IN THE SUPERIOR COURTOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`CIVIL DIVISION
`
`Filed
`
`D.C. Superior Court
`12/06/2021 08:50AM
`Clerk of the Court
`
`MUSLIM ADVOCATES,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`MARK ZUCKERBERG,ef al,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`Civil Action No: 2021 CA 001114B
`Judge: Anthony C. Epstein
`
`CONSENT MOTION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR LEAVE TO
`FILE A BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
`
`

`

`The District of Columbia moves for leave to file the attached brief as amicus curiae in
`
`support of plaintiff's opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss. This motion describes the
`
`District’s interest in this case and discusses why this Court may benefit from hearing its views.
`
`Counsel for the defendants consent to this motion.
`
`The District has a paramountinterest in protecting its residents from unfair and deceptive
`
`trade practices. Pursuant to its authority to enforce the Consumer Protection Procedures Act
`
`(“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 ef seg., the Office of the Attorney General has consistently sought
`
`to stop corporations from misleading District consumers about their goods and services. See id.
`
`§ 28-3909(a).
`
`The Attorney General
`
`is also charged with representing consumers before
`
`administrative agencies andlegislative bodies, with conducting consumer education programs, and
`
`with performing other duties necessary to protect
`
`the welfare of consumers.
`
`See id.
`
`§ 28-3909(c)(1), (3), (5). Each of these efforts embrace the notion that consumersare entitled to
`
`truthful information about the goods and services they use and the risks associated with them.
`
`The perspective of the District can help this Court resolve the important issues raised by
`
`this case. First, the District can offer the benefit of experience in interpreting the CPPA andin
`
`protecting District consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. Second, the District can
`
`highlight the consequences of immunizing defendants from District consumer protection law,
`
`including for future efforts to regulate similar technology companies.
`
`For the foregoing reasons, the District requests leave to participate as amicus curiae in
`
`support of the plaintiff in these proceedings.
`
`

`

`Respectfully submitted,
`
`KARL A. RACINE
`Attorney General for the District of Columbia
`
`LOREN L. ALIKHAN
`Solicitor General
`
`/s/ Caroline S. Van Zile
`CAROLINES. VAN ZILE
`Principal Deputy Solicitor General
`Bar Number 1017942
`Office of the Solicitor General
`
`JIMMY R. ROCK
`Assistant Deputy Attorney General
`Public Advocacy Division
`
`/s/ Benjamin M. Wiseman
`BENJAMIN M. WISEMAN
`Director, Office of ConsumerProtection
`Public Advocacy Division
`Bar Number 1005442
`
`Office of the Attorney General
`400 6th Street, NW, Suite 8100
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 724-5226
`(202) 741-8949 (fax)
`benjamin. wiseman€dc. gov
`
`December6, 2021
`
`

`

`IN THE SUPERIOR COURTOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`CIVIL DIVISION
`
`MUSLIM ADVOCATES,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`MARK ZUCKERBERG,ef al,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`Civil Action No: 2021 CA 001114B
`Judge: Anthony C. Epstein
`
`[PROPOSED] ORDER
`
`Upon consideration of the District of Columbia’s Consent Motion for Leave to File a Brief
`
`as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff, the parties’ consent, and for good cause shown,it is on
`
`this
`
`day of December, 2021,
`
`ORDEREDthat the motion is GRANTED; and
`
`FUTHER ORDEREDthatthe District’s Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff is
`
`accepted for filing.
`
`SO ORDERED.
`
`
`
`Judge Anthony C. Epstein
`Superior Court of the District of Columbia
`
`

