`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`
`CLEAN LABEL PROJECT FOUNDATION,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`THE KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Case No. ___________________
`
`NOTICE OF REMOVAL
`
`The Kraft Heinz Company (“Kraft Heinz”) hereby effects the removal of this action from
`
`the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the District
`
`of Columbia. Removal is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this case is a class action in which the putative class exceeds 100
`
`members, at least one plaintiff is diverse from at least one defendant, and the amount in controversy
`
`exceeds $5 million. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this action was filed in the
`
`Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which is coextensive with the District to which this
`
`case has been removed.
`
`FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
`
`1.
`
`Plaintiff Clean Label Project Foundation (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in the
`
`Superior Court of the District of Columbia on August 28, 2020. See Ex. A (“Compl.”). Kraft
`
`Heinz executed a waiver of service on September 16, 2020, thereby effecting service of the
`
`Complaint. See Ex. B. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1446(a), a true and correct copy of the remainder
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 2 of 13
`
`of the Superior Court case file (including all documents other than the Complaint and the Waiver
`
`of Service) is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated by reference herein.
`
`2.
`
`Kraft Heinz manufactures Maxwell House coffee in both caffeinated and
`
`decaffeinated varieties. Plaintiff alleges that the 29.3-ounce variety of Maxwell House Original
`
`Roast decaffeinated coffee (the “Product”) contains methylene chloride, the presence of which
`
`allegedly renders the Product “adulterated” under section 48-103 of the D.C. Code. Compl. ¶¶ 17,
`
`21. Plaintiff also alleges that the presence of methylene chloride renders what Plaintiff deems
`
`Kraft Heinz’s supposed “claims of purity”—including an alleged claim that the Product consists
`
`of “100% Arabica and Robusta Coffee Beans”—“false, deceptive, and misleading.” Id. ¶ 16.
`
`Plaintiff claims that “D.C. consumers are enticed to purchase this Product over the products of
`
`[Kraft Heinz’s] competitors on the basis of these false and misleading purity and superiority
`
`claims.” Id. ¶ 24. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Kraft Heinz’s marketing and
`
`sale of the Product violates the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act
`
`(“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 91-113.
`
`3.
`
`Plaintiff purports to bring this action in a representative capacity under two separate
`
`provisions of the CPPA. First, Plaintiff purports to assert its claims under section 28-
`
`3905(k)(1)(C), which permits a “nonprofit organization . . . on behalf of itself or any of its
`
`members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, [to] bring an action seeking
`
`relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.” D.C. Code § 28-
`
`3905(k)(1)(C); see also Compl. ¶¶ 45, 106-07 (referencing this provision). Second, Plaintiff
`
`purports to assert its claims under section 28-3905(k)(1)(D), which provides that a “public interest
`
`organization may, on behalf of the interest of a consumer or a class of consumers, bring an action
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 3 of 13
`
`seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.”
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D); see also Compl. ¶¶ 45, 108-09 (referencing this provision).
`
`4.
`
`Plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies under the CPPA, including a declaration that
`
`Kraft Heinz’s conduct violates the CPPA, an order “enjoining [Kraft Heinz’s] conduct found to be
`
`in violation of the CPPA,” an order “requiring [Kraft Heinz] to provide corrective advertising to
`
`the residents of the District of Columbia,” an order “requiring [Kraft Heinz] to pay statutory civil
`
`penalties” pursuant to the CPPA, and punitive damages. Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief).
`
`REMOVAL IS PROPER UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
`
`5.
`
`CAFA provides that federal courts have original jurisdiction over (i) a “class
`
`action” in which (ii) any plaintiff is diverse from any defendant, (iii) there are at least 100 members
`
`in the putative class, and (iv) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest
`
`and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any such action may be removed to
`
`the district court for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending. “No
`
`antiremoval presumption attends cases involving CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate
`
`adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v.
`
`Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014); accord Bradford v. George Washington Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d
`
`325 331 (D.D.C. 2017) (distinguishing cases directing courts to construe federal jurisdiction
`
`narrowly and holding that they were not applicable to cases removed under CAFA).
