Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 1 of 34 PageID #:21429
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`))
`
`)
`
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`))
`
`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES NORTH
`AMERICA, INC., ONE WORLD
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OWT
`INDUSTRIES, INC., ET TECHNOLOGY
`(WUXI) CO. LTD., and RYOBI
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`
`)))))))
`
`Case No.: 1:16-cv-06097
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`The Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber
`
`Magistrate Judge Sydney Schenkier
`
`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RULE 50(A) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`
`)
`)
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 2 of 34 PageID #:21430
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`a.
`
`INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1
`I.
`LEGAL STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW .................................1
`II.
`III. CGI HAS NOT PROVEN INFRINGEMENT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
`EVIDENCE ............................................................................................................................2
`A. The Legal Standard for Alleged Infringement ...........................................................2
`1. Literal Infringement (Direct and Indirect) ................................................................2
`2.
`Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents......................................................3
`B. CGI Has Not Proven Infringement of the ’275 Patent. ..............................................3
`1. CGI Has Not Proven Literal Infringement of the ’275 Patent. .................................3
`2. CGI Has Not Proven Infringement of the ’275 Patent Under the Doctrine of
`Equivalents................................................................................................................7
`Prosecution History Estoppel Bars CGI From Asserting Infringement Under the
`Doctrine of Equivalents ............................................................................................7
`b. CGI Has Not Proven Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents ...................8
`3. CGI Has Not Proven Direct Infringement of the ’275 Patent...................................9
`4. CGI Has Not Proven Indirect Infringement of the ’275 Patent ..............................10
`a. CGI Has Not Proven Contributory Infringement of the ’275 Patent ......................10
`b. CGI Has Not Proven Induced Infringement of the ’275 Patent..............................11
`C. CGI Has Not Proven Infringement of the ’966 Patent .............................................13
`1. CGI Has Not Proven Literal Infringement of the ’966 Patent ................................13
`2. CGI Has Not Proven Direct Infringement of the ’966 Patent.................................13
`3. CGI Has Not Proven Indirect Infringement of the ’966 Patent ..............................14
`a. CGI Has Not Proven Contributory Infringement of the ’966 Patent ......................14
`b. CGI Has Not Proven Induced Infringement of the ’966 Patent..............................15
`4. CGI Has Not Proven Joint Infringement of the ’966 Patent...................................16
`D. CGI Has Not Proven Which Defendants Engaged In Any Alleged Acts.................16
`IV. CGI HAS NOT PROVEN ITS CLAIM OF WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT .......................17
`V. CHAMBERLAIN FAILED TO PROVE ITS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES...........................19
`A. CGI Failed To Prove Lost Profits for the ’275 Patent..............................................20
`1. Legal Standard for Lost Profits in Patent Cases .....................................................20
`2. Chamberlain’s Experts Admitted That Panduit Factor Two Is Not Met, Which
`Bars Lost Profits Damages......................................................................................20
`B. CGI Failed To Prove Reasonable Royalty Damages for the ’275 Patent and the ’966
`Patent ........................................................................................................................21
`1. CGI Failed to Apportion Its Proffered Damages Base ...........................................21
`2. CGI Presented Ipse Dixit Expert Testimony Insufficient to Support Its Royalty
`Rate .........................................................................................................................22
`C. CGI Did Not Prove Pre-Suit Damages for the ’275 Patent ......................................23
`D. CGI Did Not Prove Damages for Any Method Claims............................................24
`VI. VENUE IN THIS DISTRICT IS IMPROPER.....................................................................25
`VII. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER TECHTRONIC
`INDUSTRIES CO., LTD. ....................................................................................................26
`VIII. CGI HAS NOT PROVEN IT IS ENTITLED TO OTHER RELIEF ...................................27
`IX. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................27
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 3 of 34 PageID #:21431
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,
`797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) ...............................................................................16
`
`American Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc.,
`514 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................20
`
`BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.,
`498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds in Akamai Techs.,
`Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015).............................................2
`
`Brown v. Snow,
`94 F. App’x 369 (7th Cir. 2004)................................................................................................2
`
`Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.,
`576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................24
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`135 S.Ct. 1920 (2015) ...................................................................................................3, 11, 15
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
`658 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................2
`
`Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co.,
`559 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................23
`
`Daimler AG v. Bauman,
`134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) ..............................................................................................................26
`
`DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,
`471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................3, 11, 12, 15
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002) ..................................................................................................................8
`
`Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,
`353 U.S. 222 (1957) ................................................................................................................25
`
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................3
`
`Garretson v. Clark,
`111 U.S. 120 (1884) ................................................................................................................22
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 4 of 34 PageID #:21432
`
`Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
`131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) .........................................................................................................3, 11
`
`Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc.,
`897 F.2d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .................................................................................................17
`
`Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
