Case 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 1 of 18 PageID 97
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
`Civil Action No. 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF
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`TRAVIS TAAFFE
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`CLASS ACTION
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`___________________________________ X
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`ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC.,
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`ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL LLC, and
`ROBINHOOD SECURITIES, LLC, :
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`___________________________________ X
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`Plaintiff,
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`vs.
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`Defendants.
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`PLAINTIFF’S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
`ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND INCORPORATED
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT THEREOF
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`Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rules 23(d) and 65, Plaintiff Travis Taaffe, individually and
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`on behalf of all other similarly situated (“Plaintiff” or “Taaffe”), by and through his
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`undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Court for issuance of an emergency temporary
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`restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendants Robinhood Financial, LLC
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`(“Robinhood Financial”), Robinhood Securities, LLC (“Robinhood Securities”), and
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`Robinhood Markets,
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`Inc.
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`(“Robinhood Markets”)
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`(collectively, “Defendants” or
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`“Robinhood”) that:
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`(1) Enjoins Robinhood from sending any further misleading communications to
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`prospective class members;
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`(2) Requires Robinhood to make each prospective class member aware of this
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`lawsuit and to provide Plaintiff’s counsel with contact information for each
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`prospective class member including the email address of each prospective class
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`member; and,
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`(3) Requires that any releases entered into by and between prospective class members
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`and Robinhood since the filing of this lawsuit be voided, with prospective class
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`members given the opportunity to affirm any release after being informed of this
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`litigation and having an opportunity to consult with counsel.
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`In support hereof, Plaintiff submits the incorporated memorandum of law, and alleges
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`as follows:
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`On March 3, 2020, Robinhood announced publically that it was at fault for its system
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`outages which prevented trading during the then-largest single-day point gain in all three
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`major U.S. stock market indices (March 2, 2020). Plaintiff filed suit on March 4, 2020 on
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`behalf of himself and the Class of others similarly situated against Defendants, seeking
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`recovery of damages that were proximately caused by Defendants’ failure to provide and
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`maintain a suitable platform for its users.
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`Plaintiff has discovered that despite Defendants’ clear awareness of this litigation –
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`or more likely due to the existence of this litigation – Defendants sent misleading
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`communications in the last approximately thirty-six hours to prospective class members in an
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`effort to obtain a waiver of the claims brought in this case. Specifically, Defendants offered
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`its users a “goodwill credit of $75” in exchange for their signatures on a “DocuSign”
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`document. Unfortunately for the prospective class members, this DocuSign document
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`includes a complete waiver of rights which is not identified or referred to in any way by
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`Defendants to its users. Neither the instant class nor the fact that customers may have
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`putative class claims is referenced in these communications. Defendants’ correspondence to
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`its users reads, in part, as follows:
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`Thanks so much for your patience as we evaluated the impact of the
`outage on your account. Based on our review, we’re able to offer you
`a goodwill credit of $75.00.
`To accept this offer, please review and sign the agreement that will
`be sent to you from Robinhood via DocuSign, which includes
`reference to your incoming credit.
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`An example of this correspondence is attached to the Declaration of Class Member Jared
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`Ward (“Ward’s Declaration”) attached hereto as Exhibit 1. As stated in Ward’s Declaration,
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`the acceptance document Robinhood provides to users contains a broad waiver of claims that
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`class members have against Robinhood without providing notice of the class action’s
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`existence. This is a misleading attempt to secure a waiver after the filing of this lawsuit
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`without class members fully understanding their rights.1 Many users who sign on their phone
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`via Docusign may not even realize they are executing a release.
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`The undersigned counsel has received numerous phone calls and electronic
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`communications from class members related to these misleading communications. See
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`Declaration of Michael S. Taaffe attached as Exhibit 2. It is very clear from the volume and
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`1 In addition to the proposed class members not being informed of the existence of this lawsuit in the
`communication seeking their waiver of all claims, Robinhood is also not agreeing to provide any programmatic
`relief sought by this lawsuit. Specifically, Robinhood is not offering to ensure that users are provided with a
`functioning trading platform moving forward or any assurance of further remuneration were the platform to
`suffer additional outages causing damage.
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`nature of these communications by class members to the undersigned that Robinhood’s
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`communications are misleading and that this Motion is thus necessary.
