throbber
Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 1 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`CLEAN LABEL PROJECT FOUNDATION,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`THE KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. ___________________
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`NOTICE OF REMOVAL
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`The Kraft Heinz Company (“Kraft Heinz”) hereby effects the removal of this action from
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`the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the District
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`of Columbia. Removal is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28
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`U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this case is a class action in which the putative class exceeds 100
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`members, at least one plaintiff is diverse from at least one defendant, and the amount in controversy
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`exceeds $5 million. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because this action was filed in the
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`Superior Court of the District of Columbia, which is coextensive with the District to which this
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`case has been removed.
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`FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
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`1.
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`Plaintiff Clean Label Project Foundation (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in the
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`Superior Court of the District of Columbia on August 28, 2020. See Ex. A (“Compl.”). Kraft
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`Heinz executed a waiver of service on September 16, 2020, thereby effecting service of the
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`Complaint. See Ex. B. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1446(a), a true and correct copy of the remainder
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`1
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 2 of 13
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`of the Superior Court case file (including all documents other than the Complaint and the Waiver
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`of Service) is attached as Exhibit C and incorporated by reference herein.
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`2.
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`Kraft Heinz manufactures Maxwell House coffee in both caffeinated and
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`decaffeinated varieties. Plaintiff alleges that the 29.3-ounce variety of Maxwell House Original
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`Roast decaffeinated coffee (the “Product”) contains methylene chloride, the presence of which
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`allegedly renders the Product “adulterated” under section 48-103 of the D.C. Code. Compl. ¶¶ 17,
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`21. Plaintiff also alleges that the presence of methylene chloride renders what Plaintiff deems
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`Kraft Heinz’s supposed “claims of purity”—including an alleged claim that the Product consists
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`of “100% Arabica and Robusta Coffee Beans”—“false, deceptive, and misleading.” Id. ¶ 16.
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`Plaintiff claims that “D.C. consumers are enticed to purchase this Product over the products of
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`[Kraft Heinz’s] competitors on the basis of these false and misleading purity and superiority
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`claims.” Id. ¶ 24. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff claims that Kraft Heinz’s marketing and
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`sale of the Product violates the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act
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`(“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 29, 91-113.
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`3.
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`Plaintiff purports to bring this action in a representative capacity under two separate
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`provisions of the CPPA. First, Plaintiff purports to assert its claims under section 28-
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`3905(k)(1)(C), which permits a “nonprofit organization . . . on behalf of itself or any of its
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`members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, [to] bring an action seeking
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`relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.” D.C. Code § 28-
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`3905(k)(1)(C); see also Compl. ¶¶ 45, 106-07 (referencing this provision). Second, Plaintiff
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`purports to assert its claims under section 28-3905(k)(1)(D), which provides that a “public interest
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`organization may, on behalf of the interest of a consumer or a class of consumers, bring an action
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`2
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 3 of 13
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`seeking relief from the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District.”
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`D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D); see also Compl. ¶¶ 45, 108-09 (referencing this provision).
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`4.
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`Plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies under the CPPA, including a declaration that
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`Kraft Heinz’s conduct violates the CPPA, an order “enjoining [Kraft Heinz’s] conduct found to be
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`in violation of the CPPA,” an order “requiring [Kraft Heinz] to provide corrective advertising to
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`the residents of the District of Columbia,” an order “requiring [Kraft Heinz] to pay statutory civil
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`penalties” pursuant to the CPPA, and punitive damages. Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief).
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`REMOVAL IS PROPER UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)
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`5.
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`CAFA provides that federal courts have original jurisdiction over (i) a “class
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`action” in which (ii) any plaintiff is diverse from any defendant, (iii) there are at least 100 members
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`in the putative class, and (iv) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest
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`and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), any such action may be removed to
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`the district court for the district and division embracing the place where the action is pending. “No
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`antiremoval presumption attends cases involving CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate
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`adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v.
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`Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014); accord Bradford v. George Washington Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d
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`325 331 (D.D.C. 2017) (distinguishing cases directing courts to construe federal jurisdiction
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`narrowly and holding that they were not applicable to cases removed under CAFA).
