Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 1 of 20 PageID #:1
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`EASTERN DIVISION
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`NIMESH PATEL, Individually and on Behalf
`of All Others Similarly Situated,
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`vs.
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`FACEBOOK, INC.,
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No.
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`CLASS ACTION
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF
`THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT
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`Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 2 of 20 PageID #:1
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`SUMMARY OF THE ACTION ......................................................................................................1 
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`PARTIES .........................................................................................................................................4 
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................................4 
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`SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS .................................................................................................5 
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`Biometric Information and the Illinois BIPA ......................................................................5 
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`Facebook Collects and Stores Members’ Biometric Information Without Informed
`Consent ....................................................................................................................6 
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`Facebook Fails to Provide a Publicly Available Written Policy Regarding the
`Retention and Destruction of Biometric Information ..............................................9 
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`Plaintiff’s Personal Experiences ........................................................................................10 
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`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ..............................................................................................10 
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`COUNT I .......................................................................................................................................13 
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`Violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b)
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)....................................................................13 
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`COUNT II ......................................................................................................................................15 
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`Violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(a)
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)....................................................................15 
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................16 
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`JURY DEMAND ...........................................................................................................................17 
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`Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 3 of 20 PageID #:1
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`Plaintiff Nimesh Patel, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, through
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`undersigned counsel, brings this Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Illinois Biometric
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`Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq., against defendant Facebook, Inc.
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`(“Facebook”), and alleges the following upon information and belief, except as to the allegations
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`within plaintiff’s personal knowledge. Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary
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`support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
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`SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
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`1.
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`Facebook is the largest social network in the United States and likely the world.
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`Facebook has previously been alleged to abuse consumers’ privacy rights.1 Plaintiff brings this class
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`action to put an end to Facebook’s latest privacy abuse – its collection, storage, and subsequent use
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`of its users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information without informed consent, in direct
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`contravention of the BIPA.
`
`2.
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`Biometric information is any information captured, converted, stored or shared based
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`on a person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual. A “biometric identifier” is any
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`personal feature that is unique to an individual, including fingerprints, iris scans, DNA, “face
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`geometry” (also referred to herein as “faceprint” or “facial features”) and voice, among others.
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`Biometric identification is the way of the future. The City of Chicago has been selected by major
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`national corporations as a “pilot testing site[] for new applications of biometric-facilitated financial
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`transactions, including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school
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`cafeterias.” 740 ILCS 14/5(b).
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`3.
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`The Illinois Legislature has found that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique
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`identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(c). “For
`
`
`1
`See https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (last visited May 12,
`2015).
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`example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are
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`biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is
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`at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated
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`transactions.” Id.
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`4.
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`In recognition of this legitimate concern over the security of biometric information,
`
`the Illinois Legislature enacted the BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that private entities like
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`Facebook may not obtain a person’s biometric information in any way unless it first: (1) informs that
`
`person in writing that biometric information will be collected or stored; (2) informs that person in
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`writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which such biometric information is being
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`collected, stored and used; and (3) receives a written release from the person for the collection of his
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`or her biometric information. See 740 ILCS 14/15(b).
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`5.
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`In direct violation of all three prongs of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook is actively
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`collecting, storing, and using the biometric information of its reportedly more than one billion users
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`without any written notice or informed written consent, including millions of Illinois residents.
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`6.
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`Specifically, sometime in late 2010, Facebook began implementing its “tag
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`suggestion” feature (“Tag Suggestions”), which utilizes sophisticated facial recognition software to
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`automatically match pictures with names.2 Facebook’s software collects, analyzes and compares the
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`facial features in user-uploaded photographs and saves what is known as a “face template” in
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`Facebook’s database. When a user uploads a photograph, Facebook’s Tag Suggestions compares the
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`faces of any individual in that photograph to the face templates in the Facebook database. If there is
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`a match, Facebook suggests that the user “tag” the person in the photograph with the appropriate
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`
`2
`See https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/making-photo-tagging-easier/467145887130 (last
`visited May 12, 2015).
