throbber
Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 1 of 73
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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`INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM
`d/b/a GLOBAL LABOR JUSTICE-
`INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM,
`1634 I Street, NW, Suite 1000, Washington, D.C.
`20006,
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`
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`Civil Action No. ________
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`
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`BUMBLE BEE FOODS, LLC, 280 10th Avenue,
`San Diego, CA 92101,
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`Defendant.
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`
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`NOTICE OF REMOVAL
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`Defendant Bumble Bee Foods, LLC (“Bumble Bee”) hereby removes this action from the
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`Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the District of
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`Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), (d), 1367, 1441(a), (b), 1446, and 1453(b),1 and states
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`as follows:
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`TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL
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`1.
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`Plaintiff International Labor Rights Forum d/b/a Global Labor Justice-International
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`Labor Rights Forum (“GLJ-ILRF”) filed this action against Bumble Bee on March 21, 2022, in
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`the Superior Court of the District of Columbia as Civil Action No. 2022 CA 001235B. Bumble
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`Bee was served with the complaint and summons on April 4, 2022.
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`2.
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`This Notice of Removal is timely because it is filed within 30 days of service. See
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`28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
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`1 By filing this Notice of Removal, Bumble Bee does not waive any right, defense, affirmative
`defense, or objection, including any challenges to personal jurisdiction over Bumble Bee. See,
`e.g., Rivera v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
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`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 2 of 73
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION
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`3.
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`Plaintiff GLJ-ILRF, a citizen of the District of Columbia, brings suit on its own
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`behalf and on behalf of District of Columbia consumers, against an out-of-state defendant, seeking
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`injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees that, if granted, would exceed the $75,000 jurisdictional
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`threshold, even if divided among the allegedly injured parties. This Court has subject matter
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`jurisdiction over the instant action because it may exercise diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§
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`1332, 1441(b), as well as jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).2
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`4.
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`Plaintiff GLJ-ILRF is a nonprofit incorporated and based in the District of
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`Columbia. It brings this suit purportedly seeking to address “unfair and dangerous labor practices
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`in the commercial fishing of the seafood that ends up in Bumble Bee Products.” Compl. ¶ 7.
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`Plaintiff claims that Bumble Bee, which is organized in Delaware and has its principal place of
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`business in California, violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act
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`(“CPPA”), D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq., through “deceptive marketing representations that
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`purport to ensure fair labor practices and worker safety.” Compl. ¶ 9.
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`5.
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`According to the Complaint, Bumble Bee advertises its products with phrases such
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`as “best-in-class culture of safety” and “fair and responsible working conditions” when, in fact,
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`“Bumble Bee sells tuna products caught by laborers who are subjected to inhuman conditions that
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`do not meet the standards Bumble Bee set for itself.” Compl. ¶ 79 (emphasis added). But the
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`Complaint does not allege any facts showing that Bumble Bee actually sells tuna sourced from any
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`such laborers, or that Bumble Bee even directly sources tuna from any such laborers.
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`2 Bumble Bee reserves the right to further elaborate on these grounds for removal, and provide
`evidence in support thereof, beyond the jurisdictional allegations in this Notice. See Dart
`Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87–89 (2014).
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`2
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`6.
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`Plaintiff nonetheless claims that it is misleading for Bumble Bee to call its practices
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`“best-in-class” without disclosing the alleged risks in its parent company’s supply chain. Id. ¶¶ 6,
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`19, 31, 41, 43, 63. But Plaintiff fails to disclose the subject matter of Bumble Bee’s “best-in-class”
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`superlative. It does not refer broadly to Bumble Bee’s supply chain, but to Bumble Bee’s promise
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`to “continue to champion [its] best-in-class culture of safety in Bumble Bee facilities.”3 This is a
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`far cry from promising best-in-class safety practices aboard the fishing vessels of third-party
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`suppliers. And Plaintiff does not allege any facts indicating that the statement is false or
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`misleading as to Bumble Bee’s own facilities.