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`This Case Is a “Class Action” Under CAFA
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`6.
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`CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action
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`to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
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`Whether the CPPA constitutes a “similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an
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`3
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 4 of 13
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`action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action” is a question of District
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`of Columbia law. See In re U-Haul Int’l, Inc., No. 08-7122, 2009 WL 902414, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
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`Apr. 6, 2009) (characterizing this inquiry as “a matter of District of Columbia law” that should be
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`answered by “the local courts”); Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[O]n
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`questions of District of Columbia law, this court defers to the D.C. Court of Appeals.”).
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`7.
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`The CPPA provides that “public interest organizations may, on behalf of the
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`interests of a consumer or class of consumers, bring an action seeking relief from the use by any
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`person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District if the consumer or class could bring
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`an action under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph for relief from such use by such person or such
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`trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) (emphasis added). Plaintiff expressly purports
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`to bring this action pursuant to section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) of the CPPA, which is indisputably a
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`statute that “authorizes” Plaintiff to bring this case as a class action. See Compl. ¶¶ 45, 108-09.
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`8.
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`Moreover, Plaintiff seeks, among other remedies, an order requiring Kraft Heinz to
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`pay “statutory civil penalties” and punitive damages. When a plaintiff seeks monetary relief on
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`behalf of class members under the CPPA, it must satisfy the requirements of D.C. Superior Court
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`Rule 23—regardless of whether it styles its lawsuit as a “class action.” Rotunda v. Marriott Int’l,
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`Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 988 (D.C. 2015) (describing Rule 23 as “the time-tested framework within
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`which suits for damages by class-members ‘as representative parties’ . . . have been maintained”);
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`cf. Alston v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., No. 17-2580, 2018 WL 2461041, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 13,
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`2018) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 applies to DCCPPA actions under D.C. law”) (citing
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`Rotunda, 123 A.3d at 988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`9.
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`It is irrelevant that Plaintiff also purports to bring this lawsuit under section 28-
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`3905(k)(1)(C), which authorizes a “nonprofit organization” to bring a representative action “on
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`4
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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 5 of 13
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`behalf of the general public.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C). Although Kraft Heinz does not
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`concede that a representative action under this provision is distinct from a “class action” as defined
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`by CAFA, the Court need not resolve this issue to determine whether removal is proper. Plaintiff,
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`as the “master of [its] complaint,” has affirmatively invoked section 28-3905(k)(1)(D), which
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`authorizes—and, indeed, requires—Plaintiff to bring this lawsuit as a class action. Barnes v.
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`District of Columbia, 42 F. Supp. 3d 111, 120 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasizing that the plaintiff
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`“should have recognized that the defendant could exercise its statutory right of removal” based on
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`the claims he chose to plead). That is sufficient to bring this lawsuit within the ambit of CAFA.1
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`The Parties Are Sufficiently Numerous To Satisfy CAFA
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`10.
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`Although Plaintiff avoids defining the size of the putative class, it purports to bring
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`this lawsuit on behalf of individuals in the District of Columbia who have purchased the Product
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`within the limitations period (i.e., since August 28, 2017). See generally Samuel v. Wells Fargo
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`Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Courts apply a three year statute of limitations to
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`1 Furthermore, to the extent that this Court concludes this case is not a class action removable
`under CAFA, the necessary implication is that Plaintiff is asserting a single claim on behalf of the
`“general public.” If that is the case, then this lawsuit is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There
`is no dispute that the parties are completely diverse. See infra ¶¶ 11-13. If the available statutory
`penalties (which greatly exceed $75,000, see id. ¶¶ 17-18) represent a single recovery to the
`“general public,” then they readily satisfy the amount in controversy. See Williams v. Purdue
`Pharma Co., No. 02-556, 2003 WL 24259557, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2003) (holding that plaintiffs
`had a “common and undivided remedy” when they sought statutory penalties and disgorgement of
`profits under the CPPA, as “[t]he amount of this recovery would not be affected by the number of
`plaintiffs, nor by the value of their individual claims”). Similarly, the value of Plaintiff’s requested
`injunctive relief—which readily exceeds $75,000 (see infra ¶¶ 19-22)—would satisfy the amount
`in controversy because it represents a common and undivided recovery on behalf of the general
`public. See Nat’l Welfare Rights Org. v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.D.C. 1974)
`(holding that a common and undivided claim exists “when the adversary of the class has no interest
`in how the claim is to be distributed among the class members”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
`Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 835-36 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (noting that “there is a common and
`undivided interest in the injunctive relief” if the injunctive relief “will benefit the class as a whole”
`and the defendant’s cost of compliance does not depend on the size of the class).
