Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 1 of 34 PageID #:21501
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`Case No.: 1:16-cv-06097
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`The Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber
`
`Magistrate Judge Sydney Schenkier
`
`))
`
`)
`
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`
`v.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`))
`
`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES NORTH
`AMERICA, INC., ONE WORLD
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OWT
`INDUSTRIES, INC., ET TECHNOLOGY
`(WUXI) CO. LTD., and RYOBI
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`
`)))))))
`
`)
`)
`
`Defendants.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ RULE 50(A) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AS
`TO INVALIDITY
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 2 of 34 PageID #:21502
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`VI.
`VII.
`
`INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
`LEGAL STANDARDS ......................................................................................................1
`A.
`Legal Standard for Judgment as a Matter of Law ..................................................1
`B.
`Legal Standard for Invalidity..................................................................................2
`C.
`Legal Standard for Section 101 Unpatentability ....................................................2
`TTI HAS PROVEN INVALIDITY OF THE ’275 PATENT BY CLEAR AND
`CONVINCING EVIDENCE..............................................................................................3
`A.
`Menard PCT Anticipates the ’275 Patent...............................................................4
`B.
`The Combination of Menard PCT and Cohen Renders Obvious the ’275
`Patent Asserted Claims.........................................................................................11
`TTI HAS PROVEN INVALIDITY OF THE ’966 PATENT BY CLEAR AND
`CONVINCING EVIDENCE............................................................................................12
`TTI HAS PROVEN THE ASSERTED CLAIMS ARE PATENT-INELIGIBLE...........25
`CGI HAS NOT PROVEN IT IS ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF....................................26
`CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................27
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`-i-
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 3 of 34 PageID #:21503
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
`134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) ....................................................................................................2, 3, 26
`
`Bilski v. Kappos,
`561 U.S. 593 (2010) ..................................................................................................................2
`
`Brown v. Snow,
`94 F. App’x 369 (7th Cir. 2004)................................................................................................1
`
`Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
`776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................2, 3
`
`Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
`658 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................1
`
`Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
`47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995).......................................................................................................1
`
`KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ..................................................................................................................2
`
`Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
`566 U.S. 66 (2012) ..................................................................................................................26
`
`Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
`629 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................2
`
`Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................3
`
`Williams v. Chavez,
`248 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2000)...................................................................................................1
`
`STATUTES
`
`35 U.S.C. § 101 ......................................................................................................................passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 102 .....................................................................................................................2, 3, 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 .....................................................................................................................2, 3, 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 284 .............................................................................................................................27
`-ii-
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 4 of 34 PageID #:21504
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (a)(1) ............................................................................................................1, 27
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 5 of 34 PageID #:21505
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), Defendants Techtronic
`
`Industries Co. Ltd., Techtronic Industries North America, Inc., One World Technologies
`
`Inc., OWT Industries, Inc., and Ryobi Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “TTI”) hereby
`
`move for entry of judgment as a matter of law that claims 1, 5, and 15 of U.S. Patent No.
`
`7,224,275 (“the ’275 patent”) and claims 14, 17, and 18 of U.S. Pat No. 7,635,966 (“the
`
`’966 patent”) are invalid, including the claims from which the asserted claims depend.
`
`II.
`
`LEGAL STANDARDS
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standard for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
`
`Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to grant
`
`judgment as a matter of law if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient
`
`evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (a)(1). The court
`
`“must presume that the jury resolved all factual disputes in favor of the prevailing party,
`
`and . . . must leave those findings undisturbed as long as they are supported by substantial
`
`evidence.” Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2011). “Substantial evidence requires more than a mere scintilla . . . and [the court] must
`
`review the record as a whole, taking into consideration evidence that both justifies and
`
`detracts from the jury’s decision.” Id.; see also Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47
`
`F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Conclusory allegations by the party opposing the motion
`
`cannot defeat the motion.”); Williams v. Chavez, 248 F.3d 1162 (7th Cir. 2000)
`
`(affirming JMOL when plaintiff “offered no evidence to support [a] speculative and
`
`conclusory assertion); Brown v. Snow, 94 F. App’x 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that
`
`a “conclusory assertion is not enough to overcome judgment as a matter of law.”).
