`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
`
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
`
`Case No. 3:23-cv-46
`
`COMPLAINT FOR
`PERMANENT INJUNCTION,
`MONETARY RELIEF, CIVIL
`PENALTIES, AND OTHER
`RELIEF
`
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`WEALTHPRESS HOLDINGS LLC, a
`limited liability company,
`
`INVESTPUB LLC, a limited liability
`company,
`and
`
`CONOR LYNCH, individually and as an
`officer of WEALTHPRESS HOLDINGS
`LLC, and
`
`ROGER SCOTT, individually and as an
`officer of WEALTHPRESS HOLDINGS
`LLC
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`Plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), for its Complaint alleges:
`
`1.
`
`The FTC brings this action under Sections 5(m)(1)(A)-(B), 13(b), and
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`19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A)-
`
`(B), 53(b), and 57b, and under Section 5 of the Restore Online Shoppers’
`
`Confidence Act (“ROSCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 8404, which authorize the FTC to seek,
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`and the Court to order, temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief,
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`monetary relief, civil penalties, and other relief against Defendants for engaging in
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`acts or practices that violate Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) and
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`Section 4 of ROSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 8403, and that the Commission has previously
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`determined to be unfair or deceptive, in connection with the sale and marketing of
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`Defendants’ goods and services.
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`SUMMARY OF CASE
`
`2.
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`Defendants, operating under the name “WealthPress,” convince
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`consumers to spend hundreds, often thousands of dollars each, to purchase one of
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`Defendants’ numerous services that recommend trades in the financial markets.
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`Each service is led by an individual claiming substantial relevant expertise which
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`he will deploy—typically through a “system” or “strategy”—to provide subscribers
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`recommendations of specific trades to place in the financial markets. Defendants’
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`marketing features numerous examples of supposed highly profitable trades,
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`testimonials from purportedly successful subscribers, claims about the purported
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`experts’ own wealth and expensive lifestyles supposedly funded by trading profits,
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`and other claims, to convey the impression that purchasers will or are likely to
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`make substantial profits by taking the recommended trades.
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`3.
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`Defendants have no reasonable data to support their lavish earnings
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`representations, which are often flatly made up or plainly false. Indeed, many
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`purchasers of Defendants’ “services” lose money trading, on top of the hefty sum
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`they pay Defendants.
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`4.
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`Defendants’ deceptive practices have violated the FTC Act and
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`ROSCA.
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`5.
`
`On October 26, 2021, the FTC sent Defendants WealthPress
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`Holdings, LLC and InvestPub, LLC (via its parent company), Notices of Penalty
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`Offenses Concerning Money-Making Opportunities and Testimonials and
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`Endorsements (the “Notices”), noting that Defendants could be subject to civil
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`penalties for violations of the FTC Act in connection with their marketing claims,
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`pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B); 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(e). The Notices stated that it
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`is an unfair or deceptive trade practice to make false, misleading, or deceptive
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`representations concerning the profits or earnings a participant in a money-making
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`opportunity can expect or to engage in certain acts or practices related to consumer
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`testimonials. Defendants have continued to use deceptive or unsubstantiated
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`earnings claims in their marketing even after receiving the Notices.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`
`6.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
`
`1331, 1337(a), 1345, and 1355.
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`7.
`
`Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), (c)(1),
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`(c)(2), (c)(3), and (d), 1395(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
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`PLAINTIFF
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`8.
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`The FTC is an independent agency of the United States Government
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`created by the FTC Act, which authorizes the FTC to commence this district court
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`civil action by its own attorneys. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. The FTC enforces Section
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`5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
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`practices in or affecting commerce. The FTC also enforces ROSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§
`
`8401 et seq., which prohibits certain methods of negative option marketing on the
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`internet.
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`DEFENDANTS
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`9.
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`Defendant WealthPress Holdings, LLC (“WealthPress”) is a Delaware
`
`limited liability company with its principal place of business at 7751 Belfort
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`Parkway, Suite 120, Jacksonville, Florida 32256. Previously, WealthPress’s
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`principal place of business was 495 Town Plaza Avenue, Ponte Vedra, Florida
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`32081. WealthPress transacts or has transacted business in this District and
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`throughout the United States. At all times relevant to this Complaint, acting alone
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`or in concert with others, WealthPress has advertised, marketed, distributed, or
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`sold trade recommendation services to consumers throughout the United States.