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`5
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 6 of 13
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`CPPA claims .”). Kraft Heinz has access to Nielsen retail scan data, which confirms over 50,000
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`units of the Product have been sold in the D.C. metropolitan area since September 30, 2017. That
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`supports a reasonable inference that over 100 individuals purchased the Product in the District of
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`Columbia during the statute of limitations period and satisfies CAFA’s numerosity requirement.
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`The Parties Are Minimally Diverse
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`11.
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`The caption of this complaint reflects that Plaintiff is headquartered in Broomfield,
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`Colorado and that it brings this action on behalf of consumers in the District of Columbia. See
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`Compl. at 1.
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`12.
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`Kraft Heinz is a Delaware corporation that is co-headquartered in Chicago, Illinois
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`and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
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`13.
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`Accordingly, CAFA’s minimal diversity requirement is satisfied in this action
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`because Plaintiff and the class members it purports to represent are citizens of Colorado and the
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`District of Columbia , while Kraft Heinz is a citizen of Delaware, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. See
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`28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (providing that a corporation is a “citizen of any State by which it has been
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`incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business”).
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`There Is At Least $5,000,000 In Controversy
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`14.
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`In assessing the amount in controversy, “[a]bsolute certainty as to the amount is not
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`essential; it suffices that there is a present probability that the damages . . . meet the statutory
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`requirement.”2 Comm. for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also
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`2 In a similar vein, courts around the country have emphasized that CAFA requires a defendant to
`show only “that it is reasonably possible that the potential liability exceeds $5 million.” Greene
`v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,
`Raskas v. Johnson & Johnson, 719 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2013 “[W]hen determining the amount
`in controversy, the question is not whether the damages are greater than the requisite amount, but
`whether a fact finder might legally conclude that they are.” ) (citation and internal quotation marks
`omitted); S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 745 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting
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`6
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 7 of 13
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`Lavelle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[C]alculating
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`the amount in controversy for purposes of the Class Action Fairness Act is less a prediction of how
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`much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover than it is an estimate of how much will be put
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`at issue during the litigation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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`15.
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`“In any class action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated
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`to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (emphasis added). In other words, this Court must “add[] up the value of the
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`claim of each person who falls within the definition of the proposed class.” Std. Fire Ins. Co v.
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`Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013).
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`16.
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`At this stage of the litigation, Kraft Heinz need not submit evidence substantiating
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`the amount in controversy, so long as it can offer a “plausible allegation that the amount in
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`controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,
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`574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the amount [in controversy] is required . . . only
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`when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.” Id. To the extent
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`there is any dispute as to the amount in controversy, Kraft Heinz expressly reserves the right to
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`submit evidence substantiating its jurisdictional allegations. See, e.g., Lavelle, 235 F. Supp. 3d at
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`223 (denying motion to remand based on post-removal “evidence regarding attorneys’ fees and
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`punitive damages” and rejecting argument that the defendant “waived its right to use these factors
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`in its calculation of the amount in controversy” because it did not submit this evidence alongside
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`its notice of removal).
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`that the amount in controversy is an “estimate of how much will be put at issue in the litigation”
`and that this “amount is not discounted by the chance that the plaintiffs will lose on the merits”).
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`7
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 8 of 13
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`17.
