Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:6781
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`Case No.: 1:16-cv-06097
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`The Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber
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`Magistrate Judge Sydney Schenkier
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`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
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`v.
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`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. LTD.,
`TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES NORTH
`AMERICA, INC., ONE WORLD
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OWT
`INDUSTRIES, INC., ET TECHNOLOGY
`(WUXI) CO. LTD., and RYOBI
`TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
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`Plaintiff,
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL RULE 59(e)
`MOTION TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER
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`Plaintiff The Chamberlain Group, Inc.’s (“Chamberlain”) Federal Rule 59(e) Motion
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`must be denied because Chamberlain has not shown it is entitled to the “extraordinary” remedy
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`of an amendment of the preliminary injunction under Rule 59(e). Indeed, Chamberlain has not
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`even tried to meet the Seventh Circuit’s strict test for Rule 59(e) motions—Chamberlain does not
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`argue that this Court committed a manifest error of law or fact or that newly discovered evidence
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`precluded entry of judgment. Instead, Chamberlain has improperly used Rule 59(e) as a vehicle
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`to rehash arguments this Court expressly rejected and to delay TTI’s appeal of the Court’s
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`preliminary injunction order.
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`Chamberlain’s motion must also be denied because Chamberlain has not presented
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`sufficient evidence that TTI1 is currently inducing infringement.
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`Since Chamberlain’s filing of the Rule 59(e) Motion suspends TTI’s appeal—an appeal
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`where TTI has already filed a motion to stay the injunction pending adjudication on the merits
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`1 “TTI” refers to Defendants Techtronic Industries North America, Inc. (“TTINA”), One World
`Technologies, Inc. d/b/a Techtronic Industries Power Equipment (“TTIPE”), OWT Industries,
`Inc., and Ryobi Technologies, Inc.
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`

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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:6782
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`and where the Federal Circuit has already ordered expedited briefing—TTI requests expedited
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`consideration of Chamberlain’s motion to avoid any undue harm to TTI.
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`On September 22, 2016, this Court issued an Order granting Chamberlain’s Motion for a
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`Preliminary Injunction as to U.S. Pat. No. 7,224,275 (the “’275 patent”). (ECF No. 107). At a
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`related hearing, the Court requested briefing on the scope of the Preliminary Injunction,
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`specifically whether The Home Depot should be enjoined and whether the Preliminary
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`Injunction Order should include both direct and “indirect infringement.”2 (ECF No. 105).
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`Before ruling on the scope of the injunction, on September 27, 2016, this Court issued the
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`Preliminary Injunction Order. (ECF No. 111). TTI filed its Notice of Appeal to the Federal
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`Circuit regarding the Preliminary Injunction Order and moved both to stay the preliminary
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`injunction and for expedited briefing. (ECF 113); see also The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v.
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`Techtronic Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 16-2713, Dkt. No. 2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2016). One week later,
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`on October 4, this Court issued an Order Modifying the Preliminary Injunction. (ECF 129).
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`On October 5, 2016, TTI filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Court lacked
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`jurisdiction to modify the preliminary injunction because TTI had already filed a Notice of
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`Appeal. (ECF 130). On October 14, 2016, this Court issued an Order agreeing with TTI and
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`finding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to modify the preliminary injunction because adding
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`indirect infringement would be an improper adjudication of the substantial rights of the parties.
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`(ECF 138). The Court noted: “Defendants argue convincingly that Plaintiff never presented
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`evidence of indirect infringement in the arguments prior to the injunction.” Id. (emphasis
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`added).
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`2 “Indirect infringement” is not a cause of action under 35 U.S.C. § 271, as it is a term used to
`refer to induced infringement (§ 271(b)) and contributory infringement (§ 271(c)).
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`2
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:6783
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`Chamberlain filed its motion under Rule 59(e) on October 18, 2016, again seeking a
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`modification of the preliminary injunction to include “indirect infringement,” which TTI
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`opposes. (ECF 141).