`
`This Case Is a “Class Action” Under CAFA
`
`6.
`
`CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal
`
`Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action
`
`to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
`
`Whether the CPPA constitutes a “similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 4 of 13
`
`action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action” is a question of District
`
`of Columbia law. See In re U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. 08-7122, 2009 WL 902414, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
`
`Apr. 6, 2009) (characterizing this inquiry as “a matter of District of Columbia law” that should be
`
`answered by “the local courts”); Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[O]n
`
`questions of District of Columbia law, this court defers to the D.C. Court of Appeals.”).
`
`7.
`
`The CPPA provides that “public interest organizations may, on behalf of the
`
`interests of a consumer or class of consumers, bring an action seeking relief from the use by any
`
`person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District if the consumer or class could bring
`
`an action under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph for relief from such use by such person or such
`
`trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) (emphasis added). Plaintiff expressly purports
`
`to bring this action pursuant to section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) of the CPPA, which is indisputably a
`
`statute that “authorizes” Plaintiff to bring this case as a class action. See Compl. ¶¶ 45, 108-09.
`
`8.
`
`Moreover, Plaintiff seeks, among other remedies, an order requiring Kraft Heinz to
`
`pay “statutory civil penalties” and punitive damages. When a plaintiff seeks monetary relief on
`
`behalf of class members under the CPPA, it must satisfy the requirements of D.C. Superior Court
`
`Rule 23—regardless of whether it styles its lawsuit as a “class action.” Rotunda v. Marriott Int’l,
`
`Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 988 (D.C. 2015) (describing Rule 23 as “the time-tested framework within
`
`which suits for damages by class-members ‘as representative parties’ . . . have been maintained”);
`
`cf. Alston v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., No. 17-2580, 2018 WL 2461041, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 13,
`
`2018) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to DCCPPA actions under D.C. law”) (citing
`
`Rotunda, 123 A.3d at 988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`9.
`
`It is irrelevant that Plaintiff also purports to bring this lawsuit under section 28-
`
`3905(k)(1)(C), which authorizes a “nonprofit organization” to bring a representative action “on
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 5 of 13
`
`behalf of the general public.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C). Although Kraft Heinz does not
`
`concede that a representative action under this provision is distinct from a “class action” as defined
`
`by CAFA, the Court need not resolve this issue to determine whether removal is proper. Plaintiff,
`
`as the “master of [its] complaint,” has affirmatively invoked section 28-3905(k)(1)(D), which
`
`authorizes—and, indeed, requires—Plaintiff to bring this lawsuit as a class action. Barnes v.
`
`District of Columbia, 42 F. Supp. 3d 111, 120 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasizing that the plaintiff
`
`“should have recognized that the defendant could exercise its statutory right of removal” based on
`
`the claims he chose to plead). That is sufficient to bring this lawsuit within the ambit of CAFA.1
`
`The Parties Are Sufficiently Numerous To Satisfy CAFA
`
`10.
`
`Although Plaintiff avoids defining the size of the putative class, it purports to bring
`
`this lawsuit on behalf of individuals in the District of Columbia who have purchased the Product
`
`within the limitations period (i.e., since August 28, 2017). See generally Samuel v. Wells Fargo
`
`Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Courts apply a three year statute of limitations to
`
`1 Furthermore, to the extent that this Court concludes this case is not a class action removable
`under CAFA, the necessary implication is that Plaintiff is asserting a single claim on behalf of the
`“general public.” If that is the case, then this lawsuit is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There
`is no dispute that the parties are completely diverse. See infra ¶¶ 11-13. If the available statutory
`penalties (which greatly exceed $75,000, see id. ¶¶ 17-18) represent a single recovery to the
`“general public,” then they readily satisfy the amount in controversy. See Williams v. Purdue
`Pharma Co., No. 02-556, 2003 WL 24259557, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2003) (holding that plaintiffs
`had a “common and undivided remedy” when they sought statutory penalties and disgorgement of
`profits under the CPPA, as “[t]he amount of this recovery would not be affected by the number of
`plaintiffs, nor by the value of their individual claims”). Similarly, the value of Plaintiff’s requested
`injunctive relief—which readily exceeds $75,000 (see infra ¶¶ 19-22)—would satisfy the amount
`in controversy because it represents a common and undivided recovery on behalf of the general
`public. See Nat’l Welfare Rights Org. v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.D.C. 1974)
`(holding that a common and undivided claim exists “when the adversary of the class has no interest
`in how the claim is to be distributed among the class members”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
`Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 835-36 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (noting that “there is a common and
`undivided interest in the injunctive relief” if the injunctive relief “will benefit the class as a whole”
`and the defendant’s cost of compliance does not depend on the size of the class).
