Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 1 of 22
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
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`WALTER PARKER and LINDA PARKER,
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`Case No. __________________
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`Plaintiffs,
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`- against -
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`SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION LLC,
`CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., and UNITED STATES
`SUGAR CORPORATION,
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`(Formerly Case No. 50-2021-CA-009421-
`xxxx-MB in the Circuit Court of the
`Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach
`County, Florida)
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`Defendants.
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`NOTICE OF REMOVAL
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`Defendants Syngenta Crop Protection LLC (“Syngenta”) and Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
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`(“Chevron”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1367, hereby remove the
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`above-captioned action from the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Palm Beach
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`County, Florida, case number 50-2021-CA-009421-xxxx-MB, to the United States District Court
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`for the Southern District of Florida. In support of removal, Syngenta and Chevron provide this
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`“short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
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`NATURE OF REMOVED ACTION
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`1.
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`On August 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed this action, Walter Parker and Linda Parker v.
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`Syngenta Crop Protection LLC et al., in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
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`Beach County, Florida, case number 50-2021-CA-009421-xxxx-MB, alleging claims based upon
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`exposure to products containing paraquat and Plaintiff Walter Parker’s subsequent diagnosis with
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`Parkinson’s disease.
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`2.
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`The Complaint asserts three causes of action against Syngenta and Chevron,
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`namely: (i) negligence; (ii) strict liability; and (iii) loss of consortium. The Complaint also purports
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`to assert a claim against Defendant United States Sugar Corporation (“U.S. Sugar”) under the tort
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`exception to workers’ compensation immunity.
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`3.
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`The thrust of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that by manufacturing, distributing, or selling
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`products containing paraquat, Syngenta and Chevron exposed Walter Parker to an increased
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`likelihood of developing Parkinson’s disease, a disease that he was later diagnosed with.
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`4.
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`This alleged conduct purportedly harmed Plaintiffs in the form of physical pain,
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`mental anguish, loss of consortium, and medical expenses.
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`5.
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`Over 250 similar cases—alleging Parkinson’s disease based on past exposure to
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`paraquat—have been filed against Syngenta and Chevron in federal courts around the country, and
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`consolidated into a multidistrict litigation in the Southern District of Illinois. See In re: Paraquat
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`Prods. Liab. Litig., 21-md-03004 (S.D. Ill. 2021). That MDL is still in its early stages, with new
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`cases regularly being transferred to it. By filing this case in state court, Plaintiffs are seeking to
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`avoid the MDL, which is designed to ensure the most efficient and orderly administration of a
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`large number of cases presenting common issues of law and fact.
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`6.
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`This case is subject to removal on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction, however,
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`because there would be complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiffs and Defendants but
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`for the joinder of U.S. Sugar as a Defendant—but Plaintiffs have no hope of prevailing against
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`U.S. Sugar given the immunity provided by Florida’s workers’ compensation regime. Defendant
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`U.S. Sugar has therefore been fraudulently joined as a Defendant, and its citizenship is properly
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`ignored for purposes of evaluating the Court’s jurisdiction.
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`7.
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`Even if Plaintiffs had viable claims against U.S. Sugar, the claims against U.S.
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`Sugar (which was Plaintiff Walter Parker’s employer) are not properly joined in the same action
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`with the claims against Syngenta and Chevron (who allegedly manufactured and distributed the
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`Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 3 of 22
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`products containing paraquat). Defendant U.S. Sugar has therefore been fraudulently misjoined,
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`and its citizenship is properly ignored for purposes of evaluating the Court’s jurisdiction.
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`8.
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`At a minimum, the Court should sever the claims against U.S. Sugar from the
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`claims against Syngenta and Chevron in order to preserve federal jurisdiction over the latter and
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`defeat Plaintiffs’ efforts to undermine federal jurisdiction over this case.
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`9.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are also removable because they arise under federal law.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the breach of duties governed by the Federal Insecticide,
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`Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (“FIFRA”), as regulated and enforced by
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`the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a (EPA must register any
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`pesticide, including herbicides, before it is sold domestically after weighing the economic, social,
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`and environmental benefits and costs of the product); id. § 136(q)(1)(F) (FIFRA empowers EPA
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`to control warnings, directions, and packaging, and specifically mandates warnings for pesticides
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`that are “adequate to protect health and the environment”); id. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (making it illegal
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`to use any pesticide “in a manner inconsistent with its labeling”); 40 C.F.R. § 152.160 (paraquat
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`is a “restricted use” pesticide and may only be applied by a certified “restricted use” applicator or
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`someone acting under a certified applicator’s “direct supervision”); id. §§ 171.103, 171.105
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`(pesticide applicators are taught to read and understand warnings and instructions for paraquat and
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`must take “[m]easures to avoid or minimize adverse health effects”).
