Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 1 of 103
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`IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
`BID PROTEST
`
`AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
`by and through the U.S. Department of Defense,
`
`Case No. - - - - - - - - -
`
`Judge
`
`Defendant.
`
`REDACTED VERSION
`
`-COMPLAINT
`
`Amazon Web Services, Inc. ("A WS") protests the decision of the U.S. Department of
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`Defense ("DoD'') to award the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure ("JEDI") Contract,
`
`Solicitation No. HQ0034-l 8-R-0077 ("RFP"), to Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft"). 1
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`Throughout the JEDI procurement process, based on A WS' s depth of experience, superior
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`technology, and proven record of success in handling the most sensitive government data, A WS
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`was the consensus frontrunner to aid DoD in this important modernization effort. Yet when the
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`time came to make the award, DoD chose Microsoft. Any meaningful review of that decision
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`reveals egregious errors on nearly every evaluation factor, from ignoring the unique strengths of
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`AWS's proposal, to overlooking clear failures in Microsoft's proposal to meet JEDI's technical
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`1 The Defendant has represented that DoD will not proceed with performance of the JEDI
`Contract beyond initial preparatory activities until at least February 11, 2020. Accordingly,
`A WS and Defendant have agreed that a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
`are not necessary at this time. A WS reserves the right to move for such immediate injunctive
`relief if DoD decides to proceed with performance in advance of this Court's resolution of
`AWS's protest.
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 2 of 103
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`requirements, to deviating altogether from DoD's own evaluation criteria to give a false sense of
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`parity between the two offerors. These fundamental errors alone require reversal.
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`These errors, however, were not merely the result of arbitrary and capricious decision(cid:173)
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`making. They were the result of improper pressure from President Donald J. Trump, who launched
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`repeated public and behind-the-scenes attacks to steer the JEDI Contract away from AWS to harm
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`his perceived political enemy-Jeffrey P. Bezos, founder and CEO of AWS's parent company,
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`Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon"), and owner of the Washington Post. DoD's substantial and
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`pervasive errors are hard to understand and impossible to assess separate and apart from the
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`President's repeatedly expressed determination to, in the words of the President himself, "screw
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`Amazon." Basic justice requires reevaluation of proposals and a new award decision. The stakes
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`are high. The question is whether the President of the United States should be allowed to use the
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`budget of DoD to pursue his own personal and political ends.
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`On dispassionate review of the technical merits alone, bedrock government
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`procurement principles require overturning the award of the JEDI Contract to Microsoft.
`
`In
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`granting that award, DoD committed numerous and compounding prejudicial errors, glossing over
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`wide gaps between A WS's market-segment-leading cloud solution and Microsoft's offering,
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`completely ignoring critical aspects of A WS's technical proposal, and overlooking key failures by
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`Microsoft to comply with the RFP's stated requirements. These errors pervaded nearly every
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`evaluation factor.
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`2.
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`In a particularly egregious example that is plainly contrary to the factual record,
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`DoD concluded under Factor 3 (Tactical Edge) that
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`2
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`. DoD
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 3 of 103
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`compounded this error by
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`, while allowing Microsoft
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`-to escape DoD's scrutiny as to Factor 3 entirely.
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`Further exacerbating this fatal e1rnr, DoD also failed to recognize the proven benefits of A WS's
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`Snowball Edge device, which is already in active use in the field today (including on the battlefield
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`) by numerous DoD organizations,
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`3.
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`Similarly, under Factor 6 (Management and Task Order ("TO") 001), DoD
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`arbitrarily evaluated an outdated, superseded version of AWS's proposal. The full impact of this
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`highly prejudicial error is difficult to calculate.
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`The evaluation documents identify numerous other instances where DoD
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`also ignored the plain language of A WS's proposal. When confronted with this fact in A WS's
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`debriefing questions, however, DoD declined to explain its conclusions, stating simply-despite
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`the contrary evidence in the evaluation materials-that DoD evaluated the correct version of
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`A WS' s proposal.
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`4.