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 6 of 13
`
`CPPA claims .”). Kraft Heinz has access to Nielsen retail scan data, which confirms over 50,000
`
`units of the Product have been sold in the D.C. metropolitan area since September 30, 2017. That
`
`supports a reasonable inference that over 100 individuals purchased the Product in the District of
`
`Columbia during the statute of limitations period and satisfies CAFA’s numerosity requirement.
`
`The Parties Are Minimally Diverse
`
`11.
`
`The caption of this complaint reflects that Plaintiff is headquartered in Broomfield,
`
`Colorado and that it brings this action on behalf of consumers in the District of Columbia. See
`
`Compl. at 1.
`
`12.
`
`Kraft Heinz is a Delaware corporation that is co-headquartered in Chicago, Illinois
`
`and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
`
`13.
`
`Accordingly, CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement is satisfied in this action
`
`because Plaintiff and the class members it purports to represent are citizens of Colorado and the
`
`District of Columbia , while Kraft Heinz is a citizen of Delaware, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. See
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (providing that a corporation is a “citizen of any State by which it has been
`
`incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business”).
`
`There Is At Least $5,000,000 In Controversy
`
`14.
`
`In assessing the amount in controversy, “[a]bsolute certainty as to the amount is not
`
`essential; it suffices that there is a present probability that the damages . . . meet the statutory
`
`requirement.”2 Comm. for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
`
`2 In a similar vein, courts around the country have emphasized that CAFA requires a defendant to
`show only “that it is reasonably possible that the potential liability exceeds $5 million.” Greene
`v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
`Raskas v. Johnson & Johnson, 719 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2013 “[W]hen determining the amount
`in controversy, the question is not whether the damages are greater than the requisite amount, but
`whether a fact finder might legally conclude that they are.” ) (citation and internal quotation marks
`omitted); S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 7 of 13
`
`Lavelle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[C]alculating
`
`the amount in controversy for purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act is less a prediction of how
`
`much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover than it is an estimate of how much will be put
`
`at issue during the litigation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`15.
`
`“In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated
`
`to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (emphasis added). In other words, this Court must “add[] up the value of the
`
`claim of each person who falls within the definition of the proposed class.” Std. Fire Ins. Co v.
`
`Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013).
`
`16.
`
`At this stage of the litigation, Kraft Heinz need not submit evidence substantiating
`
`the amount in controversy, so long as it can offer a “plausible allegation that the amount in
`
`controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,
`
`574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the amount [in controversy] is required . . . only
`
`when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. To the extent
`
`there is any dispute as to the amount in controversy, Kraft Heinz expressly reserves the right to
`
`submit evidence substantiating its jurisdictional allegations. See, e.g., Lavelle, 235 F. Supp. 3d at
`
`223 (denying motion to remand based on post-removal “evidence regarding attorneys’ fees and
`
`punitive damages” and rejecting argument that the defendant “waived its right to use these factors
`
`in its calculation of the amount in controversy” because it did not submit this evidence alongside
`
`its notice of removal).
`
`that the amount in controversy is an “estimate of how much will be put at issue in the litigation”
`and that this “amount is not discounted by the chance that the plaintiffs will lose on the merits”).
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 8 of 13
`
`17.