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`-1-
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 6 of 34 PageID #:21506
`
`B.
`
`Legal Standard for Invalidity.
`
`A patent claim is invalid as anticipated under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102 if a single
`
`prior art reference describes “every element of the claimed invention, either expressly or
`
`inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention
`
`without undue experimentation.” Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331,
`
`1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A patent claim is invalid as obvious if the “differences between
`
`the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
`
`would have been obvious at the time of invention to a person having ordinary skill in the
`
`art.” 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007).
`
`C.
`
`Legal Standard for Section 101 Unpatentability.
`
`Under section 101 of the Patent Act, “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
`
`abstract ideas” are not patentable. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010). The
`
`fundamental concern underlying these limitations is that “[l]aws of nature, natural
`
`phenomena, and abstract ideas are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”
`
`Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotations,
`
`citations, and alterations omitted).
`
`Alice provides a two-step inquiry for adjudicating patent eligibility under section
`
`101. The Court must first “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to” a
`
`“patent-ineligible concept[].” Id. at 2355. If so, the Court must then “determine whether
`
`[any] additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
`
`application …. [presenting an] ‘inventive concept.’”
`
` Id. (citations omitted).
`
`Determinations of ineligibility under section 101 can be made on the basis of
`
`representative claims of the patents at issue. See Content Extraction & Transmission
`2
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 7 of 34 PageID #:21507
`
`LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`After finding an abstract idea, the Court must search for an “inventive concept”
`
`by determining whether “an element or combination of elements … amounts to
`
`significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
`
`2355 (quotations omitted; brackets in original). If the claims merely add “conventional”
`
`activity or recitations “limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological
`
`environment,” they fail under section 101. Id. at 2357–59 (quotations omitted). As the
`
`Court in Alice explained, taking an otherwise ineligible abstract idea and merely adding
`
`“well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry” is
`
`also not enough. Id. at 2359 (quotations and alterations omitted). For example, applying
`
`an abstract idea on a generic computer or limiting the idea to a particular field of use or
`
`technological environment does not provide an inventive concept. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S.
`
`Ct. at 2357-59; Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,
`
`772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
`
`III.
`
`TTI HAS PROVEN INVALIDITY OF THE ’275 PATENT BY CLEAR
`AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
`
`TTI has adduced substantial evidence such that no reasonable jury could find,
`
`under the clear and convincing evidence standard, that asserted claims 1, 5, and 15 of the
`
`’275 patent are not invalid.
`
`No reasonable jury could conclude that the asserted claims 1, 5 and 15 of the ’275
`
`patent: (1) are not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Patent Cooperation
`
`Treaty Application No. WO2001/93220A1 to Menard (“Menard PCT), published
`
`December 6, 2001; and (2) are not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 8 of 34 PageID #:21508
`
`Menard PCT combined with U.S. Patent No. 6,388,559 (“Cohen”), published May 14,
`
`2002.
`
`A.
`
`Menard PCT Anticipates the ’275 Patent
`
`Menard PCT discloses each element of the asserted claims of the ’275 patent.
`
`Menard PCT is prior art to the ’275 patent, because it published on December 6, 2001.
`
`DX-35.
`
`1.
`
`Preamble (claim 1 of the ’275 patent)
`
`Menard PCT discloses the movable barrier operator required by the Preamble of
`
`Claim 1. The Court construed “a movable barrier operator comprising” to be “an
`
`operator that controls movement of the movable barrier and may contain additional
`
`functionality, comprising.” Trial Tr. 855:23-856:1; Markman Order at 19. Menard PCT
`
`describes the system and method which allows for remote control of single or multiple
`
`doors. Trial Tr. at 856:2-7; DX-35, Menard PCT at 10:3-7 (“A system and method is
`
`described which allows remote control and management of single or multiple door
`
`openers using a wired or wireless communication device.”). Therefore, the Menard
`
`application describes the first requirement of the claim. Trial Tr. at 856:20-22.
