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`Supreme Court of Florida
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`____________
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`No. SC17-85
`____________
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`SUZANNE HARVEY, etc.,
`Petitioner,
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`vs.
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`GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
`Respondent.
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`September 20, 2018
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`QUINCE, J.
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`This case involves the application of the law of bad faith, which imposes a
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`fiduciary obligation on an insurer to protect its insured from a judgment that
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`exceeds the limits of the insured’s policy. The specific issue in this case is whether
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`the Fourth District Court of Appeal misapplied this Court’s bad faith precedent and
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`relied on inapplicable federal precedent when it reversed the judgment entered in
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`favor of the insured after a jury found that the insurer acted in bad faith in failing to
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`settle the claim. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 208 So. 3d 810, 812 (Fla. 4th
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`DCA 2017). The Fourth District concluded that “the evidence was insufficient as a
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`matter of law to show that the insurer acted in bad faith,” and, “even if the
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`insurer’s conduct were deficient, the insurer’s actions did not cause the excess
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`judgment.” Id. We have jurisdiction based on the Fourth District’s misapplication
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`of our bad faith precedent as set forth in Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v.
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`Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980), and, more recently, in Berges v. Infinity
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`Insurance Co., 896 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 2004).1
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`For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Fourth District erred in
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`holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the insurer acted in bad
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`faith in failing to settle the insured’s claim. In reaching this erroneous conclusion,
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`the Fourth District failed to properly apply the directed verdict standard and
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`misapplied this Court’s precedent in Boston Old Colony and Berges, where we set
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`forth the fiduciary duties of insurance companies toward their insurers. We also
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`conclude that the Fourth District misapplied our precedent when it stated that an
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`insurer cannot be liable for bad faith “where the insured’s own actions or inactions
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`. . . at least in part” caused the excess judgment. Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 816. Not
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`only did the Fourth District misapply our well-established bad faith precedent but
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`it relied, in part, on nonbinding federal cases that cannot be reconciled with our
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`1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; see also Cortez v.
`Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1087 (Fla. 2013) (stating that this Court’s
`conflict jurisdiction was properly invoked by the district court’s misapplication of
`a decision of this Court).
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`clear precedent. Accordingly, we quash the Fourth District’s decision and remand
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`with instructions to reinstate the final judgment.
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`FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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`The Underlying Accident
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`On August 8, 2006, Petitioner James Harvey, the insured, was involved in an
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`automobile accident with John Potts. Potts, who was 51 years old at the time of
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`the accident, died from injuries sustained in the crash, leaving behind a wife and
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`three children. Harvey’s vehicle was registered in both his name and his
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`business’s name, and was covered under a $100,000 liability policy. The accident
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`was reported to his insurer, Respondent GEICO, and the claim was assigned to
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`Fran Korkus, a claims adjuster.
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`The Claims Process
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`Two days after the accident, on August 10, GEICO resolved the liability
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`issue adversely to Harvey. GEICO was aware that there was significant financial
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`exposure to Harvey because Potts had died leaving multiple survivors and
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`Harvey’s insurance coverage was only $100,000. On August 11, Korkus sent
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`Harvey a letter explaining that Potts’ claim could exceed his policy limits and that
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`he had the right to hire his own attorney.
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`Vivian Tejeda, a paralegal employed by the attorney representing Potts’
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`estate, called Korkus on August 14 and requested a statement from Harvey. Tejeda
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`explained that a recorded statement from Harvey was necessary to determine the
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`extent of his assets, whether he had any additional insurance, and if he was in the
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`course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Significantly,
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`Korkus did not immediately communicate the request to Harvey, and, according to
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`Tejeda, Korkus denied the request.
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`Three days later, GEICO tendered the full amount of the policy limits to the
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`estate’s attorney, Sean Domnick, along with a release and affidavit of coverage. In
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`response, Domnick wrote a letter to Korkus, acknowledging receipt of the check
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`and Korkus’s refusal to make Harvey available for a statement. Korkus received
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`this letter on August 31 and faxed it to Harvey, who learned for the first time that a
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`statement had been requested.