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`Defendants are attempting to mislead the putative class members into unknowingly
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`waiving their rights to participate in the class action—whether they know it exists or not—in
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`exchange for as little as a $75 credit. Defendants’ conduct must not be allowed to continue.
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`Neither the letter nor the release mentions this class action lawsuit.
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`Further, the compensation offered by Defendants is grossly inadequate. Class
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`members have incurred significant monetary damages as a result of the Defendants’ systems
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`outage; many in the tens of thousands of dollars. However, Defendants have offered only $75
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`to settle all of their claims. This $75 offer appears to be a very intentional determination of
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`remuneration by Robinhood, as that is the amount of money that Robinhood charges its
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`users to withdraw their funds from its platform.
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`Unless Defendants’ conduct is immediately enjoined by this Court, the putative class
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`members will suffer severe and irreparable harm by way of unwittingly forfeiting their rights
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`in exchange for inadequate compensation and no programmatic relief. Not only will putative
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`class members suffer irreparable harm without the injunctive relief sought, but the injury is
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`so imminent that notice and a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction is
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`impractical, if not impossible. Accordingly, immediate injunctive relief should be granted by
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`this Court to preserve the status quo.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`As set forth in the Complaint, Robinhood is an online brokerage firm whose users
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`place securities trades mainly through the firm’s website and mobile application.
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`Furthermore, Robinhood permits many of its users to engage in the buying and selling of
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`option contracts. However, on March 2, 2020, Robinhood’s systems went down. This of
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`course not only rendered Robinhood’s trading platform and services inaccessible the entire
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`day and through the next morning, but also specifically prevented users from buying or
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`selling securities, which included but was not limited to an inability for customers to exercise
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`options positions in their portfolios or buy or sell new option contracts or the premiums on
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`already-owned options contracts. Moreover, during this outage, users were also unable
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`connect with Robinhood customer service and therefore could not obtain information or
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`support specific to their individual investment needs.
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`As pled in the Complaint, this resulted in particularized damages for Robinhood
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`users. Unable to exercise their option contracts or trade them to capitalize on the market’s
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`recent historic gains and losses, Plaintiff and putative class members were forced to sit idly
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`by while incurring preventable monetary losses. Many in-the-money (exercisable) option
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`contracts expired unexercised and worthless, and those that did not expire worthless surely
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`decreased in value from the many variables that impact the contract value, such as time-value
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`and implied-volatility.
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`It is important to note that at the time of the outage Robinhood likely affected over 10
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`million unique users, all of whom likely suffered losses to some degree. See Maggie
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`Fitzgerald, Start-up Robinhood tops 10 million accounts even as industry follows in free-
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`trading footsteps, CNBC.COM (DEC. 4, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/04/
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`start-up-robinhood-tops-10-million-accounts-even-as-industry-follows-in-free-trading-
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`footsteps.html. As such, the number of putative class members for the instant case is
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`enormous. On March 25, 2020, it came to the undersigned counsel’s attention that
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`Defendants were attempting to undermine the rights of these putative class members.
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`MEMORANDUM OF LAW
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`I.
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`The Court’s Authority under Rule 23(d) to Prohibit Defendants’ Conduct and to
`Grant the Relief Sought by Plaintiff
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`This Court Has Broad Discretion to Enter Orders Governing the Conduct of
`A.
`Counsel.
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`The Supreme Court of the United States held in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard that, pursuant
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`to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(d), this Court has “both the duty and the broad authority to exercise
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`control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of
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`counsel.”2 Though the Supreme Court did not enumerate specific standards in Gulf Oil for
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`restraining communications by parties or counsel, District Courts have started a pattern of
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`issuing orders limiting communications after a finding of either: (1) misleading, deceptive, or
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`coercive communications; or (2) communications that undermine the class action by
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`convincing potential class member to avoid the representative suit.3 This power to restrict
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`communications between parties and potential class members extends to the time before a
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`class is certified.4
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`The Court’s authority to enjoin abusive communications exists pursuant to both
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`Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 23(d) as well as Rule 65 (governing preliminary injunctions and
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`restraining orders). However, when seeking an order under Rule 23(d), a party does not have
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`2 Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981).
`3 See e.g. Zwerin v. 533 Short North, LLC, 2011 WL 2446622, *2 (S.D. Ohio 2011); Belt v. Emcare, Inc., 299 F.
