`
`Supreme Court of Florida
`
`
`
`____________
`
`No. SC17-506
`____________
`
`RODRICK D. WILLIAMS,
`Petitioner,
`
`vs.
`
`STATE OF FLORIDA,
`Respondent.
`
`[February 22, 2018]
`
`
`LABARGA, C.J.
`
`
`
`This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District
`
`Court of Appeal in Williams v. State (Williams II), 211 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA
`
`2017). In its decision, the Fifth District ruled upon the following question certified
`
`to be of great public importance:
`
`DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
`186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE
`TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER
`SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO
`WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED,
`INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM?
`
`Id. at 1073. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the
`
`reasons explained below, we hold that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`finding, but conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review.
`
`Where the error cannot be deemed harmless, the proper remedy is to resentence the
`
`juvenile offender pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2016).
`
`FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
`
`
`
`On December 19, 2013, a jury found Petitioner Rodrick D. Williams guilty
`
`of first-degree murder and kidnapping. During the evening hours of April 26,
`
`2010, and through the early morning hours of April 27, 2010, victim James
`
`Vincent Brookins was beaten and bound with duct tape at a “trap house”1 in
`
`Jacksonville, then transported in the trunk of a vehicle to a rural road in St. Johns
`
`County, where he was shot twice. Two other individuals, Harry Henderson and
`
`Sharina Parker, were also involved in the death of Brookins. Williams and Parker
`
`were involved in a sexual relationship. Although Henderson and Parker were
`
`adults at the time of the murder, Williams was sixteen years old. The firearm used
`
`to commit the murder was never located.
`
`The predominant evidence offered during trial to connect Williams to the
`
`offenses included: (1) the police interrogation of Williams, during which his
`
`
`
`1. During trial, a St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office detective explained that
`the term “trap house” is “a slang term for a house, an apartment, a whatever,
`residence where folks don’t actually live. They just go there to either sell drugs or
`use drugs. It’s kind of just a vacant residence.”
`
`
`
`- 2 -
`
`

`

`
`
`mother was present and Williams signed a Miranda2 waiver; (2) a text message
`
`purportedly sent by Williams to Parker at 6:24 p.m. on April 26, in which Williams
`
`stated, “Bae thx killah[3] i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae
`
`ima take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight”; and (3) the testimony of
`
`a jailhouse informant.
`
`During the interrogation, Williams contended it was Henderson who shot
`
`Brookins. According to Williams, Parker called him between 2 and 3 p.m. on
`
`April 26—less than five hours before the text message was sent—and told him she
`
`had been robbed of marijuana by a relative of Brookins during a drug transaction,
`
`and Parker believed Brookins had “set her up.” Williams asserted that Parker and
`
`Henderson brought Brookins to the trap house later that day in an attempt to force
`
`him to give them money or disclose the location of his safe, where Parker believed
`
`the stolen marijuana was stored. Parker subsequently picked up Williams and
`
`drove him to the trap house, where, upon entering the house, Williams saw “blood
`
`all over” and Brookins begging for his life. According to Williams, Henderson
`
`beat Brookins with a gun, and Henderson and Parker bound his arms and legs and
`
`covered his mouth with duct tape as Brookins screamed. Williams stated that
`
`
`2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3. Williams’s mother gave him the nickname “Killer.”
`
`- 3 -
`
`