`
`2.
`
`“(a) a controller having a plurality of potential operational
`status conditions defined, at least in part, by a plurality of
`operating states” (claims 1 and 5 of the ’275 patent)
`
`Menard PCT also discloses “a controller having a plurality of potential
`
`operational status conditions, defined, at least in part, by a plurality of operating states”
`
`as construed by the Court. The Court construed this claim element as: “a programmable
`
`platform (such as, for example, a microprocessor, a microcontroller, a programmable
`
`logic or gate array, or the like), that can obtain, through self-awareness or through
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 9 of 34 PageID #:21509
`
`externally developed information (e.g., from sensors), two or more potential operational
`
`status conditions defined, at least in part, by two or more operational conditions being
`
`experienced by the controller [programmable platform].”
`
`A programmable platform (such as, for example, a microprocessor, a
`microcontroller, a programmable logic or gate away, or the like):
`
`Menard PCT discloses this part of the claim. 857:22-848:5. Menard PCT’s
`
`processor 12000 in Figure 31 is a programmable platform that has “two or more potential
`
`operational status conditions defined, at least in part, by two or more operational
`
`conditions being experienced by the controller.” DX-35, Menard PCT at 33:9-15 & Fig.
`
`31. “Processor 12000 may include a microprocessor as well as memory to perform the
`
`programmed functions and to retain settings and configuration information.” Id. at 33:9-
`
`15.
`
`That can obtain, through self-awareness or through externally developed
`information (e.g., from sensors):
`
`Menard PCT discloses this part of the claim. Trial Tr. at 858:5-12. Menard PCT
`
`discloses that the “Processor 12000 may also include a circuit to receive electrical signals
`
`from electrical, or electromechanical sensors and monitors and to provide an electrical
`
`signal to drive and actuator.” DX-35, Menard PCT at 34:11-15; Trial Tr. at 858:5-12. .
`
`Menard PCT further discloses what type of information is received from the sensors,
`
`including position information. Trial Tr. 858:13-21; DX-35, Menard PCT at 46:24-26
`
`(“sensor 15500 provides the position information to processor 12000.”).
`
`Two or more potential operational status conditions defined, at least in part, by
`two or more operational conditions being experienced by the controller
`[programmable platform]:
`
`Menard PCT discloses this part of the claim. Trial Tr. 858:22-861:2. Menard
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 10 of 34 PageID #:21510
`
`PCT discloses that:
`
`In one embodiment, sensor 15500 provides the position information to
`processor 12000. At 37000, the user receives notification of the door
`position information. The door position may be indicated by a pair of
`lights on a pager (one light labeled “open” and another “close”), by a
`graphical image on a screen, a recognizable audio tone, a recognizable
`vibration, or any other means of indicating position to a user.”
`
`DX-35, Menard PCT at 46:24-30.
`
`Menard further discloses that the position sensor programming 26500 “may
`
`include software routines and modules that receive and interpret position information”
`
`from the door position sensor. Id. at 44:1-10. Software routines and modules also
`
`“receive and interpret information from optical sensor 17000” and “from temperature
`
`sensor 17500.” Id. Thus, the several potential operational status conditions identified by
`
`Menard PCT include door position, light and temperature. Trial Tr. 859:11-860:2. The
`
`operational status condition of a door position is defined by the operating states open,
`
`closed and partially closing. Id. at 860:3-5. The operational status condition of a light is
`
`defined by the operating states on, off and the brightness level. Id. at 860:6-8. The
`
`operational status condition of a temperature sensor is defined by freezing, normal and
`
`overheating. Id. at 860:9-11.