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`7.
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`Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees.
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`Compl. ¶ 17.
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`GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL
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`A.
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`This Court Has Diversity Jurisdiction Over the Action.
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`8.
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`This action is removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441 because the action is
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`between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy far exceeds $75,000.
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`9.
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`A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in State court of which the
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`district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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`10.
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`Federal district courts have “original,” diversity jurisdiction over civil actions for
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`which (1) there is “complete diversity,” meaning that no plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as
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`any defendant; and (2) the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1332(a); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005). Both criteria are satisfied
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`here.
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`3 The Bumble Bee Seafood Company,
`Impact,
`Impact: Sustainability and Social
`https://thebumblebeecompany.com/impact/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2022) (emphasis added)
`(cited in Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21, 41).
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`3
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`11.
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` “[C]omplete diversity” is present because the sole Plaintiff and the sole Defendant
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`in this action are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); see also id. § 1332(e)
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`(providing that the District of Columbia is a “State” for purposes of Section 1332(a)(1)). For
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`purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation—including a not-for-profit corporation—is a
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`citizen of the state in which it is incorporated, and the state in which it has its principal place of
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`business. Id. § 1332(c)(1); see North v. Smarsh, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 3d 63, 79 (D.D.C. 2015).
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`12.
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`Plaintiff GLJ-ILRF is a citizen of the District of Columbia because, according to
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`the allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff is “registered as a nonprofit in the District of Columbia.”
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`Compl. ¶ 70.
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`13.
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`Defendant Bumble Bee is a privately-held limited liability company that is
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`organized under the laws of Delaware and has its primary place of business in San Diego,
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`California. Compl. ¶ 64.
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`14.
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`The “in-state defendant rule” does not bar removal of this case because Bumble
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`Bee is not a citizen of the District of Columbia and therefore is not “a citizen of the State in which
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`such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). The parties are therefore “completely diverse.”
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`15.
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`The amount in controversy also far “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In measuring the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
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`a court must assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume that a jury will return
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`a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint, no matter how baseless they might
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`be. See Lovelle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 3d 217, 223–24 (D.D.C. 2017). A
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`defendant’s notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in
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`controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Beyond Pesticides v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp.,
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`Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89).
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`4
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`16. Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, the amount in controversy is
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`“measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,
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`432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). This value can be calculated from “either viewpoint,” meaning the
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`“value of the right that plaintiff seeks to enforce or to protect” or “the cost to the defendant to
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`remedy the alleged denial.” Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Thus,
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`“[t]he value of injunctive relief for determining the amount in controversy can be calculated as the
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`cost to the defendant.” GEO Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Husisian, 951 F. Supp. 2d 32, 39 (D.D.C.
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`2013) (quoting Wexler v. United Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 150, 153 (D.D.C. 2007)).
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`17.
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`The question of how to apportion the cost to the defendant in cases seeking
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`injunctive relief on behalf of a class of consumers is an open and recurring question within the
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`D.C. Circuit. District courts have employed the “non-aggregation” principle in CPPA suits when
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`calculating the cost to the defendant of the injunctive relief. See Earth Island Inst. v. BlueTriton
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`Brands, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2022 WL 252031, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2022) (citing cases). The
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`non-aggregation principle provides that “separate and distinct claims of two or more plaintiffs
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`cannot be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.” Snyder v. Harris,
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`394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969). These courts have found that the cost of compliance with the injunctive
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`relief should be divided by the number of affected consumers who could bring suit in their own
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`right. See, e.g., Organic Consumers Ass’n v. Handsome Brook Farm Grp. 2, LLC, 222 F. Supp.