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`Moreover, DoD arbitrarily and wrongly concluded that
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`3
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 4 of 103
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`DoD also erroneously concluded that
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`despite the fact that AW
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`was and still is the only contractor that has a
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`proven approach for managing, developing, and deploying classified and unclassified cloud
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`infrastructure and platforms at the scale contemplated by JEDI.
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`5.
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`Under Factor 2 (Logical Isolation and Secure Data Transfer), DoD fundamentally
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`misunderstood AWS's cloud solution.
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`In particular, DoD arbitrarily omitted from its final
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`evaluation-without explanation-previously assessed strengths, such as for A WS's virtual
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`networking functionality, cryptographic protections, marketplace offerings, CloudFormation
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`service, and network design and implementation. DoD also deviated from the RFP by failing to
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`meaningfully consider offerors' proposed hypervisors, a foundational security and operational
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`control element and an area where A WS has clearly distinguished itself from Microsoft through
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`its novel Nitro architecture. Further, DoD failed to recognize other beneficial aspects of A WS's
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`proposal
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`while also
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`6.
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`Under Factor 4 (Information Security and Access Controls), DoD again deviated
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`from the RFP's criteria by failing to consider offerors' capabilities with respect to isolation,
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`patching, access control configuration, data and resource tagging, and token-based and time(cid:173)
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`limited federated authentication. Specifically, DoD failed to recognize that A WS's Nitro
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`architecture provides improved infonnation security to DoD users. DoD also overlooked A WS's
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`robust access control capabilities, which include role- and attribute-based access controls, the
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`4
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 5 of 103
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`ability to tag resources and objects for various functions, and the ability to leverage token-based
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`authentication.
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`7.
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`Under Factor 5 (Application and Data Hosting and P011ability), DoD irrationally
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`concluded that the
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`-
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`unique third-party marketplace offerings included in
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`A WS 's proposal would not be available at the time of award. In fact, AWS's proposal makes clear
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`the contnuy is tm e - - - are available at award in the unclassified marketplace,
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`with many of these offerings also available at award in the classified marketplace. DoD's
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`unfounded and incorrect conclusion is particularly egregious given that A WS operates the largest
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`cloud software marketplace in the world, and is the only cloud service provider with a classified
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`cloud software marketplace. DoD also ru:bitrarily omitted from its fmal evaluation-again without
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`explanation-previously assessed strengths,
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`. And DoD overlooked
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`other strengths (such as AWS's Content Delivei:y Network Points of Presence,
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`. , its advanced graphics-processing unit and high-memory compute instance types, and its
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`machine leamiugla11ificial intelligence and managed database capabilities) when conducting its
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`final evaluation of A WS 's proposal.
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`8.
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`Under Factor 8 (Demonstration), DoD again deviated from the RFP by failing to
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`consider the extent to which AWS successfully demonstrated its technical approach for Factors 1
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`through 6. Specifically, DoD failed to acknowledge the numerous instances in which AWS's
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`demonstrated capabilities vastly exceeded performance requirements-while ignoring instances
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`where Microsoft necessarily failed to demonstrate its solution met the technical requirements of
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`the JEDI SOO.
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`5
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 6 of 103
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`9.
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`In committing the foregoing evaluation errors-and many others-DoD failed to
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`meet its minimum obligation to apply the RFP's stated evaluation criteria reasonably, consistently,
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`and in a fair and equal manner among all offerors. This arbitrary and capricious evaluation created
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`a false parity between the two competitors' technical capabilities, notwithstanding A WS's depth
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`of experience, superior technology, and record of success in handling the most sensitive
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`government data at hyperscale data centers dedicated to serving
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`and
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`DoD.
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`10.
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`Despite the clear factual record establishing AWS's technical superiority over
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`Microsoft-including broad consensus among industry analysts and experts who assessed A WS
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`as the clear frontrunner for the JEDI Contract-DoD did not accurately assess A WS's technical
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`superiority regarding essentially every meaningful aspect of DoD's requirements. As a result,
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`DoD created the illusion that
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`defects, however, AWS's more relevant and highly successful experience managing -
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`Even viewed in isolation from all of the other foregoing
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`, combined with DoD's obvious errors when
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`evaluating AWS's proposal under Factor 6, underscore the thin veneer DoD artificially and
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`improperly used to distinguish Microsoft's offering.