`
`The controller actually experiences these operational status conditions as
`
`described in Menard PCT. Id. at 860:12-22. Thus, Menard PCT describes this claim
`
`element. Id. at 860:23-861:2.
`
`3.
`
`“(b) a movable barrier interface that is operably coupled to the
`controller” (’275 patent, claims 1 and 5)
`
`Menard PCT discloses the “movable barrier interface” claim limitation. Trial Tr.
`
`at 861:3-8. Figure 31 depicts a movable barrier interface as a line connecting the
`6
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 11 of 34 PageID #:21511
`
`processor 12000 to the GDO 1000. Id. at Fig. 31; Trial Tr. at 861:9-12 (“[T]hat’s the
`
`operable coupling of those two entities.”). Menard PCT describes a movable barrier
`
`interface with physical elements (motor, belt drive, chain, etc.) to lift the garage door.
`
`Trial Tr. 861:15-21; Menard PCT at 31:3-4; see also id. at 2:31-3:6 & Fig. 30. Therefore,
`
`Menard PCT discloses this claim element. Trial Tr. at 861:22-25.
`
`4.
`
`“(c) a wireless status condition data transmitter that is
`operably coupled to the controller, wherein the wireless status
`condition data transmitter transmits a status condition signal
`that: corresponds to a present operational status condition
`defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states from
`the plurality of operating state” (’275 patent, claims 1 and 5)
`
`A wireless status condition data transmitter that is operably coupled to the
`controller, wherein the wireless status condition data transmitter transmits a status
`condition signal:
`
`Menard PCT discloses “a wireless status condition data transmitter that is
`
`operably coupled to the controller, wherein the wireless status condition data transmitter
`
`transmits a status condition signal.” Trial Tr. at 862:1-21. Figure 31 shows transceiver
`
`13000, which is a wireless status condition data transmitter coupled to the controller (i.e.,
`
`processor 12000). Id.; DX-35, Menard PCT at Fig. 31. Menard PCT specifically talks
`
`about how the processor 12000 is coupled to the element’s power and also transciever
`
`13000. Trial Tr. at 862:13-18; DX-35, Menard PCT at 34:1-2.
`
`Corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at least in part, by
`at least two operating states from the plurality of operating state:
`
`Menard PCT discloses this claim element as construed by the Court. Trial Tr. at
`
`862:22-863:3. The Court construed this limitation to require transmission of a status
`
`condition signal that “corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at
`
`least in part, by at least two from the two or more operational conditions being
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 12 of 34 PageID #:21512
`
`experienced by the controller [programmable platform].” Markman Order at 38-39.
`
`Menard PCT discloses how the position information may be transmitted as well as
`
`other information, and gives examples of door position information, temperature levels,
`
`and light levels. Trial Tr. at 863:14-19; Menard PCT at 10:24-26 (“Position information
`
`is transmitted to the device by a transceiver coupled to the processor. Other information,
`
`such as temperature or light levels, may also be transmitted to the device.”). These things
`
`are all being experienced by the controller, and the signal sent is defined by a plurality of
`
`operating states as required by the Court’s construction—multiple states are sent together.
`
`Trial Tr. at 863:20-864:7. Therefore, Menard PCT discloses this claim element. Id. at
`
`864:8-13.
`
`5.
`
`“a status condition signal that: . . . comprises an identifier that
`is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator,
`such that the status condition signal substantially uniquely
`identifies the movable barrier operator” (’275 Patent, claims 1,
`5, 14, and 15)
`
`Menard PCT also discloses that the status condition signal “comprises an
`
`identifier that is at least relatively unique to the movable barrier operator, such that the
`
`status condition signal substantially uniquely identifies the movable barrier operator.”