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`10. Defendant InvestPub, LLC (“InvestPub”) is a Florida limited liability
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`company with its principal place of business at 495 Town Plaza Avenue, Ponte
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`Vedra, Florida 32081. InvestPub transacts or has transacted business in this District
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`and throughout the United States. InvestPub shares or has shared office space with
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`WealthPress, and shares ownership. InvestPub participated in WealthPress’s
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`operations, including by marketing WealthPress’s products or services. At times
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`relevant to this Complaint, acting alone or in concert with others, InvestPub
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`advertised, marketed, distributed, or sold trade recommendation services to
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`consumers throughout the United States.
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`11. Defendant Conor Lynch (“Lynch”) was Head Publisher of
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`WealthPress. Until recently, Lynch owned one third of WealthPress through
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`Happy Camper Publishing, Inc., a Canada-based company that Lynch solely owns.
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`At times relevant to this Complaint, acting alone or in concert with others, Lynch
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`has formulated, directed, controlled, had authority to control, or participated in the
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`acts and practices of WealthPress, including the acts and practices set forth in this
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`Complaint. For years, Lynch has managed the day-to-day operations of
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`WealthPress. Lynch has written promotions or other marketing materials used to
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`market WealthPress goods or services. Lynch has resided in Toronto, Canada and,
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`in connection with the matters alleged herein, transacts or has transacted business
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`in this District and throughout the United States.
`
`12. Defendant Roger Scott (“Scott”) is WealthPress’s most featured
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`purported trading expert and participates in managing WealthPress. Scott appears
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`in WealthPress’s advertising, stars in a substantial portion of its marketing videos,
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`develops new WealthPress programs, and claims to operate a number of its trade
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`recommendation services. Scott owns one third of WealthPress through Market
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`Geeks LLC, a company he solely owns. At times relevant to this Complaint, acting
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`alone or in concert with others, he has formulated, directed, controlled, had
`
`authority to control, or participated in the acts and practices set forth in this
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`Complaint. Defendant Scott resides in Ponte Vedra, Florida, and in connection
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`with the matters alleged herein, transacts or has transacted business in this District
`
`and throughout the United States.
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`COMMON ENTERPRISE
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`13. Defendants WealthPress and InvestPub (“collectively, “Corporate
`
`Defendants”) have operated as a common enterprise while engaging in the
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`deceptive and unlawful acts and practices and other violations of law alleged
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`below. Corporate Defendants have conducted the business practices described
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`below through interrelated companies that have common ownership, managers,
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`business functions, employees, office locations, advertising, and marketing.
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`Because these Corporate Defendants have operated as a common enterprise, each
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`of them is liable for the acts and practices alleged below.
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`COMMERCE
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`14. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants have maintained a
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`substantial course of trade in or affecting commerce, as “commerce” is defined in
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`Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
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`15. Defendants offer or have offered scores of services to the public that
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`recommend trades in financial markets (“trade recommendation services”), chiefly
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`through online video promotions. Defendants frequently launch new trade
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`recommendation services. Each trade recommendation service is ostensibly led by
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`a specific purported WealthPress expert who stars in its promotional videos.
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`Defendants represent that the purported expert leveraged his extensive expertise to
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`develop an algorithm or strategy that consistently identifies extremely profitable
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`trades, that he uses the algorithm or strategy to generate substantial trading profits,
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`and that subscribers will get specific trade recommendations from the algorithm or
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`strategy, leading to similar substantial trading profits for them, regardless of their
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`experience, knowledge, available capital, or available time. Defendants represent
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`that the alerts provide all the information needed to place and close the trades—
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`subscribers do not need any special knowledge or expertise.
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`16. Subscribers to a WealthPress trade recommendation service are given
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`access to a members-only page on WealthPress’s website, and periodically receive
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`trade alerts via email or text message. The trade alerts advise the subscribers that a
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`new trade recommendation has been posted to the members-only page. Subscribers
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`who log on can view specific details regarding the recommended trade, such as the
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`security, the price, and the timing of the recommended trade. For example:
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`6/7/21
`Ticket: KAR Kar auction services
`Expiration: July 16, 2021
`Strike price: $20 strike calls
`Position size: medium (4-6%)
`Buy to open the KAR July 16, 2021 expiration 20 strike calls at .40
`First profit target: .60
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`17. Defendants represent that subscribers will or are likely to make
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`substantial profits by taking the recommended trades. In numerous instances,
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`however, consumers have instead lost substantial sums of money when investing
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`based on Defendants’ trade recommendations, not counting the thousands of
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`dollars individual consumers paid for access to Defendants’ trade recommendation
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`services.