`Supp. 2d 664, 667 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
`4 Friedman v. Intervet Inc., 730 F.Supp.2d 758 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
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`to establish the four preliminary-injunction factors required under Rule 65 to obtain such an
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`injunction.5
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`The General Standard for Entering an Order Restricting Communications
`B.
`Pursuant to Rule 23(d)
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`According to Gulf Oil, parties seeking an order limiting communications must
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`establish “a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a
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`limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.”6 In compliance
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`with Gulf Oil, courts have routinely recognized that the moving party must present an
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`evidentiary showing of actual or threatened abuse by the party sought to be restrained.7 Two
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`kinds of proof are required. First, the movant must show that a particular form of
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`communication has occurred or is threatened to occur.8 Second, the movant must show that
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`the particular form of communication at issue is abusive in that it threatens the proper
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`functioning of the litigation. Abusive practices which have been considered sufficient to
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`warrant a protective order include communications that contain false, misleading or
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`confusing statements.9 Restrictions on the communication of settlement offers are subject to
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`the same proof requirements.10
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`5 Tolmasoff v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 16-11747, 2016 WL 3548219, at *10 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2016); see
`Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1201 (11th Cir. 1985) (An order enjoining abusive
`communications is a “directive[ ] to counsel in their capacity as officers of the court, pursuant to the court’s
`inherent power to manage its cases. ...The more relaxed prerequisites of Rule 23[ ] therefore appl[y]....”).
`6 Gulf Oil Co. at 101.
`7 Cox Nuclear Med. v. Gold Cup Coffee Servs., Inc., 214 F.R.D. 696, 697–98 (S.D. Ala. 2003)
`8 “An order ‘involv[ing] serious restrictions on expression [must be] justified by a likelihood of serious abuses.”
`Gulf Oil at 104.
`9 See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litigation, 842 F.2d at 683; Lester v. Percudani, 2002 WL 1460763 at *2
`(M.D.Pa.2002); Basco v. Wal–Mart, 2002 WL 272384 at *3; Jenifer v. Delaware Solid Waste Authority, 1999
`WL 117762 at *2; O'Neil v. Appel,1995 WL 351371 at *2; Hampton Hardware, Inc. v. Cotter & Co., 156
`F.R.D. 630, 632 (N.D.Tex.1994).
`10 E.g., Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545, 548 (S.D.Iowa 2000).
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`Courts Have Held that Communications between Defense Counsel and
`C.
`Prospective Class Members are Misleading When the Communications Could Result in
`Unknowing Waivers by Prospective Class Members of Their Rights.
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`Based on the authority and responsibility conferred by Rule 23(d), district courts have
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`imposed restrictions on communications by defense counsel with prospective class members
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`when misleading communications have taken place. Importantly, courts throughout the
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`country have repeatedly held that settlement communications to prospective class members
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`which do not reference to the pending class action are misleading and are therefore subject to
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`restrictions.
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`For example the Southern District of New York addressed this issue in Ralph
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`Oldsmobile Inc. v. General Motors Corporation.11 In that case, the plaintiff had filed a class
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`action on behalf of all General Motors dealers in New York State relating to the issue of
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`reimbursement for warranty repairs. While the class action was pending, GM contacted
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`dealers, who were prospective class members, concerning transition payments resulting from
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`the discontinuance of the Oldsmobile line. To obtain the transition payments, the dealers had
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`to sign a release of claims; however, GM did not inform the prospective class members about
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`the pending class action litigation. The district court concluded that the record supported a
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`finding of “potentially unknowing waivers of the rights asserted” in the class action. To
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`remedy this problem, the court ordered GM to send notice to members of the putative class
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`of the existence of the class action. The court noted that generic communications from
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`Plaintiffs to the prospective class members regarding the class action, even if mailed directly
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`11 Ralph Oldsmobile Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 2001 WL 1035132 (S.D.N.Y).
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`to the putative class members, are not enough to establish that the class members ever
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`received or read the notices so as to inform their decision about executing a release.12
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`The Northern District of Ohio addressed this topic in Friedman v. Intervet Inc.13 In
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`that case, the defendant—after receiving notice of the lawsuit—affirmatively reached out to
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`prospective class members both in writing and via telephone concerning resolution of the
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`same claims that were addressed in the class action lawsuit. However, the communications,
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`the offer of settlement, and the release of claims all failed to make any mention of the
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`pending class action lawsuit. Moreover, the settlement offer from the defendant constituted
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`nothing more than a refund of the unused product purchased by the prospective class
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`members. The Court held that “defendant’s failure to notify putative class members of this
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`litigation before obtaining settlements and releases from them […] constituted a misleading
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`communication.”14 In response, the court ordered pursuant to Rule 23(d) that the defendant
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`must notify the individuals from whom it seeks or received a settlement about the class
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`action lawsuit as well as provide the name and contact information for plaintiff’s counsel.
