gain of the “two-stop shopping.”
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`7
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`16.
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`The unlawful purpose of the Cartel is two-fold: fight to preserve the BMI and
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`ASCAP duopoly and make PMR (and any other new PRO) cease to exist. If PMR continues to
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`exist, the Cartel deploys its backup strategy: “a take-it-or-leave-it,” feigned negotiation where the
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`Cartel will only buy a License at a price that will result in PMR’s giving up or shutting down. That
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`is precisely what Defendants had attempted to do with GMR and SESAC, and what RMLC is
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`presently doing with its antitrust lawsuit against GMR. As the newest PRO, with more musical
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`works than GMR and SESAC combined, PMR is battling for its existence against the Cartel.
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`17.
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`Yet, PMR has not sat idly waiting for the Cartel to negotiate with it. Despite several
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`rounds of letters, emails, conference calls and other communications with various Defendants, the
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`Cartel has maintained their course, executing on their illegal agreement to boycott PMR. PMR has
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`been unable to secure any License from any member of the Cartel over the course of the past 2
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`years. As a participant in the market unlawfully restrained, controlled and rigged by the Cartel,
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`PMR has suffered an injury of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`18.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over this action under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
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`Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 26 and 28 U.S.C. § §1331 and 1337. This Court also has jurisdiction over
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`the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367, because those claims are so related to the federal
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`claims that they form part of the same case or controversy.
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`19.
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`Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d) as
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`well as 15 U.S.C. § 22 because (1) the Defendants resided, transacted business, were found or had
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`agents in this judicial district; (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to these
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`claims occurred in this judicial district; (3) a substantial portion of the interstate trade and
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`commerce discussed herein was carried out in this judicial district; or (4) they have engaged in
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`anticompetitive and illegal conduct that has had an impact in this judicial district.
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`20.
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`Defendants, directly or indirectly, singly and in concert, made use of the means and
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`instrumentalities of transportation or communication in, or the instrumentalities of, interstate
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`and/or international commerce in connection with the unlawful acts and practices and courses of
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`business alleged in this Complaint.
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`21.
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`According to the nationwide contacts test provided for by 15 U.S.C. §22, all
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`Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States because they, as set forth below,
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`were formed in or have their principal places of business in the United States. All Defendants
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`transact business in this judicial district. Additionally, all members of the conspiracy are subject
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`to personal jurisdiction in the United States because the conspiracy was directed at, carried out in
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`substantial part in, effectuated in whole or in part, or had the intended effect of, causing injury to
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`Plaintiff, who resided in and did business in the United States.
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`22.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties because all Defendants (i)
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`conducted business throughout the United States, including in the District of Connecticut; (ii) had
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`substantial contacts with the District of Connecticut; and (iii) engaged in a campaign of price-
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`fixing and boycott that has affected a nationwide market for the license of copyrighted musical
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`works, which market includes the District of Connecticut.
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`III.
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`PARTIES
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`A.
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`Pro Music Rights, LLC
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`23.
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`PMR is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of Florida
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`with its principal place of business at 3811 Airport Pulling, STE 203, Naples, Florida 34105. PMR
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`was founded in January 2018 by Jake Noch (“Noch”), its chief executive officer. PMR’s
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`9
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 13 of 120
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`executives and representatives are experts in the market, the licensing industry, and the business
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`model of PROs. PMR is a PRO that collects license fees on behalf of songwriters, composers and
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`music publishers with whom it is affiliated and then distributes the license fees as royalties to those
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`affiliates whose works have been publicly performed.
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`24.
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`It is the fifth-ever formed public PRO in the United States behind the ASCAP, BMI,
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`SESAC and GMR, and it controls an estimated 7.4% market share of the public performance rights
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`in the United States based on the number of works in its repertory (the “PMR Repertory”),
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`including works by notable artists such as A$AP Rocky, Wiz Khalifa, Pharrell, Young Jeezy, Juelz
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`Santana, Lil Yachty, MoneyBaggYo, Larry June, Trae Pound, Sause Walka, Trae Tha Truth,
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`Sosamann, Soulja Boy, Lex Luger, Lud Foe, SlowBucks, Gunplay, OG Maco, Rich The Kid, Fat
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`Trel, Young Scooter, Nipsey Hussle, Famous Dex, Boosie Badazz, Shy Glizzy, 2 Chainz, Migos,
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`Gucci Mane, Young Dolph, Trinidad James and Fall Out Boy. Most of the musical works in the
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`PMR Repertory have only one copyright holder. PMR has many reputable artists in its cache
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`including, OG Maco, best known for his 2014 debut single “U Guessed It,” which went viral and
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`peaked at number 90 on the U.S. Billboard Hot 100.
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`25.
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`The musical works in PMR’s Repertory are quality works in various genres. Some
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`of those musical works have generated royalties when licensed through BMI or ASCAP, each of
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`which ultimately paid the copyright holder because of a License from the respective Defendant.
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`Yet, when such copyright holder leaves BMI or ASCAP for PMR, the revenue stops, meaning
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`while a Defendant had a license to play, had played, and had paid performance royalties for such
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`musical work when housed at BMI or ASCAP, a Defendant no longer has a license when such
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`copyright holder leaves for PMR––a license from another PRO does not translate into a license
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`with PMR.
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`10
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 14 of 120
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`26.
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`The musical works in PMR’s Repertory have been publicly performed hundreds of
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`millions of times and have generated performance royalties in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
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`Any administrative or legal expenses to negotiate a License with PMR is substantially outweighed
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`by the benefit of having a License and not having infringement liability.
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`27.
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`Additionally, PMR partnered with Cosynd, a New York-based legal service that
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`automates copyright contracts and registrations. The partnership allows PMR artists to create
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`contracts (split sheets, premium split sheets, work for hire agreements, and producer agreements)
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`that secure copyrights and registrations with the U.S. Copyright Office. Songwriters, composers
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`and publishers can submit applications to register their musical works in a matter of minutes. In a
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`later phase of the partnership, Cosynd’s API will integrate directly with PMR’s dashboard for
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`further management of musical works and relationships by PMR’s songwriters, composers and
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`publishers.
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`B.
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`Apple, Inc.
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`28.
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`Upon information and belief, Defendant Apple, Inc. is a for-profit California
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`corporation having its principal place of business located at 1 Infinite Loop, Cupertino, California,
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`and maintaining corporate offices in New York, New York. Apple also has numerous locations
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`throughout the United States, including 7 Apple retail stores in Connecticut collectively employing
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`between 500 – 1,000 Connecticut residents.
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`29.
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`Apple owns, maintains and operates Apple Music, a music and video streaming
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`service. Users select music to stream to their device on-demand, or they can listen to existing,
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`curated playlists. Apple’s streaming service touts around 45 million songs and has approximately
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`60 million monthly subscribers worldwide. It is the most popular paid streaming service in the
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`United States, beating out Spotify and other music streaming services.
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`2 CORPORATE DR., SUITE 210 • TRUMBULL, CT • 06611 • 203.424.8021 • RICH@GORALAW.COM
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`WWW.GORALAW.COM
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`GORA LLC
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`11
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`Case 3:20-cv-00309-JAM Document 1 Filed 03/09/20 Page 15 of 120
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`30.
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`Apple provides its interactive streaming service and platform to individuals located
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`in Connecticut and Connecticut re