`

`IN THE SUPERIOR COURTOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`CIVIL DIVISION
`
`MUSLIM ADVOCATES,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`MARK ZUCKERBERG,ef al,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`Civil Action No: 2021 CA 001114B
`Judge: Anthony C. Epstein
`
`BRIEF OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS AMICUS CURTAE
`IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 0000.00 etetenteenee 1
`
`ARGUMENT ooo ence cece ene ceeecetensceneeneecneeceeecstessesteeneeneesereseensesteenestesteeseeniesteenieeniees 3
`
`I.
`
`The CPPA’s Prohibition On Unfair And Deceptive Trade Practices Applies
`Regardless Of Whether Businesses Charge Fees...........000.0000ccccccccseeseesteetseenees 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`The CPPA applies to trade practices that relate to both the “sale”
`and “transfer” of consumer goods and Se€rviCeS ...........c cece ecceteeeeeeees 3
`
`Limiting the CPPA’s protections to paying customers would
`severely curtail District consumers’ right to truthful information
`about the goods and services they US@ ........0...00ccccccccce cee eeseestetetteeseees 7
`
`IL.
`
`The Communications Decency Act Does Not Immunize Defendants From
`Liability For Their Own Alleged Misrepresentations...........00.00.0ccccceceteeteeeees 9
`
`CONCLUSION 0000.0c cece cee cence eee etee ee eceeceseseceeeeeeeceeteseseesecssstesseisssstseteeetieeeeees 13
`
`il
`
`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Atwater v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regul. Affs., 566 A.2d 462 (D.C. 1989)oo. 9
`
`Barnes v. Yahoo!Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) 00.0.0c cece cette tte eettenieees 12
`
`Byrd v. Jackson, 902 A.2d 778 (D.C. 2006) oo. ccccccccccc ccc cece cece cteetetseeteteetettisteistectseeteenies 6
`
`Cooper v. First Gov. Mortg. & Investors Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2002)... 6
`
`Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714 (D.C. 2003) oo. ccc cee ceeeeteetees 9
`
`District of Columbia v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 2016 CA 003788 B,
`2016 WL 4410867 (D.C. Sup. Ct. AUg. 17, 2016) ccccccccccsccscssssesssssessssssessssresesssttssssseesesseeeeee 6
`
`Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016)... ccc cc ccs ceeteenees 10,11, 12
`
`HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City ofSanta Monica, 918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019)oe 10
`
`Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701 (D.C. 1981) o.oo cect ect e cette ttteeeniees 5,6
`
`Klayman vy. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) occcc cece ctettneeenees 10, 11
`
`Lemmon vy. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021)... cece cee eeteeeeeeseenees 10, 11, 12
`
`Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2019)... 11
`
`McDonald vy. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533 (D. Md. 2016)oe 11
`
`Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710
`(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ooo cee cee ese eseeteceeeteesseeeesseeteesiesteeteetseeeeteneens 10
`
`Thomas vy. D.C. Dep’t ofEmp’t Servs., 547 A.2d 1034 (D.C. 1988)... cece eeee 5,7
`
`Statutes
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3901 oii ccccccccccc cece eesceteceeceeeeeseescenseeectseesesseeessetsestestiseseeeseeseetsesteeteeseeenees 1
`
`D.C. Code § 28-390 1 (a)... cceeccee cece eeees sees eetseeteetseessecsseeseeteesisenseetseseeesetseeteeses 2,4, 5, 6,7
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3901 (BD)... ccecceee cece cece ceteceseeteecssecsseeseetsesseetsesseessessesieeteetieesseeeenees 3,9
`
`D.C. Code § 28-390 1(C) oo. ccccccccccceeeceeeceteetecseeeeeeeseetseesecneseeeeseeessetseseetisesseeeeeeeteeeeenes 3, 6, 7,9
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3904 ooo. cccccceccccc cece ees ceeecetecteeeseeseesseesseesetseeseesesssecseeteesesteseseeereseseenes 1,2,3
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3904(a) o.oo cccccceeccecetee cece sees ceteceseeeecssecseeeseetsesseeteecseeseessesteeseeteestieeseenees 2,4
`
`ili
`
`