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`In Westerfield v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., LLC, Quizno’s and a Quizno’s-affiliate sent
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`releases to prospective class members that did not mention the pending class action.15 The
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`district court concluded that “there exists a potential for unknowing waivers resulting from a
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`lack of information in the [releases]. Neither [communication] mentions the instant action.”
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`Therefore, the district court required Quiznos to provide notice of the class action to any of
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`12 Id. at *4.
`13 Friedman v. Intervet Inc., 730 F.Supp.2d 758 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
`14 730 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762–63 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
`15 Westerfield v. Quizno’s Franchise Co., LLC, No. 06-C-1210, 2007 WL 1062200 (E.D. Wis.)
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`its Wisconsin franchisees from whom it sought a release of claims while the class action was
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`pending.
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`Defendant’s Communications Constitute Misleading Conduct that Must be
`D.
`Restricted under Rule 23(d)
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`The communications by Defendants are misleading and designed to undermine the
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`class action by obtaining releases from unknowing prospective class members at a significant
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`discount to what the claims are actually worth. The record clearly establishes that (i) the
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`communications have already occurred and may be ongoing, and (ii) the particular form of
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`misleading communication is abusive as a matter of law. Accordingly, Rule 23(d) authorizes
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`the Court to enjoin Robinhood’s behavior and to grant Plaintiff the relief sought in this
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`Motion.
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`First, the record clearly shows that Defendants have engaged in a campaign of
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`misleading communications with prospective class members of this lawsuit. Specifically,
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`Defendants have begun offering its users a “goodwill credit of $75” in exchange for their
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`signatures on a “DocuSign” document. (See Ward’s Declaration, Exhibit 1). Unfortunately
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`for the prospective class members, this DocuSign document includes a complete waiver of
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`rights which is not identified or referred to in any way by Defendants to its users.
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`Second, these communications by Defendants qualify as abusive practices. In the
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`present matter, Defendants have solicited and potentially obtained releases from prospective
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`class members relating to the exact conduct at issue in this class action. The release and all
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`accompanying communications do not mention this pending class action. Thus, just as in
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`Friedman, Ralph Oldsmobile, and Westerfield, there is a high probability of Defendants
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`obtaining unknowing waivers on the part of prospective class members of their class action
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`rights.
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`To remedy this problem, Plaintiff requests that Robinhood be: (1) enjoined from
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`sending any further misleading communications to prospective class members; (2) required
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`to make each prospective class member aware of this lawsuit and to provide Plaintiff’s
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`counsel with contact information for each prospective class member including the email
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`address of each prospective class member; and, (3) required to void any releases entered into
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`by prospective class members and Robinhood since the filing of this lawsuit. This relief is
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`sought so as to offset the damage that may have resulted from this ex parte abusive
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`communication.
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`This Court Has the Power to Void Releases that Were Entered into by
`E.
`Prospective Class Members Who Were Not Made Aware of the Pending Class Action
`Litigation.
`The Court, in exercising its “broad authority to exercise control over a class action,”16
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`has the power to void releases that were improperly gained as a direct result of Defendants’
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`misleading communications. As an example of that authority, the Northern District of Ohio
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`has voided offers of judgment in circumstances in which the offerees were “deprived of the
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`opportunity to make an informed decision to accept or reject the offers of judgment[.]”17
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`In Murton v. Measurecomp, LLC, the defendant sent offers of judgment to 122
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`individual class members. The underlying claim was a class action for unpaid overtime. At
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`the time the offers of judgment were made, the plaintiffs had not received the relevant time
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`records. The Murton court found that the appropriate remedy was “to nullify the effect of all
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`16 Gulf Oil, supra.
`17 Murton v. Measurecomp, LLC, No. 1:07CV3127, 2008 WL 5725628 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2008)
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`offers of judgment issued to date, whether accepted or not, subject to certain conditions[.]”