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`3d 74, 78 (D.D.C 2016); Witte v. General Nutrition Corp., 104 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2015).4
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`4 To meet its statutory standing requirements for a suit brought under D.C. Code § 28-
`3905(k)(1)(D), Plaintiff must demonstrate that the consumers it purports to represent “could
`bring suit in their own right.” Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp., 258 A.3d
`174, 183 (D.C. 2021). In other words, the only consumers whose interests Plaintiff could
`represent in this case necessarily would be “consumers who have suffered a cognizable injury
`under the CPPA sufficient to give each of them Article III standing.” Organic Consumers Ass’n
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`5
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`The D.C. Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of “how the ‘non-aggregation’ and ‘either
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`viewpoint’ doctrines interact.” Handsome Brook Farm, 222 F. Supp. 3d at 79. Whether the Court
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`assesses Bumble Bee’s total cost of compliance or the individual cost to each affected consumer,
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`the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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`18.
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`In addition to the costs of compliance with injunctive relief, the amount in
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`controversy also includes Plaintiff’s separate request for “costs and disbursements, including
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`reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Compl. at 19, Prayer for Relief (c). It is well established that
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`attorneys’ fees “may be counted towards establishing a jurisdictional amount when they are
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`provided for by statute in controversy,” Parker-Williams v. Charles Tini & Assocs., Inc., 53 F.
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`Supp. 3d 149, 153 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up), as they are in the CPPA, see D.C. Code § 28-
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`3905(k)(2)(B). Indeed, attorneys’ fee awards under the CPPA routinely exceed the $75,000
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`jurisdictional threshold on their own. See, e.g., Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Inv’rs. Corp.,
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`225 F.3d 738, 745–47 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ($199,340); Beck v. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc., 73 F.
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`Supp. 3d 12, 20 (D.D.C. 2014) ($854,623.90); In re InPhonic, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 273, 289
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`(D.D.C. 2009) ($453,885.31); Dist. Cablevision L.P. v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 718 (D.C. 2003)
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`($425,916.25).
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`19.
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`Here, Plaintiff alleges that consumers are misled by certain statements in Bumble
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`Bee’s annual reports, website, and social media and seeks equitable relief that would compel
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`Bumble Bee to modify its messages in those forums. Compl. ¶ 17 (citing D.C. Code § 28-
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`3905(k)(2)(D)). Plaintiff also seeks “reasonable attorneys’ fees.” Compl. at 19, Prayer for Relief
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`v. General Mills, Inc., No. 2016 CA 6309 B, 2017 WL 2901210, at *5 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr.
`27, 2017).
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`6
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`(c). The total value of complying with this injunctive relief and paying attorneys’ fees would far
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`exceed $75,000.
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`20.
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`Injunctive Relief. Bumble Bee’s total annual advertising budget is roughly $12
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`million, which includes social media. Indeed, Bumble Bee’s budget for social media alone has
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`approached $2 million. In addition to this annual advertising budget, Bumble Bee spends hundreds
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`of thousands of dollars each year on corporate communications, reports, and website content—
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`much of which is directed at the company’s sustainability efforts. Upon information and belief,
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`an injunction directing Bumble Bee to revise and/or supplement its past and potentially future
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`corporate reports, website content, and social media campaigns to satisfy Plaintiff’s demands could
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`easily reach into the millions of dollars. In light of these substantial expenditures, it is more than
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`plausible that Bumble’s total cost of compliance with Plaintiff’s requested relief would far exceed
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`$75,000.5 See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89.
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`21.
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`Attorneys’ Fees. As of 2017, Plaintiff’s lead counsel, Kim Richman, has sought
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`statutory attorneys’ fees at $700.00 per hour.6 At that rate, the amount in controversy will exceed
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`$75,000 so long as Mr. Richman alone bills just 110 hours to this litigation.7 Given the nature of
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`5 Bumble Bee does not concede—and in fact denies—that Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief
`it seeks. A plaintiff’s claim “fixes the right of the defendant to remove” whether “well or ill-
`founded in fact.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938); see
`also 14B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
`§ 3702.1 (4th ed. 2020) (“[A] defendant who seeks to prove that the amount in controversy is
`greater than the jurisdictional amount does not automatically concede that the jurisdictional
`amount is recoverable.”).