`

`
`
`while at the trap house, Parker told him she and Henderson planned to leave
`
`Brookins alive in the trunk of the vehicle.4 Williams admitted he drove the vehicle
`
`with Brookins in the trunk to the rural road while Henderson and Parker rode in a
`
`separate vehicle. He stated that upon arriving, Henderson wiped down the vehicle
`
`used to transport Brookins, opened the trunk, and shot Brookins. Williams
`
`asserted that he only participated in the offenses because he feared he would be
`
`harmed if he refused.
`
`In contrast, during trial, the informant testified that while they were housed
`
`together at the St. Johns County jail, Williams admitted that he brought a gun to
`
`the trap house and shot Brookins. According to the informant, Williams stated he
`
`was involved in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on the pretense of
`
`having gold teeth created5 and then force him to disclose the location of his safe.
`
`Coincidentally, prior to his interactions with Williams, the informant was housed
`
`
`
`4. However, Williams also contradicted himself by implying he knew
`Henderson and Parker planned to kill Brookins:
`
`I was telling them, I’m, like, “I’m not going to be driving this man
`around. Is y’all crazy? What if we get stopped? I’m gonna catch this
`murder charge, not y’all.” You know what I’m saying? . . . [“]And
`I’m not going to jail for y’all.”
`
`(Emphasis added.)
`
`5. According to the informant, Brookins possessed portable equipment for
`
`creating gold teeth.
`
`
`
`- 4 -
`
`

`

`
`
`with codefendant Henderson at the St. Johns County jail. The informant testified
`
`on cross-examination that Henderson assisted him by filing a motion on his behalf
`
`with respect to a drug-related charge and, as a result of Henderson’s assistance, the
`
`charge was dropped. However, the informant testified that Henderson never spoke
`
`with him about the Brookins homicide.
`
`The jury was instructed on both first-degree premeditated murder and first-
`
`degree felony murder with robbery, attempted robbery, kidnapping, and attempted
`
`kidnapping as the underlying felonies; however, the verdict form did not require
`
`the jury to specify the theory upon which it found Williams guilty of first-degree
`
`murder. Upon conviction, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment
`
`with the possibility of parole in twenty-five years for the murder. The court relied
`
`upon Horsley v. State (Horsley I), 121 So. 3d 1130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), quashed,
`
`160 So. 3d 393 (Fla. 2015), in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed
`
`the implications of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for Florida sentencing
`
`law. See Williams v. State (Williams I), 171 So. 3d 143, 144-45 (Fla. 5th DCA
`
`2015). Because Miller determined “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing
`
`scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile
`
`offenders,” 567 U.S. at 479, the Fifth District in Horsley I held that in Florida, the
`
`only sentence available for a juvenile offender convicted of capital murder was life
`
`
`
`- 5 -
`
`

`

`
`
`imprisonment with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Williams I,
`
`171 So. 3d at 144.
`
`On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed Williams’s convictions but reversed
`
`his sentence with respect to the murder conviction. Id. The district court
`
`recognized that while the trial court properly relied on Horsley I when it imposed
`
`the sentence, this Court subsequently granted review of Horsley I based upon a
`
`certified question. Id. at 144-45. In Horsley v. State (Horsley II), 160 So. 3d 393
`
`(Fla. 2015), we held the appropriate remedy for juveniles whose sentences are
`
`unconstitutional under Miller is to resentence them in conformance with chapter
`
`2014-220, Laws of Florida. See Williams I, 171 So. 3d at 144. Chapter 2014-220
`
`was enacted to bring Florida juvenile sentencing law into compliance with United
`
`States Supreme Court Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See Horsley II, 160 So.
`
`3d at 394. It amended section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, to provide, in pertinent
`
`part:
`
`(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or
`attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
`capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony,
`which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall
`be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing
`hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the
`court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the
`court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
`person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40
`years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to
`a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
`
`
`
`- 6 -
`
`

`

`
`
`2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt
`to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital
`felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which
`was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be
`punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years
`equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
`accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is
`an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of
`imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or
`her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
`
`
`Ch. 2014-220, § 1, Laws of Fla. The session law also created section 921.1402,
`
`Florida Statutes (2017), which provides, in pertinent part:
`
`(2)(a) A juvenile offender sentenced under s. 775.082(1)(b)1. is
`
`entitled to a review of his or her sentence after 25 years [unless the
`juvenile offender has been previously convicted of certain enumerated
`offenses that were part of a separate criminal transaction or episode].
`
`. . . .
`
`(c) A juvenile offender sentenced to a term of more than 15
`years under s. 775.082(1)(b)2., s. 775.082(3)(a)5.b., or
`s. 775.082(3)(b)2.b. is entitled to a review of his or her sentence after
`15 years.
`
`
`Ch. 2014-220, § 3, Laws of Fla.
`
`
`
`The Fifth District in Williams I instructed the trial court as follows:
`
`On remand, the trial court shall hold an individualized sentencing
`hearing . . . to consider the enumerated and other pertinent factors
`“relevant to the offense and [Williams’s] youth and attendant
`circumstances.” Ch. 2014–220, § 2, Laws of Fla. Because the jury
`did not find that Williams actually possessed and discharged a firearm
`during the crime, the court must make a written finding as to whether
`Williams killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim.
`Ch. 2014–220, § 1, Laws of Fla. Based on that determination, after
`holding the individualized hearing, the trial court may sentence
`Williams to life imprisonment if it finds that life is an appropriate
`sentence. Id. If the trial court determines that life is not an
`
`
`
`- 7 -
`
`