`136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) ......................................................................................................17, 18
`
`Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
`47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1995)........................................................................................................2
`
`Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc.,
`6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993) .......................................................................................................2
`
`K&K Jump Start/Chargers, Inc. v. Schumacher Elec. Corp.,
`52 Fed. Appx. 135 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................23
`
`LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,
`694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................22
`
`Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
`545 U.S. 913 (2005) ..................................................................................................................3
`
`N. Grain Mktg. LLC v. Greving,
`743 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2014).............................................................................................26, 27
`
`Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
`138 F.3d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ...............................................................................................23
`
`Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.,
`575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).................................................................................1, 19, 20, 21
`
`SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp.,
`926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991) .....................................................................................1, 20, 21
`
`State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.,
`883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990)......................................20
`
`Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp.,
`785 F.3d 625 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................3
`
`TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,
`137 S.Ct. 1514 (2017) .............................................................................................................25
`
`Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
`90 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ...............................................................................................3, 9
`
`iii
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`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 5 of 34 PageID #:21433
`
`Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.,
`681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................11
`
`Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr,
`574 F.3d 1403 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................26
`
`Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ...............................................................................................23
`
`VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,
`917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ...............................................................................................25
`
`Vita-Mix v. Basic Holding, Inc.,
`581 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .................................................................................................3
`
`WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,
`829 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ...............................................................................................17
`
`Williams v. Chavez,
`248 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2000)...................................................................................................2
`
`STATUTES
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).......................................................................................................................25
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).................................................................................................................25, 26
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404 ...........................................................................................................................26
`
`35 U.S.C. § 271(c)...........................................................................................................................3
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 .......................................................................................................................17, 27
`
`35 U.S.C. § 287 .............................................................................................................................23
`
`Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, § 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4669 ..............................25
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)...................................................................................1, 2, 27
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 6 of 34 PageID #:21434
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), Defendants Techtronic Industries Co.
`
`Ltd., Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., One World Technologies Inc., OWT Industries,
`
`Inc., and Ryobi Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “TTI”) hereby move for entry of judgment as a
`
`matter of law that:
`
`1.
`
`The Ryobi GD200 and GD200A (the “Accused Products”) do not infringe claims
`
`1, 5, and 15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,224,275 (“the ’275 patent”) and claims 14, 17, and 18 of U.S.
`
`Pat No. 7,635,966 (“the ’966 patent”) directly, indirectly, literally, or under the doctrine of
`
`equivalents;
`
`2.
`
`The Chamberlain Group Inc. (“CGI”) has not proven its claim of willful
`
`infringement;
`
`3.
`
`CGI failed to present sufficient evidence to support the recovery of lost profits or
`
`reasonable royalty damages;
`
`Venue is improper in this District; and
`
`Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd. is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`District.
`
`On the third point, CGI’s experts admitted that the Genie Aladdin Connect is a
`
`commercially available and acceptable noninfringing alternative. Therefore, prong two of the
`
`Panduit test is not met, barring recovery of lost profits. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
`
`Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1991). No reasonable jury could have a legally
`
`sufficient evidentiary basis to award lost profits as a result.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
`
`Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant judgment as a
`
`matter of law if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find
`1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 7 of 34 PageID #:21435
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`for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (a)(1). The court “must presume that the jury
`
`resolved all factual disputes in favor of the prevailing party, and . . . must leave those findings
`
`undisturbed as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.” Cordis Corp. v. Boston
`
`Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence requires more than
`
`a mere scintilla . . . and [the court] must review the record as a whole, taking into consideration
`
`evidence that both justifies and detracts from the jury's decision.” Id.; Hedberg v. Indiana Bell
`
`Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.1995) (“Conclusory allegations by the party opposing the
`
`motion cannot defeat the motion.”); Williams v. Chavez, 248 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2000)
`
`(affirming JMOL when Plaintiff “offered no evidence to support [a] speculative and conclusory
`
`assertion); Brown v. Snow, 94 F. App’x 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that a “conclusory
`
`assertion is not enough to overcome judgment as a matter of law.”).
`
`III.