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`name. Facebook’s facial template database is so large that it dwarfs the FBI’s.3 Indeed, at a hearing
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`before the U.S. Senate on Capitol Hill in 2012, Senator Al Franken described Facebook as the
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`“world’s largest privately held database of face prints – without the explicit consent of its users.”4
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`7.
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`Indeed, Facebook never gave its members notice that their biometric information
`
`would be collected, stored or used, nor did Facebook inform its users of the specific purpose and
`
`length of term for which their biometric information would be collected, stored and used. Rather,
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`Facebook announced that it was collecting such data only after it had already begun doing so.
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`Facebook also never received a written release from its members for the collection, storage and use
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`of their biometric information. Indeed, Facebook members are not even given an opportunity to
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`provide a written release because Facebook enables Tag Suggestions on its users’ accounts by
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`default.
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`8.
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`Facebook’s collection, storage and use of its members’ biometric information has
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`been the subject of a hearing before the U.S. Senate, and European regulators forced Facebook to
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`pull Tag Suggestions.
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`9.
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`Moreover, §15(a) of the BIPA provides that:
`
`A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must
`develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention
`schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and
`biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such
`identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last
`interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.
`
`
`3
`See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/10/17/the-biometrics-revolution-is-
`already-here-and-you-may-not-be-ready-for-it/ (last visited May 12, 2015).
`
`4
`http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-
`europe.html?_r=0 (last visited May 12, 2015).
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`740 ILCS 14/15(a). Facebook does not provide its users with a publicly available retention schedule
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`or guidelines for permanently destroying their biometric information as required by the BIPA.
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`Therefore, defendant has also violated §15(a) of the BIPA.
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`10.
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`Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of a proposed class in order to
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`stop Facebook’s violations of the BIPA and to recover statuary damages for the unauthorized
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`collection, storage and use of their biometric information in violation of the BIPA.
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`PARTIES
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`11.
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`Plaintiff Nimesh Patel is, and has been at all relevant times, a resident and citizen of
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`the state of Illinois and a resident of Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff has been a Facebook user since
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`at least 2009.
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`12.
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`Defendant Facebook is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters and principal
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`executive offices at 1601 Willow Road, Menlo Park, California 94025. Facebook is a citizen of the
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`states of Delaware and California. Facebook is also registered to conduct business in the State of
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`Illinois (file number 66267067) and maintains an office in Cook County.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`13.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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`§1332 in that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy
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`exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.
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`14.
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`Jurisdiction is also proper in this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
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`U.S.C. §1332(d) (“CAFA”), because: (i) the proposed class consists of well over 100 members; (ii)
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`the parties are minimally diverse, as members of the proposed class, including plaintiff, are citizens
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`of a state different from defendant’s home states; and (iii) the aggregate amount in controversy
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`exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs. It was reported that as of 2010, there were
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`millions of Facebook users in Illinois. The estimated number of Illinois Facebook users impacted by
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`defendant’s conduct multiplied by BIPA’s statutory liquidated damages figure ($5,000 for each
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`intentional or reckless violation and $1,000 for each negligent violation) easily exceeds CAFA’s
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`$5,000,000 threshold.
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`15.
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`Venue is proper in this District because defendant is registered to conduct business in
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`Illinois, conducts business transactions in this District, and the causes of action arose, in substantial
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`part, in this District. Venue is additionally proper because plaintiff resides in this District.
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`SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
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`Biometric Information and the Illinois BIPA
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`16.
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`A “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual,
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`including fingerprints, iris scans, DNA, facial features and voice, among others.5
`
`17.
`
`The Illinois Legislature has found that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique
`
`identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(c). “For
`
`example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are
`
`biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is
`
`at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated
`
`transactions.” Id.
`
`18.
`
`In recognition of this legitimate concern over the security of biometric information,
`
`the Illinois Legislature enacted the BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that:
`
`No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise
`obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information,
`unless it first:
`
`
`5
`The BIPA defines “biometric information” as “any information, regardless of how it is captured,
`converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual.
`Biometric information does not include information derived from items or procedures excluded under the
`definition of biometric identifiers.” 740 ILCS 14/10. Plaintiff herein uses the terms “biometric information”
`and “biometric identifier” interchangeably.