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`In reaching that decision, the court noted the potential prejudice stemming from the “offerees
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`having been deprived of the opportunity to make an informed decision to accept or reject the
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`offers of judgment” after consulting with an attorney. The same potential prejudice exists in
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`this case. Nothing indicates that prospective class members contacted by Defendants in this
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`case know about the pending litigation. Certainly, Defendants have not told them about it.
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`Therefore, any releases signed by prospective class members should be voided, with the
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`prospective class members having the option of affirming the release after they have had the
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`opportunity to confer with legal counsel.
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`II.
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`The Court’s Authority under Rule 65 to Prohibit Defendants’ Conduct and to
`Grant the Relief Sought by Plaintiff
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`Beyond its authority under Fed.R.Civ.P Rule 23(d), this Court also has the authority
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`to issue preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
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`Rule 65. Concerning Rule 65, “the four factors to be considered in determining whether
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`temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief is to be granted . . . are whether the
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`movant has established: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that
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`irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury
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`outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief
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`would serve the public interest." Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–
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`26 (11th Cir. 2005). “At the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on
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`affidavits and hearsay materials[.]” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Intern. Trading Inc., 51
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`F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995).
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`A.
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`Plaintiff Has a Substantial Likelihood of Prevailing on the Merits
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`As outlined above in Section I, supra, Defendants’ conduct is the exact type of
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`conduct that federal courts around the country have either prohibited or limited. Defendants
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`are fully aware that they face multiple class actions, whereas the average Robinhood user has
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`no idea that potential class action relief exists for them. Courts have found that
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`communicating with a prospective class member regarding a release—without informing the
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`prospective class member of the existence of a class—has been found to be “misleading” and
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`therefore not covered by First Amendment protections.18 As the Court can see, Defendants’
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`conduct in the instant case is identical to the conduct discussed by the courts cited above and
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`therefore warrants the Court’s intervention. Moreover, due to the incredible similarity of the
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`conduct, Plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
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`Plaintiff Will Suffer Irreparable Injury If Immediate Injunctive Relief Is Not
`B.
`Granted
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`If undisturbed, Defendant’s misconduct will result in—and likely already has resulted
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`in—the unknowing waiver of rights by putative class members. It is not necessary to show
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`that irreparable harm has already been done but only that there is a reasonable probability
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`that harm will occur unless the action is prevented.19 After being tricked into signing a
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`waiver, these prospective class members would then be unable to participate in the class,
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`would lose out on the opportunity to collect monetary damages accordingly, and therefore
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`would have no method of being made whole. Such an outcome constitutes irreparable injury.
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`18 See generally Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 68 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1981).
`19 City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc., 509 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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`The Threatened Injury to Plaintiff Outweighs Any Harm that Injunctive Relief
`C.
`Would Inflict on Defendant
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`The
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`injury
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`to Plaintiffs
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`is severe, whereas
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`the harm
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`to Defendants
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`is
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`minimal. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of supporting a temporary restraining
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`order.
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`If the Defendants are not enjoined from making these misleading communications,
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`then prospective class members who sign a release will unknowingly give up all rights to
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`recovery under the class action without the opportunity to make an informed decision of
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`whether to remain eligible for the potential class. When taking into consideration the low
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`offer made by Defendants to the prospective class members, the harm to these prospective
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`class members is substantial.
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` In contrast, if the Defendants are enjoined from making misleading communications,
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`the harm is minimal. As a preliminary matter, the speech which Plaintiff seeks to restrict
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`does not come under the protections of the First Amendment—for commercial speech to
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`come within the First Amendment, it at least must concern lawful activity and must not be
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`misleading.20 Accordingly, with such an order having no impact to Defendants’ rights to
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`speech, the only harm to Defendants would be one of the costs in controlling or limiting
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`communications with customers and former customers. Here, the restriction sought by
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`Plaintiffs is specifically limited to those communications to prospective class members which
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`relate to the March 2020 outages and which seek a settlement and/or release of claims. All
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`other communications to customers and former customers, relating to the normal business
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`20 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343,
`2346, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980).
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`Case 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 15 of 18 PageID 111
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`operations of the services provided by Defendants, would be unaffected by such an
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`order. For that reason, the burden on the Defendants is minimal.
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`D.
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`Entry of Injunctive Relief Would Serve the Public Interest
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`The public interest is served by enforcing fair and reasonable communications
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`between large corporations and their customers regarding their rights to bring suit. To be
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`effective, a waiver must be clear and unequivocal. Submersible Sys. Tech., Inc. v. 21st
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`Century Film Corp., 767 F. Supp. 266, 267 (S.D. Fla. 1991); see also Moayedi v.