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`18. Buried in a purported disclaimer on their website, described further
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`below, Defendants admit they have no substantiation for their claims that
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`consumers are likely to make the advertised profits or income. Defendants admit
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`that the claims made in their consumer testimonials are not typical of consumers
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`using their services.
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`19. Numerous consumers have realized Defendants’ services do not work
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`as claimed. In many cases, Defendants have denied consumers’ refund requests.
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`20. Defendants instruct their customer service representatives to funnel
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`cancellation requests to a team of “retention specialists” who are tasked with trying
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`to induce consumers not to cancel.
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`Defendants’ Advertising
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`21. Defendants have offered at least eighty-five trade recommendation or
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`other related services since WealthPress’s inception, each ostensibly helmed by a
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`specific purported expert. Although the lineup of services and purported experts
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`has changed over time, Defendants’ advertisements for their trade recommendation
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`services typically follow the same playbook.
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`22. Defendants use targeted advertising on widely-used websites,
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`including YouTube, to show advertisements to consumers who search for or view
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`content relating to securities trading. For example, FTC staff encountered a video
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`advertisement for a WealthPress trade recommendation service, “Blitz Alerts,”
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`while searching for videos on trading advice on YouTube.
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`23. During this five-minute video, a purported expert represents to
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`consumers that if they subscribe to his Blitz Alerts service, they will make
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`substantial income, including through statements such as:
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` “I’ll show you how you can potentially make $24,840 dollars—or
`more—every single week. With [] quick simple … trades that require
`zero market knowledge or trading experience.”
`
` He “hired a team of world-class programmers” who built “a specialized
`tool” that reliably identifies such trade opportunities before they happen.
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` The system alerted subscribers to a trade on Nordstrom that the “expert”
`personally took, and which returned over 400% profit overnight, while
`he spent the day fishing.
`In many instances, the trades described were never actually made, and
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`24.
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`neither the purported experts nor their subscribers reaped the profits cited. Indeed,
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`in many cases, the trades are entirely fictional, representing nothing more than
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`calculations based on historical price data.
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`25. Consumers who click the advertised link are taken to a WealthPress
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`website with further marketing for the service. The websites frequently advertise a
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`free presentation or webinar, which is in truth a lengthy, pre-recorded, video sales
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`presentation or “video sales letter” (“VSL”). Defendants often depict the VSL in
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`terms that imply it will be held, live, in a matter of minutes after the consumer
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`arrives at the webpage, and request the consumer enter an email address to be
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`given access to the VSL.
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`26. For example, consumers who clicked the link from the Blitz Alerts
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`YouTube advertisement described above would be taken to a webpage touting the
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`service. The page offered a free event purportedly about to start within minutes and
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`asked for the consumer’s email address in order to access it. Some consumers
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`arrive at such pages via other marketing channels, such as email marketing and
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`banner advertisements.
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`27. Defendants gather consumer contact information in additional ways,
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`including by offering free newsletters and market analysis videos to consumers
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`who provide an email address.
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`28. After consumers submit their email address to Defendants, they are
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`bombarded with numerous emails every day, advertising Defendants’ trade
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`recommendation services. Consumers receive these emails directly from
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`WealthPress, but also from its affiliates, such as InvestPub. The emails often
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`feature various purported WealthPress experts promoting each other’s trade
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`recommendation services.
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`Defendants’ VSLs
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`29. Many of the emails Defendants send to consumers urge consumers to
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`sign up or register for purportedly live events or presentations. Those who do are
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`sent a link. In many instances, the links take consumers to pre-recorded VSLs
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`advertising Defendants’ services.
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`30. The VSLs are typically between 30 minutes and an hour. They feature
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`purported experts making numerous earnings claims. The VSLs often appear to
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`be—but are not—extemporaneous discussions among the purported experts.
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`Instead, they are scripted.
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`31. Defendants’ purported experts describe specific trades that the service
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`purportedly recommended to subscribers, invariably yielding substantial profits.
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`For example, Roger Scott, in a VSL for a service called “Robinhood Effect,”
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`describes numerous supposed profitable trades that his system alerted him to,
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`including trades on which he claims returns of 260% in two weeks, 316% in just
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`over a week, 71% in over three weeks, and 51% in just days. In the Blitz Alerts
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`VSL, the purported expert tells consumers that his system alerted him to the
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`purportedly lucrative Nordstrom trade described above. And that a week later, his
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`system alerted him to two more trades, this time netting him and subscribers who
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`invested $1,000, returns of $7,330 on Dollar General and $12,100 on Guess,
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`overnight, while “you could have spent the … afternoon on the golf course.”