`

`
`
`appropriate sentence, then it should sentence Williams to a term of at
`least forty years’ imprisonment. Id. Either way, unless Williams has
`a prior conviction of a felony enumerated in section three of chapter
`2014–220, Laws of Florida, arising out of a separate criminal
`transaction or episode, he will receive a judicial review of his sentence
`after fifteen or twenty-five years, depending on the court’s
`determination. See ch. 2014–220, § 3, Laws of Fla.
`
`171 So. 3d at 145 (second alteration in original).
`
`
`
`On September 30, 2015, Williams filed with the trial court a Motion to
`
`Empanel Jury. Williams asserted that because the finding that a juvenile offender
`
`actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim leads to a minimum
`
`forty-year sentence with a sentence review after twenty-five years—whereas a
`
`finding that the offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the
`
`victim results in there being no minimum sentence and a sentence review after
`
`fifteen years—Alleyne requires that this factual determination be made by a jury
`
`beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that it
`
`had been directed by the Fifth District to make the finding.
`
`
`
`After a hearing, the trial court found that Williams both actually killed and
`
`intended to kill Brookins. The court subsequently held a resentencing hearing on
`
`the first-degree murder conviction pursuant to section 921.1401, Florida Statutes
`
`(2016), and again sentenced Williams to life imprisonment, but with a sentence
`
`review in twenty-five years, as required by section 921.1402(2)(a), Florida Statutes
`
`(2016).
`
`
`
`- 8 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`On appeal, Williams challenged the trial court’s denial of his Motion to
`
`Empanel Jury. Williams II, 211 So. 3d at 1071. The Fifth District held that the
`
`trial court properly denied the motion, but noted that the Alleyne challenge
`
`appeared to have merit on the basis that the finding “increases both the mandatory-
`
`minimum from zero years to forty years—if the sentencing court determines that
`
`life is not an appropriate sentence—and the time for a sentence review hearing
`
`from fifteen years to twenty-five years.” Id. at 1072-73. However, the Fifth
`
`District explained that in Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015), this Court
`
`stated the trial court was to make the finding of whether the defendant actually
`
`killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. Id. at 1073.6 As a result, the
`
`Fifth District certified the question now before this Court as one of great public
`
`importance.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`Alleyne v. United States
`
`
`
`In Alleyne, the defendant (Alleyne) was charged with using or carrying a
`
`firearm in relation to a crime of violence, as well as other federal offenses, arising
`
`from the robbery of a store manager. 570 U.S. at 103. The applicable statute
`
`provided that anyone who uses or carries a firearm in relation to a crime of
`
`
`6. Our decision in Falcon did not address the applicability of Alleyne to
`
`chapter 2014-220 because neither party raised the issue.
`
`
`
`- 9 -
`
`

