`
`
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
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`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`META PLATFORMS, INC.
`
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB
`
`
`Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition
`to Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Production of 2012 and 2014 FTC
`Memoranda
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 2 of 39
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`Table of Contents
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`A.
`
`B.
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`A.
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`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`A.
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`B.
`C.
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`A.
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`II.
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`III.
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`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2
`I.
`Recommendation Packages Relating to the 2012 Instagram Acquisition .......................... 3
`May 2012 Recommendation Package to the Commission Regarding Compulsory
`Process (Entries 1a Through 1e) ................................................................................... 3
`August 2012 Recommendation Package to the Commission Regarding Closing
`the Investigation (Entries 2a, 2b, and 2e) ..................................................................... 4
`Notes Relating to the FTC’s 2014 WhatsApp Review (Entries 3 and 4) ........................... 5
`II.
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6
`The Deliberative Process Privilege Protects from Discovery FTC Recommendation
`I.
`Memoranda (Entries 1a-e, 2a, 2b, and 2e) and Attorneys’ Notes (Entries 3 and 4) ........... 6
`The Deliberative Process Privilege Applies Because the Recommendation
`Memoranda and Attorney Notes Are Predecisional and Deliberative .......................... 6
`FTC Regulations Provide for a Twenty-Five-Year Application of the Deliberative
`Process Privilege, Not Ten Years as Meta Argues ....................................................... 8
`Any Factual Material in the Documents Is “Inextricably Interwoven” with Staff’s
`Analysis and Recommendations ................................................................................... 8
`The Court Should Reject Meta’s Ipse Dixit Claim that the FTC’s 2012 and 2014
`“Decision-making Process Is Directly at Issue” ......................................................... 10
`Meta’s Argument that the FTC Has Waived the Deliberative Process Privilege by
`Initiating a Lawsuit Is Contrary to Binding Precedent ............................................... 12
`The Documents at Issue Are Protected Work Product ..................................................... 13
`Meta Does Not Contest the FTC’s Work Product Claim Regarding Entries
`1a, 1b, 1c, 1e, 2a, 2b, 3 and 4 ...................................................................................... 13
`Entries 1d and 2e Are Protected Work Product Prepared by BE Economists ............ 14
`The Documents Are “Virtually Undiscoverable” Opinion Work Product ................. 15
`The FTC Did Not Waive its Privileges by Providing the Documents to Congress .......... 17
`The FTC Responded to an Official Request from Congress, Consistent with
`Long-Standing Policy ................................................................................................. 17
`The FTC Did Not Waive Privileges by Providing Information to Congress .............. 18
`The Court Should Reject Meta’s Alternative Argument That It Has Overcome the
`Deliberative Process Privilege and Work Product Protection .......................................... 21
`Meta Exaggerates the Factual Information in the Recommendation Memorandum
`and Notes at Issue, and Ignores the Information It Already Has ................................ 21
`The FTC Did Not Collect Any Documents in Its 2014 WhatsApp Review,
`
`B.
`IV.
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`A.
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`1.
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`i
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 3 of 39
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`2.
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`B.
`C.
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`D.
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`and Sought to Interview Only Sixteen Third Parties that Are Equally Available to
`Meta ...................................................................................................................... 22
`The FTC Has Already Produced to Meta All of the Documents in Its
`Possession Collected in the 2012 Instagram Investigation, and Meta Has
`Equal or Superior Access to All Witnesses .......................................................... 23
`Meta Inaccurately Claims that Staff’s Statements Are FTC’s “Admissions” ............ 24
`Meta’s Concession that It Seeks “Admissions” Proves that Its Motion Should Be
`Denied to Avoid Chilling Candid Communication Among FTC Staff ...................... 25
`Meta’s Assertion that the FTC’s 2012 and 2014 Investigations May Be
`“Dispositive” Misstates Antitrust Principles, and Ignores the Investigations’
`Limited Scope ............................................................................................................. 26
`Meta’s Complaints About “Unfairness” Do Not Establish an Extraordinary
`Need for the FTC’s Privileged Documents ................................................................. 28
`Attorney-Client and Investigatory File Privileges Also Apply......................................... 29
`V.