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`That same day, Korkus contacted Domnick regarding the requested
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`statement. After the conversation, Domnick faxed a letter confirming the scope of
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`the conversation:
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`This confirms our conversation in which you told me that you had
`received our recent letter regarding this matter. You asked me why we
`wanted a statement from Mr. Harvey. I told you that it was for the
`same reason that Ms. Tejeda outlined previously as well as that
`referenced in my recent letter. We want to determine what other
`coverage or assets may be available to cover this incident. You were
`unable to confirm that he would be available for a statement.
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`(Emphasis added.) Korkus did not respond to the letter.
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`The next day, September 1, Harvey called Korkus to discuss Domnick’s
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`letter. Harvey told Korkus that he planned to meet with his attorney, whom he had
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`hired at Korkus’s suggestion, to review his financial documents and provide the
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`information requested, but advised Korkus that his attorney would not be available
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`until September 5. Korkus documented the call in the following activity log entry:
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`Received call from insured. He received the fax. Said his company
`attorney Pat Geraghty is not available until Tuesday after the holiday
`weekend. Insured does not want claimant attorney to think we are not
`acting fast enough and asked what we can do to let the claimant’s
`attorney know we are working on this. I told insured that we will
`discuss letter with management and get back to him. Insured
`requested I fax him a copy of any response before it’s sent.
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`(Emphasis added.) Korkus’s supervisor specifically instructed Korkus to relay
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`Harvey’s message to Domnick. Korkus did not.
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`On September 13, 2006, approximately one month after Tejeda’s initial
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`request for a statement, the estate returned GEICO’s check and filed a wrongful
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`death suit against Harvey. The wrongful death action was tried before a jury that
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`found Harvey 100% at fault and awarded the estate $8.47 million in damages. A
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`judgment in favor of the estate was entered against Harvey for the full amount of
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`damages.
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`Harvey’s Bad Faith Action
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`Harvey filed a bad faith claim against GEICO based on the judgment that
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`exceeded his policy limits of $100,000. At the trial on Harvey’s bad faith claim,
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`Domnick, the lawyer for the estate, testified that he did not receive any
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`communication from GEICO following his August 31 letter. He also testified that
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`had he known that Harvey’s only other asset was a business account worth
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`approximately $85,000, he would not have filed suit and would have instead
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`advised the estate to accept the policy limits. Korkus, the insurance adjuster,
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`conceded during her testimony that it was reasonable for Domnick to request
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`information about whether Harvey had other insurance coverage and the extent of
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`his assets, testifying that plaintiff’s attorneys asked for that information “all the
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`time.” GEICO’s expert, John Atkinson, also testified that Domnick needed that
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`information to properly advise the estate regarding settlement. Tracey Potts, wife
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`of the decedent, testified that if Domnick had recommended that she settle, she
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`would have followed his advice and accepted the policy limits offered by GEICO.
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`Daniel Doucette, an expert in bad faith, testified that a serious claim such as
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`this one would require “a sense of urgency” on behalf of the insurer. He stated that
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`it would have been in Harvey’s best interests for Korkus to inform Domnick that
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`he had retained an attorney, as this would have facilitated the recorded statement.
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`Doucette also explained that because GEICO was handling the claim, Harvey
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`could not contact Domnick directly. Instead, Harvey had to use Korkus as “a go-
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`between given his duty to cooperate with his insurer.”
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`In addition to this expert testimony, Harvey presented evidence which
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`showed that Korkus had a history of struggling to manage her files. At the time of
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`Harvey’s claim, Korkus was handling approximately 130 claims. Her personnel
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`file showed that she had trouble managing her claims properly, which included
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`communication failures. In a performance appraisal from 2005, a year before
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`Harvey’s accident, a performance review indicated that “[her] productivity
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`numbers fell below average . . . there is now exposure to our insured and to GEICO
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`for extra contractual damage . . . [and she] could use help with her organizational
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`skills, filtering her emails, along with organizing her desk.” A year later, another
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`performance review stated that Korkus “has struggled throughout the year with
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`desk management, which is magnified in her low file quality rating.”