`

`
`
`violence shall be sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison. Id. However, if
`
`the firearm is brandished, the statute mandated a minimum sentence of seven
`
`years’ incarceration. Id. at 104. The jury convicted Alleyne and indicated on the
`
`verdict form that he used or carried a firearm; however, the jury did not indicate a
`
`finding that the firearm was brandished. Id. The trial court found that the evidence
`
`supported a finding of brandishing and imposed a seven-year sentence on this
`
`count. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id.
`
`
`
`On certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Fourth
`
`Circuit’s judgment with respect to the sentence on the count of using or carrying a
`
`firearm in relation to a crime of violence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at
`
`117-18. The Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory
`
`minimum sentence for an offense is an “element” which must be submitted to a
`
`jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 108. In reaching this holding, the
`
`Supreme Court relied upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which
`
`it held that any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence is an “element”
`
`of the offense to be found by a jury. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 106; see also Apprendi,
`
`530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
`
`the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
`
`submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
`
`
`
`- 10 -
`
`

`

`
`
`The Supreme Court explained that “Apprendi’s definition of ‘elements’
`
`necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that
`
`increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to
`
`which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the
`
`punishment.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108. The Court further stated:
`
`[I]t is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed
`floor aggravate the punishment. Elevating the low end of a
`sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the
`crime: the defendant’s “expected punishment has increased as a result
`of the narrowed range” and “the prosecution is empowered, by
`invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a
`higher punishment than he might wish.” Apprendi, supra, at 522, 120
`S. Ct. 2348 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Why else would Congress link
`an increased mandatory minimum to a particular aggravating fact
`other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior? This
`reality demonstrates that the core crime and the fact triggering the
`mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated
`crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury. [n.2]
`
`[N.2.] Juries must find any facts that increase either the
`statutory maximum or minimum because the Sixth
`Amendment applies where a finding of fact both alters
`the legally prescribed range and does so in a way that
`aggravates the penalty. Importantly, this is distinct from
`factfinding used to guide judicial discretion in selecting a
`punishment “within limits fixed by law.” Williams v.
`New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). While such
`findings of fact may lead judges to select sentences that
`are more severe than the ones they would have selected
`without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not
`govern that element of sentencing.
`
`
`Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
`
`
`
`- 11 -
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
`The Supreme Court rejected the contention that, because the seven-year
`
`sentence could have been imposed without the finding of brandishing, the Sixth
`
`Amendment right to trial by jury was not violated:
`
`[T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an
`element of the crime. When a finding of fact alters the legally
`prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms
`a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.
`It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same
`sentence with or without that fact. It is obvious, for example, that a
`defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for assault, if the jury
`only finds the facts for larceny, even if the punishments prescribed for
`each crime are identical. One reason is that each crime has different
`elements and a defendant can be convicted only if the jury has found
`each element of the crime of conviction.
`Similarly, because the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally
`prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a
`separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless
`of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different
`range had been applicable.
`
`
`Id. at 114-15.
`
`
`Section 775.082(1)(b)
`
`
`
`The relevant portion of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides:
`
`(b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or
`attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a
`capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony,
`which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall
`be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing
`hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the
`court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the
`court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such
`person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40
`years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to
`a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a).
`
`
`
`- 12 -
`
`

`

`
`
`2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt
`to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital
`felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which
`was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be
`punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years
`equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in
`accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is
`an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of
`imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or
`her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c).
`
`
`(Emphasis added.) Thus, a finding that a juvenile offender actually killed,
`
`intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim results in a minimum sentence of
`
`forty years’ imprisonment under subsection (1)(b)1. Without this finding, the trial
`
`court is not required to impose a minimum sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b)2., Fla.
`
`Stat. Further, under section 921.1402, a finding of actual killing, intent to kill, or
`
`attempt to kill entitles a juvenile offender to a sentence review in twenty-five
`
`years, whereas without the finding, the juvenile offender is entitled to a sentence
`
`review in fifteen years (provided the trial court imposes a sentence greater than
`
`fifteen years). § 921.1402(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat. Because a finding of actual killing,
`
`intent to kill, or attempt to kill “aggravates the legally prescribed range of
`
`allowable sentences,” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115, by increasing the sentencing floor
`
`from zero to forty years and lengthening the time before which a juvenile offender
`
`is entitled to a sentence review from fifteen to twenty-five years, this finding is an
`
`
`
`- 13 -
`
`