`
`CGI HAS NOT PROVEN INFRINGEMENT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
`EVIDENCE
`
`CGI has not adduced substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could find, under
`
`the preponderance of the evidence standard, infringement as to asserted claims 1, 5, and 15 of the
`
`’275 patent and asserted claims 14, 17, and 18 of the ’966 patent, including for both patents the
`
`claims from which the dependent asserted claims depend.
`
`A.
`
`The Legal Standard for Alleged Infringement
`
`1.
`
`Literal Infringement (Direct and Indirect)
`
`“Direct infringement requires a party to perform or use each and every step or element of
`
`a claimed method or product.” BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds in Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797
`
`F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus, a method or process claim is infringed only when actually
`
`performed. Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 8 of 34 PageID #:21436
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`“Inducement can be found where there is ‘[e]vidence of active steps taken to encourage
`
`direct infringement.’” Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625,
`
`630-31 (Fed. Cir. 2015), quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
`
`913, 936 (2005). Evidence that the accused infringer was reckless or negligent is insufficient.
`
`Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011). The “mere
`
`knowledge of possible infringement by others” is also insufficient. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,
`
`471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Liability for induced infringement “can only attach if the
`
`defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that the induced acts constitute patent
`
`infringement.” Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1920, 1926-28 (2015), quoting
`
`Global–Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2068 (internal quotation marks removed).
`
`To prove contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), the patent owner must
`
`show (1) direct infringement, (2) the accused infringer’s knowledge of the patent, (3) lack of
`
`substantial noninfringing uses, and (4) materiality of the accused component. Fujitsu Ltd. v.
`
`Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Substantial noninfringing uses are not
`
`“unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, occasional, aberrant, or experimental.” Vita-Mix v.
`
`Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
`
`2.
`
`Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
`
`A patentee must “provide particularized testimony and linking argument . . . to support a
`
`finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Such evidence must be presented on a
`
`limitation-by-limitation basis.” Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d
`
`1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
`
`B.
`
`CGI Has Not Proven Infringement of the ’275 Patent.
`
`1.
`
`CGI Has Not Proven Literal Infringement of the ’275 Patent.
`
`CGI has not adduced substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could find, under
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 9 of 34 PageID #:21437
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`the preponderance of the evidence standard, literal infringement as to at least the following claim
`
`limitations of the ’275 patent:
`
`a.
`
`“a controller having a plurality of potential operational status
`conditions defined, at least in part, by a plurality of operating
`states” (claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 patent)
`
`The Court construed this limitation as “a programmable platform (such as, for example, a
`
`microprocessor, a microcontroller, a programmable logic or gate array, or the like), that can
`
`obtain, though self-awareness or through externally developed information (e.g., from sensors),
`
`two or more potential operational status conditions defined, at least in part, by two or more
`
`operational conditions being experienced by the controller.” CGI failed to present substantial
`
`evidence to support its burden to prove that the alleged “controller” or “programmable platform”
`
`can obtain two or more potential operational status conditions that are defined, at least in part, by
`
`two or more operational conditions being experienced by the controller.
`
`CGI identifies three alleged potential operational status conditions. Trial Tr. at 341:25-
`
`342:12. The only alleged “operating states” that CGI asserts define these conditions are
`
`“different states that they can actually take on.” See id. at 342:13-16. However, only one
`
`alleged state can be “being experienced by the controller” at a particular time. See id. at 354:23-
`
`355:6. Under this theory of infringement, no reasonable juror could find the Accused Products
`
`have a controller having two or more potential operational status conditions that are defined, at
`
`least in part, by two or more operational conditions being experienced by the controller.
`
`b.
`
`“a wireless status condition data transmitter that is operably
`coupled to the controller, wherein the wireless status condition
`data transmitter transmits a status condition signal that:
`corresponds to a present operational status condition defined,
`at least in part, by at least two operating states from the
`plurality of operating state” (’275 patent, claims 1 and 5)
`
`The Court construed this limitation, in part, as “a status condition signal that: corresponds
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 10 of 34 PageID #:21438
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`to a present operational status condition defined, at least in part, by at least two from the two or
`
`more operational conditions being experienced by the controller.” CGI failed to present
`
`substantial evidence to support its burden to prove the Accused Products transmit a signal
`
`corresponding to a “present operational status condition,” as claimed. The requirement of “at
`
`least two from the two or more operational conditions being experienced by the controller” finds
`
`antecedent basis in the “operational conditions being experienced by the controller” that defined
`
`the alleged “potential operational status condition” of the controller. Trial Tr. at 348:1-4. The
`
`only alleged “operating states” that CGI asserts define the conditions of the controller are the
`
`“different states that they can actually take on.” See id. at 342:13-16. However, Dr. Rhyne
`
`admitted that each of the alleged present operational status conditions are only defined by only
`
`one of the possible states. Trial Tr. at 351:22-34 (light status), 354:4-22 (door status), 355:19-
`
`356:4 (operation mode).