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`Here, Plaintiff seeks “statutory civil penalties” under the CPPA. See Compl. at 21
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`(Prayer for Relief). The CPPA authorizes a plaintiff to recover statutory damages of “$1,500 per
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`violation.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(A)(i); see also Sloan v. Soul Circus, Inc., No. 15-1389,
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`2015 WL 927838, at *7 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2015) (noting that “the CPPA allows prevailing plaintiffs
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`to recover statutory damages”). Many courts have computed the amount in controversy by
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`multiplying the number of alleged violations (i.e., the number of products sold) by $1,500.3 See,
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`e.g., Sloan, 2015 WL 9272838, at *8-9 (noting that “CPPA statutory damages awards flow from a
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`purchase or receipt of consumer goods and services” and that “each . . . purchase merits one award
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`of $1,500 in statutory damage”); Fahey v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., No. 19-2128, 2020 WL
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`805776, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 2020) (calculating statutory damages of “one violation for each
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`individually wrapped candy bar” when the plaintiff allegedly purchased five candy bars).
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`18.
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`As noted earlier, Kraft Heinz has access to Nielsen retail scan data, which confirms
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`that over 50,000 units of the Product have been sold in the D.C. metropolitan area since September
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`30, 2017. Multiplied by $1,500 in statutory damages for each sale of the Product, the total statutory
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`damages would amount to $75,000,000—fifteen times the jurisdictional threshold.
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`19.
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`Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, including but not limited to an order requiring
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`Kraft Heinz to “provide corrective advertising to the residents of the District of Columbia.”
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`Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief). It is well-established that “the test for determining the amount
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`3 For the avoidance of doubt, Kraft Heinz does not concede that this is the appropriate means of
`calculating statutory damages, and it maintains that an aggregate award of $75 million in statutory
`damages based on sales that total well under $1 million is inconsistent with the Due Process
`Clause. See Golan v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 950, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2019) (noting that a
`“shockingly large” aggregate statutory damages award under the TCPA violated the Due Process
`Clause). But for present purposes, the question is not whether Plaintiff is likely to obtain such an
`award, or whether Kraft Heinz would have viable defenses to an aggregate award of statutory
`damages; instead, the relevant question is whether such an award is legally possible.
`
`8
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 9 of 13
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`in controversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would directly produce.”
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`Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 951 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 408 U.S. 1 (1972);
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`see also, e.g., Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“[A] court may look
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`to either the value of the right that plaintiff seeks to enforce or protect or the cost to the defendants
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`to remedy the alleged denial.”); Comm. for GI Rights, 518 F.2d at 472 (same). “Courts do not
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`have to ascertain the value of injunctive relief precisely; so long as a plaintiff’s pleadings amount
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`to more than a ‘formal allegation’ that the relief is worth more than [the jurisdictional threshold],
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`that is sufficient.” Info Strategies, Inc. v. Dumosch, 13 F. Supp. 3d 135, 141-42 (D.D.C. 2014)
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`(citing Smith, 593 F.3d at 1102-03).
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`20.
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`Although the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks is not entirely clear, its cost to Kraft
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`Heinz exceeds $5 million—if not alone, then certainly when coupled with the other relief Plaintiff
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`seeks. For example, if the Court enjoined Kraft Heinz from selling the Product, Kraft Heinz would
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`need to cease all sales of the Product in the District of Columbia—which would require it to take
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`steps to ensure the product was no longer sold into District of Columbia stores for resale, and
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`would require Kraft Heinz to forego hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars in future
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`sales.
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`21.
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`Alternatively, if Kraft Heinz was required to reformulate the Product to comply
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`with the injunction, it would require Kraft Heinz to initiate a complete overhaul of its supply chain
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`and manufacturing process. It would need to locate suppliers and supplies that would ensure that
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`their ingredients contain absolutely no methylene chloride at any time, and it would need to
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`segregate the supply chain—as well as the manufacturing lines—for the Product to ensure no
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`potential of cross-contamination.
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`9
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 10 of 13
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`22.
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`Even if this Court limited the cost of injunctive relief to “corrective advertising,”
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`that cost is still significant. The costs associated with a “corrective advertising” campaign would
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`include the cost of print, digital, television, and radio advertising into the District of Columbia, as
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`the well as the cost of having Kraft Heinz’s external marketing firms and internal marketing and
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`creative service functions work on the material for the campaign. It is entirely possible that the
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`cost of such a corrective advertising campaign alone could come close to, or even exceed, $5
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`million. See, e.g., Fefferman v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 13-160, 2013 WL 12114486,
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`at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (noting that, “[i]n total, the corrective advertisement campaign
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`would cost Defendants approximately $4,985,000”).