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`10.
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`Because any duties relating to paraquat arise exclusively from federal law—FIFRA
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`and its underlying regulations—alleged violations of federal law form the basis for the underlying
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`claims. It would be illegal for any state to require that a paraquat label include a warning about
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`the risk of developing Parkinson’s disease, because EPA has determined that no causal link exists.
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`See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (states are prohibited from imposing “labeling or packaging” requirements
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`“in addition to or different from” those required under FIFRA); EPA, Paraquat Dichloride: Interim
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`Registration Review Decision, Case No. 0262, at 18 (July 13, 2021), available at
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`https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OPP-2011-0855-0307
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`(“[T]he weight of
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`evidence [is] insufficient to link paraquat exposure from pesticidal use of U.S. registered products
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`to [Parkinson’s disease] in humans.”).
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`11.
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`Federal courts have routinely grappled with an important question that will be
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`raised here: which state law claims regarding pesticide products are preempted under FIFRA. See,
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`e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (common-law tort claims based on
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`inadequate labeling of pesticides preempted by FIFRA); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d
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`1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (common-law claims based upon manufacturer’s alleged failure to properly
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`label pesticides and to warn of their dangers preempted by FIFRA); Lescs v. William R. Hughes,
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`Inc., 168 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1999) (tort claims regarding injuries allegedly caused by pesticide
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`exposure preempted by FIFRA); King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.
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`1993) (FIFRA preempted state law tort claim due to failure to warn); Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v.
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`DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (state law claims regarding pesticide
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`manufacturer’s label instructions preempted by FIFRA); Nat’l Bank of Com. of El Dorado,
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`Arkansas v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1999) (inadequate labeling, failure to warn,
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`and express and implead breach of warranty claims preempted by FIFRA); Indian Brand Farms,
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`Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot. Inc., 617 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2010) (failure to warn claims and claims
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`based on alleged misrepresentation in pesticide marketing brochure not preempted).
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`12.
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`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) and the Local Rules of this Court, a copy
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`of the Complaint is attached as Exhibit A (“Compl.”). A copy of all other process, pleadings, and
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`orders served on Syngenta and Chevron or otherwise on file with the state court are attached as
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`Exhibit B. A copy of Defendant U.S. Sugar’s consent to the removal of this proceeding to this
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`Court on federal question grounds is attached as Exhibit C.
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`TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL
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`13.
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`Syngenta and Chevron were each served with the Complaint on August 24, 2021.
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`U.S. Sugar was served with the Complaint on or about August 28, 2021. Defendants have not
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`responded to the Complaint in state court.
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`14.
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`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), this notice of removal is timely filed
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`because it is within 30 days of Defendants being served. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
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`Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 354-56 (1999) (30-day removal period begins to run upon service of
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`summons and complaint).
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`PROPRIETY OF VENUE
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`15.
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`Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the Circuit
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`Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, where the state court action
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`was pending prior to removal, is a state court within this federal district and division.
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`BASIS OF REMOVAL
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`Diversity Jurisdiction
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`16.
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`Removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441 because there is
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`complete diversity between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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`17.
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`18.
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`Plaintiffs are both citizens of the state of Florida. Compl. ¶ 2.
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`Syngenta is an LLC with its headquarters in Greensboro, North Carolina.
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`Syngenta’s sole member is Syngenta Seeds, LLC, which is headquartered in Downers Grove,
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`Illinois. The sole member of Syngenta Seeds, LLC is Syngenta Corporation, which is incorporated
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`and headquartered in Delaware.
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`19.
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`Chevron is headquartered in San Ramon, California and incorporated in the state
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`of Pennsylvania, and it is thus a resident of those two states. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
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`77, 80-81 (2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).
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`20.
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`Therefore, complete diversity exists among the parties but for the joinder of U.S.
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`Sugar as a defendant, and U.S. Sugar’s residency should be excluded for the purposes of
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`determining the existence of diversity jurisdiction.
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`21.