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`6 See Decl. of Kim Richman in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, & Incentive
`Awards ¶ 20, Charvat v. Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC, Civ. No. 15-4106 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5,
`2017) (hereinafter, “Richman Decl.”)
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`7 As of 2017, Mr. Richman’s of counsel and associate each bill at $450.00 per hour. See Richman
`Decl. ¶ 20.
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`7
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`Plaintiff’s action, it is not only plausible, but highly probable that the attorneys’ fees here will on
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`their own exceed $75,000.
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`22.
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`Bumble Bee submits that the non-aggregation principle should not be applied here
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`to reduce the cost of compliance with an injunction or attorneys’ fees. The non-aggregation
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`principle is subject to an important exception. It does not apply where “two or more plaintiffs
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`unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest.”
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`Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335. “[A] common and undivided claim exists when the adversary of the class
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`has no interest in how the claim is to be distributed among the class members.” Nat’l Welfare
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`Rights Org. v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.D.C. 1974); Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
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`Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 48 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 1999). Plaintiff’s claims meet this
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`standard here because the cost of complying with Plaintiff’s requested injunctive relief and paying
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`attorneys’ fees will “not be affected by the number of plaintiffs, nor by the values of their
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`individual claims.” Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., Civ. No. 02-0556, 2003 WL 24259557, at
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`*5 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2003). Unlike damages, the relief Plaintiff seeks—modification of Bumble
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`Bee’s advertising and attorneys’ fees—cannot be distributed on a pro rata basis among a class of
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`District of Columbia consumers. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 90 F. Supp. 2d 819, 835
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`(E.D. Mich. 1999) (“[W]here the plaintiff and the class members have a common and undivided
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`interest in the injunctive relief, it is appropriate to aggregate the total cost of the requested
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`injunctive relief from the defendant’s viewpoint”); Zuckman v. Monster Beverage Corp., 958 F.
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`Supp. 2d 293, 301 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that apportioning attorneys’ fees between plaintiff “and
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`the general public on a pro rata basis” would “underestimate the portion of fees properly attributed
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`to” plaintiff).
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`8
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`23.
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`Even if the non-aggregation principle were to apply, the cost of compliance with
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`the injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees divided by the number of affected consumers in this case
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`would still exceed $75,000. Here, the number of consumers who actually viewed the statements
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`at issue, and thus potentially could have brought suit in their own right, is miniscule. For example,
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`upon information and belief, the webpage hosting the 2020 Seafood Future Report received fewer
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`than a dozen visits from IP addresses traceable to the District of Columbia from June 8, 2020 to
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`June 8, 2021. See Compl. ¶ 20, 22–24, 49, 62. It is likely that even fewer bothered to open the
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`report and read it. Similarly, upon information and belief, Bumble Bee’s Instagram account had
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`only 19 followers from the District of Columbia on the day Bumble Bee posted about “World
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`Ocean’s Day.” Id. ¶ 26. And again it is likely that even a smaller number actually viewed the
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`“World Ocean’s Day” post cited in the Complaint. Upon information and belief, only about 15
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`percent of Bumble Bee’s total followers (from any location) viewed the “World Ocean’s Day”
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`post on June 8, 2020, which suggests that the post was viewed by only a handful of individuals in
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`the District of Columbia, at most. Based on these estimates, it is likely that the actual number of
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`D.C. consumers even potentially affected by the statements cited in the Complaint is quite small.8
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`24.
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`Dividing the substantial cost of compliance and attorneys’ fees—which, as set forth
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`above, could run into the millions of dollars—by the small number of affected consumers here
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`would still result in an amount in controversy well over the $75,000 threshold. Compare
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`Breakman v. AOL LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2008) (dividing AOL’s cost of
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`compliance of $255,800 by the 28,451 affected consumers, and holding that “the cost running to
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`8 A total of 479 non-followers also viewed the “World Ocean’s Day” post, though Bumble Bee
`is not presently able to break down that figure by location. Given that only 0.3 percent of
`Bumble Bee’s total followers are from the District of Columbia, it is reasonable to infer that the
`same proportion of non-followers are located in the District. That would suggest that only 2
`non-followers in the District of Columbia viewed the post in question.