`

`
`
`“element” of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted to a jury and found
`
`beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 108.7
`
`The Verdict
`
`
`
`In this case, the verdict form did not separate out the theories of first-degree
`
`murder; therefore, it is unclear whether the jury found Williams guilty of
`
`premeditated murder, felony murder, or both. Further, with respect to the offense
`
`of first-degree murder, there was no interrogatory on the verdict form as to whether
`
`Williams discharged a firearm.8 Based upon the jury instructions given, it cannot
`
`be determined from the general verdict form whether the jury found beyond a
`
`reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill
`
`Brookins.
`
`First, with respect to actual killing, as part of the instruction on premeditated
`
`first-degree murder, the jury received an instruction on principals, which allowed it
`
`to find Williams guilty even if he did not actually shoot Brookins. The jury was
`
`advised:
`
`If the defendant helped another person or persons commit a
`crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if he had
`done all the things the other person or persons did if, one, the
`defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done; and,
`
`
`7. We recede from Falcon to the extent it concludes this determination is to
`
`be made by a trial court.
`
`
`
`
`
`8. The lesser included offenses contained interrogatories.
`
`- 14 -
`
`

`

`
`
`two, the defendant did some act or said some word which was
`intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise
`the other person or persons to commit—to actually commit the crime.
`
`Moreover, as part of the felony-murder instruction, the jury was instructed based
`
`both upon whether Williams was the actual killer or whether someone else shot
`
`Brookins:
`
`To prove the crime of first-degree felony murder, the State must
`prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
`
`1. That James Vincent Brookins is dead.
`
`2. The death occurred as a consequence of and while Rodrick
`Williams was engaged in the commission of a robbery, an attempted
`robbery, kidnapping, or an attempted kidnapping.
`
`3. That Rodrick Williams was a person who actually killed James
`Vincent Brookins, or James Vincent Brookins was killed by a person
`other than Rodrick Williams but both Rodrick Williams and the
`person who killed James Vincent Brookins were principals in the
`commission of a robbery, an attempted robbery, kidnapping, or an
`attempted kidnapping.
`
`(Emphasis added.) Therefore, based upon the instructions given, the general guilty
`
`verdict for first-degree murder fails to demonstrate the jury found beyond a
`
`reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed Brookins.
`
`
`
`Whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams intended to
`
`kill Brookins cannot be determined from the verdict either. The jury was
`
`instructed under the premeditated theory of first-degree murder that “[k]illing with
`
`premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be
`
`present in the mind at the time of the killing.” Therefore, regardless of whether
`
`
`
`- 15 -
`
`

`

`
`
`Williams actually killed Brookins, or was a principal, a finding of intent to kill
`
`would have been inherent in a guilty verdict as to first-degree premeditated
`
`murder. However, the general verdict form that was used is problematic because
`
`the jury was instructed that “[i]n order to convict of first-degree felony murder, it is
`
`not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or
`
`intent to kill.”
`
`The jury found Williams guilty of the underlying felony of kidnapping.
`
`However, with respect to that offense, the jury was instructed as follows:
`
`To prove the crime of kidnapping, the State must prove the
`following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
`
`1. That Rodrick Williams forcibly or by threat confined or abducted
`or imprisoned James Vincent Brookins against his will.
`
`2. Rodrick Williams had no lawful authority.
`
`3. Rodrick Williams acted with intent to commit or facilitate
`commission of robbery or attempted robbery . . . .
`
`4. Or inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another
`person.
`
`(Emphasis added.) Even if the jury found that Williams acted with the intent to
`
`inflict bodily harm upon Brookins,9 this does not equate to an intent to kill.
`
`
`
`9. During the interrogation, Williams admitted to hitting Brookins with his
`hands. The jailhouse informant testified that Williams stated he struck Brookins
`with a gun.
`
`
`
`- 16 -
`
`