`

`D.C. Code § 28-3904(d)...cecccccsessessesssssessssesvesssssvesssssvtssssiesssstveessssesssstssssssissssssinssssvvesesesees 2,4, 12
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3904(€)
`
`...cecccccscssssssssssssessssssevesssvssssisvesssssessstivsssisisssisissssissssssisssssisssssessssseessen 2
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3909(a) ...cecccccssssssesssssssesssssssssssvessssrivessssvessssisvesssisussssisssissessssssissssvsssssesssssensen 1
`
`D.C. Code § 28-3910 ooecccccecsscssssssessesssssvesssesvsssssvsssssvssssssvesssassutsssivsssssisesssisesssssvtssssesssssenessssveee 1
`
`AT U.S.C. § 230 oocccecsecsesssssessssssseessssvesssssisessssvssssrisessssvsssstiisssssssssssinessseees 1,2, 3,9, 10, 11, 12, 13
`
`AT U.S.C. § 230(C)(L) ceecssecssssesesssessesssssvesssssisesssvesssssissssssisssastesssssssststsssivisssssisssssssesesvees 3, 9, 10
`
`Legislative Materials
`
`H.R. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).....0... cocci cece cece cette eens eece secre stseeetseeteteeseenies 10
`
`Report on Bill 1-253 before the Committee on Public Services and ConsumerAffairs,
`Council of the District of Columbia (Mar. 24, 1976) ........cccccc cece eee et cece ete cntetetteeieens 6
`
`Litigation Materials
`
`D.C. Compl., District of Columbia vy. Facebook, Inc., 2018 CA 008715 B
`(D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018)...cc ee ec eerie tect brett tetitecteetieetieeteetieens 7
`
`D.C. Opp’n to Facebook’s Mot. to Dismiss, District of Columbia v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2018 CA 008715 B (D.C. Super Ct. Mar. 1, 2019) oo.eee cee ett etteeetieens 4,8
`
`Order Den. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, District of Columbia v. Facebook, Inc.,
`2018 CA 008715 B (D.C. Super. Ct. May 31, 2019)... ccc cece ces tbtetteensecenes 2
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Amnesty Int’l, Surveillance Giants: How The Business Model of Google and Facebook
`Threatens Human Rights.....000.0000 coco ccc cece cee ce eee c eect cnet ects tecetecieetieeststessteseenteeensees 13
`
`Brian X. Chen, 7he Battle for Digital Privacy Is Reshaping the Internet, N.Y. Times
`(Sept. 21, 2021) occ ececccsececseeeeteceeneeeeensensecsensecsesecseenestesssensecsensesseseeeeeeneensensenseneed 8
`
`Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, Zhe Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
`Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401 (2017) oo... cece 10, 13
`
`Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Datain the Era of the Internet of Things,
`59 B.C. L. Rev. 423 (2018)... ccccccceceecceteeeeneeceneesseesenseeseneceeeceesnsensessensessesteeteenseneeerenees 8
`
`GLAAD,Social Media Safety Index 00.00ce eect e cece tte ete ctettiseetsteetecteetientitees 13
`
`John Gramlich, /0 Facts About Americans and Facebook, Pew Research Ctr.
`(June 1, 2021).nnn Enc d ene SLE tobi tec de tte tbeeetitecteetieenieteteecieess 7
`
`

`

`Cecilia Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Will Be Added to A Facebook Privacy Lawsuit,
`N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2021) o.ooe eee ete ce bee ete ceeeteeeetstecieesesiiteetseetsieeseenies 7
`
`Mayo Clinic, Teens and Social Media Use: What’s the Impact? ..........0ccccccccccccct tte tee tee teetees 8
`
`Rani Molla, Why Your Free Software Is Never Free, Vox.com (Jan. 29, 2020)...ccc 9
`
`John M. Newman, The Myth ofFree, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 513 (2018)... 4,8
`
`Press Release, D.C. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Racine Announces Apple Will Pay
`$2.6M-+ to Districtfor Deceiving iPhone Users About Battery Problems and
`Throttling Performance (Nov. 18, 2020) ........ccccccccccceecees cece eeeeeeesseeseetseeestetteseeeeeteeneens 1
`
`Press Release, D.C. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Racine Sues DoorDashfor Deceiving
`District Consumers by Taking Tipsfrom Food Delivery Workers (Nov. 19, 2019).............5 1
`
`Press Release, D.C. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Racine Sues Facebookfor Failing to
`Protect Millions of Users’ Data (Dec. 19, 2018) .......ccccccccccec cect eee ctte ttt tetteneteees 1, 7, 12
`
`Sale, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002) oo...cc eeeeeee 4
`
`Sell, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary ......0.000000ccc ccc cece cee c cece ete ceeettetetstetteeteetiennitees 4
`
`Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (2016)... 5
`
`Transfer, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) oo... cece cece cette ete tteeeeniees 5
`
`Transfer, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002) oo... cece eee 5
`
`Kate Vlatch, What’s Old Is New Again: How State Attorneys General Can Reinvigorate
`UDAP Enforcement to Combat Crisis Pregnancy Center Deception,
`39 Colum. J. Gender & L. 140 (2020) ooo. eect eee etn stint eet tec ttcteeeniteteetieens 5
`
`Cat Zakrzewski, Coalition ofState Attorneys General Opens Investigation into
`Instagram ’s Impact on Children and Teens, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 2021) ..........c eee 8, 12
`
`