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`First, the residency of U.S. Sugar should be disregarded because it has been
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`fraudulently joined in this proceeding in an attempt to destroy diversity. See, e.g., Legg v. Wyeth,
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`428 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005) (“A common strategy employed by the plaintiffs . . . is to
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`name local parties, . . . thus defeating [defendant’s] right to remove a case to federal court.”);
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`Henderson v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (“When a plaintiff
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`names a non-diverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the district
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`court must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion to remand.”).
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`22.
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`A defendant is fraudulently joined if “there is no possibility the plaintiff can
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`establish a cause of action against the resident defendant.” Legg, 428 F.3d at 1281. Plaintiffs have
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`fraudulently joined Defendant U.S. Sugar because they cannot state a claim against U.S. Sugar.
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`U.S. Sugar is Mr. Parker’s former employer, and is protected by worker’s compensation immunity
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`for any non-intentional claim involving a work-related injury. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09(1)
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`(employer is liable to pay worker’s compensation to an employee for any “accidental compensable
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`injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment”); id. §
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`440.11 (worker’s compensation is “exclusive” form of recovery and stands “in place of all other
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`liability, including vicarious liability ... to the employee, the legal representative thereof,
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`husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kind, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover
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`damages from such employer” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant U.S. Sugar
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`are solely due to Mr. Parker’s work-related exposure to paraquat while working for the company.
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`Compl. ¶¶ 11-13 (alleging that he suffered injury “in the course of his employment”).
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`23.
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`Plaintiffs have not and cannot allege an intentional tort exception to worker’s
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`compensation liability. “[C]ourts have highlighted two factors which show the type of intentional
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`conduct which a reasonable person would consider resulting in the substantial certainty of injury
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`or death: 1) knowledge of prior accidents or defects and 2) intentional conduct to prevent the
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`employee from learning and appreciating the risks involved in the work specifically known by the
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`employer.” Pendergrass v. R.D. Michaels, Inc., 936 So. 2d 684, 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
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`Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting these elements. Compl. ¶¶ 30-33.
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`24.
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`Complete diversity exists when an improper party such as Defendant U.S. Sugar,
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`against whom Plaintiffs have no right of recovery, is fraudulently joined. See Wilson v. Republic
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`Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) (joinder of a non-diverse defendant as “a sham or
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`fraudulent device” will not prevent the removal); Legg, 428 F.3d at 1322-25 (removal based on
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`diversity jurisdiction appropriate where non-diverse defendant was fraudulently joined); Ritchey
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`v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (“It is a commonplace that fraudulently
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`joined defendants will not defeat removal on diversity grounds”); Cuevas v. BAC Home Servicing,
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`LP, 648 F.3d 242, 250 (5th Cir. 2011) (improper joinder exists if “there is no possibility of recovery
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`by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant”); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2006)
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`(time-barred claims against non-diverse defendant constituted fraudulent joinder). Here, there is
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`no right to recovery against U.S. Sugar under Florida law and Plaintiffs’ claims against U.S. Sugar
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`to avoid removal should be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.1
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`1 If Plaintiffs oppose the removal of this case to this Court, Syngenta and Chevron reserve
`the right to make an evidentiary submission in support of their assertion of improper joinder. See
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`25.
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`Second, even if Plaintiffs could recover against U.S. Sugar—which they cannot—
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`U.S. Sugar was fraudulently misjoined and should be dropped as a party for that reason. “The
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`doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder applies ‘where a diverse defendant is joined with a nondiverse
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`defendant as to whom there is no joint, several or alternative liability and where the claim against
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`the diverse defendant has no real connection to the claim against the nondiverse defendant.” Bollea
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`v. Clem, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
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`26.
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`In the Eleventh Circuit, parties are fraudulently misjoined if their joinder does not
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`satisfy the joinder requirements of Rule 20(a)(2). Id. Under Rule 20, the joinder of multiple
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`defendants in a single action requires that the claims “aris[e] out of the same transaction,
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`occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and include “a question of law or fact common
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`to all plaintiffs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). “To determine whether claims arise from the same ‘series
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`of transactions or occurrences’ under Rule 20(a)(2), courts in the Eleventh Circuit apply the
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`‘logical relationship’ test.” Bollea, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 1350. Put simply, “there is a logical
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`relationship when the same operative facts serve as the basis of both claims.” Republic Health
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`Corp. v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 755 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985).
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`27.