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`11.
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`DoD further compounded its errors through its targeted efforts to drive up A WS's
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`pnce
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`government contracting principles, these fundamental errors, alone, which combined to skew
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`improperly the best-value determination in Microsoft's favor, require termination of the JEDI
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`Contract and a reevaluation of the proposals.
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`. Under ordinary
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`6
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 7 of 103
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`12.
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`But in this extraordinary case, another, more fundamental defect also demands
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`reevaluation of the award: the intervention of President Trump, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
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`Military and head of the Executive Branch, in the JEDI procurement and award. This intervention
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`destroyed the requisite impartial discharge of the government procurement process, making it
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`impossible for DoD to meet its minimum obligation to apply the RFP's stated evaluation criteria
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`reasonably, consistently, and in a fair and equal manner among all offerors. President Trump's
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`intervention casts the errors discussed above in an even harsher light and puts the very integrity of
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`the government procurement process in question.
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`13.
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`The government procurement process-through which hundreds of billions of
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`taxpayer dollars are awarded each year to provide essential government services, including to our
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`nation's military-demands objective and even-handed administration based on facts and fair
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`comparisons, not personal animus and undue influence. In this case, the President made it widely
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`known to everyone-including on publicly broadcast television and through his prolific tweets(cid:173)
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`that DoD should not award the JEDI Contract to A WS. The blatant, inexplicable errors in DoD's
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`award to Microsoft make plain that President Trump's message had its intended and predictable
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`effect.
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`14.
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`The publicly available record of President Trump's statements and actions
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`demonstrates that he repeatedly attacked and vilified his perceived political enemy-Mr. Bezos,
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`the founder and CEO of AWS's parent company, Amazon, and who separately owns the
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`Washington Post-and then intervened in this procurement process to thwart the fair
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`administration of DoD' s procurement of technology and services critical to the modernization of
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`the U.S. military.
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`7
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 8 of 103
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`15.
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`President Trump has made no secret of his personal dislike for Mr. Bezos, Amazon,
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`and the Washington Post, or of his express desire to harm them. The seeds of this animus originate
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`with the Washington Post's coverage of him before he even was elected President. That coverage
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`placed Mr. Bezos, Amazon, and the Washington Post directly in the crosshairs of President
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`Trump's wrath.
`
`16.
`
`For example, in February 2016, then-candidate Trump made this promise during a
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`campaign rally about what would happen to Amazon if he was elected President: "[B]elieve me,
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`if I become president, oh do they have problems. They're going to have such problems." A few
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`months later, he repeated this sentiment, accusing Amazon of "getting away with murder,"
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`and "rigg[ing]" the system, and proclaiming that Mr. Bezos uses the Washington Post "as a tool
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`for political power against [him]" while declaring "[w]e can't let him get away with it."
`
`17.
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`After he assumed office, President Trump grew "obsessed" with Mr. Bezos and
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`determined to "fl'** with him."2 His new powers expanded his ability to punish Mr. Bezos for the
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`Washington Post's coverage of him.
`
`18.
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`Since the JEDI procurement was announced, the President has reaffirmed his
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`hostility towards Amazon and, as even the public record strongly suggests, has used his office to
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`prevent A WS from winning the JEDI Contract. These efforts range from his own public statements
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`and tweets to pronouncements from the highest levels of power within his Administration. They
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`have been on full display for the whole country to see, including the members of the TEB, the
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`Source Selection Evaluation Board ("SSEB"), the Source Selection Advisory Committee
`
`2 Gabriel Sherman, ''Trump Is Like, 'How Can I F-k With Him?'": Trump's War With Amazon
`(April
`2,
`2018),
`Is Personal, Vanity Fair
`(And The Washington Post)
`https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/04/trump-war-with-amazon-and-the-washington(cid:173)
`post-is-personal.
`
`8
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 9 of 103
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`("SSAC"), and the Source Selection Authority ("SSA"), all of whom serve under President
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`Trump's command.
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`19.