`

`INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
`
`The District of Columbia respectfully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of
`
`plaintiff's opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss.
`
`The District’s brief addresses the
`
`interpretation of the ConsumerProtection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 3901 ef seq.,
`
`and of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. The District
`
`has a clear interest in the proper interpretation and application of its foremost consumerprotection
`
`law.
`
`The Office of the Attorney General is vested with the statutory authority to enforce the
`
`CPPA,in the name of the District, against “any person... engage[d] in an unfair or deceptive
`
`trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-3904; see id. § 28-3909(a), -3910. The District regularly relies
`
`on the CPPAto protect its residents from corporate deception, including by defendants. See, e.g.,
`
`Press Release, D.C. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Racine Sues Facebook for Failing to Protect
`
`Millions of Users’ Data (Dec. 19, 2018) (‘AG Racine Sues Facebook”), see also Press Release,
`
`D.C. Off. of the Att’y Gen., AG Racine Sues DoorDash for Deceiving District Consumers by
`
`Taking Tipsfrom Food Delivery Workers (Nov. 19, 2019); Press Release, D.C. Off. of the Att’y
`
`Gen., AG Racine Announces Apple Will Pay $2.6M~+ to Districtfor Deceiving iPhone Users About
`
`Battery Problems and Throttling Performance (Nov. 18, 2020).° Furthermore, the CPPA grants
`
`the Attorney General authority to perform a range of duties necessary to protect consumerwelfare,
`
`including representing consumers before administrative agencies and legislative bodies and
`
`conducting consumer education programs. See D.C. Code § 28-3909(c)(1), (3), (5). Givenits role
`
`I
`2
`3
`
`Available at https://bit.ly/3¢XDzHIL.
`Available at https://bit.ly/3lbsQOT.
`Available at https://bit.ly/31dvwEc.
`
`

`

`in enforcing the CPPA and representing consumers in various fora, the District has a paramount
`
`interest
`
`in ensuring that Facebook and similar companies cannot evade accountability for
`
`misleading consumers aboutthe nature of the goods andservices they provide.*
`
`In their motion to dismiss, defendants assert that they are exempt from the CPPA’s
`
`prohibition on deceptive trade practices because Facebook offers its services “free of charge.”
`
`Facebook Mot. to Dismiss 22. They also argue that Section 230 of the CDA immunizes them from
`
`any liability for their allegedly misleading statements about Facebook’s platform andits policies
`
`for removing hate speech. Facebook Mot. to Dismiss 11; see Compl. 1. The District submitsthis
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`amicus brief to clarify that neither the CPPA nor the CDA precludes defendants from incurring
`
`liability for deceptive trade practices.
`
`The CPPA’s prohibition on “unfair [and] deceptive trade practices,” D.C. Code § 28-3904,
`
`extends to misrepresentations about consumer goods and services that are “s[old], lease[d] or
`
`transfer[red].” Jd. § 28-3901(a)(6); see id. § 28-3904(a), (d), (e). As this Court has previously
`
`explained, Facebook’s services “may qualify as business ‘transactions’ for purposes of the CPPA”
`
`because Facebook “provides a free online service to its users” while “allegedly collect[ing] and
`
`sell[ing]” users’ personal data “to third parties.” Order Den. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 20, District
`
`ofColumbia v. Facebook, Inc., 2018 CA 008715 B (D.C. Super. Ct. May 31, 2019).° Abandoning
`
`this principle and limiting the CPPA’s reach to fee-based transactions would contradict the
`
`statute’s text, which plainly prohibits mispresentations about products that are “transferr[ed],” in
`
`addition to those that are “s[old].” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6). This broad language, along with
`
`Following the filing of this lawsuit, Facebook changed its name to Meta Platforms, Inc.
`+
`Because their name remains “Facebook,Inc.” on the docket, we continue to reference them as such
`in this brief.
`
`>
`
`Available at https://bit.ly/3G0FLea.
`
`