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`At the conclusion of Harvey’s case, GEICO moved for directed verdict,
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`which the trial court denied. In a special verdict, the jury found that GEICO acted
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`in bad faith and the trial court entered judgment in favor of Harvey in the amount
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`of $9.2 million. GEICO’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was
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`denied.
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`GEICO appealed, arguing that Harvey “offered insufficient evidence at trial
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`to support his bad faith claim.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 814. The Fourth District
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`agreed and reversed, concluding that “the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
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`law to show [GEICO] acted in bad faith” in failing to settle the claim against
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`Harvey. Id. at 816. The Fourth District further concluded that “even if the
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`insurer’s conduct were deficient, the insurer’s actions did not cause the excess
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`judgment rendered against the insured.” Id. at 812.
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`ANALYSIS
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`Harvey argues that the Fourth District’s decision was erroneous for two
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`reasons. First, Harvey asserts that the Fourth District erred in granting a directed
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`verdict in favor of GEICO on his bad faith claim because he presented sufficient
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`evidence to support his claim. Second, Harvey contends that the Fourth District
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`erred in concluding that an insurer cannot be found liable when the insured’s own
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`conduct “at least in part,” results in an excess judgment. Id. at 816. Because this
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`case involves an order entered on a motion for directed verdict our review is de
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`novo. Christensen v. Bowen, 140 So. 3d 498, 501 (Fla. 2014). “When reviewing a
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`trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict, this Court views the evidence
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`and all inferences of fact in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
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`We begin by explaining the bad faith law of this state, as set forth by this
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`Court first in Boston Old Colony, and more recently in Berges. We then turn to
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`this case, where we first address the Fourth District’s conclusion that the evidence
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`is insufficient to support the jury’s finding that GEICO acted in bad faith in failing
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`to settle the estate’s claim against Harvey. We then address the Fourth District’s
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`conclusion that an insurer cannot be found liable for bad faith where the excess
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`judgment was caused in part by the insured.
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`I. Bad Faith
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`We have explained that “[b]ad faith law was designed to protect insureds
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`who have paid their premiums and who have fulfilled their contractual obligations
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`by cooperating fully with the insurer in the resolution of claims.” Berges, 896 So.
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`2d at 682. Thus, “[b]ad faith jurisprudence merely holds insurers accountable for
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`failing to fulfill their obligations, and our decision does not change this basic
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`premise.” Id. at 683.
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`Almost four decades ago, we explained the law of bad faith and the good
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`faith duty insurers owe to their insureds in handling their claims, which still holds
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`true today. See Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785. We explained that “in
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`handling the defense of claims against its insured,” the insurer “has a duty to use
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`the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary care and prudence
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`should exercise in the management of his own business.” Id. This duty arises
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`from the nature of the insurer’s role in handling the claim on the insured’s behalf—
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`because the insured “has surrendered to the insurer all control over the handling of
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`the claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation and settlement, then the
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`insurer must assume a duty to exercise such control and make such decisions in
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`good faith and with due regard for the interests of the insured.” Id. We explained
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`in great detail what this duty requires of insurers:
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`This good faith duty obligates the insurer to advise the insured of
`settlement opportunities, to advise as to the probable outcome of the
`litigation, to warn of the possibility of an excess judgment, and to
`advise the insured of any steps he might take to avoid same. The
`insurer must investigate the facts, give fair consideration to a
`settlement offer that is not unreasonable under the facts, and settle, if
`possible, where a reasonably prudent person, faced with the prospect
`of paying the total recovery, would do so. Because the duty of good
`faith involves diligence and care in the investigation and evaluation of
`the claim against the insured, negligence is relevant to the question of
`good faith.