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`9
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`each District of Columbia consumer is $8.99, an amount far below the jurisdictional requirement”);
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`Hackman v. One Brands, LLC, No. 18-2101 (CKK), 2019 WL 1440202, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 1,
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`2019) (dividing the defendant’s costs of compliance by the 100 affected consumers for an
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`apportioned cost of either $10,825 for rebranding or $1,300 for reformulation, “both of which fall
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`below the jurisdictional requirement of $75,000”).
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`25.
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`In sum, because the parties are “completely diverse,” and the amount in controversy
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`plausibly exceeds $75,000, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1332(a).
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`B.
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`This Court Also Has Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act.
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`26.
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`In the alternative, this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under the Class Action
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`Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of District
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`of Columbia consumers and CAFA’s statutory requirements are satisfied.
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`27.
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`CAFA permits removal of (1) any “class action;” (2) where minimal diversity
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`exists; (3) at least 100 class members are represented; and (4) “the matter in controversy exceeds
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`the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), (2), (5);
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`Bradford v. George Washington Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d 325, 332 (D.D.C. 2017); see also 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1453(b). Each criterion is satisfied here.
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`28.
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`CAFA defines a “class action” as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal
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`Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action
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`to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
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`CAFA’s legislative history provides that “the definition of ‘class action’ is to be interpreted
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`liberally. Its application should not be confined solely to lawsuits that are labelled ‘class actions.’
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`Generally speaking, lawsuits that resemble a purported class action should be considered class
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`actions for the purpose of applying these provisions.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), as
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`10
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`reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34 (formatting altered); see also McMullen v. Synchrony Bank,
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`82 F. Supp. 3d 133, 140 (D.D.C. 2015). In other words, CAFA permits removal of a suit that is
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`“in substance a class action” notwithstanding a plaintiff’s “attempt to disguise the true nature of
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`the suit.” Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2013);
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`see, e.g., Williams v. Empl’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 845 F.3d 891, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2017); Song v. Charter
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`Commc’ns, Inc., Civ. No. 17-325, 2017 WL 1149286, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017).
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`29.
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`This action is a putative “class action” under CAFA. Plaintiff purports to bring this
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`action “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers, . . . seeking relief from
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`the use by any person of a trade practice in violation of a law of the District if the consumer or
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`class could bring an action . . . for relief from such use by such person of such trade practice.”
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`Compl. ¶ 14 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 16 (noting that this is an action brought on behalf of
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`“District consumers who purchase seafood and may be targeted by Bumble Bee’s marketing
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`claims.”). Plaintiff further represents that it “has a sufficient nexus to District consumers to
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`adequately represent their interests.” Id. ¶ 15.
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`30.
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`By filing a suit under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D)(i) and styling its action as a
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`representative suit brought on behalf of a class of consumers, Plaintiff has chosen to bring what is
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`in substance a putative class action: a “representative suit on behalf of a group of persons similarly
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`situated.”
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` 1 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions
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`§ 1.1 (4th ed. 2002) (cleaned up). While Plaintiff makes the self-serving assertion that “[n]o class
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`certification will be requested,” Compl. ¶ 16, actions like this one “that resemble a purported class
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`action should be considered [a] class action for the purpose of applying [CAFA’s] provisions,”
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`Song, 2017 WL 1149286, at *1 n.1 (emphasis added). Indeed, the D.C. Court of Appeals has
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`explained that such suits under the CPPA are necessarily subject to the “framework long
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`11
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`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 12 of 73
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`established by” D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Rotunda v. Marriot Int’l, Inc.,
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`123 A.3d 980, 982 (D.C. 2015), which is in all relevant respects “identical” to Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 23, see D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 23 cmt.9
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`31. Minimal diversity is also more than satisfied here because complete diversity is in
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`fact present. Minimal diversity demands only that “any member of a class of plaintiffs” be “a
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`citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). The putative class
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`of the District of Columbia consumers includes citizens of the District of Columbia. Compl.