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`
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`informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative
`(1)
`in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or
`stored;
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`informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative
`(2)
`in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier
`or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and
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`receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric
`(3)
`identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized representative.
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(b).
`
`19.
`
`Section 15(a) of the BIPA further provides that:
`
`A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information must
`develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention
`schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and
`biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such
`identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last
`interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(a).
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`20.
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`As alleged herein, Facebook’s practices of collecting, storing and using its members’
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`biometric information without informed written consent violates all three prongs of §15(b) of the
`
`BIPA. Facebook’s failure to provide a publicly available written policy regarding its schedule and
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`guidelines for the retention and permanent destruction of its users’ biometric information violates
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`§15(a) of the BIPA.
`
`Facebook Collects and Stores Members’ Biometric
`Information Without Informed Consent
`
`21.
`
`Facebook operates the largest online social network in the world with five new
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`profiles being created every second and over one billion users and millions of users in Illinois alone.
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`22.
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`The Facebook network allows its members to create a “profile” page where members
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`can upload photographs and communicate and interact with other Facebook members who also
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`upload photographs to their own profiles. Member photographs have always been a vital part of the
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`Facebook experience, with Facebook members uploading approximately 300 million photos per day.
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`23.
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`Facebook allows its members to “tag” themselves and other members who appear in a
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`user-uploaded photograph. A tag identifies each person in a photograph and also acts as a hyperlink
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`to that person’s profile, which may display more photographs of that person, thereby increasing user
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`engagement. This basic “tagging” feature has existed since the early days of Facebook.
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`24.
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`On or about December 15, 2010, Facebook announced an upcoming new feature
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`called Tag Suggestions.6 Tag Suggestions took photo tagging one step further by utilizing
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`sophisticated facial recognition software to automatically match photographs of people with their
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`proper names.
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`25.
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`Facebook’s sophisticated facial recognition technology works by collecting and
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`analyzing the facial features of individuals appearing in a user-uploaded photograph and generating a
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`“biometric signature” or “face template” of each individual’s face. Facebook stores those face
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`templates in a large database (which dwarfs the FBI’s facial recognition database), and as Facebook
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`members continue to manually tag friends, family and other people they recognize in a photograph,
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`Facebook’s software automatically compares those images to the face templates in its database. If
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`there is a match, Facebook suggests that a user tag the photograph with the appropriate name.
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`26.
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`Facebook’s Tag Suggestions collects, stores, and uses its members’ biometric
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`information without notice and without informed written consent, in violation of all three prongs of
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`§15(b) of the BIPA.
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`27.
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`First, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never informed its
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`members that it would collect, store and use their biometric facial information. Rather, on or about
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`June 7, 2011, Facebook simply announced that it was collecting such biometric information after it
`
`
`6
`https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/making-photo-tagging-easier/467145887130 (last visited
`May 12, 2015).
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`had already begun doing so.7 To be sure, Facebook later admitted that “we should have been more
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`clear during the roll-out process when this [feature] became available.”8
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`28.
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`Second, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never informed its
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`users of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric information would be
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`collected, stored and used.
`
`29.
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`Third, in direct contravention of §15(b) of the BIPA, Facebook never received a
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`written release from its members before it began to collect, store and use their biometric information.
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`Indeed, Facebook members are not even given an opportunity to provide a written release because
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`Facebook enables Tag Suggestions on its users’ accounts by default. By contrast, some of
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`Facebook’s other features, like its “Nearby Friends” feature, which utilizes geolocation to identify a
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`user’s friends who may be nearby, provides users with several screens of information regarding the
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`feature before asking the member to opt in.
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`30.
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`These issues were the subject of a U.S. Senate hearing in 2012 where Minnesota
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`Senator Al Franken took issue with Facebook’s practice of activating Tag Suggestions by default.9
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`Senator Franken was likewise concerned with Facebook’s lack of transparency regarding Tag
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`Suggestions: “How can users make an informed decision about facial recognition in their privacy
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`settings if you don’t actually tell them that you are using facial recognition?”10 he asked. Even more
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`troubling is that Facebook could not assure the Senate that Facebook would not sell its users’
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`biometric information to third parties in the future, which is also prohibited by the BIPA. See 740
`
`
`7
`See id.