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`Id. (citations omitted).
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`We reaffirmed this duty insurers owe to their insureds in Berges, stating that
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`the insurer “owe[s] a fiduciary duty to act in [the insured’s] best interests.” 896
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`So. 2d at 677. Indeed, “this is what the insured expects when paying premiums.”
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`Id. at 683.
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`The obligations set forth in Boston Old Colony are not a mere checklist. An
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`insurer is not absolved of liability simply because it advises its insured of
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`settlement opportunities, the probable outcome of the litigation, and the possibility
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`of an excess judgment. Rather, the critical inquiry in a bad faith is whether the
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`insurer diligently, and with the same haste and precision as if it were in the
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`insured’s shoes, worked on the insured’s behalf to avoid an excess judgment.
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`“[T]he question of whether an insurer has acted in bad faith in handling claims
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`against the insured is determined under the ‘totality of the circumstances’
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`standard.” Id. at 680. Further, it is for the jury to decide whether the insurer failed
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`to “act in good faith with due regard for the interests of the insured.” Boston Old
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`Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785. This Court will not reverse a jury’s finding of bad faith
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`where it is supported by competent, substantial evidence, as “it is not the function
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`of [the appellate court] to substitute its judgment for the trier of fact.” Berges, 896
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`So. 2d at 680.
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`In a case “[w]here liability is clear, and injuries so serious that a judgment in
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`excess of the policy limits is likely, an insurer has an affirmative duty to initiate
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`settlement negotiations.” Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d
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`12, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). In such a case, where “[t]he financial exposure to [the
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`insured] [i]s a ticking financial time bomb” and “[s]uit c[an] be filed at any time,”
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`any “delay in making an offer under the circumstances of this case even where
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`there was no assurance that the claim could be settled could be viewed by a fact
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`finder as evidence of bad faith.” Goheagan v. Am. Vehicle Ins. Co., 107 So. 3d
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`433, 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785).
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`The damages claimed by an insured in a bad faith case “must be caused by
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`the insurer’s bad faith.” Perera v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 35 So. 3d 893, 902
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`(Fla. 2010). However, “the focus in a bad faith case is not on the actions of the
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`claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling its obligations to the
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`insured.” Berges, 896 So. 2d at 677.
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`Federal case law interpreting our bad faith precedent does not always hit the
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`mark. For example, in this case, the Fourth District relied in part on Novoa v.
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`GEICO Indemnity Co., 542 F. App’x 794 (11th Cir. 2013), which was not selected
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`for publication in the Federal Reporter. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
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`Appeals stated that “[t]o fulfill the duty of good faith, an insurer does not have to
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`act perfectly, prudently, or even reasonably. Rather, insurers must ‘refrain from
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`acting solely on the basis of their own interests in settlement.’ ” Id. at 796 (quoting
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`State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. 1995)). Though
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`the Eleventh Circuit cherry-picked a single clause from this Court’s opinion
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`Laforet in which we addressed the narrow issue of the validity “of retroactively
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`applying a penalty to insurance companies for bad faith conduct in failing to settle
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`uninsured motorist claims,” 658 So. 2d at 56, it failed to consider our opinion in
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`Boston Old Colony, where we made clear that there is far more to the bad faith
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`inquiry than whether the insurer acted in its own interest.
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`Indeed, in Boston Old Colony, we stated in no uncertain terms that an
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`insurer “has a duty to use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of
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`ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own
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`business.” 386 So. 2d at 785. We explained that this duty obligated an insurer “to
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`exercise such control” over the handling of the claim “and make such decisions in
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`good faith and with due regard for the interests of the insured.” Id. Additionally,
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`not only is an insurer required to refrain from acting in its own interests in handling
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`the claim, but it must also act with “care and diligence.” Id. Thus, the Eleventh
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`Circuit’s contention that an insurer need not act prudently or even reasonably also
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`misconstrues our well-established bad faith precedent.