`

`the statutory commandthat the CPPA “be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose”
`
`of “assur[ing]
`
`that a just mechanism exists to remedy a// improper trade practices,” id.
`
`§ 28-3901(b)(1), (c) (emphasis added), confirms that the CPPA applies regardless of whether a
`
`consumerpays a fee. A contrary conclusion would exempt a large class of powerful technology
`
`companies from the District’s foremost consumerprotection law, starkly diminishing consumers’
`
`“right to truthful information” about many of the goods and services they use every day.
`
`/d.
`
`§ 28-390 1(c).
`
`Nor does Section 230 of the CDA prevent plaintiff from asserting consumer protection
`
`claims against Facebook. Section 230 bars courts from treating interactive computerserviceslike
`
`Facebookas the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
`
`provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). But the statute is inapposite where, as here, the cause of action
`
`arises from defendants own alleged affirmative deception of District consumers, rather than from
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`statements made by third parties on Facebook’s platform.
`
`Immunizing defendants from liability
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`merely because their misleading statements addressed their content moderation policies would
`
`grant Facebook and other social media platforms unprecedented, unchecked powerto deceive
`
`District consumers about the dangers of their goods and services.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I
`
`The CPPA’s Prohibition On Unfair And Deceptive Trade Practices Applies
`Regardless Of Whether Businesses ChargeFees.
`
`A.
`
`The CPPA applies to trade practices that relate to both the “sale” and
`“transfer” of consumer goodsandservices.
`
`The CPPA“establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about
`
`consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received in the District of
`
`Columbia.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). To that end, the statute prohibits “unfair or deceptive trade
`99 6¢
`
`practice[s],” id. § 28-3904, including misrepresentations about the “uses,” “benefits,”
`
`“standard,”
`
`

`

`or “quality” of a product, id. § 28-3904(a), (d). This prohibition on unfair trade practices is not
`
`limited to businesses that charge moneyfor their goods or services. Rather, the statute specifically
`
`defines “trade practice” to include “any act which does or would... provide information
`
`about...a sale,
`
`lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services.”
`
`/d.
`
`§ 28-3901(a)(6).
`
`Facebook’s provision of social media services constitutes both a “sale” and “transfer” of a
`
`consumergood or service under the CPPA.
`
`Asan initial matter, the service Facebook providesits users can qualify as a “sale” without
`
`any exchange of money. A “sale” is simply “a contract transferring ... ownership of property
`
`from one person or corporate body to another for a price (as a sum of money or any other
`
`consideration).”
`
`Sale, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2003 (3d ed. 2002)
`
`(emphasis added); see Se//, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (defining “sell” as “to give up
`
`(property) to another for something of value (such as money)’).° Facebook users do not pay the
`
`company when they create a profile on the platform. Compl. § 18. But they do give Facebook
`
`something else of value: their data. Compl. { 18-21. As the District has explained elsewhere,
`
`Facebook earnstens of millions of dollars every year by collecting District users’ data and selling
`
`advertising targeted at District consumers. D.C. Opp’n to Facebook’s Mot. to Dismiss at 9,
`
`Facebook, Inc., 2018 CA 008715 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2019).’ Facebook users cannot join
`
`the platform without allowing Facebook to control their personal data and monitor their online
`
`activity, Compl. 7 19, which underscores the exchange of data for Facebook’s products. See John
`
`M. Newman, Zhe Myth ofFree, 86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 513, 553-55 (2018) (describing how users
`
`of Facebook and other “free” products “pay with ... their information”); Maurice E. Stucke &
`
`6
`7
`
`Available at https://bit.ly/3CVoMbb.
`Available at https://adobe.ly/3xTpa9i.
`
`