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 30
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`
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`E.
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`ii
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 4 of 39
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`Table of Authorities
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`Cases
`A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................................ 7
`Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976)............................................................. 18
`Aspin v. Dep’t of Def., 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ................................................................... 30
`Brock v. Weiser, 1987 WL 12686 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1987) ................................................... 11, 12
`Chisler v. Johnston, 796 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Pa. 2011) .......................................................... 29
`Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ....................... 2, 7, 8
`* Dir., Off. of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304
`(D.C. Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................................. 9, 16, 21
`Doe 2 v. Esper, 2019 WL 4394842 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2019) ....................................................... 11
`* Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Just., 739 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .......................... 6, 9, 10, 26
`Elec. Frontier Foundation v. Dep’t of Just., 890 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2012) .............................. 17
`EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) ................................................................................... 6, 8, 19, 26
`Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 466 F. Supp. 1088 (D.D.C. 1978) ............................................................... 14
`Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .............................................................. 18, 20
`First Heights Bank, FSB v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 312 (2000) ......................................... 20, 29
`Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2018) ....... 30
`FTC v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16889
`(N.D. Ohio May 8, 1984) .......................................................................................................... 15
`FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983)................................................................................ 29, 30
`FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1980).............................. 18, 20
`FTC v. Staples, Inc., 2016 WL 259642 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2016) ................................................... 22
`FTC v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................. 1, 6
`Heggestad v. Dep’t of Just., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000) ................................................ 7, 20
`Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) ...................................................................................... 29
`In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 274 F.R.D. 106
`(S.D.N.Y. 2011) .................................................................................................................. 12, 28
`In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ..................... 27
`In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ................................................................. passim
`_________________
`* Authorities principally relied upon are marked with an asterisk.
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`iii
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`In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ........................................................................ 16
`In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on OCC, 145 F.3d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ......................... 11
`In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on OCC, 156 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (on rh’g) ......... 11
`Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 841 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2012) ....................... 17
`Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 2019 WL 2452325 (D.D.C. June 12, 2019) ................... 16
`* Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .......................................................... 10, 11, 13
`* Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18242 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1984) 14, 30
`Lundy v. Interfirst Corp., 105 F.R.D. 499 (D.D.C. 1985) ...................................................... 12, 13
`MacNamara v. City of New York, 249 F.R.D. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) .............................................. 29
`Murphy v. Dep’t of Army, 613 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .............................................. 18, 19, 20
`New York v. Facebook, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2021) .................................................... 12
`NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) .................................................................... 8
`Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated in part on other grounds,
`724 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................... 7
`Parker v. United States DOJ Exec. Office for U.S. Attys., 78 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 2015) .... 14
`* Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 235 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 2001) .................. 18, 19, 21
`* SafeCard Svces., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ........................................... 14, 15
`Safeway Stores Inc. v. FTC, 428 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1977) ............................................... 19, 26
`Swartwood v. County of San Diego, 2013 WL 6670545 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) .................... 29
`Tax’n with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981)........................................ 7
`Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175 (D.D.C. 1998) ............................................................................. 30
`U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777 (2021) ........................................ 25
`United States v. AT&T Co., 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980) ...................................................... 24
`United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) .............................................................. 19
`United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ........................................... 27
`United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) ........................................................ 26
`United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ..................................................... 17
`United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964) ................................................................ 13
`United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975) ............................................. 28
`United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011) ................................................... 30
`United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988) .................................................................. 24
`United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) ................. 12
`United States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 212 F.R.D. 421 (D.D.C. 2002) ........................................... 20
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`iv