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`As we discuss below, the Fourth District went astray, in part, by relying on
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`this federal case, in lieu of this Court’s precedent, to reverse the judgment entered
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`in favor of Harvey. We now turn to this case.
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`II. This Case
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`Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there was
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`competent, substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding that GEICO acted in
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`bad faith in failing to settle the estate’s claim against Harvey. In concluding
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`otherwise, the Fourth District (1) failed to properly apply the directed verdict
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`standard; and (2) misapplied this Court’s precedent in Boston Old Colony and
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`Berges. We also conclude that the Fourth District misstated the law when it stated
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`that an insurer cannot be liable for bad faith “where the insured’s own actions or
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`inactions result, at least in part, in an excess judgment.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at
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`816. Nothing in our precedent can be read to suggest that an insurer cannot be
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`found liable for bad faith merely because the insured could have attempted on his
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`own to avoid the excess judgment. In fact, our precedent states just the opposite,
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`as it is the insurer who owes a fiduciary obligation to the insured “to exercise such
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`control and make such decisions in good faith and with due regard for the interests
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`of the insured.” Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785.
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`We first address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding
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`of bad faith.
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`A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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`In a bad faith case, the evidence must be viewed in the context of the
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`circumstances of each particular case. See Berges, 896 So. 2d at 680 (stating that
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`each bad faith case “is determined on its own facts”). In this case, viewing the
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`evidence in the light most favorable to Harvey, GEICO’s independent investigation
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`of the facts revealed, within days after the accident, that this was a case of clear
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`liability and substantial damages, and a jury verdict could exceed the insured’s
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`$100,000 policy limit. Not only did GEICO know that Harvey was at fault for the
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`accident, but it knew that John Potts, a husband and father of three children, died
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`as a result. In other words, this was a case of catastrophic damages.
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`As the evidence reveals, however, GEICO failed to act as if the financial
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`exposure to Harvey was a “ticking financial time bomb.” Goheagan, 107 So. 3d at
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`439. The evidence shows that GEICO completely dropped the ball and failed to
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`fulfill its obligation to Harvey to “use the same degree of care and diligence as a
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`person of ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of his
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`own business.” Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785. Instead of doing
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`everything possible to facilitate settlement negotiations, GEICO’S claims adjuster,
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`Korkus, was a considerable impediment to both Harvey and the estate. When
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`Domnick, the estate’s attorney, requested a statement from Harvey, Korkus refused
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`the request, despite acknowledging that such statements were standard practice.
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`Additionally, not only did Korkus refuse the request, but she did not inform
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`Harvey of the request until two weeks later, when Korkus received a letter from
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`Domnick stating that the request had been denied. Even when Harvey informed
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`Korkus that he intended to meet with his attorney to compile the information
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`necessary for the statement, Korkus did not relay this information to Domnick. In
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`fact, Korkus wholly failed to communicate with Domnick at all after receiving his
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`letter.
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`The significance of Korkus’s failure to inform the estate that Harvey
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`intended to provide a statement cannot be overstated, as Domnick testified that had
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`he known that Harvey planned to give a statement, “he would have recommended
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`delaying the filing of the wrongful death suit.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 813.
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`Further, the estate’s personal representative testified that “she would have followed
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`her attorney’s advice and would have declined to file the lawsuit.” Id. at 813-14.
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`Thus, had GEICO acted “with due regard” for Harvey’s interests, the excess
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`judgment could have been prevented. Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785.
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`There can be no doubt that had GEICO been faced with paying the entire multi-
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`million-dollar judgment returned by the jury in this case, an amount that was
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`completely foreseeable given the clear liability and catastrophic damages, it would
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`have done everything possible to comply with the estate’s reasonable demands.