`
`See https://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (last visited May 12,
`
`8
`2015).
`
`9
`See http://venturebeat.com/2012/07/18/facebook-hit-with-tough-questions-on-facial-recognition-in-
`senate-hearing/ (last visited May 12, 2015).
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`10
`
`See id.
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`ILCS 14/15(c). In an e-mail statement following the hearing, Senator Franken said that he hoped
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`Facebook would offer a way for American users to opt in to its photographic database: “I believe
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`that we have a fundamental right to privacy, and that means people should have the ability to choose
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`whether or not they’ll be enrolled in a commercial facial recognition database.”11
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`31.
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`Facebook’s collection, storage and use of its members’ biometric information also
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`drew scrutiny from European regulators from countries including Ireland, Belgium and the
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`Netherlands. Indeed, as a result, Facebook was forced to pull Tag Suggestions, promising European
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`regulators that it would stop using facial recognition software and delete the data it stored, and also
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`promised European regulators that it would not reinstate the feature until it got their approval. In an
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`e-mail statement, Senator Franken said: “I encourage Facebook to provide the same privacy
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`protections to its American users as it does its foreign ones.”12
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`32.
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`Facebook’s intentional, reckless, or negligent failure to provide its members with
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`written notice that their biometric information would be collected, stored and used; to inform
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`members the specific time and purpose for which such biometric information would be stored; and to
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`obtain its members’ written release for the collection, storage and use of their biometric information,
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`violates all three prongs of §15(b) of the BIPA.
`
`Facebook Fails to Provide a Publicly Available Written Policy
`Regarding the Retention and Destruction of Biometric Information
`
`33.
`
`Facebook does not comply with §15(a) of the BIPA’s requirement to “develop a
`
`written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for
`
`permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information.” 740 ILCS 14/15(a).
`
`
`11
`See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-down-on-face-recognition-in-
`europe.html?_r=0 (last visited May 12, 2015).
`
`12
`
`See id.
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`Plaintiff’s Personal Experiences
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`34.
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`Plaintiff is a resident of Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff has been a member of Facebook
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`since at least 2009. Since joining Facebook, plaintiff has uploaded and posted many photographs to
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`Facebook’s network that include images of his face, and plaintiff has tagged himself in many of
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`those photographs. Plaintiff has also been tagged in photographs by other Facebook users.
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`35.
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`Using these manually tagged images of plaintiff, Facebook created a biometric face
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`template of plaintiff’s face that Facebook stores and uses without authorization.
`
`36.
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`Plaintiff did not receive notice that Facebook would collect, store or use his biometric
`
`information.
`
`37.
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`Plaintiff never provided informed consent, in writing or otherwise, to Facebook’s
`
`collection, creation, storage, or use of his face template or any of his biometric information.
`
`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
`
`38.
`
`Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules of
`
`Civil Procedure on behalf of the following proposed class (the “Class”):
`
`All persons who, while residing in Illinois, had their biometric identifiers collected,
`captured, received or otherwise obtained by Facebook.
`
`39.
`
`Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and
`
`discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or
`
`amended complaint.
`
`40.
`
`Specifically excluded from the Class are defendant, its officers, directors, agents,
`
`trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants,
`
`partners, joint-venturers, or any entities controlled by defendant, and its heirs, successors, assigns, or
`
`other persons or entities related to or affiliated with defendant and/or its officers and/or directors, the
`
`judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family.
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`41.
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`Numerosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder is
`
`impracticable. Upon information and belief, plaintiff alleges that the Class contains many thousands
`
`of members. Although the precise number of Class members is unknown to plaintiff, the true
`
`number of Class members is known by defendant, and thus, may be notified of the pendency of this
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`action by first class mail, electronic mail and/or published notice.
`
`42.