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`United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994)................................................................ 24
`* United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984)................................................. 7, 19
`Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) ....................................................................... 16
`Wolfe v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) ................... 9
`Worldnetdaily.com, Inc. v. DOJ, 215 F. Supp. 3d 81 (D.D.C. 2016) ......................................... 7, 9
`Statutes
`15 U.S.C. § 18a(i)(1)............................................................................................................... 12, 27
`15 U.S.C. § 53(b) ............................................................................................................................ 2
`15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(b)(3)(C) ........................................................................................................... 17
`15 U.S.C. § 57b-2(d)(1)(A)........................................................................................................... 17
`16 C.F.R. § 0.1 ................................................................................................................................ 2
`16 C.F.R. § 0.18 ...................................................................................................................... 14, 15
`16 C.F.R. § 3.54 .............................................................................................................................. 2
`16 C.F.R. § 4.10(a)(3) ..................................................................................................................... 8
`16 C.F.R. § 4.11(b) ....................................................................................................................... 17
`16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.83 ...................................................................................................................... 2
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(ii) ............................................................................................................ 21
`Other Authorities
`5 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
`and Their Application (4th ed. Supp. 2022) ............................................................................. 28
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`v
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 7 of 39
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`The Court should deny Meta’s motion to compel production of FTC staff’s internal
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`recommendations and advice relating to Meta’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp. ECF
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`No. 152 (hereinafter “Mem.”). The FTC has properly asserted deliberative process protection
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`over each of the documents at issue, and Meta’s non-credible arguments to the contrary flout or
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`ignore precedent. Infra Section I. Moreover, Meta does not even contest the FTC’s assertion of
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`work product protection over the documents at issue, except with respect to two recommendation
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`memos prepared by the FTC’s Bureau of Economics staff. Infra Section II. Meta’s work-
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`product arguments regarding these two documents are unavailing, and in any event the two
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`Bureau of Economics recommendation memos are unquestionably protected by deliberative
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`process privilege. See FTC v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1984).
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`Further, the attorney-client privilege and investigative file privileges apply. Infra Section V.
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`Meta fails to advance any precedent suggesting that these privileges were waived when
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`the FTC produced the documents in response to a formal Congressional request, expressly noting
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`the privileges implicated and requesting confidential treatment (which Congress has provided).
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`Infra Section III. Nor does Meta address the policy concern that animates D.C. Circuit authority
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`holding that such productions do not waive privilege: a finding of waiver would chill Congress’s
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`future ability to obtain information from the FTC and other federal agencies.
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`Finally, Meta’s hyperbolic accusations of a “cover up” do not justify abrogating the
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`FTC’s privileges. Infra Section IV. Contrary to Meta’s overblown claims, the documents at
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`issue do not contain “findings” of the FTC, “evidence” that is unavailable to Meta, or
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`“admissions” that Meta can use in this case. Instead, the documents express the analyses and
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`advice of individual staff members, which are core work product, and an essential part of “the
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`give-and-take of the consultative process.” Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617
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`1
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 8 of 39
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`F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Staff members’ advice, based on the necessarily limited inquiry
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`undertaken at the time of the Instagram and WhatsApp acquisitions, is not dispositive of – or
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`even particularly informative about – any issues in this matter. Despite Meta’s overheated
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`rhetoric, the disclosure of the FTC’s privileged documents is not necessary to illuminate the real
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`issue in this case, which is Meta’s unlawful maintenance of monopoly power, and not (as Meta
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`would pretend) the particulars of FTC staff members’ 2012 and 2014 analyses.
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`BACKGROUND
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`The FTC’s Bureau of Competition (“BC”) investigates potential antitrust violations,
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`recommends further actions to the Commission, and prosecutes any enforcement actions the
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`Commission authorizes. Declaration of BC Director Holly Vedova, Ex. A ¶ 6. (Hereinafter, all
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`references to “Ex.,” unless otherwise identified, refer to exhibits to the Declaration of Daniel
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`Matheson (“Matheson Decl.”).) The FTC’s Bureau of Economics (“BE”) advises the
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`Commission on economic aspects of its functions and provides “economic and statistical
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`assistance to the enforcement Bureaus in the investigation and trial of cases.” 16 C.F.R. § 0.1;
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`see Ex. A ¶¶ 6, 24. During investigations, BC attorneys and BE economists work closely
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`together to conduct and coordinate investigations. Ex. A ¶ 24.