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`Similarly, in a VSL for “Primetime,” another purported expert describes numerous
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`supposed profitable trades that his Primetime system had alerted him to, including
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`specific trades yielding profits of 88%, 68% overnight, $2,500 into $4,140, and
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`$1,000 into $1,927 in three days.
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`32.
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`In many cases the trades depicted are not real, were not actually taken
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`by Defendants, and were not sent to subscribers. Rather, Defendants searched
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`historical price information for significant price changes, and then pretended that
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`their service had predicted those changes before they happened. Defendants do not
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`disclose this fact to consumers, but instead pretend that past subscribers were able
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`to place highly profitable trades that, in reality, are entirely fictional and shed no
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`light on the likelihood that subscribers will actually attain substantial profits. The
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`supposed Nordstrom, Dollar General, and Guess trades referenced above would
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`have predated the offering of Blitz Alerts to the public and so could not have been
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`sent to subscribers.
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`33.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts extol their own purported
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`trading prowess, credentials, and expertise, including by name-dropping prominent
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`institutions and individuals they claim to have worked for or with.
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`34. Defendants’ purported experts represent to consumers that they are
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`personally responsible for the trade recommendations sent to subscribers, or that
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`the trades recommended by their service are based on an algorithm or strategy that
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`the purported expert personally discovered or developed. These representations
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`convey the impression that the trades the service recommends to subscribers are
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`more likely to be profitable because of the purported expert’s supposed algorithms,
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`expertise, inside knowledge, or personal involvement in selecting them.
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`35.
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`In many instances the purported expert also claims to have hired a
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`team of programmers to help him develop and implement his strategy. For
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`example, in the Blitz Alerts VSL, the purported expert tells consumers about his
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`time working at “Citi Group, one of the biggest investment banks in the world,”
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`where, he claims, he was tasked with making money for clients using Shadow
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`Blitzes. He tells consumers that when he saw how “powerful” they were, he hired a
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`team of programmers to “build a specialized tool” that identifies Shadow Blitzes
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`before they happen, for use in his own trading. He then claims that the Blitz Alerts
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`service’s trade recommendations are generated by that “tool” and that he
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`personally double checks them before they are sent out to subscribers.
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`36. Contrary to the above-described representations, in many cases the
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`trade recommendations sent to subscribers are actually generated by WealthPress
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`with little or no involvement by the purported expert. Rather, in many cases, prior
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`to the launch of a new service the purported expert provides WealthPress with
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`some general trading concepts or strategy ideas, WealthPress devises a name and
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`marketing strategy for the service, and, after subscriptions begin to be sold,
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`WealthPress selects and sends trade recommendations to subscribers with no
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`further involvement by the purported expert. In many instances, including Blitz
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`Alerts, the purported expert, contrary to their claims, did not in fact hire a team to
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`develop the strategy or algorithm.
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`37.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts represent to consumers
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`that they personally make the trades recommended by their service, and have
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`reaped substantial profits from those trades. In many cases, the purported experts
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`specifically claim to have made the trades featured in the VSL, and assert that
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`profits depicted are real, not fake or hypothetical. For example, in the Blitz Alerts
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`VSL the purported expert tells consumers: “Listen, this is not a hypothetical
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`example. I personally placed the trade on Nordstrom. In fact, I took every single
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`trade I’m about to share with you today.”
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`38.
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`In many cases, contrary to what they tell consumers, the purported
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`experts did not actually place the trades they describe.
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`39.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts state or imply that they
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`have reaped substantial profits by making the trades their system recommends to
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`subscribers, including by depicting a lavish lifestyle that their strategy has
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`purportedly afforded them, and which it will supposedly make possible for
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`subscribers, as well. Roger Scott, in a VSL for “Robinhood Effect,” tells
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`consumers that he has used the service’s method to grow his account from a few
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`thousand to tens of millions of dollars, implying that profits from the service’s
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`recommendations enabled him to buy a home in Beverly Hills next door to Julia
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`Roberts and Eddie Van Halen, and charter private planes to take him on vacation.