`

`Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy § 1.26 (2016) (“Consumers pay [for free
`
`services] with their personal data and privacy.”).
`
`But even if Facebook’s data collection does not make this exchange a “sale,” Facebook
`
`“transfer[s]... consumer goods or services” to its users. D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(6). By
`
`definition, a “transfer” requires no exchangeatall, much less a money payment. Rather, a transfer
`
`is a “conveyanceofright, title, or interest .. . by sale, gift, or other process.” Transfer, Webster’s
`
`Third New International Dictionary 2427 (3d ed. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Transfer, New
`
`Oxford American Dictionary 1839 (3d ed. 2010) (defining a “transfer” as “an act of moving
`
`something ... to another place”). Pursuant to the “basic principle” that no statutory provision
`
`should be “render[ed] .. . superfluous,” Zhomas v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp ’t Servs., 547 A.2d 1034,
`
`1037 (D.C. 1988), the word “transfer” must be afforded its plain meaning independentof “sale.”
`
`Cf Kate Vlatch, What’s Old Is New Again: How State Attorneys General Can Reinvigorate UDAP
`
`Enforcement to Combat Crisis Pregnancy Center Deception, 39 Colum. J. Gender & L. 140,
`
`174-75 (2020) (highlighting state consumer protection laws that apply to the “furnishing” or
`
`“distribution” of services and thus “do[] not impose a financial element”).
`
`The notion that the CPPA “police[s] trade practices arising only out of consumer-merchant
`
`relationships,” Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. 1981), does not cabin the
`
`CPPA’s reachto relationships between merchants and theirpaying customers. See Facebook Mot.
`
`to Dismiss 21 (contending that defendants do not have a “consumer-merchant relationship” with
`
`Facebook’s users because they are not “paying a merchantfor its services”). To the contrary, the
`
`Act’s definition of “consumer” encompasses any “person who... does or would purchase,
`
`lease... or receive consumer goodsor services .
`
`.
`
`. or does or would otherwise provide economic
`
`demandfor a trade practice.” D.C. Code § 28-390 1(a)(2)(A) (emphases added). This definition
`
`

`

`includes consumers who“receive”services, in addition to those who “purchase” or “lease” them.
`
`Id.; see id. § 28-390 1(c) (highlighting that the CPPA “establishes an enforceable right to truthful
`
`information from merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased,
`
`leased, or received” (emphasis added)). And it also includes potential consumers who “would”
`
`receive goods and services, id. § 28-3901(a)(2)(A)—aprovision that allows courts to apply the
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`CPPA “whether or not [a merchant] entered a formal contractual relationship with [a consumer]
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`or received money for the services,” Byrd v. Jackson, 902 A.2d 778, 781 (D.C. 2006).
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`Nor does the “consumer-merchant relationship” require that merchants “personally sell”
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`consumer goods and services to plaintiff. Facebook Mot. to Dismiss 22. As a result, even
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`corporate officers can be held liable for deceptive practices, whether money was exchangedornot.
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`The CPPA expansively defines “merchant” to include any “person... who in the ordinary course
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`of business does or would sell, lease (to), or transfer, either directly or indirectly, consumer goods
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`or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3). As above, the statute explicitly defines merchants to
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`include those who “transfer” consumer goods and services, in addition to those who “sell” or
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`“lease” such products. /d. And the “merchant” in the “consumer-merchant”relationship does not
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`have to “directly” sell or transfer goods or services to the consumer. /d.; see Howard, 432 A.2d at
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`709 (requiring only that a “merchant” be “connected with the ‘supply’ side of a consumer
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`transaction” (quoting Report on Bill 1-253 before the Committee on Public Services and Consumer
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`Affairs, Council of the District of Columbia, at 13 (Mar. 24, 1976))).
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`Indeed, “merchant[s]” can
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`include “corporate officers” who “participate in... deceptive trade practices under the CPPA,”
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`even if they are not the “direct supplier of goods or services to consumers.” District of Columbia
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`v. Student Aid Ctr., Inc., No. 2016 CA 003788 B, 2016 WL 4410867, at *3-4 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug.
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`17, 2016); see Cooper v. First Gov ’t Mortg. & Invs. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2002).
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`