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`Accordingly, we conclude that there was competent, substantial evidence to
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`support the jury’s finding that GEICO acted in bad faith in failing to settle the
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`estate’s claim against Harvey. In concluding otherwise, the Fourth District failed
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`to properly apply the directed verdict standard that all evidence be viewed in the
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`light most favorable to Harvey, as the nonmoving party.
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`In addition to the Fourth District’s failure to properly apply the directed
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`verdict standard, it relied on a nonbinding decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
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`Appeals, which cannot be reconciled with this Court’s bad faith jurisprudence. See
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`Novoa, 542 F. App’x 794. As a result, the Fourth District misapplied this Court’s
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`precedent in Boston Old Colony and Berges.
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`Relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Novoa, the Fourth District
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`acknowledged that “GEICO could have acted more efficiently in handling the
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`insured’s claim.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 816. The Fourth District concluded,
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`however, that the evidence “merely show[ed] that GEICO could have perhaps
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`‘improved its claims process,’ not that it acted in bad faith.” Id. (quoting Novoa,
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`542 F. App’x at 796). The Fourth District stated further that, “even if GEICO’s
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`actions were negligent, negligence alone is insufficient to prove bad faith.” Id.
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`While it is true that negligence is not the standard, we made clear in Boston Old
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`Colony that “[b]ecause the duty of good faith involves diligence and care in the
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`investigation and evaluation of the claim against the insured, negligence is relevant
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`to the question of good faith.” 386 So. 2d at 785 (emphasis added). By relying on
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`this opinion from the Eleventh Circuit in lieu of this Court’s binding precedent in
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`Boston Old Colony, the Fourth District minimized the seriousness of the insurer’s
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`duty to act in good faith with due regard for the interests of its insured.2
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`Instead of taking seriously what the duty of good faith requires of insurers as
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`set forth in Boston Old Colony, the Fourth District appeared to treat the obligations
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`an insurer owes to its insured as a checklist; so long as a checkmark appeared next
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`to each item, bad faith may not be found. Indeed, the Fourth District noted that
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`GEICO notified Harvey of settlement opportunities, advised him of the possibility
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`of an excess judgment, and recommended that he retain his own attorney. Harvey,
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`2. Regarding the Fourth District’s reliance on federal case law, it has been
`observed that the “[t]o the extent that the federal cases permit summary judgment
`based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 . . . they are of limited precedential
`value in Florida summary judgment cases” because Florida places a higher burden
`on a party moving for summary judgment in state court. Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc.,
`948 So. 2d 921, 923-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
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`208 So. 3d at 815. Thus, the Fourth District concluded that GEICO “fulfilled
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`every obligation” it owed Harvey. Id.
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`Significantly absent from the Fourth District’s analysis, however, is whether
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`GEICO “use[d] the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary care
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`and prudence should exercise in the management of his own business.” Boston
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`Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785. Indeed, had the Fourth District conducted a careful
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`analysis of this question, it would not have concluded as a matter of law that
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`GEICO acted “in good faith with due regard for the interests” of Harvey when
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`Korkus failed to inform the estate’s attorney that Harvey was working on a
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`financial statement even after both Harvey and Korkus’s supervisor specifically
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`asked Korkus to do so. Id.
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`In addition to concluding that GEICO fulfilled its obligations to Harvey, the
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`Fourth District also found significant that GEICO “tendered the policy limits,
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`unconditionally, nine days after the accident.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 816. Indeed,
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`when considering the circumstances in this case, offering the $100,000 policy
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`limits when GEICO knew that the estate demanded a statement from Harvey as to
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`any additional assets that he might own was not only perfectly reasonable but
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`critical to a prompt resolution. However, nothing in either Boston Old Colony or
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`Berges can be read to suggest that an insurer’s obligations end by tendering the
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`policy limits. To the contrary, the insurer’s duty to act in good faith “in handling
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`the defense of claims against its insured” continues through the duration of the
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`claims process. Boston Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785.