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`Similarly, in the Blitz Alerts VSL the purported expert tells consumers that his
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`algorithm allows him to spend mere minutes placing trades, and then go about his
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`days fishing, wakeboarding, and drinking and smoking cigars with friends, and the
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`VSL features a montage depicting him doing that. He claims that his trading
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`success allowed him to buy “a house in Tampa, [and] then [his] first boat,” and
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`when he returns from his various leisure pursuits, he simply checks his previous
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`trades and realizes profits of close to $10,000. The purported PrimeTime expert
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`claims his system allows him “to do whatever I want, whenever I want,” that it has
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`“granted me ultimate freedom,” and he’ll never have to work again. He claims he
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`has bought two houses and a brand new Corvette with profits from his system’s
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`trades.
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`40.
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`In truth, in many cases the purported experts do not generate
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`substantial income through trading in the financial markets, and do not fund their
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`lifestyle with profits from their trading, but instead rely on income from the sale of
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`trade recommendation services to consumers. And, as described below, Defendants
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`have no reason to believe that the trade recommendations sent to subscribers will
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`provide them with profits similar to those described, or wealth sufficient to fund
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`the expensive lifestyle depicted.
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`41.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts depict or describe
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`numerous supposed testimonials from allegedly successful users of the advertised
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`trade recommendation service, implying that the results described are likely or
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`typical. For example, the Blitz Alerts VSL features purported subscribers claiming
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`results such as $4,497.50 overnight, and returns of 962.5%, and 1,250%. Similarly,
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`testimonialists featured in the PrimeTime VSL claim to have turned $5,000 into
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`$22,516.93, to get average returns of 20% per trade, and to be “just getting started”
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`with profits of $7,404.
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`42.
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`In truth, the results described in the testimonials are far from typical.
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`As explained in Paragraphs 60-61 below, Defendants admit, in poorly disclosed
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`fine-print disclaimers, that “[t]he testimonials and examples used herein are
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`exceptional results, which do not apply to the average member and are not
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`intended to represent or guarantee that anyone will achieve the same or similar
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`results.” In some cases, Defendants have featured testimonials in VSLs without
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`making any effort to confirm the validity of the claims made in the testimonials. In
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`some cases, VSLs feature testimonials that are not even from subscribers to the
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`service being offered, or that are based on trades not recommended to subscribers
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`to the service being offered.
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`43.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts tell consumers that
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`purchasers will or are likely to reap substantial profits with the service’s trade
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`recommendations. For example, in the “Robinhood Effect” VSL, Scott implies his
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`service will let subscribers “track the BIG money” and “could quite literally
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`transform your life.” He suggests subscribers can anticipate 200% to 500% gains,
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`that returns of 64%, 58.4%, 148.48% and 235% are typical, and that 74% of trades
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`are profitable. Similarly, in the Blitz Alerts VSL the purported expert tells
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`consumers that if they “do exactly what the steps outline,” they could “collect an
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`easy $7,000 the very next day,” implies that subscribers will reap at least 300%
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`returns on every trade, and says he believes the service will “make you very
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`wealthy very quickly,” and “put you on the path to millionaire status, no matter
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`your starting point today.”
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`44.
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`In truth, Defendants have no basis for representing that purchasers are
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`likely to realize substantial profits, or any profits at all.
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`45.
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`In the VSLs, Defendant’s purported experts tell consumers that they
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`will be able to easily make the trades recommended, without substantial capital or
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`expertise, and that subscribers will be provided all the necessary details to place
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`the recommended trades, such as the exact securities to purchase or sell, the time
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`and price at which to execute the trade, and when and how to close out the trade.
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`For example, in the Robinhood Effect VSL Scott claims the service is “real simple,
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`its’s effortless, and it’s objective,” that consumers do not need any special
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`knowledge or account to take the trades, that “we give you everything you need,
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`and if you’re a beginner not a problem,” and that consumers only need a few
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`thousand dollars to use the service to profit. Similarly, the Blitz Alerts VSL tells
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`consumers they can profit without any experience or investing credentials, that the
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`service is “so simple and so easy that anybody could do it with just a few minutes
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`of free time,” and that subscribers need only place a trade before the market closes
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`to reap the advertised profits.
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`46.
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`In many cases, subscribers are unable to place all of the trades
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`recommended by a service, for example due to a lack of capital, or are not
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`Case 3:23-cv-00046-MMH-LLL Document 1 Filed 01/12/23 Page 19 of 43 PageID 19
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`provided with all of the details of how to open and close recommended trades. In
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`many cases, subscribers who do place a recommended trade do not reap the
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`advertised profit, and, in many cases, make no money or lose money.