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`The Commission neither “clears” nor “approves” transactions; instead, it may only take
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`action to challenge a transaction, which it does by voting to initiate an administrative proceeding
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`or file suit in federal court. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (authorizing FTC to seek injunctive relief in
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`federal court); 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.83 (FTC rules of practice for administrative proceedings). The
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`only time the Commission passes judgment on a transaction is when the Commission itself
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`formally decides on a transaction’s legality as part of an administrative proceeding. See, e.g., 16
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`C.F.R. § 3.54. The Commission does not otherwise make “findings” or come to “conclusions”
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`2
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`about a transaction’s legality, or any predicate issues. Meta’s assertions that the documents it
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`seeks include the FTC’s “findings,” “determinations,” or “views” are incorrect: the documents
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`are pre-decisional in nature, and do not constitute agency findings or decisions.
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`Meta’s motion failed to identify the specific documents at issue or the privilege
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`descriptions provided by the FTC, instead lumping the relevant documents into eight generally
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`described buckets. See ECF No. 152-1 at 7. In an effort to provide clarity, the FTC below
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`identifies the documents at issue and the relevant privilege entries. See Ex. B (Privilege Log).
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`I.
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`Recommendation Packages Relating to the 2012 Instagram Acquisition
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`BC staff and BC Front Office attorneys communicate opinions, advice, strategies, and
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`recommendations to the Commission by transmitting recommendation packages. Ex. A ¶¶ 9, 11.
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`These packages contain pertinent documents including recommendation memoranda. See id.
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`Two recommendation packages contain all Instagram-related documents Meta seeks in its
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`Motion; as described below, these are Entries 1a-1e, and Entries 2a, 2b, and 2e.
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`A. May 2012 Recommendation Package to the Commission Regarding
`Compulsory Process (Entries 1a Through 1e)
`
`Entry 1a is a cover memo from the BC Front Office to the Commission regarding
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`compulsory process; Entry 1b is a memo from BC staff to the Commission. See Ex. B; Mem. 7
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`(Arabic numeral (1)). Both recommendation memos represent an integral part of how the FTC
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`makes decisions about enforcing the antitrust laws; candor and open debate in such memoranda
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`are vital to the Commission’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its case selection process.
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`See Ex. A ¶¶ 20-21. These documents are drafted for law enforcement purposes. Id. ¶ 23. FTC
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`staff analyze each case understanding that the Commission could ultimately vote to initiate legal
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`action as a result of the investigation. Id. ¶ 25.
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`Entries 1c and 1d are BC and BE memos “to the Merger Screening Committee, later
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`3
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`provided to the Commission as an attachment to the compulsory process memorandum.” See
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`Mem. 7 (Arabic numerals (2) and (3)); see also Ex. B. As Director Vedova’s Declaration
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`describes, pursuant to the FTC’s procedures, based on information gathered in a preliminary
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`review, in May 2012 BC and BE staff drafted separate recommendation memoranda to the
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`FTC’s Merger Screening Committee regarding whether to seek additional information from
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`Facebook and Instagram. Ex. A ¶ 14. The Merger Screening Committee is typically composed
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`of managers from the BC Front Office, BE Front Office, and representatives of the FTC Chair.
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`Id. ¶ 10. The May 2012 memos to the Merger Screening Committee comprised staff’s opinions,
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`analyses, and mental impressions about information gathered to that point from Facebook and
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`Instagram, and opinions and advice regarding strategy for further investigation. Id. ¶ 14.
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`Meta characterizes Entry 1e as a “resolution authorizing the use of compulsory process.”
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`See Mem. 7 (Arabic numeral (6)). As described in the FTC’s privilege log, it is a draft resolution
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`from staff and therefore pre-decisional. See Ex. B.
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`Following standard agency practice, all of these documents were compiled into a single
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`recommendation package to inform the Commission’s 2012 vote regarding compulsory process.