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`For example, following months of scathing tweets about Mr. Bezos and Amazon in
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`the summer of2018 (a time when industry analysts widely reported AWS to be best qualified to
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`win the JEDI Contract), the Commander in Chief directed his then-Secretary of Defense James
`
`Mattis to "screw Amazon" out of the contract, as recounted in a book published by Secretary
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`Mattis's former chief speechwriter and Pentagon insider.
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`20.
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`Similarly, during a press conference held on July 18, 2019, President Trump
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`claimed that he had been getting "tremendous complaints about the contract with the Pentagon and
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`with Amazon," and that he had heard "complaining from different companies, like Microsoft and
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`Oracle and IBM." He then declared that he personally "will be asking [DoD] to look at it very
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`closely to see what's going on." That same day, President Trump's eldest son, Donald Trump, Jr.,
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`alleged in a tweet that Mr. Bezos and Amazon had engaged in "shady and potentially corrupt
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`practices," and he ominously predicted that it "may come back to bite them" with respect to JEDI.
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`President Trump doubled down on these statements on July 22, 2019, when he tweeted television
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`coverage decrying the JEDI Contract as the "Bezos bailout." Each of these messages came while
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`DoD was evaluating the JEDI proposals and it would have been virtually impossible for anyone
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`involved in JEDI to ignore them.
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`21.
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`President Trump's attacks were relentless, and he resorted to increasingly
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`aggressive tactics to carry out his apparent personal goal of preventing Mr. Bezos and A WS from
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`receiving the JED I Contract.
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`In early August 2019, President Trump-in an unprecedented
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`move-intervened directly in the very final phases of the two-year procurement process. President
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`Trump directed his newly appointed Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper (who replaced Secretary
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`9
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 10 of 103
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`Mattis after President Trump claimed to have "essentially fired" Mattis following repeated clashes
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`with the President's leadership), to conduct an "independent" examination. President Trump's
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`improper direct intervention, its upending of the procurement, and the President's personal goal of
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`preventing A WS from receiving the JEDI Contract were widely reported at the time: "The White
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`House reportedly directed the Department of Defense to review a $10 billion cloud contract
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`because it would probably go to Amazon." 3
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`22.
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`As President Trump's tweets against Mr. Bezos, Amazon, the Washington Post,
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`and the JEDI bid process piled up, DoD took numerous actions to systematically remove the
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`advantages of AWS's technological and experiential superiority and artificially level the playing
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`field between A WS and its competitors, including Microsoft.
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`23.
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`For example, in mid-2018, DoD refused to evaluate past performance-which only
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`A WS possessed with regard to a contract remotely comparable to the size and complexity of
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`JEDI-contrary to the applicable requirements of FAR Subparts 12.206 and 15.304. This was an
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`unusual decision, given the JEDI Contract's significant national security implications and the fact
`
`3 Matt Weinberger, The White House Reportedly Directed the Department of Defense to Review
`a $10 Billion Cloud Contract Because It Would Probably Go to Amazon, Business Insider
`(Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.my/sec-of-defense-to-look-into- l 0-billion-jedi(cid:173)
`contract-2019-8/; see also, e.g., Rosalie Chen, President Donald Trump Reportedly Wants to
`'Scuttle' the $10 Billion Pentagon Cloud Contract that Amazon and Microsoft are Fighting
`Over, Business Insider (July 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-jedi-cloud(cid:173)
`contract-amazon-microsoft-oracle-2019-7; Ari Levy, Trump Says He's Looking into a
`Pentagon Cloud Contract for Amazon or Microsoft Because 'We 're Getting Tremendous
`Complaints,' CNBC
`(July 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07 /18/trump-says(cid:173)
`seriously-looking-into-amazons-pentagon-contract.html; Jim Osman, Why Amazon Could Be
`Trumped
`in
`Its
`JEDI
`Mission,
`Forbes
`(June
`7,
`2019),
`https :/ /www .forbes.com/sites/j imosman/2019/06/07 /amazon-j edi-trump-microsoft-walmart(cid:173)
`oracle-tech/#7b7c359a3 l fl; Idrees Ali & Nandita Rose, Pentagon Puts $10 Billion JEDI
`Contract on Hold After Trump Suggests It Favored Amazon, Reuters (Aug. 1. 2019),
`https://www.reuters.com/articie/us-amazon-com-jedi/pentagon-puts-lO-billion-jedi-contract(cid:173)
`on-hold-after-trump-suggests-it-favored-amazon-idUSKCN 1 URSUA.