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`In sum,the statute clarifies no fewer than four timesthat it applies to the “transfer,” D.C.
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`Code § 28-390 1(a)(3), (6), and the “recei[pt],” id. § 28-390 1(a)(2)(A), (c), of consumer goods and
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`services, in addition to their sale and purchase.
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`Ignoring these statutory distinctions in favor of
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`defendants’ proposed reading would render each of these references “superfluous” and directly
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`contradict the Court of Appeals’ instruction to “construe[] [the statute] so as to give effect to all of
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`[its] provisions.” Thomas, 547 A.2d at 1037.
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`B.
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`Limiting the CPPA’s protections to paying customers would severely curtail
`District consumers’ right to truthful information about the goods and services
`they use.
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`In addition to misconstruing the statutory text, defendants’ proposed reading of the CPPA
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`would substantially shrink District consumers’ “right to truthful information from merchants about
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`consumer goods and services” they receive every day. D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). Nationally,
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`around seven in ten U.S. adults use Facebook—many of whom visit the site several times a day.
`
`John Gramlich, /0 Facts About Americans andFacebook, Pew Research Ctr. (June 1, 2021).8 And
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`the fact that District consumers do not pay Facebook fees for the services they receive does not
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`lessen their need for truthful information about Facebook’s product. Asthe District has alleged in
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`ongoing litigation, Facebook has made “misleading and deceptive” representations “regarding
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`consumerprivacy” on the platform, among other things. D.C. Compl. at 16, Kacebook, Inc., 2018
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`CA 008715 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2018)?; see also AG Racine Sues Facebook, supra; Cecilia
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`Kang, Mark Zuckerberg Will Be Added to a Facebook Privacy Lawsuit, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29,
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`2021). And a numberofstate attorneys general, including the District’s, have recently begun
`
`8
`?
`10
`
`Available at https://pewrsr.ch/3p6TxoF.
`Available at https://bit.ly/3lrYKpyY.
`Available at https://nyti.ms/302LPf£G.
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`

`

`investigating the extent to which Facebook executives knew of Instagram’s harmful effects on
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`children, especially teenage girls. See Cat Zakrzewski, Coalition ofState Attorneys General Opens
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`Investigation into Instagram’s Impact on Children and Teens, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 2021)!'; see
`
`also Mayo Clinic, Zeens and Social Media Use: What’s the Impact? (describing studies that link
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`high levels of social media use with symptomsof depression and anxiety). Limiting the CPPA’s
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`reach to fee-based transactions would stymie such efforts to demandtruthful information from
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`Facebook aboutthe nature ofits products.
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`Facebookis not the only company that offers its product at no cost in exchange for users’
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`personal information. See Newman, supra, at 553. When individuals create profiles on various
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`“free” internet platforms,
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`those platforms can gather data about their users’ demographics,
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`interests, search histories, physical locations, and even their health-related data—information
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`which they can in turn sell to advertisers. See, e.g., Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer
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`Data in the Era ofthe Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 423, 426-27 (2018); Brian X. Chen, 7he
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`Battle for Digital Privacy Is Reshaping the Internet, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2021).'° This model
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`of advertising “powered the growth of Facebook, Google and Twitter, which offered their search
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`and social networking services to people without charge.” Chen, supra; see also D.C. Opp’n to
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`Facebook Mot. to Dismiss, supra, at 9 (highlighting the immense revenue Facebook earns from
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`selling advertising). And this approach is no longer limited to technology giants like Facebook
`
`and Google—services ranging from antivirus and personal finance apps to email servers collect
`
`Ml
`V
`1s
`
`Available at https://wapo.st/3FZ3xan.
`Available at https://mayocl.in/3rwL1Cj (last visited Dec. 6, 2021).
`Available at https://nyti.ms/308Nn8l.
`
`