`
`Trial Tr. at 864:14-20. In particular, Menard PCT’s signal “comprises an identifier that is
`
`sufficiently unique to allow identification of the movable barrier operator . . . that sent the
`
`signal,” as required by the Court’s construction. Markman Order at 41; Trial Tr. at
`
`864:21-865:3. Menard PCT describes how you can use an identifier in the signals that
`
`are transmitted, because it talks about how, in the transceiver, how the communication
`
`device can be Bluetooth, HomeRF, wireless LAN (i.e. WiFi), or other entities. DX-35 at
`
`37:24-26; Trial Tr. at 865:6-12. Bluetooth uses a unique identifier. Trial Tr. at 865:16-
`8
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 13 of 34 PageID #:21513
`
`22. Therefore, Menard PCT discloses the last claim element. 865:23-25.
`
`6.
`
`Dependent Claim 5
`
`Menard PCT also discloses every element of the asserted dependent claim 5.
`
`Trial Tr. at 866:9-868:1. Claim 5 recites a number of possible operating states, including
`
`moving the barrier in a first or second direction, detecting the presence of an obstacle, a
`
`vacation mode status change, detecting a likely proximal presence of a vehicle or human,
`
`and receiving an operating parameter alteration signal. Because at least one of these
`
`requirements is shown in Menard PCT, Menard PCT invalidates the claim. Id. at 866:25-
`
`867:2. Indeed, Menard discloses many of them. Id. at 867:3-6. Menard PCT discloses
`
`door control options include “include partially, or fully, closing the door” (i.e., moving
`
`the barrier in a first direction). Id. at 867:8-14; Menard PCT at 46:26-47:1. Menard PCT
`
`also discloses that sensor 17000 “may provide a signal to indicate if an interior or exterior
`
`garage light is illuminated.” Trial Tr. at 867:15-22; Menard PCT at 42:7-10. Therefore,
`
`Menard PCT invalidates the claim. Trial Tr. at 867:23-868:1.
`
`7.
`
`Claim 15: “detecting at least one predetermined condition as
`corresponds to a present operational status defined, at least in
`part, by at least two operating states, of the movable barrier
`operator” (’275 patent, claims 14 and 15)
`
`Asserted claim 15 depends from claim 14. Claim 14 is similar to claim 1 except it
`
`recites “detecting at least one predetermined condition as corresponds to a present
`
`operational status defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states, of the movable
`
`barrier operator.” PX-1, ’275 Patent at 9:24-38; Trial Tr. at 868:9-869:8.
`
`The Court construed this element as “detecting at least one predetermined
`
`condition as corresponds to a present operational status of the movable barrier operator
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 14 of 34 PageID #:21514
`
`[operator that controls movement of the movable barrier and may contain additional
`
`functionality], which status is defined, at least in part, by at least two operational
`
`conditions being experienced by the controller [programmable platform].” Markman
`
`Order at 46; Trial Tr. at 869:9-19.
`
`Menard PCT discloses this type of detecting process. Trial Tr. at 869:20-21.
`
`Menard PCT is directed to “[a] system and method for detecting and monitoring at least
`
`one event or condition of interest.” DX-35, Menard PCT at Abstract; Trial Tr. at 869:22-
`
`25. Once you detect it, Menard PCT talks about how that outbound signal can be
`
`transmitted. Trial Tr. at 870:1-13; DX-35, Menard PCT at 41:2-5. Information about
`
`more than one operational status condition could be transmitted in the same signal. Trial
`
`Tr. at 870:14-24. As a result, Menard PCT discloses all elements of independent claim
`
`14, from which claim 15 depends. Trial Tr. at 870:18-871:4.
`
`Dependent claim 15 is similar to claim 5, in that it claims a list of many
`
`predetermined conditions that may be detected. Trial Tr. at 871:9-14. Similar to claim 5,
`
`if any one thing on claim 15’s list is detected according to Menard PCT, then Menard
`
`PCT discloses claim 15. Trial Tr. at 871:15-21. Menard PCT discloses “moving a
`
`barrier operator in the first direction.” Id. at 871:22-872:12; DX-35 at 41:2-5 (“The
`
`outbound signal (e.g., indicating the door position) may be transmitted to the pager on a
`
`predetermined schedule, or upon inquiry, or upon a change of position of the door (or
`
`actuator) at any time.”). Therefore, Menard PCT invalidates claim 15. Trial Tr. at
`
`872:13-17.