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`Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P., 438 S.W.3d 1, 6–7 (Tex. 2014) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
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`304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Moreover, the United States
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`Supreme Court has defined waiver as an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
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`a known right or privilege.” Id.
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`Defendants’ attempts at misleading the class members into signing a waiver fly in
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`the face of well-settled law regarding enforceability of waiver provisions as well as
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`notions of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently, it is in the public interest of equity
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`Defendants be required to communicate in an honest and fair manner with putative class
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`members, if at all.
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`III.
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`CONCLUSION
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`By obtaining releases from prospective class members without informing them of the
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`pending class action litigation, Defendants are intentionally obtaining unknowing waivers
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`from prospective class members. To prevent any prospective class member from being
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`denied his or her legal rights under the pending class action litigation, Plaintiff requests that
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`this Court take three actions. First, Plaintiff requests that the Court enjoin Robinhood from
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`Case 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 16 of 18 PageID 112
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`sending any further misleading communications to prospective class members. Second,
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`Plaintiff requests that the Court order Robinhood to make each prospective class member
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`aware of this lawsuit and to provide Plaintiff’s counsel with contact information for each
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`prospective class member including the email address of each prospective class member.
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`Third, Plaintiff requests that any releases entered into by prospective class members and
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`Robinhood since the filing of this lawsuit be voided, with prospective class members given
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`the opportunity to affirm any release after being informed of this litigation and having an
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`opportunity to consult with counsel.
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`Plaintiff is ready and willing to hold a hearing at the Court’s earliest convenience,
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`but, in the interim, respectfully requests that the Court immediately issue a temporary
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`restraining order to prevent further harm pending such a hearing. If immediate injunctive
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`relief is not entered in favor of Plaintiff, it will be gravely prejudiced because Defendants
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`will continue to mislead putative class members, thereby irreparably harming Plaintiff and
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`class members, and deliberately destroying the status quo before injunctive relief can be
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`granted.
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`WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court grant this Motion and enter the
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`relief requested in the Proposed Injunction Order submitted herewith and such other relief as
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`the Court deems just and appropriate.
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`Case 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 17 of 18 PageID 113
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`this 27th day of March, 2020.
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`Respectfully Submitted,
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`By: _/s/Michael S. Taaffe____
`Michael S. Taaffe
`Florida State Bar No. 490318
`Michael D. Bressan
`Florida State Bar No. 0011092
`Jarrod J. Malone
`Florida State Bar No. 0010595
`Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP
`240 South Pineapple Ave., 10th Floor
`Sarasota, Florida 34236
`Telephone: (941) 366-6660
`Facsimile: (941) 366-3999
`E-Mail: mtaaffe@shumaker.com
`E-Mail: mbressan@shumaker.com
`E-Mail: jmalone@shumaker.com
`Trial Counsel for Class Plaintiffs
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I HEREBY CERTIFY that I presented the foregoing to the Clerk of the Court for
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`filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system. I further certify that I served the foregoing
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`document to the following:
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`this 27th day of March, 2020.
`
`By: _/s/Michael S. Taaffe____
`Michael S. Taaffe
`Florida State Bar No. 490318
`Michael D. Bressan
`Florida State Bar No. 0011092
`Jarrod J. Malone
`Florida State Bar No. 0010595
`Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP
`240 South Pineapple Ave., 10th Floor
`Sarasota, Florida 34236
`Telephone: (941) 366-6660
`Facsimile: (941) 366-3999
`E-Mail: mtaaffe@shumaker.com
`E-Mail: mbressan@shumaker.com
`E-Mail: jmalone@shumaker.com
`Trial Counsel for Class Plaintiffs
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`Case 8:20-cv-00513-CEH-SPF Document 10 Filed 03/26/20 Page 18 of 18 PageID 114
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`RULE 3.01(g)
`CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH CONFERENCE
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`Counsel for Plaintiff hereby gives notice that it has attempted to confer with counsel
`for the Defendants on March 26, 2020 via email and via telephone regarding the relief
`requested in Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
`Injunction. Counsel for Defendants did not respond to either attempt to communicate.
`
`By: _/s/Michael S. Taaffe____
`Michael S. Taaffe
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