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`The Fourth District further misapplied our precedent when it blamed Harvey
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`for the estate’s decision to return GEICO’s check and file suit, reasoning that
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`Harvey “never provided a statement to the estate despite having the assistance of
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`legal counsel for several days before suit was eventually filed.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d
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`at 816. As we stated in Berges, “the focus in a bad faith case is not on the actions
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`of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling its obligations to the
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`insured.” 896 So. 2d at 677. This is because, as the insured, Harvey “surrendered
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`to the insurer all control over the handling of the claim.” Boston Old Colony, 386
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`So. 2d at 785. Indeed, as Harvey’s bad faith expert testified, because GEICO was
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`handling the claim, Harvey could not contact the estate’s attorney directly, but had
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`to use Korkus as “a go-between.” The Fourth District, thus, misapplied our
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`precedent when it blamed Harvey for failing to do more to avoid the excess
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`judgment.
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`In concluding the evidence was insufficient to show that GEICO acted in
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`bad faith in failing to settle the estate’s claim against Harvey, the Fourth District
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`did not properly apply the directed verdict standard and misapplied this Court’s
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`well-established bad faith precedent by relying on erroneous federal precedent.
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`Had the Fourth District properly applied the directed verdict standard and faithfully
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`adhered to this Court’s precedent, the only result would have been to uphold the
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`jury’s verdict for Harvey, because the totality of the circumstances support the
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`jury’s finding that GEICO acted in bad faith in handling the defense of claims
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`against Harvey.
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`We now turn to the Fourth District’s statement that an insurer cannot be
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`found liable for bad faith where the excess judgment was caused in part by the
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`insured.
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`B. Causation
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`In the decision below, the Fourth District stated that “where the insured’s
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`own actions or inactions result, at least in part, in an excess judgment, the insurer
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`cannot be liable for bad faith.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 816. We conclude that this
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`statement misapplies our precedent in Berges, where we stated that “the focus in a
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`bad faith case is not on the actions of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer
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`in fulfilling its obligations to the insured.” Berges, 896 So. 2d at 677.
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`After holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that GEICO acted
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`in bad faith, the Fourth District went on to conclude the that “[e]ven assuming that
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`GEICO handled [Harvey’s] claim improperly, [Harvey] failed to establish that
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`GEICO’s conduct caused the excess judgment.” Harvey, 208 So. 3d at 816. In
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`reaching this conclusion, the Fourth District, again relying on federal cases, stated
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`that “where the insured’s own actions or inactions result, at least in part, in an
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`excess judgment, the insurer cannot be liable for bad faith.” Id. (citing Barnard v.
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`GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 448 F. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2011); Novoa, 542 F.
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`App’x at 796-97). This statement is fundamentally inconsistent with this Court’s
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`precedent, which could not be clearer in stating that “the focus in a bad faith case is
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`not on the actions of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling its
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`obligations to the insured.” Berges, 896 So. 2d at 677.
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`While this Court has stated that “there must be a causal connection between
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`the damages claimed and the insurer’s bad faith,” Perera, 35 So. 3d at 902, this
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`Court has never held or even suggested that an insured’s actions can let the insurer
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`off the hook when the evidence clearly establishes that the insurer acted in bad
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`faith in handling the insured’s claim. In fact, the standard jury instructions on legal
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`cause in a bad faith case belies the Fourth District’s conclusion that where the
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`insured’s own actions, even “in part” cause the judgment, the insurer cannot be
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`found liable for bad faith. Indeed, the standard legal cause instruction states:
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`Bad faith conduct is a legal cause of [loss] [damage] [or] [harm]
`if it directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or
`contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [damage] [or]
`[harm], so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the bad faith
`conduct, the [loss] [damage] [or] [harm]would not have occurred.
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`Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 404.6(a). Nowhere in this instruction does it state that
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`an insurer can escape liability merely because the insured’s actions could have
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`contributed to the excess judgment.3
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`To take the Fourth District’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, an insurer
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`could argue that regardless of what evidence may be presented in support