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`10
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 11 of 103
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`that the FAR explicitly states past performance "should be an important element of every
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`evaluation and contract award for commercial items."
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`24.
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`Further, in the spring of 2019, DoD required AWS to make various changes to its
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`technical proposal that forced AWS
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`. For example, RFP
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`Amendment 0005 in May 2019 required offerors
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`--even though DoD's technical evaluators had previously confirmed AWS's proposed
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`solution was "realistic and feasible"
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`- · Amendment 0005 also created a new and artificial limitation on technical solutions,
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`without any justification, by requiring offerors to
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`in the
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`Price Scenarios.
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`driving up AWS's total evaluated price b y - - a - increase over AWS's initial
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`total evaluated price. And at the eleventh hour-months after DoD completed its evaluation of
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`A WS' s initial proposal, and after the conclusion of all scheduled discussions-DoD changed its
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`interpretation of the RFP's classified infrastructure requirements, effectively rejecting A WS's
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`long-standing plan to utilize existing data centers already certified for classified use and instead
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`requiring A WS to build new dedicated classified infrastructure for DoD. There was no technical
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`basis for this change-which could only impact A WS as the only cloud provider with existing
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`classified infrastructure-and it resulted in an additional -
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`increase to AWS's total
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`evaluated price. These and other late-breaking DoD-directed changes-all of which arose after
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`DoD's discussions with offerors and focused disproportionately on A WS's unique capabilities(cid:173)
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`were unnecessary from a technical and overall mission perspective and increased A WS' s total
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`11
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 12 of 103
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`evaluated price
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`and arbitrarily leveling the playing field.
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`25.
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`In addition to these overt changes, DoD evaluators applied a watered-down, "check
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`the box" analysis for many factors-ignoring A WS's numerous technical advantages despite
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`evaluation criteria requiring a comparative analysis in connection with the best value
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`determination-to conclude both offerings were "good enough." Under this approach, the
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`evaluators ignored numerous features that make A WS objectively superior to Microsoft from
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`technical, security, and risk perspectives. These features include A WS's more advanced cloud
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`and security architecture and its demonstrated and accredited ability-unlike any other
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`competitor-to manage Secret and Top Secret classified information, something A WS has been
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`doing
`
`since 2013.
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`26.
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`The SSAC further skewed the analysis in favor of Microsoft. The SSEB-which
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`consists of individuals responsible for considering the TEB's input, further evaluating offerors'
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`technical proposals, and providing recommendations to the SSAC-concluded that AWS's core
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`cloud security architecture is "extraordinary" and explicitly recognized the positive impact A WS 's
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`technical approach would have on the security of DoD's most critical information. Yet in the
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`midst of the President's campaign against A WS, the SSAC issued a written and comparative
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`analysis that disregarded the SSEB's conclusion entirely. Compounding that gross omission, the
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`SSAC proffered a pretextual reason for disregarding the SSEB's conclusion:
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`. It also is inconsistent with previous concerns raised by DoD, and in
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`12
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`particular the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the agency that is responsible for
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`providing information technology (IT) and communications support across DoD. For example, in
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`June of 2019, A WS participated in a technical exchange meeting with representatives from DISA,
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`the Do D's Chieflnformation Officer's ("CIO") Office (the office responsible for all aspects of the
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`JEDI program), and the U.S. Navy
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`- · This meeting included a tabletop exercise designed by DISA
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`. Further, the SSAC's conclusion th a t -
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`unreasonably ignores that AWS's Nitro architecture also reduces the risks
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`associated with each of these issues, as well as insider threats, data exfiltration/theft, and many
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`other infrastructure vulnerabilities.
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`27.