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`Ex. A ¶ 17; see Ex. B, Entries 1-1e. These documents communicate the authors’ analyses,
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`theories, opinions, advice, and recommendations to the Commission. Ex. A ¶ 17. To the extent
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`that these memoranda include or reference factual material, such material either is inextricably
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`interwoven with the authors’ own evaluations, analyses, and recommendations, or discloses the
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`mental impressions of FTC staff. Id.
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`B. August 2012 Recommendation Package to the Commission Regarding
`Closing the Investigation (Entries 2a, 2b, and 2e)
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`Entries 2a, 2b, and 2e are each a memorandum to the Commission “with respect to
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`closing the investigation”: 2a is from the BC Front Office, 2b is from BC staff, and 2e is from
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`4
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 11 of 39
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`
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`BE staff. See Mem. 7 (Arabic numerals (4) and (5)). Each of these documents was prepared
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`prior to, and provided information and analysis to inform, the Commission’s decision in 2012 to
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`close the Instagram investigation. Ex. A ¶ 17. These documents communicate the authors’
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`analyses, advice, and recommendations. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17; see Ex. B, Entries 2-2g. To the extent
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`that these memoranda include or reference factual material, such material either is inextricably
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`interwoven with the authors’ own analyses and recommendations or discloses the mental
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`impressions of FTC staff. Ex. A ¶ 17.
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`After deliberating on these recommendations, the Commission voted to close the
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`Instagram investigation on August 22, 2012. Given that the Commission did not adjudicate the
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`legality of the acquisition in an administrative proceeding, see supra at 2-3, the Commission did
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`not make any “findings,” conclusions, or determinations about the legality of Facebook’s
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`acquisition of Instagram or any predicate issues such as market power or the competitive effects
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`of the transaction. Accordingly, the FTC informed Meta that while the Commission took no
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`further action at that time, “[t]his action is not to be construed as a determination that a violation
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`may not have occurred . . . . The Commission reserves the right to take such further action as the
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`public interest may require.” See Ex. C (A. Tabor Ltr. To T. Barnett).
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`II. Notes Relating to the FTC’s 2014 WhatsApp Review (Entries 3 and 4)
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`In 2014, BC staff reviewed HSR filings and interviewed third parties in connection with
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`Meta’s proposed acquisition of WhatsApp. Ex. A ¶ 15. The two documents at issue, Entries 3
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`and 4, are BC staff notes containing analyses, legal theories, opinions, and strategy as part of the
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`staff’s deliberations regarding what investigational steps to take. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18; Ex. B, Entries 3,
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`4; see also Mem. 7 (discussing WhatsApp documents at issue). Any factual material referenced
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`in these documents is inextricably interwoven with the authors’ own evaluations, analyses, and
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`recommendations or discloses the mental impressions of FTC staff. Ex. A ¶ 18.
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`5
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`
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`ARGUMENT
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`The deliberative process privilege, work-product doctrine, attorney-client privilege, and
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`investigatory file privilege protect the documents at issue. The FTC did not waive privileges by
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`producing the documents to Congress, and Meta’s fervent desire for the documents cannot
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`overcome the applicable privileges.
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`I.
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`The Deliberative Process Privilege Protects from Discovery FTC Recommendation
`Memoranda (Entries 1a-e, 2a, 2b, and 2e) and Attorneys’ Notes (Entries 3 and 4)
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`Meta is simply not credible when it asserts that “The Deliberative Process Privilege Does
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`Not Apply to the Instagram Memoranda” – that is, to Entries 1a-e, 2a, 2b, and 2e. See Mem. 12.
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`Meta itself concedes that precedent establishes that FTC recommendation memoranda are
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`protected by the deliberative process privilege. See Mem. 20 (citing Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
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`742 F.2d at 1161, which held that two FTC BE recommendation memoranda were protected by
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`the deliberative process privilege). Meta does not cite a single instance in which any merger-
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`related FTC recommendation memo has ever been produced, and counsel for the FTC is aware
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`of none. Entries 3 and 4 are equally subject to the deliberative process privilege.
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`A.