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`Existence and predominance of common questions of law and fact. Common
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`questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions
`
`affecting only individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but
`
`are not limited to, the following:
`
`(a)
`
`whether defendant collected, captured, received, or otherwise obtained
`
`biometric identifiers or biometric information from plaintiff and the Class;
`
`(b)
`
`whether defendant informed plaintiff and the Class before collecting, using,
`
`and storing their biometric identifiers or biometric information, as required by §15(b) the BIPA;
`
`(c)
`
`whether defendant informed plaintiff and the Class of the specific purpose and
`
`length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored and
`
`used, as required by §15(b) the BIPA;
`
`(d)
`
`whether defendant obtained a written release, as defined by the BIPA, from
`
`plaintiff and the Class to collect, store, and use their biometric identifiers or biometric information;
`
`(e)
`
`whether defendant used biometric identifiers to identify plaintiff and the
`
`Class;
`
`(f)
`
`whether defendant provided a publicly available written policy establishing a
`
`retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometrics
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`information, as required by §15(a) of the BIPA;
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`(g)
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`whether defendant’s violations of the BIPA were committed intentionally,
`
`recklessly or negligently;
`
`(h)
`
`whether plaintiff and the Class are entitled to statutory damages under the
`
`BIPA and the correct measure of those damages; and
`
`(i)
`
`whether plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief.
`
`43.
`
`Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the
`
`Class in that defendant collected, stored and used his biometric information without informed
`
`consent in the exact same manner as every other Class member.
`
`44.
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`Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests
`
`of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel highly experienced in complex consumer class action
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`litigation, and plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Further, plaintiff has no interests
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`that are antagonistic to those of the Class.
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`45.
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`Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and
`
`efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by
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`individual Class members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be
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`entailed by individual litigation of their claims against defendant. It would thus be virtually
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`impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs committed
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`against them. Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the
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`court system could not. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or
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`contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also
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`increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this
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`action. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a
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`single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and
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`presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here.
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`

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`Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 15 of 20 PageID #:1
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`
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`46.
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`The Class may also be certified because:
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`(a)
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`the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create
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`a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class members that would
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`establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant;
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`(b)
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`the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create
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`a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the
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`interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede
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`their ability to protect their interests; and/or
`
`(c)
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`defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
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`Class as a whole, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect
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`to the members of the Class as a whole.
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`COUNT I
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`Violations of the Illinois Biometric
`Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15(b)
`(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)
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`47.
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`Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the
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`preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.
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`48.
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`Section 15(b) of the BIPA provides that a private entity may not, among other things,
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`collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a
`customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first:
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`informs the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or
`(l)
`biometric information is being collected or stored;
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`informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of
`(2)
`term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected,
`stored, and used; and
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`(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric
`identifier or biometric information . . . .
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`740 ILCS 14/15(b).
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`- 13 -
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`Case: 1:15-cv-04265 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/14/15 Page 16 of 20 PageID #:1
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`
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`49.
`
`50.
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`51.
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`Facebook is a private entity under the BIPA. See 740 ILCS 14/10.
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`Plaintiff and the Class members are individuals under the BIPA. See id.
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`Facebook collected plaintiff’s and the Class members’ “biometric identifiers” through
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`its facial recognition software, as alleged above. See id.
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`52.
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`Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ biometric identifiers collected by Facebook
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`constitute “biometric information” as defined by the BIPA because Facebook used those biometric
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`identifiers to identify plaintiff and the Class members. See id.
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`53.
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`Facebook systematically collected, used, and stored plaintiff’s and the Class
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`members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information without first obtaining the written release
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`required by §15(b) of the BIPA.
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`54.
`
`As alleged above, Facebook did not inform plaintiff or the Class members in writing
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`that their biometric identifiers or biometric information were being collected, stored and used, as
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`required by §15(b) of the BIPA.
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`55.
`
`As alleged above, Facebook did not inform plaintiff or the Class members in writing
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`of the specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric identifiers or biometric
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`information was being collected, stored and used, as required by §15(b) of the BIPA.
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`56.
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`By collecting, storing, and using plaintiff’s and the Class members’ biometric
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`identifiers and biometric information as described herein, Facebook violated plaintiff’s and the Class
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`members’ rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth in the
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`BIPA, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq.
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`57.
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`Facebook’s violations of §15(b) of the BIPA were intentional or reckless because
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`Facebook intentionally activated Tag Suggestions by default and without written notice as required
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`by the BIPA and, therefore, plaintiff and the Class members had no opportunity t