`

`andsell user data while offering their services ostensibly for free. See Rani Molla, Why Your Free
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`Software Is Never Free, Vox (Jan. 29, 2020).
`
`Exempting this entire business model
`
`from statutory liability would contradict
`
`the
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`Council’s purposeto “assure that a just mechanism exists to remedy a// impropertrade practices,”
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`to “deter the continuing use of such practices,” D.C. Code § 28-390 1(b)(1) (emphasis added), and
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`to “promote .
`
`.
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`. fair business practices throughout the community,” id. § 28-3901(b)(2). See also
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`Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 722-23 (D.C. 2003) (emphasizing that the
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`CPPAis a “comprehensive statute designed to provide procedures and remedies for a broad range
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`of practices which injure consumers” (quoting Atwater v. D.C. Dep't of Consumer & Regul. Affs.,
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`566 A.2d 462, 465 (D.C. 1989))). Drawing on the CPPA’s expansive definition of “consumer”
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`and “merchant,” as well as the Council’s instruction to “construe[] and appl[y] [the CPPA]
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`liberally to promote its purpose,” D.C. Code § 28-3901(c), this Court should reject Facebook’s
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`argumentthat only paying customers are protected by the CPPA.
`
`I.
`
`The Communications Decency Act Does Not Immunize Defendants From Liability
`For Their Own Alleged Misrepresentations.
`
`Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act prevents a website operator like
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`Facebook from being treated as the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
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`information content provider.”
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`47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1). The statute thus bars plaintiffs from
`
`bringing defamation and othertort actions against interactive computer services that would more
`
`properly be asserted against the individual who posted such tortious content in the first place. By
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`contrast, Section 230 does not provide businesses with sweeping immunity for their own
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`affirmative, unlawful misrepresentations about the nature of their goods andservices.
`
`iM
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`Available at https://bit.ly/3rfscDe.
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`

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`Congress passed Section 230 of the CDA with the “specific purpose[]” of overruling
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`Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995),
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`“and any other similar decisions which havetreated... providers and users [of an interactive
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`computer service] as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own.” H.R. Rep. No.
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`104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
`
`In Stratton Oakmont, a New York court concluded that
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`Prodigy—anearly internet platform—wasliable for anonymous defamatory messages posted on
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`its online bulletin board. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *5; see also Danielle
`
`Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans $ 230
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`Immunity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 401, 404-05 (2017). Addressing the threat of such litigation,
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`Section 230 was designedto protect interactive computerservices like Prodigy from the burden of
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`tort claims that would be more properly asserted against the individual tortfeasor. See, e.g., Doe
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`v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasizing that a suit “clear[ly]”
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`barred by Section 230 “is a defamation action founded on the hosting of defamatory third-party
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`content”). By immunizing internet platforms from liability for their users’ defamatory statements,
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`Section 230 “promote[d] the continued developmentof the Internet.” Lemmon v. Snap, Inc., 995
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`F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting HomeAway.com, Inc. v. City ofSanta Monica, 918 F.3d
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`676, 681 (9th Cir. 2019)).
`
`But the statute was not designed as a general grant of immunity for companies like
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`Facebook. Section 230 only prevents providers of interactive computer services from being treated
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`as the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”
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`47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As such, the statute grants immunity when “(1) [the defendant] is a provider
`
`or user of an interactive computer service, (ii) the information for which [the plaintiff] seeks to
`
`hold [the defendant] liable was information provided by another information content provider, and
`
`10
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`

`

`(iii) the complaint seeks to hold [the defendant] liable as the publisher or speaker of that
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`information.” Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir.
`
`2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir.
`
`2014)).
`
`Defendants’ conduct at issue here is not, however, “information provided by another
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`information content provider.” /d. (quoting Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357). Rather than asserting
`
`that Facebook is liable for speech posted by third parties, plaintiff alleges that Facebook and its
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`executives violated the CPPA through their own misrepresentations about the platform’s content
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`moderation policies.
`
`See Compl. 3 (highlighting “[t]he failure of Facebook and its senior
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`executives to abide by their promises to