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`47. Toward the end of the VSL, Defendants’ purported experts offer their
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`service for sale, and typically make representations designed to convey a sense of
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`urgency. These claims frequently include a representation that the number of spots
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`or subscriptions available is limited. The VSLs also represent that consumers who
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`purchase promptly will receive a substantial discount, including through depictions
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`of a purported “retail” price several times greater than the price advertised in the
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`VSL. These claims attempt to pressure consumers to sign up quickly to avoid
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`missing the opportunity. For example, in the Blitz Alerts VSL, consumers are told
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`that spots are limited and that “the doors close” after 199 subscriptions are sold
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`because the service would lose its power if it were made available to too many
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`people. The PrimeTime VSL similarly claims “there’s limited spots available today
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`at this special rate,” after which the price will be at least $14,997.
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`48.
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`In many cases in which Defendants have made such claims of limited
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`availability, Defendants were willing to, and did, sell more subscriptions than the
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`limited number they advertised, and did not actually charge prospective purchasers
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`the purported “retail” prices. For example, contrary to the claims that only 199
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`subscriptions of Blitz Alerts would be sold, in the first year alone Defendants sold
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`Case 3:23-cv-00046-MMH-LLL Document 1 Filed 01/12/23 Page 20 of 43 PageID 20
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`more than 1,800 subscriptions. And Defendants never sold the PrimeTime service
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`for $14,997—most subscriptions were sold for $1,497, and all but a handful were
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`sold for $2,497 or less.
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`49. Defendants’ purported experts are paid a percentage of the revenue
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`generated by the services they promote, and so have direct knowledge that sales
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`exceed the advertised limits.
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`50.
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`In the VSLs, Defendants’ purported experts make representations
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`stating or implying that purchasing the service and making the recommended
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`trades poses low or no risk to consumers. These statements vary, but often include
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`claims that the strategy selects low-risk trades, purported representations of past
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`trade results that imply that trades are consistently profitable, and even explicit
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`guarantees to consumers, the exact terms of which vary, but which impliedly or
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`explicitly convey a drastic reduction or complete removal of the risk for
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`consumers. Such statements convey to consumers that Defendants’ trade
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`recommendation services involve little risk or no risk at all. For example, in the
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`Blitz Alerts VSL, the purported expert tells consumers that if they place trades “at
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`3:30 p.m., then cash out at 10 a.m.,” they will have “[l]ow risk [and] extremely
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`high rewards;” claims that “because of the steep price discount and trading secrets
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`you’ll receive … the risk is almost entirely on me;” and implies that every trade
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`will yield at least 300% gains. The PrimeTime VSL claims the system exploits “a
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`Case 3:23-cv-00046-MMH-LLL Document 1 Filed 01/12/23 Page 21 of 43 PageID 21
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`repeatable pattern that’s handed out double digit winners over and over, like clock-
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`work,” is “the best way to predict the next stock market move,” and is “the
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`opportunity of a lifetime for anyone who wants to retire stress free.” At one point,
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`the purported expert describes a series of profitable trades allegedly sent to
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`subscribers, concluding “[y]our account would be at nearly forty grand in just a
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`few weeks’ time, and you wouldn’t have even risked a penny of your profits along
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`the way.” He also offers a “guarantee” that, he says, “take[s] all the risk of the
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`program off you.”
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`51.
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`In truth, contrary to Defendants’ representations many purchasers
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`have lost significant amounts of money or been unable to recoup the cost of the
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`service through trading profits.
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`Defendants’ Representations Are Deceptive and False
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`52.
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`In many cases, representations such as those described in Paragraphs
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`15 to 50 were deceptive, unsubstantiated, or misleading for the reasons noted
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`above at Paragraphs 15 to 51.
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`53.
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`In truth, and contrary to the claims made by Defendants and their
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`purported experts, the testimonials and trading profits depicted in Defendants’
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`advertising are not typical, and Defendants’ representations that subscribers are
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`likely to reap substantial profits have no reasonable basis. Defendants do not know
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`whether purchasers of their trade recommendation services typically make profits
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`Case 3:23-cv-00046-MMH-LLL Document 1 Filed 01/12/23 Page 22 of 43 PageID 22
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`or, if so, how much. In reality, many consumers who purchased Defendants’ trade
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`recommendation services lost money trading in the financial markets. Defendants’
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`own very limited internal surveys revealed that a number of purchasers had lost
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`money, and that purchasers’ results typically varied—often substantially—from
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`those documented in Defendants’ trackers. In some cases, Defendants’ own
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`trackers demonstrated that tra