`
`23.
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`Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages, which the CPPA authorizes it to recover. See
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`Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief); D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(C). “Punitive damages are properly
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`considered as part of the amount in controversy.” McQueen v. Woodstream Corp., 672 F. Supp.
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`2d 84, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hartigh v. Latin, 485 F.2d 1068 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1973)); see
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`also Bradford, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 334 (considering punitive damages in assessing the amount in
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`controversy). And under the CPPA, punitive damages can potentially exceed $2 million. See,
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`e.g., Modern Mgmt. Co. v. Wilson, 997 A.2d 37, 54 (D.C. 2010) (affirming punitive damages of
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`$2 million, $1.1 million, and $200,000 against various defendants in a CPPA case).
`
`24.
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`Finally, Plaintiff seeks to recover its attorneys’ fees, which are also recoverable
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`under the CPPA. See Compl. at 21 (Prayer for Relief); D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(2)(B). Courts
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`routinely consider attorneys’ fees under the CPPA in calculating the amount in controversy. See,
`
`e.g., Sloan, 2015 WL 927838, at *9 (noting that “[a]ttorney fees are part of the amount in
`
`controversy if they are provided for by statute or contract” and collecting cases). And fee awards
`
`under the CPPA can easily reach into the hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of dollars. See,
`
`10
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`

`

`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 11 of 13
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`e.g., Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 12, 18, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) (awarding
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`$927,707.89 in attorneys’ fees and expenses in a CPPA lawsuit); Williams v. First Govt’ Mortg.
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`& Invr’s Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming award of $199,340 in attorneys’
`
`fees in a CPPA lawsuit).
`
`25.
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`In short, the potential statutory damages available under the CPPA—along with the
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`value of Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, corrective advertising, punitive damages, and
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`attorneys’ fees—significantly exceed the minimum amount-in-controversy of $5 million.
`
`VENUE IS PROPER
`Venue is proper because this action was initially filed in the Superior Court of the
`26.
`District of Columbia, which is coextensive with the U.S. District Court for the District of
`Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (noting that an action may be removed “to the district court
`of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
`pending”).
`
`OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOVAL ARE MET
`Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), notice of removal of a civil action must be filed within
`27.
`thirty days of the defendant’s receipt of service of the summons and the Petition. Kraft Heinz
`executed a waiver of service on September 16, 2020, thirty days before it filed this Notice of
`Removal. See Ex. B. This Notice of Removal is accordingly timely.
`28.
`Kraft Heinz has not filed any pleadings in the Superior Court responding to the
`Complaint. It appeared in the Superior Court for the sole purpose of filing a consent motion
`extending its 21-day deadline to respond to the Complaint, which appears in the state court case
`file attached as Exhibit C.
`29.
`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Kraft Heinz will promptly give written
`notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal to all parties, and a copy of this Notice will be filed
`with the Clerk of the Superior Court.
`
`11
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 12 of 13
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`Dated: October 15, 2020
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`JENNER & BLOCK LLP
`
`By: /s/ Previn Warren
`
`Previn Warren (#1022447)
`Jenner & Block LLP
`1099 New York Ave., NW, Ste. 900
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 639-6000
`pwarren@jenner.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`The Kraft Heinz Company
`
`12
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`

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`Case 1:20-cv-02964 Document 1 Filed 10/15/20 Page 13 of 13
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I, Alexander M. Smith, hereby certify that the foregoing Notice of Removal was served
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`upon the following counsel for Plaintiff Clean Label Foundation by email at the email addresses
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`set forth below this 15th day of October, 2020:
`
`J. Travis Pittman (jtpittman@hphattorneys.com)
`Kristen Ross (kristen.ross@dldmlaw.com)
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`I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the District of
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`Columbia that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
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`Executed on October 15, 2020 in Los Angeles, California.
`
`By: /s/ Alexander M. Smith
`
`13
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