`
`Here, Plaintiff seeks “statutory civil penalties” under the CPPA. See Compl. at 21
`
`(Prayer for Relief). The CPPA authorizes a plaintiff to recover statutory damages of “$1,500 per
`
`violation.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(A)(i); see also Sloan v. Soul Circus, Inc., No. 15-1389,
`
`2015 WL 927838, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2015) (noting that “the CPPA allows prevailing plaintiffs
`
`to recover statutory damages”). Many courts have computed the amount in controversy by
`
`multiplying the number of alleged violations (i.e., the number of products sold) by $1,500.3 See,
`
`e.g., Sloan, 2015 WL 9272838, at *8-9 (noting that “CPPA statutory damages awards flow from a
`
`purchase or receipt of consumer goods and services” and that “each . . . purchase merits one award
`
`of $1,500 in statutory damage”); Fahey v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., No. 19-2128, 2020 WL
`
`805776, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2020) (calculating statutory damages of “one violation for each
`
`individually wrapped candy bar” when the plaintiff allegedly purchased five candy bars).
`
`18.
`
`As noted earlier, Kraft Heinz has access to Nielsen retail scan data, which confirms
`
`that over 50,000 units of the Product have been sold in the D.C. metropolitan area since September
`
`30, 2017. Multiplied by $1,500 in statutory damages for each sale of the Product, the total statutory
`
`damages would amount to $75,000,000—fifteen times the jurisdictional threshold.
`
`19.
`
`Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, including but not limited to an order requiring
`
`Kraft Heinz to “provide corrective advertising to the residents of the District of Columbia.”
`
`Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief). It is well-established that “the test for determining the amount
`
`3 For the avoidance of doubt, Kraft Heinz does not concede that this is the appropriate means of
`calculating statutory damages, and it maintains that an aggregate award of $75 million in statutory
`damages based on sales that total well under $1 million is inconsistent with the Due Process
`Clause. See Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 950, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that a
`“shockingly large” aggregate statutory damages award under the TCPA violated the Due Process
`Clause). But for present purposes, the question is not whether Plaintiff is likely to obtain such an
`award, or whether Kraft Heinz would have viable defenses to an aggregate award of statutory
`damages; instead, the relevant question is whether such an award is legally possible.
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 9 of 13
`
`in controversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce.”
`
`Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 951 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 408 U.S. 1 (1972);
`
`see also, e.g., Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[A] court may look
`
`to either the value of the right that plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect or the cost to the defendants
`
`to remedy the alleged denial.”); Comm. for GI Rights, 518 F.2d at 472 (same). “Courts do not
`
`have to ascertain the value of injunctive relief precisely; so long as a plaintiff’s pleadings amount
`
`to more than a ‘formal allegation’ that the relief is worth more than [the jurisdictional threshold],
`
`that is sufficient.” Info Strategies, Inc. v. Dumosch, 13 F. Supp. 3d 135, 141-42 (D.D.C. 2014)
`
`(citing Smith, 593 F.3d at 1102-03).
`
`20.
`
`Although the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks is not entirely clear, its cost to Kraft
`
`Heinz exceeds $5 million—if not alone, then certainly when coupled with the other relief Plaintiff
`
`seeks. For example, if the Court enjoined Kraft Heinz from selling the Product, Kraft Heinz would
`
`need to cease all sales of the Product in the District of Columbia—which would require it to take
`
`steps to ensure the product was no longer sold into District of Columbia stores for resale, and
`
`would require Kraft Heinz to forego hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars in future
`
`sales.
`
`21.
`
`Alternatively, if Kraft Heinz was required to reformulate the Product to comply
`
`with the injunction, it would require Kraft Heinz to initiate a complete overhaul of its supply chain
`
`and manufacturing process. It would need to locate suppliers and supplies that would ensure that
`
`their ingredients contain absolutely no methylene chloride at any time, and it would need to
`
`segregate the supply chain—as well as the manufacturing lines—for the Product to ensure no
`
`potential of cross-contamination.
`
`9
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 10 of 13
`
`22.