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`The Deliberative Process Privilege Applies Because the Recommendation
`Memoranda and Attorney Notes Are Predecisional and Deliberative
`
`“The deliberative process privilege protects agencies from being ‘forced to operate in a
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`fishbowl.’” Elec. Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Just., 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) [hereinafter
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`EFF”] (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973)). The privilege protects “documents that
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`are ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative,’ meaning they reflect advisory opinions, recommendations,
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`and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
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`formulated, or the personal opinions of the writer prior to the agency’s adoption of a policy.”
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`EFF, 739 F.3d at 7 (cleaned up). “To show that a document is predecisional, the agency need
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`not identify a specific final agency decision; it is sufficient to establish ‘what deliberative process
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`6
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 13 of 39
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`is involved, and the role played by the documents at issue in the course of that process.’”
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`Heggestad v. Dep’t of Just., 182 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (quoting Coastal States, 617
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`F.2d at 868). Materials are “deliberative” if they reflect “the give-and-take of the consultative
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`process” by which a decision is made. See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866.
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`This privilege applies especially to law enforcement recommendation memoranda.
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`“[T]he information-gathering and deliberative process that produces” “a decision as to whether
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`or not to prosecute someone” “is precisely the type of material” that the deliberative process
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`privilege protects. Paisley v. CIA, 712 F.2d 686, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated in part on other
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`grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Heggestad held that the privilege applied to law
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`enforcement recommendation memoranda, including those declining to prosecute, and that
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`“allowing release of these memoranda would violate the intent of the deliberative process
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`privilege.” 182 F. Supp. 2d at 10. Likewise, Worldnetdaily.com, Inc. v. DOJ, 215 F. Supp. 3d
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`81, 84 (D.D.C. 2016), held that the privilege protected a memorandum laying out “the evidence
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`and analysis” underlying a recommendation to supervisors about whether to prosecute. See also
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`A. Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (the privilege protected a
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`memorandum from FTC staff to the Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection
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`containing a recommendation regarding disposition of an investigation). Whether these
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`decisions arise under FOIA or in the context of civil discovery is irrelevant because the analysis
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`is the same. See, e.g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799-800 (1984);
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`Tax’n with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (FOIA construed “to
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`encompass the protections traditionally afforded certain documents pursuant to evidentiary
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`privileges in the civil discovery context,” including deliberative process); contra Mem. 16 (FOIA
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`cases are inapplicable because this case does not involve a FOIA request); see also id. at 29-30.
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`7
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`Case 1:20-cv-03590-JEB Document 160 Filed 07/19/22 Page 14 of 39
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`Here, the documents Meta seeks communicated FTC staff’s advice, recommendations,
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`and opinions to the Commission about whether and how to investigate Meta’s acquisitions of
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`Instagram and WhatsApp and possible antitrust violations. Meta does not dispute that the
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`documents are predecisional. Nor can Meta dispute that the documents are deliberative, as they
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`constitute “advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
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`by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
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`421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975); see also Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866 (same).
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`B.
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`FTC Regulations Provide for a Twenty-Five-Year Application of the
`Deliberative Process Privilege, Not Ten Years as Meta Argues
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`Meta incorrectly asserts that deliberative process protection does not apply to FTC
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`memoranda that are over ten years old, Mem. 12-13, relying only on the FTC’s 2016 Open
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`Government Plan, which is a non-binding announcement to the public about open government
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`goals. Meta ignores FTC regulations providing that the deliberative process privilege applies for
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`twenty-five years after a document is created. 16 C.F.R. § 4.10(a)(3). The twenty-five-year
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`period provided by the actual regulations controls. Decl. of Elizabeth Tucci ¶ 19; compare id.
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`(FTC regulations adopted twenty-five-year period on December 22, 2016), with Mem. 13 (FTC
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`Open Government Plan announced on September 15, 2016).
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`C. Any Factual Material in the Documents Is “Inextricably Interwoven” with
`Staff’s Analysis and Recommendations
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`Contrary to Meta’s representation, the Supreme Court in Mink did not simply say that
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`“purely factual” material must be disclosed. See Mem. 13-14 (citing Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88).
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`Rather, the Court observed that only “purely factual material co