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`These shifts in the DoD evaluators' assessments of A WS's proposal, including the
`
`significance of A WS's security advantages, occurred as President Trump increased the intensity
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`of his public attacks against Mr. Bezos, Amazon/A WS, and the Washington Post. Additionally,
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`as discussed in more detail below, there are numerous similar examples in the ultimate award
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`where the SSAC inexplicably disregarded critical evaluation criteria or mischaracterized A WS's
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`offering in order to give the false appearance of technical parity between A WS and Microsoft.
`
`28.
`
`Although DoD is afforded significant discretion in evaluating proposals, it is
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`required to wield that discretion within the bounds of the RFP and applicable law and regulation.
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`Indeed, even one prejudicial error in DoD's process would require reevaluation of the JEDI
`
`proposals and the issuance of a new award decision. What is most remarkable here is that(cid:173)
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`consistent with the expressed desires of its Commander in Chief--DoD consistently and
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`13
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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 14 of 103
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`repeatedly made prejudicial errors, at every step along the way, that systematically favored
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`Microsoft and harmed A WS-e1Tors that grew in magnitude at each stage, and that mirrored the
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`increasing tactics from President Trump to thwart the award of the contract to A WS. The most
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`plausible inference from these facts is simply this: under escalating and overt pressure from
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`President Trump, DoD departed from the rules of procurement and complied-consciously or
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`subconsciously-with its Commander in Chief's expressed desire to reject A WS's superior bid.
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`Even ifDoD were somehow immune from this presidential pressure-plainly, it is not-the many
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`e1Tors in its evaluation of A WS's proposal alone nonetheless warrant reversal of the award decision
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`and re-evaluation of the proposals.
`
`29.
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`As a result, on October 17, 2019 (after President Trump directed Secretary Esper
`
`to "look ... very closely" at the JEDI procurement), DoD set aside the concrete evidence that A WS
`
`was the technically superior provider, and instead executed a "Source Selection Decision
`
`Document" ("SSDD") that declared Microsoft the awardee of the JEDI Contract.
`
`30.
`
`A few days later, on October 22, 2019, with the public unaware that DoD had
`
`already awarded the JEDI Contract to Microsoft, Secretary Esper-having already called for his
`
`Department to conduct a careful review of the JEDI process-announced that he was recusing
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`himself from the JEDI source selection review in another unprecedented and bizaITe attempt to
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`rewrite the factual record and unsully a process tainted by the President's intervention. DoD's
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`stated basis for Secretary Esper's recusal-"his adult son's employment with one of the original
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`contract applicants [i.e., IBM]"-was questionable: not only had Secretary Esper's son been
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`employed by IBM for more than six months before the recusal, but DoD had already eliminated
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`IBM as a contender since April 2019, when it announced that only AWS and Microsoft were the
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`remaining candidates for the JEDI award.
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`14
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`31.
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`On October 25, 2019, to the extreme surprise of the overwhelming majority of
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`industry experts and analysts, DoD announced publicly the decision it had made a week earlier
`
`(before Secretary Esper's recusal), that it had awarded the JEDI Contract to Microsoft.
`
`32.
`
`At every step in the process, this procurement has been highly unusual. Agencies
`
`are prohibited from reinterpreting their evaluation criteria to create false parity among the offerors,
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`ignoring categorical differences between offerors, and making patent errors that mischaracterize
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`one offeror's solution to the benefit of another. In this procurement, however, those highly unusual
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`steps-which alone demand re-evaluation-occurred in a truly extraordinary context: Throughout
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`the final year of the multi-year award process, the President of the United States and Commander
`
`in Chief of our military used his power to "screw Amazon" out of the JEDI Contract as part of his
`
`highly public personal vendetta against Mr. Bezos, Amazon, and the Washington Post. Rarely, if
`
`ever, has a President engaged in such a blatant and sustained effort to direct the outcome of a
`
`government procurement-let alone because of personal animus and political objectives. Our laws
`
`reject this unfair influence and bias into the government procurement process, and this Court
`
`should not sanction such behavior or its intended result in this case.
`
`33.