`
`¶¶ 151–52. By contrast, Bumble Bee is a citizen of Delaware where it is incorporated, and a citizen
`
`of California where it is headquartered. Id. ¶ 64.
`
`32.
`
`As discussed above, Bumble Bee respectfully submits that the number of
`
`potentially affected consumers is quite small. Should the Court determine otherwise, Bumble Bee
`
`argues, in the alternative, that the consumers on whose behalf Plaintiff sues exceeds 100 purported
`
`class members. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); Compl. ¶ 65 (“Bumble Bee’s Products are
`
`available in a wide variety of national supermarket chains, regional stores, and other retail outlets,
`
`including stores in the District”); id. ¶ 73 (“Bumble Bee’s Products can be, and are, purchased in
`
`the District by District consumers”).10
`
`
`9 Courts in this district have held that Rotunda applies only to CPPA cases seeking monetary
`damages, not injunctive relief. See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp.,
`249 F. Supp. 3d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2017). But Rotunda did not provide the D.C. Court of Appeals
`“with an opportunity to consider the 2012 amendments to the CPPA,” which specifically added
`language to section 28-3905(k)(1)(D) “permitting public interest organizations to sue on behalf
`of a ‘class’ of consumers.” General Mills, 2017 WL 2901210, at *4 (emphasis added). The
`effect of the 2012 amendments on the class certification requirement in Rotunda thus remains
`an open question.
`
`10 See also Quick Facts: District of Columbia, U.S. Census Bureau (July 1, 2021),
`https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/DC (estimating the District of Columbia population at
`670,050).
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 13 of 73
`
`
`
`33.
`
`Finally, given the cost to Bumble Bee of complying with Plaintiff’s requested relief
`
`as described above, in addition to attorneys’ fees, the amount in controversy exceeds the
`
`$5,000,000 threshold. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
`
`COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOVAL
`
`
`
`34.
`
`Based on the foregoing, this Court has original jurisdiction over this action under
`
`28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(b) (diversity jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b) (CAFA).
`
`35.
`
`The United States District Court for the District of Columbia is the appropriate
`
`venue for removal under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a) because the Superior Court of the District of
`
`Columbia, where this suit was originally filed, is within the District of Columbia.
`
`36.
`
`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders
`
`served upon Bumble Bee is attached as Exhibits A–E.
`
`37.
`
`Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Bumble Bee will promptly provide written notice
`
`of this filing to all adverse parties, and file a copy of this Notice of Removal with the clerk of the
`
`Superior Court of the District of Columbia. A copy of this filing (without exhibits) is attached as
`
`Exhibit F.
`
`38.
`
`This Notice of Removal is signed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, as required by 28
`
`U.S.C. § 1446(a).
`
`39.
`
`Bumble Bee reserves the right to amend or supplement this Notice of Removal.
`
`Bumble Bee also reserves all rights, defenses, and objections available under applicable law. The
`
`filing of this Notice of Removal is subject to, and without waiver of, any such defenses or
`
`objections.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 14 of 73
`
`
`
`WHEREFORE, Bumble Bee respectfully gives notice that this action is hereby removed
`
`from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to the United States District Court for the
`
`District of Columbia.