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`Here, the claims against Syngenta and Chevron are not based on the same operative
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`facts as the claims against U.S. Sugar. The claims against U.S. Sugar involve alleged misconduct
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`by Mr. Parker’s former employer occurring in the state of Florida between 1967 and 2001—when
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`Mr. Parker was allegedly exposed to a hazardous product based on workplace conditions and other
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`circumstances. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 31-33. Plaintiffs have not and could not plausibly claim that
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`Syngenta or Chevron played any role in U.S. Sugar’s exposure of its workers to conditions
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`Wilson, 257 U.S. at 97-99; Legg, 428 F.3d at 1323 (a court may rely on affidavits to determine
`whether a defendant was fraudulently joined).
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`“substantially certain to result in injury or death.” Compl. ¶ 32.
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`28.
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`Conversely, the claims against Syngenta and Chevron involve allegations about
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`Syngenta’s and Chevron’s sale of an allegedly defective product without adequate warnings,
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`contrasted with U.S. Sugar’s alleged employment practices. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 18-19 with
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`Compl. ¶¶ 13, 32. Plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege that U.S. Sugar played any role in the alleged
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`misconduct by Syngenta and Chevron.
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`29.
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`U.S. Sugar has been fraudulently misjoined because it has “no real connection with
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`the controversy” involving Syngenta and Chevron. Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp. et al., 77
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`F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996). The claims against U.S. Sugar are based upon completely
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`separate facts and legal issues and arise from geographically and temporally remote allegations.
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`See, e.g., Luria v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-24012, 2021 WL 2561793, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June
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`23, 2021) (plaintiff’s fraudulent misjoinder of defendants was “egregious” because claims against
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`separate defendants involved “two distinct time periods and ... completely different agreements.”).
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`For these reasons, U.S. Sugar has been fraudulently misjoined in this proceeding.
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`30.
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`Third, and at minimum, Rule 21 provides that “[o]n motion or on its own, the court
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`may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a
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`party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. This Court thus has the “authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse
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`party to be dropped at any time.” Luxor Agentes Autonomos de Investimientos, Ltda. v.
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`Intertransfers, Inc., 638 F. App’x 925, 927 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v.
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`Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989)); see also Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
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`815 F. 3d 1293, 1298 n.8 (11th Cir. 2016) (court may drop dispensable non-diverse parties “when
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`necessary to establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction”).
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`31.
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`A court applying this rule may “dismiss a dispensable party whose presence spoils
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`diversity jurisdiction.” Buckley v. Control Data Corp., 923 F.2d 96, 97 (8th Cir. 1991); see also
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`Soberay Mach. & Equipment Co. v. MPF Ltd., 181 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is
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`appropriate to drop a nondiverse and dispensable party from litigation in order to achieve
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`diversity.”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House, Tenn., 36 F.3d 540, 545–46 (6th Cir.
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`1994) (“[Rule 21] permits a district court to retain diversity jurisdiction over a case by dropping a
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`nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required under Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 19.”); Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing cases).
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`32.
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`U.S. Sugar is a dispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Plaintiffs’ employment-
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`related claims against Mr. Parker’s former employer U.S. Sugar, see Compl. ¶¶ 11-13; 30-33, are
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`completely separate from their pesticide-related tort claims against Syngenta and Chevron, which
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`turn on obligations owed under FIFRA. Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by U.S. Sugar’s severance
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`from this action since each Defendant is, at most, independently liable to Plaintiffs. Meanwhile,
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`failing to dismiss U.S. Sugar would prejudice Syngenta and Chevron, who are Defendants in
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`consolidated multidistrict litigation concerning paraquat that includes over 250 federal cases in the
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`Southern District of Illinois. See In re: Paraquat Prods. Liab. Litig., 21-md-03004 (S.D. Ill. 2021).
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`Given the substantial factual overlap between this action and those that have already been approved
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`for consolidation, this case will likely be transferred to the federal MDL. Transfer and
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`coordination in these proceedings would (1) avoid substantial and duplicative discovery burdens
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`and (2) eliminate the risk of inconsistent pretrial rulings on discovery, dispositive motions to
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`dismiss, summary judgment, and other pretrial matters. Allowing Plaintiffs’ claims against
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`Syngenta and Chevron to proceed in federal court will thus best serve the policy of facilitating
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`“complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.” Provident Tradesmens Bank &
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`Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968).2
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`33.