`
`Even if this Court limited the cost of injunctive relief to “corrective advertising,”
`
`that cost is still significant. The costs associated with a “corrective advertising” campaign would
`
`include the cost of print, digital, television, and radio advertising into the District of Columbia, as
`
`the well as the cost of having Kraft Heinz’s external marketing firms and internal marketing and
`
`creative service functions work on the material for the campaign. It is entirely possible that the
`
`cost of such a corrective advertising campaign alone could come close to, or even exceed, $5
`
`million. See, e.g., Fefferman v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 13-160, 2013 WL 12114486,
`
`at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (noting that, “[i]n total, the corrective advertisement campaign
`
`would cost Defendants approximately $4,985,000”).
`
`23.
`
`Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages, which the CPPA authorizes it to recover. See
`
`Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief); D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(C). “Punitive damages are properly
`
`considered as part of the amount in controversy.” McQueen v. Woodstream Corp., 672 F. Supp.
`
`2d 84, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d 1068 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see
`
`also Bradford, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 334 (considering punitive damages in assessing the amount in
`
`controversy). And under the CPPA, punitive damages can potentially exceed $2 million. See,
`
`e.g., Modern Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 54 (D.C. 2010) (affirming punitive damages of
`
`$2 million, $1.1 million, and $200,000 against various defendants in a CPPA case).
`
`24.
`
`Finally, Plaintiff seeks to recover its attorneys’ fees, which are also recoverable
`
`under the CPPA. See Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief); D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(B). Courts
`
`routinely consider attorneys’ fees under the CPPA in calculating the amount in controversy. See,
`
`e.g., Sloan, 2015 WL 927838, at *9 (noting that “[a]ttorney fees are part of the amount in
`
`controversy if they are provided for by statute or contract” and collecting cases). And fee awards
`
`under the CPPA can easily reach into the hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of dollars. See,
`
`10
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 11 of 13
`
`e.g., Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 12, 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (awarding
`
`$927,707.89 in attorneys’ fees and expenses in a CPPA lawsuit); Williams v. First Govt’ Mortg.
`
`& Invr’s Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming award of $199,340 in attorneys’
`
`fees in a CPPA lawsuit).
`
`25.
`
`In short, the potential statutory damages available under the CPPA—along with the
`
`value of Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, corrective advertising, punitive damages, and
`
`attorneys’ fees—significantly exceed the minimum amount-in-controversy of $5 million.
`
`VENUE IS PROPER
`Venue is proper because this action was initially filed in the Superior Court of the
`26.
`District of Columbia, which is coextensive with the U.S. District Court for the District of
`Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (noting that an action may be removed “to the district court
`of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
`pending”).
`
`OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOVAL ARE MET
`Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), notice of removal of a civil action must be filed within
`27.
`thirty days of the defendant’s receipt of service of the summons and the Petition. Kraft Heinz
`executed a waiver of service on September 16, 2020, thirty days before it filed this Notice of
`Removal. See Ex. B. This Notice of Removal is accordingly timely.
`28.
`Kraft Heinz has not filed any pleadings in the Superior Court responding to the
`Complaint. It appeared in the Superior Court for the sole purpose of filing a consent motion
`extending its 21-day deadline to respond to the Complaint, which appears in the state court case
`file attached as Exhibit C.
`29.
`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Kraft Heinz will promptly give written
`notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal to all parties, and a copy of this Notice will be filed
`with the Clerk of the Superior Court.
`
`11
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 12 of 13
`
`Dated: October 15, 2020
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`
`By: /s/ Previn Warren
`
`Previn Warren (#1022447)
`Jenner & Block LLP
`1099 New York Ave., NW, Ste. 900
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 639-6000
`pwarren@jenner.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`The Kraft Heinz Company
`
`12
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 13 of 13
`
`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
`
`I, Alexander M. Smith, hereby certify that the foregoing Notice of Removal was served
`
`upon the following counsel for Plaintiff Clean Label Foundation by email at the email addresses
`
`set forth below this 15th day of October, 2020:
`
`J. Travis Pittman (jtpittman@hphattorneys.com)
`Kristen Ross (kristen.ross@dldmlaw.com)
`
`I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the District of
`
`Columbia that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
`
`Executed on October 15, 2020 in Los Angeles, California.
`
`By: /s/ Alexander M. Smith
`
`13
`
`