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 15 of 34 PageID #:21515
`
`B.
`
`The Combination of Menard PCT and Cohen Renders Obvious the
`’275 Patent Asserted Claims.
`
`1.
`
`Disclosure of Cohen
`
`Cohen is prior art to the ’275 patent, because it published on May 14, 2002. Trial
`
`Tr. at 874:21-875:4. Cohen discloses that “[a] remote control system uses a state signal
`
`that indicates whether a door or lock is opening, open, closing or closed.” DX-181,
`
`Abstract; see id. at Fig. 2 (showing door opener can be a garage door opener); Trial Tr.
`
`875:5-24. Cohen describes a controller that is actually aware of operational states, and
`
`wirelessly transmits those states to a remote device. Trial Tr. at 875:11-23. Cohen also
`
`describes how the controller actually transmits the signal that can have four states (open,
`
`opening, closed, closing). Trial Tr. at 876:24-877:10, 877:23-878:13.
`
`Therefore, to the extent these four states are not disclosed by Menard (and
`
`Defendants have proven that they are), Cohen describes those exact four states for the
`
`position of the door. Trial Tr. at 877:11-17. Put another way, Cohen describes this signal
`
`format of the ’275 patent exactly. Id.
`
`2.
`
`Motivation to Combine
`
`One of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Menard
`
`PCT’s door position information with the signal format disclosed in Cohen. Trial Tr.
`
`878:14-879:4. Both Menard PCT and Cohen are directed to remote monitoring of garage
`
`doors. Id. Both references are directed to the wireless transmission of state information.
`
`Id. Both address the same problem using similar technology. Id. Moreover, combining
`
`the signal format described in Cohen to transmit Menard’s door position information
`
`would be a simple substitution of known data formats. Id. Therefore, one of ordinary
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 16 of 34 PageID #:21516
`
`skill in the art would have had more than a reasonable probably of success in combining
`
`the teachings of Menard PCT and Cohen. Id.
`
`As a result, the combination of Menard PCT and Cohen renders the asserted
`
`claims of the ’275 patent invalid as obvious (id.at 879:5-11), and no reasonable jury
`
`could find otherwise.
`
`3.
`
`No Secondary Considerations
`
`No secondary considerations of non-obviousness negate a finding that the ‘275
`
`patent claims are obvious as a matter of law, because of a lack of nexus and a lack of
`
`evidence of copying, among other things. Trial Tr. 879:12-881:7
`
`IV.
`
`TTI HAS PROVEN INVALIDITY OF THE ’966 PATENT BY CLEAR
`AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
`
`TTI has adduced substantial evidence such that no reasonable jury could find,
`
`under the clear and convincing evidence standard, that asserted claims 14, 17, and 18 of
`
`the ’966 patent are not invalid.
`
`No reasonable jury could conclude that the asserted claims 14, 17, and 18 of the
`
`’966 patent: (1) are not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated by Craftsman
`
`139.53919 manual and product (“Craftsman”); (2) not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
`
`anticipated or 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 7,786,619 to
`
`Crusius et al. (“Crusius”); and (3) are not invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as anticipated or
`
`35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,484,784 to Weik et al. (“Weik”).
`
`1.
`
`Craftsman Anticipates the ’966 Patent.
`
`Craftsman was available to the public at least as early as November 10, 2004.
`
`Trial Tr. at 886:10-24; DX-034. CGI has not contested that Craftsman is prior art to the
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 17 of 34 PageID #:21517
`
`’966 patent. Trial Tr. at 887:3-5. As demonstrated below, no reasonable juror could
`
`conclude that Craftsman does not anticipate claims 14, 17, and 18 of the ’966 Patent.