`
`Dr. Rhyne also admits that the “ignore value” is not one of the states that define the
`
`conditions for light status, door position, or operation mode. Trial Tr. at 358:6-19. Indeed, Dr.
`
`Rhyne testified “ignore val” is not a state or a condition the garage door opener can be
`
`experiencing, as required by this Court’s construction. Id. at 359:24-360:1, 360:19-361:10. No
`
`reasonable juror could find the Accused Products transmit a signal corresponding to a “present
`
`operational status condition,” as claimed.
`
`c.
`
`“a status condition signal that: . . . comprises an identifier that
`is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator,
`such that the status condition signal substantially uniquely
`identifies the movable barrier operator” (’275 Patent, claims 1
`5, 14, and 15)
`
`The Court construed this limitation as “a status condition signal that: . . . comprises an
`
`identifier that is sufficiently unique to allow identification of the movable barrier operator
`
`[operator that controls movement of the movable barrier and may contain additional
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 11 of 34 PageID #:21439
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`functionality] that sent the signal.” CGI failed to present substantial evidence to support its
`
`burden to prove that Accused Products transmit a “status condition signal that: … comprises an
`
`identifier that is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator,” as claimed. To show
`
`this element, CGI relies exclusively on the Ryobi GDO’s alleged transmission of signals
`
`containing a media access control address (“MAC address”). However, as Dr. Madisetti
`
`explained, the MAC address is not part of the “status conditional signal” that allegedly
`
`corresponds a present operational status condition. Trial Tr. (8/28 Draft) at 87:20-88:13. No
`
`reasonable juror could find the Accused Products transmit a “status condition signal that: …
`
`comprises an identifier that is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator,” as
`
`claimed.
`
`d.
`
`“detecting at least one predetermined condition as corresponds
`to a present operational status defined, at least in part, by at
`least two operating states, of the movable barrier operator”
`(’275 patent, claims 14 and 15)
`
`The Court construed this limitation as “detecting at least one predetermined condition as
`
`corresponds to a present operational status of the movable barrier operator, which status is
`
`defined, at least in part, by at least two operational conditions being experienced by the
`
`controller.” CGI relies on the same analysis and evidence as provided for claim 1 and has failed
`
`to present substantial evidence to support its burden to prove that the Accused Products detect at
`
`least one predetermined condition as corresponds to a present operational status of the movable
`
`barrier operator. CGI has also failed to present substantial evidence to support its burden to
`
`prove that the alleged “present operational status” is “is defined, at least in part, by at least two
`
`operational conditions being experienced by the controller.” No reasonable juror could find the
`
`Accused Products detect a “predetermined condition as corresponds to a present operational
`
`status,” as claimed.
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 12 of 34 PageID #:21440
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`e.
`
`“in response to detecting the at least one predetermined
`condition, automatically wirelessly transmitting a status
`condition signal that: represents the present operational status
`defined, at least in part, by the at least two operating states”
`(’275 patent, claims 14 and 15)
`
`The Court construed this limitation, in part, as “a status condition signal that: represents
`
`the present operational status condition defined, at least in part, by the at least two operational
`
`conditions being experienced by the controller [programmable platform].” CGI relies on the
`
`same analysis and evidence as provided for claim 1 and has failed to present substantial evidence
`
`to support its burden to prove that the Accused Products transmit a status condition signal “in
`
`response to detecting the at least one predetermined condition,” as claimed. CGI has also failed
`
`to present substantial evidence to support its burden to prove that the alleged “present operational
`
`status condition” are “defined, at least in part, by the at least two operational conditions being
`
`experienced by the controller.” No reasonable juror could find the Accused Products transmit a
`
`signal corresponding to a “present operational status condition,” as claimed.
`
`2.
`
`CGI Has Not Proven Infringement of the ’275 Patent Under the
`Doctrine of Equivalents
`
`TTI hereby moves for entry of judgment as a matter of law that CGI is barred from
`
`asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a result of prosecution history
`
`estoppel, and that CGI has not adduced substantial evidence that the GD200A infringes clams 1,
`
`5, and 15 under the doctrine of equivalents.