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`If this Court somehow concludes that Plaintiffs can state a claim against U.S. Sugar
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`despite the existence of an exclusive worker’s compensation scheme, it should thus be dismissed
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`as a dispensable party pursuant to this Court’s authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, with federal
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`jurisdiction thereby preserved. See, e.g., Clements v. Essex Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-574, 2016 WL
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`3144151, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2016) (dismissing nondiverse defendant pursuant to Rule 21);
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`Byrd v. Howse Implement Co., 227 F.R.D. 692, 694 (M.D. Ala. 2005); Chabrowski v. Bank of New
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`York Mellon Tr. Co. NA, No. CV-17-03867-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 132350, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Jan.
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`8, 2019); In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
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`18ML02814ABFFMX, 2018 WL 5905942, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2018).
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`34.
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`Finally, the amount in controversy in this proceeding exceeds $75,000 despite
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`Plaintiffs’ suggestion that it might not. A notice of removal must include “a plausible allegation
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`that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin
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`Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). The defendant is only required to present
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`evidence supporting that plausible allegation if the allegation is challenged by the plaintiff or the
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`court. Id. However, the court may review any evidence submitted with the notice of removal, as
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`well as make “reasonable deductions, reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations”
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`to determine whether the amount in controversy has been met. Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc.,
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`608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2010).
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`2 U.S. Sugar is not a “necessary’ party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 because complete relief is
`available in its absence, and litigation of the pesticide-related claims in a federal forum will not
`impair its ability to protect any interest or give rise to a risk of double or inconsistent obligations.
`Ahmed v. Kifle, 728 F. App’x 934, 936 (11th Cir. 2018).
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`35. When a plaintiff does not make “a specific demand in the ad damnum clause of the
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`complaint, the damages are unspecified, and the preponderance of evidence standard applies.” See
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`Barnes v. JetBlue Airways Corp., No. 07-cv-60441, 2007 WL 1362504, at *1, n.1 (S.D. Fla. May
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`7, 2007). Under this standard, “the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the
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`evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Williams v. Best
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`Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
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`36. While “minor, short-term injuries” are insufficient to show the amount in
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`controversy, allegations of “serious, lasting” injuries are “typically removable.” Hickerson v.
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`Enter. Leasing Co. of Ga., LLC, 818 F. App’x. 880, 883 (11th Cir. 2020).
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`37.
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`The amount in controversy is met here because Plaintiffs seek substantial monetary
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`damages for physical pain, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and medical expenses as a result
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`of Mr. Parker’s diagnosis with a serious long-term illness—Parkinson’s disease. Compl. ¶¶ 37-
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`45. Indeed, the cost of his medical treatment alone likely satisfies the $75,000 requirement. See
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`Matthew Gavidia, “Study Details Economic Burden of Parkinson’s Disease in the United States,”
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`available at https://www.ajmc.com/view/study-details-economic-burden-of-parkinson-disease-
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`in-the-united-states. Plaintiffs’ assertion that the amount in controversy could fall below this
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`threshold if they prevail, Compl. ¶ 1, should be disregarded because the allegations in the
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`complaint and objective facts show that it is more likely than not that Plaintiffs’ claims for
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`monetary damages exceed $75,000. See, e.g., Pease v. Medtronic, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1356-
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`57 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying motion to remand where the amount in controversy clearly exceeded
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`$75,000 despite plaintiff’s assertion to the contrary).3
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`3 If Syngenta and Chevron are mistaken on this point, they invite Plaintiffs to stipulate that
`their alleged damages do not exceed $75,000.
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`Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 13 of 22
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`38.
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`The exception to removal based on diversity of citizenship stated in 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1441(b)(2) does not apply because Defendant U.S. Sugar has been improperly joined in this
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`proceeding for the reasons explained above, and therefore its citizenship should be ignored for
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`purposes of evaluating jurisdiction. See supra ¶¶ 16-33.
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`Federal Question Jurisdiction
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`39.
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`Removal is proper in the alternative pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441
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`because Plaintiffs’ claims present a substantial federal question.
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`40.
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`The original jurisdiction of the district courts includes jurisdiction over “all civil
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`actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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`41.
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`“[W]hether a case ‘arises under’ federal law for purposes of § 1331” is governed
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`by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
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`535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002). The artful-pleading doctrine, however, “empowers courts to look
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`beneath the face of the complaint to divine the underlying nature of a claim.” BIW Deceived v.