`
`Irrespective of any artificial steps the Administration might have taken to sterilize
`
`the record, it was impossible to shield DoD from the bias exhibited and undue influence exerted
`
`by President Trump and others. That improper and unlawful intervention contributed directly to
`
`an arbitrary and capricious award that is contrary to procurement law and contrary to the interests
`
`of our national security. As a result, the award must be terminated, and DoD must reevaluate the
`
`proposals fairly and free of any direct or indirect improper influence.
`
`II.
`
`JURISDICTION
`
`34.
`
`This Court has jurisdiction over this post-award protest pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
`
`§ 1491(b)(l), which provides that the Court of Federal Claims "shall have jurisdiction to render
`
`15
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 16 of 103
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`judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to ... a proposed award or the award of a
`
`contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a
`
`proposed procurement. [T]he United States Court of Federal Claims ... shall have jurisdiction to
`
`entertain such an action without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after the contract is
`
`awarded."
`
`35.
`
`AWS is an interested party to pursue this protest because it was an actual offeror
`
`for the JEDI Contract and, but for DoD's erroneous and flawed evaluation process, including
`
`improper influence by President Trump and DoD officials working at his direction, A WS would
`
`have received the contract award. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(l).
`
`III.
`
`PARTIES
`
`36.
`
`Plaintiff is A WS, a subsidiary of Amazon. A WS is the leading provider of scalable
`
`cloud computing services to individuals, companies, and governments. A WS is located at 410
`
`Terry Avenue North, Seattle, WA 98109.
`
`37.
`
`Defendant is the United States of America, acting by and through DoD.
`
`IV.
`
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`
`A.
`
`DoD's Cloud Modernization Initiative
`
`38.
`
`The Executive, and specifically DoD, is charged with making the best possible
`
`decisions to ensure the safety and security of our nation, and that the taxpayer dollars appropriated
`
`by Congress are being responsibly spent free from political influence or ulterior motives. Article
`
`I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution grants the power of the purse to Congress, which
`
`then appropriates funds for the Executive to spend through its inherent power to contract. Article
`
`II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution "vest[s]" the "executive Power" in the "President of the
`
`United States." Congress has defined and bounded the Executive's authority to spend appropriated
`
`16
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 17 of 103
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`funds through a detailed set of procurement laws and regulations to ensure the fair, efficient, and
`
`transparent use of public funds. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. §§ 3101 et seq.; 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.000 et seq.
`
`39.
`
`In an environment fraught with increasingly sophisticated technological threats
`
`from our nation's adversaries, it is critical that our military leaders and intelligence community
`
`have access to the most advanced technological capabilities to enable them to make mission
`
`critical, data-driven decisions. Over the past several years, DoD has sought to modernize its
`
`information technology infrastructure to ensure it remains the most capable, nimble, and secure
`
`defense institution in the world. As part of this modernization initiative, in September 2017, DoD
`
`announced the JEDI program, DoD's plan to upgrade and consolidate its cloud computing
`
`infrastructure across the Department, which would enable DoD to employ "emerging technologies
`
`to meet warfighter needs" and maintain "our military's technological advantage."4
`
`40.
`
`"Cloud computing" refers to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
`
`(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and
`
`released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. Cloud computing is an
`
`alternative to traditional "on-premises" information technology resources, which require users to
`
`plan, procure, manage, and maintain physical computing resources (i.e., servers). DoD launched
`
`its search for a cloud solution that could meet its stringent requirements, including handling
`
`complex management of unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret information, and supporting
`
`advanced data-analytic capabilities like machine learning and artificial intelligence. 5
`
`4 Accelerating
`Adoption,
`Cloud
`Enterprise
`(Sept.
`Nextgov
`https :/ /www.nextgov.com/media/ gbc/ docs/pdfs _ edit/0905 l 8cloud2ng.pdf.
`5 Draft
`RFP
`Cloud
`JEDI
`DOD
`(Mar.
`https://beta.sam.gov/opp/8e l 323cb7a001 b0eb3d35b5f8480fd35/view.
`
`13,
`
`2017),
`
`7,
`
`2018),
`
`17
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`

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`Case 1:19-cv-01796-PEC Document 26 Filed 12/09/19 Page 18 of 103
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`41.
`
`Over the next several months, DoD invited the public, including industry and
`
`technological leaders, to provide i