`
`
`
`DATED: May 2, 2022
`
` Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`
`By: /s/ Justin Anderson
`Justin Anderson (D.C. Bar No. 1030572)
`Jake E. Struebing (D.C. Bar No. 1673297)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`2001 K Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 223-7300
`Facsimile: (202) 223-7420
`janderson@paulweiss.com
`jstruebing@paulweiss.com
`
`William Michael (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`1285 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10019
`Telephone: (212) 373-3000
`Facsimile: (212) 757-3990
`wmichael@paulweiss.com
`
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Bumble Bee Foods,
`LLC
`
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 15 of 73
`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 15 of 73
`
`
`
`EXHIBIT A
`EXHIBIT A
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 16 of 73
`Filed
`D.C. Superior Court
`03/21/2022 15:21PM
`Clerk of the Court
`
`SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`CIVIL DIVISION
`
`))
`
`INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM
`d/b/a GLOBAL LABOR JUSTICE-INTERNATIONAL )
`LABOR RIGHTS FORUM,
`a non-profit corporation,
`1634 I Street NW, Suite 1000
`Washington, D.C. 20006
`
`)))))
`
`)))
`
`))
`
`))
`
`)
`
`v.
`
`BUMBLE BEE FOODS, EEC
`280 10th Avenue,
`San Diego, CA 92101
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`Defendant.
`
`COMPLAINT
`
`On behalf of itself and the general public, and in the interest of consumers, Plaintiff
`
`International Labor Rights Forum d/b/a Global Labor Justice-International Labor Rights Forum
`
`(“GLJ-ILRF”) brings this action against Defendant Bumble Bee Foods, LLC (“Bumble Bee”)
`
`concerning its false and deceptive marketing representations that its industrial tuna products are
`
`produced through a “fair and safe supply chain,” despite significant evidence of forced labor and
`
`worker safety violations. GLJ-ILRF alleges the following based upon personal knowledge,
`
`information, and belief.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`1.
`
`The use of fair labor practices and the promotion of worker safety is of growing
`
`concern to consumers.
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-cv-01220 Document 1 Filed 05/02/22 Page 17 of 73
`
`2.
`
`This is a consumer-protection case concerning deceptive marketing representations
`
`about Bumble Bee’s tuna products (the “Products”).1 This case is brought by GLJ-ILRF, a non­
`
`profit, public-interest organization dedicated to fair labor practices, workers’ rights, and consumer
`
`education. GLJ-ILRF seeks no monetary damages, only an end to the deceptive marketing and
`
`advertising at issue.
`
`3.
`
`Defendant Bumble Bee is one of the largest producers of canned tuna in the United
`
`States, which it markets under its name and various other brand names.
`
`4.
`
`In June 2020, Bumble Bee was acquired by FCF Co. Ltd. (“FCF”), a Taiwan-based
`
`seafood producer. Even before Bumble Bee was formally acquired by FCF, the company acquired
`
`between 70% and 95% of the tuna used in its major Products through FCF.2
`
`5.
`
`Most of the tuna produced through FCF’s supply chain comes from fishing methods
`
`and regions recognized by U.S. government agencies as high risk for forced labor and other
`
`abuses.3 Bumble Bee has thus long relied on FCF’s supply chain and profited from the well-
`
`documented and endemic labor abuses therein.4
`
`6.
`
`Nevertheless, Bumble Bee makes marketing and advertising representations that
`
`convey to consumers, including consumers in the District of Columbia, that Bumble Bee is “best-
`
`in-class” in terms of its worker safety standards and that it is the company’s “mission” to
`
`“champion sustainable fishing” throughout the Products supply chain.
`
`1 Discovery may reveal that additional Bumble Bee brands and products should be included within the scope of
`the allegations in this Complaint, and Plaintiff reserves the right to add such products.
`2 Declaration of Kent McNeil in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First-Day Motions at 50, In re Bumble Bee
`Parent, Inc., No. 19-12502, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3369 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2020).
`3 2020 List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, U.S. Department of Labor (Sept. 2020),
`https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2019/2020_TVPRA_List_Online_Final.pdf.
`4
`Seafood Stewardship Index:
`FCF Co., Ltd., World Benchmarking Alliance,
`https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/publication/seafood-stewardship-index/companies/fcf-co/ (last visited
`Mar. 21, 2022).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 1:22-

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