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`Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., 132 F.3d 824, 831 (1st Cir.
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`1997); see also Lopez-Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc., 754 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he artful
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`pleading doctrine allows a federal court to peer beneath the local-law veneer of a plaintiff's
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`complaint in order to glean the true nature of the claims presented.”). “In other words, a plaintiff
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`may not, by the expedient of artful pleading, defeat a defendant’s legitimate right to a federal
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`forum.” BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 831.
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`42.
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`Even when state law creates the causes of action, a complaint may raise a
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`substantial question of federal law if “vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on
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`some construction of federal law.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808-09
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`(1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)); see
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`also Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Under the
`
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`Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 14 of 22
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`substantial-federal-question doctrine, a state law cause of action may actually arise under federal
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`law, even though Congress has not created a private right of action, if the vindication of a right
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`under state law depends on the validity, construction, or effect of federal law.”).
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`A.
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`Plaintiffs’ Claims Implicate a Federal Issue That Is Necessarily Raised,
`Actually Disputed, Substantial, and Capable of Resolution in Federal Court.
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`43.
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`“[F]ederal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is:
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`(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal
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`court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn v. Minton, 568
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`U.S. 251, 258 (2013); see Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
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`314 (2005). “Where all four of these requirements are met . . . jurisdiction is proper because there
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`is a ‘serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,’
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`which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress’s intended division of labor between state
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`and federal courts.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 313-14).
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`44. Where, as here, purported state law claims are premised on violations of duties
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`governed by a federal statute, these requirements are satisfied and a federal court has jurisdiction
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`over those claims. See Bd. of Comm’rs of Se. La. Flood Protection Auth.-East v. Tenn. Gas
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`Pipeline Co., 850 F.3d 714, 722-23 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding that federal question jurisdiction
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`exists because claims were premised on failure to satisfy standard of care established in federal
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`statute); see also Wullschleger v. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., 953 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 2020)
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`(concluding a federal question was raised where “Plaintiffs’ dependence on federal law permeates
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`the allegations such that the [claims purportedly brought under state law] cannot be adjudicated
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`without reliance on and explication of federal law”).
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`45.
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`As set forth below, all four requirements for federal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
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`claims are satisfied.
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`-14-
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`Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 15 of 22
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`46.
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`Although Plaintiffs ostensibly plead claims against Syngenta and Chevron as
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`violations of state law, they base the underlying theory of liability on alleged violations of federal
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`law or alleged duties arising out of FIFRA. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 17-19, 26.
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`47.
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`Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Syngenta and Chevron violated duties
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`established by federal law by failing to warn about the risks that paraquat allegedly posed to human
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`health, Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 26-27, and by failing to instruct regarding appropriate protective clothing
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`and equipment to employ while using paraquat-containing products and proper methods for
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`handling paraquat-containing products, id. ¶¶ 9-10.
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`48.
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`FIFRA and its implementing regulations are the exclusive source of the asserted
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`legal duties regarding the labeling, handling, and use of paraquat. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(F)
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`(FIFRA empowers EPA to control warnings, directions, and packaging, and specifically mandates
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`warnings that are “adequate to protect health and the environment”); id. § 136j(a)(2)(G) (it is illegal
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`to use any pesticide “in a manner inconsistent with its labeling”). Indeed, states are prohibited
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`from imposing “labeling or packaging” requirements “in addition to or different from” those
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`required under federal law. Id. § 136v(b); see also Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 459–
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`60 (2012) (holding that such language “sweeps widely—and in so doing … prevents a State from
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`imposing any additional or different—even if non-conflicting—requirements that fall within the
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`scope of the” federal law). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are necessarily governed by the federal
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`requirements under FIFRA and require interpretation and application of that statute, as any
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`additional or different duties would be preempted.
`
`49.
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`Plaintiffs’ theories of liability against Syngenta and Chevron, as pleaded in the
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`Complaint, are thus predicated on allegations that they breached alleged duties owed under FIFRA
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`regarding the distribution and sale of paraquat. Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that Syngenta and
`
`-15-
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`Case 9:21-cv-81791-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2021 Page 16 of 22
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`Chevron should have included additional or different information on the labels for paraquat
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`products even though the information on those labels is directly approved by the EPA and federal
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`law prohibits any state law from imposing different requirements. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 19.
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`50.
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`The federal question presented by Plaintiffs’ claims therefore is “(1) necessarily
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`raised, (2) actually disput