`
`a.
`
`Prosecution History Estoppel Bars CGI From Asserting
`Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
`
`During prosecution, CGI narrowed the claims of the ’275 patent to require transmitting a
`
`signal corresponding to a present operational status condition that was defined at least in part by
`
`at least two operating states. During the same Office Action response, CGI cancelled dependent
`
`claims reciting transmitting data that corresponds to at least one operating state. CGI’s
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 13 of 34 PageID #:21441
`
`amendment was made for purposes of patentability and was narrowing. Accordingly, under the
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`Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., there is a
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`presumption that CGI “surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower
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`language.” 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002). CGI cannot overcome this presumption because the
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`alleged equivalent was foreseeable at the time of amendment. Indeed, the alleged equivalent is
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`the same as was recited by the dependent claims that were cancelled. Additionally, CGI’s
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`amendment was made to traverse an anticipation rejection over a prior art application to Doyle
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`that disclosed embodiments for transmitting both an “intermediary position” and “absolute
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`position” of the garage door. Therefore, CGI is barred from using the doctrine of equivalents to
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`recapture alleged equivalents that were present in Doyle and other prior art.
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`b.
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`CGI Has Not Proven Infringement Under the Doctrine of
`Equivalents
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`CGI has not adduced substantial evidence that the GD200A infringes clams 1, 5, and 15
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`under the doctrine of equivalents. The accused wireless signal transmitted by the GD200A does
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`not perform the claimed function of transmitting a status condition signal that corresponds or
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`represents a present operational status condition defined, at least in part, by two operating states
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`in substantially the same way as claims 1, 5, and 15 of the ’275 patent. Rather, the GD200A’s
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`WiFi transmitter transmits signals corresponding, at most, to one state. Trial Tr. (8/28 Draft) at
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`35:4-10, 38:16-25, 73:20-74:16. The GD200A thus performs a different function in a
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`substantially different way than claimed. Indeed, the GD200A performs the transmitting
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`function in the same way as was surrendered when the applicant canceled original claim 4 during
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`prosecution of the application leading to the ’275 patent.
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`For these same reasons, the GD200A does not create substantially the same result, as the
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`claimed function is transmitting a status condition signal that corresponds or represents a present
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`8
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`

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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 14 of 34 PageID #:21442
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`operational status condition defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states.
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`Finding otherwise would also run contrary to the doctrine of claim vitiation, i.e., the rule
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`that the doctrine of equivalents may not be used in a way that renders a claim term meaningless.
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`Here, permitting the claimed “present operational status condition” to cover a signal
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`corresponding, at most, to a single state would vitiate the claim language “at least two.” Thus,
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`no reasonable juror could find the GD200A transmits a signal corresponding to a signal
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`corresponding to or represent a “present operational status condition,” as claimed.
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`Additionally, a patentee must “provide particularized testimony and linking argument . . .
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`to support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Such evidence must be
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`presented on a limitation-by-limitation basis.” Tex. Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567. Here, CGI
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`never linked any accused product with the alleged infringement or provided testimony about the
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`accused products in such a way to link infringement to the product under the doctrine of
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`equivalents on a limitation-by-limitation basis. Trial Tr. at 292:5-294:14. Dr. Rhyne’s
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`conclusory statements that “parallel” signals are equivalent to “serial” signals fail to address the
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`actual limitations of the claims. The claims require “a present operational status condition” to be
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`“defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states.” Dr. Rhyne’s generalized discussion of
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`serial versus parallel signals fails to even identify what the present status condition is, let alone
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`why it is defined, at least in part, by two operating states. Dr. Rhyne’s testimony cannot suffice
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`to meet the requisite “particularized testimony and linking argument” requirement from the
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`Federal Circuit. Tex. Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567.
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`3.
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`CGI Has Not Proven Direct Infringement of the ’275 Patent
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`CGI has not adduced substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that TTI
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`directly infringes claims 1, 5, and 15 of the ’275 patent. Claims 1 and 5 are apparatus claims.
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`CGI has not adduced substantial evidence such that a reasonable jury could find TTI directly
`9
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`

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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 573 Filed: 08/28/17 Page 15 of 34 PageID #:21443
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`infringes claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 patent by making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
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`importing a product meeting all of the elements of claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 patent.
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`Claims 14 and 15 are method claims that require performance of the claimed steps.
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`These steps