`

`
`
`Based upon the foregoing, and because of the general verdict form with
`
`respect to the charge of first-degree murder, there is no clear jury finding that
`
`Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins. Therefore,
`
`an Alleyne violation occurred.
`
`Harmless Error
`
`
`
`Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed
`
`whether Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. We conclude such
`
`violations can be harmless. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held “[o]ther than the
`
`fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
`
`prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
`
`reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296
`
`(2004), the Supreme Court explained:
`
`[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum
`sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected
`in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the
`relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge
`may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may
`impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts
`punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has
`not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the
`punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
`
`Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal
`
`Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212,
`
`215 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations are subject to harmless
`
`
`
`- 17 -
`
`

`

`
`
`error review. See also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 522-23 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]o
`
`the extent some of our pre-Apprendi decisions may suggest that the failure to
`
`submit factual issues to the jury is not subject to harmless error analysis, Recuenco
`
`has superseded them.”). Because Blakely derived from Apprendi, and Blakely
`
`errors are subject to harmless error review, we conclude that Alleyne violations can
`
`be harmless as well.
`
`
`
`In Galindez, after concluding that Apprendi violations are subject to
`
`harmless error review, this Court delineated the applicable consideration under the
`
`facts of that case:
`
`Count I charged that “on various occasions” in a four-month period,
`Galindez “committed an act defined as sexual battery” on a child “by
`placing his penis in union with . . . and/or penetrating the vagina of
`A.M. (a minor) with his penis.” Galindez claims that because the
`charge was made in the alternative (and therefore the jury did not
`specifically find that penetration was involved), the trial court could
`assess only 40 points for victim injury. . . . [F]or purposes of our
`harmless error analysis the issue is whether the failure to have the
`jury make the victim injury finding as to Count I contributed to the
`conviction or sentence—in other words, whether the record
`demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
`have found penetration.
`At trial the young victim, then pregnant by Galindez, testified
`that she and Galindez engaged in sexual intercourse on multiple
`occasions over a period of several months. Galindez’s confession
`confirming these facts, including his admission that they repeatedly
`had sexual intercourse, was admitted at trial. Finally, Galindez’s
`defense at trial was that the twelve-year-old victim consented. Thus,
`Galindez did not dispute the facts of the sexual relationship at trial,
`and he did not contest them at resentencing, either.
`
`
`
`
`- 18 -
`
`

`

`
`
`955 So. 2d at 523-24 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation
`
`omitted). We concluded that “[i]n light of the clear and uncontested record
`
`evidence of penetration,” the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
`
`524.
`
`Based upon Galindez, the applicable question in evaluating whether an
`
`Alleyne violation is harmful with respect to section 775.082(1)(b) is whether the
`
`failure to have the jury make the finding as to whether a juvenile offender actually
`
`killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim contributed to his sentence—
`
`stated differently, whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that
`
`a rational jury would have found the juvenile offender actually killed, intended to
`
`kill, or attempted to kill the victim. See Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 523.
`
`Application
`
`
`
`Based upon our review of the record in this case, the Alleyne violation
`
`cannot be deemed harmless. Unlike the defendant in Galindez, who did not
`
`dispute during trial that he and the victim engaged in sexual intercourse, Williams
`
`disputed both that he killed Brookins and that he was a willing participant in the
`
`murder. There was sharply conflicting evidence in the form of Williams’s
`
`statements during his interrogation that he hoped Brookins would live, and the
`
`testimony of the jailhouse informant who painted Williams as both an active
`
`participant in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house and the actual killer.
`
`
`
`- 19 -
`
`

`

`
`
`In the light least favorable to Williams, the evidence reflects that (1) Parker
`
`called Williams and informed him that she had been robbed, and she believed
`
`Brookins “set her up”; (2) within a few hours of that call, Williams sent Parker a
`
`text message stating, “i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae ima
`
`take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight”; and (3) according to the
`
`informant, Williams helped devise the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on
`
`the pretense of having gold teeth created and actively participated in the crimes
`
`against Brookins. This included striking Brookins with a firearm that Williams
`
`brought to the house; demanding the location of the safe while Brookins pleaded,
`
`“It doesn’t have to be like this. I thought we was better than this”; sending Parker
`
`to purchase duct tape; binding Brookins with the tape; waiting until the early
`