`
`Claim 14: Asserted claim 14 depends from independent claim 9. Craftsman
`
`discloses every element of independent claim 9 and every element of asserted dependent
`
`claim 14. Dr. Rhyne does not dispute that Elements 9[preamble], 9[a], and 9[c] are
`
`taught by Craftsman. See Trial Tr. (8/29 Draft) at 67:14 at 71:2.
`
`a.
`
`9[Preamble] “battery charging apparatus”
`
`Craftsman discloses a “battery charging apparatus.” Craftsman discloses a battery
`
`backup unit (“BBU”) having two rechargeable batteries are charged when the BBU is
`
`connected to a power source, such as the head unit of a garage door operator (“GDO”).
`
`Trial Tr. at 890:23-9; 891:15-15-25; 893:1-8; DX-134-032; DX-007.
`
`b.
`
`9[a] “a battery charging station in electrical
`communication with a rechargeable battery and in
`electrical communication with a head unit of a barrier
`movement operator for supplying power to at least one
`rechargeable battery”
`
`Craftsman discloses “a battery charging station in electrical communication with a
`
`rechargeable battery and in electrical communication with a head unit of a barrier
`
`movement operator for supplying power to at least one rechargeable battery.” The Court
`
`construed “barrier movement operator” to mean “an operator that controls movement of
`
`the movable barrier and may contain additional functionality.” Markman Order at 62-63.
`
`Craftsman discloses that when you connect the BBU to the head unit using the plug there
`
`the battery charging station is in electrical communication with the rechargeable battery
`
`and the head unit . Trial Tr. at 892:1-893:4; DX-134-032; DX-007. This electrical
`
`communication allows the battery charging station to supply power to the BBU’s
`13
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 18 of 34 PageID #:21518
`
`rechargeable batteries. Trial Tr. at 893:1-893:8; DX-134-032; DX-007.
`
` Dr. Rhyne
`
`agrees. Trial Tr. (8/29 Draft) at 114:14-20.
`
`c.
`
`9[b] “the at least one rechargeable battery being
`removably connectable to electrically powered
`equipment other than and physically separate or
`separable from the barrier movement operator to
`provide power to the electrically powered equipment”
`
`Craftsman discloses “the at least one rechargeable battery being removably
`
`connectable to electrically powered equipment other than and physically separate or
`
`separable from the barrier movement operator to provide power to the electrically
`
`powered equipment.” The Court construed “removably connectable” to mean
`
`“configured to allow a user to insert, plug in, or otherwise manually attach and detach.”
`
`Markman Order at 71.
`
`Craftsman discloses that the BBU is connectable to the head unit via a plug. Trial
`
`Tr. at 893:23-894:4; DX-134-032; DX-007. Thus, the BBU is removably connectable
`
`(i.e., configured to plug in) to the head unit of the Craftsman garage door operator. The
`
`BBU can be disconnected from a first Craftsman garage door operator and then
`
`connected to and provide power to a second Craftsman garage door operator. Trial Tr. at
`
`895:9-24; 897:25-4.
`
`It
`
`is undisputed that the second Craftsman GDO is electrically powered
`
`equipment. Trial Tr. (8/29 Rough) at 111:11-13 (Dr. Rhyne: “Q. Now you agree that a
`
`garage door opener is electrically powered equipment, correct? A. It is.”); see also Trial
`
`Tr. at 894:5-16; DX-134-032; DX-007. Dr. Rhyne also agrees the second Craftsman
`
`GDO is physically separate from the first Craftsman GDO. Trial Tr. (8/29 Draft) at
`
`119:4-6 (“Q. You’ll agree with me that the first garage door opener, DX-7, is physically
`14
`
`DB1/ 93478197.1
`
`

`

`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 581 Filed: 08/29/17 Page 19 of 34 PageID #:21519
`
`separate from DX 7-D, right? A. Yes.”). Thus, the second Craftsman GDO is “other than
`
`and physically separate or separable from the barrier movement operator,” as claimed.
`
`The second Craftsman GDO can also be powered by t