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`The Federal Circuit has granted TTI’s request for an expedited briefing schedule, but
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`TTI’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction remains pending. See The Chamberlain Group,
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`Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., Ltd., No. 16-2713, Dkt. No. 38 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 19, 2016).
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`II.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`“Once judgment has been entered, there is a presumption that the case is finished, and the
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`burden is on the party who wants to upset that judgment to show the court that there is good
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`reason to set it aside.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 591 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule
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`59(e), the Court may alter or amend its judgment only if the movant “clearly establish[es]
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`(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
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`precluded entry of judgment.” Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th
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`Cir. 2012). This rule “enables the court to correct its own errors and thus avoid unnecessary
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`appellate procedures.” Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 683 F.3d 805, 813 (7th Cir. 2012).
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`A manifest error of law or fact occurs where “the district court commits a wholesale
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`disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807
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`F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Oto v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 224
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`F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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`To support a motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence under Rule
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`59(e), the moving party must “show not only that this evidence was newly discovered or
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`unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have
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`discovered and produced such evidence [during the pendency of the original motion].” Caisse
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`Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
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`3
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:6784
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`Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 955 (7th Cir. 2013) (movant must have been
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`unable to discover information despite exercise of due diligence).
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`A motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) cannot “be used to rehash previously rejected
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`arguments.” Vesely v. Armlist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations
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`omitted) (citing Oto, 224 F.3d at 606). Thus, “[Rule 59(e)] motions are not appropriate vehicles
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`for relitigating arguments that the district court previously rejected, or for arguing issues or
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`presenting evidence that could have been raised during the pendency of the motion presently
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`under reconsideration.” Right Field Rooftops, LLC v. Chicago Baseball Holdings, LLC, No. 15
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`C 551, 2016 WL 4549087, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2016) (citing Sigworth v. City of Aurora, 487
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`F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)). It is well established that a court’s opinions are not “mere first
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`drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.” Int’l Test & Balance, Inc.
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`v. Associated Air & Balance Council, No. 98 C 2553, 1998 WL 957332, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23,
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`1998) (citing Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill.
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`1988)).
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`III. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Chamberlain’s Is Misusing Rule 59(e) and Does Not Even Try to Satisfy the
`Rule 59(e) Standard.
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`Rule 59(e) motions have been described as an “extraordinary remedy that should be used
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`sparingly.” Indep. Coca-Cola Employees’ Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca-Cola
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`Bottling Co. United, 114 F. App’x 137, 143 (5th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has stated this
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`Court may alter or amend its judgment under Rule 59(e) only if the movant “clearly establish[es]
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`(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
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`precluded entry of judgment.” Blue, 698 F.3d at 598 (emphasis added). Chamberlain neither
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`invokes this high standard nor makes any attempt to show that it has met either requirement.
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`4
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:6785
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`1.
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`Chamberlain Relies on the Wrong Standard.
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`In its motion, Chamberlain argues that “good cause exists” for the Court to exercise its
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`jurisdiction under Rule 59(e). (ECF 141 at 4). But “good cause” is not the appropriate standard
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`for a Rule 59(e) motion. And Chamberlain does not argue that the Court made a manifest error
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`of law or fact in entering the original preliminary injunction, as is required. In fact, Chamberlain
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`does not argue that the Court made any error whatsoever. Nor does Chamberlain argue it has
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`newly discovered evidence that it could not have discovered and produced earlier with
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`reasonable diligence.
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`Instead, Chamberlain only argues that TTI is allegedly promoting the sale of the
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`infringing product and encouraging customers to use the accused features, which is irrelevant to
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`the Rule 59(e) analysis. It is not surprising that Chamberlain fails to cite to any authority to
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`support its proposition that this Court should “exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 59(e)” in such
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`a situation, because no such authority exists. By filing a Rule 59(e) motion but making no
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`attempt to state the standard or show why it has met its burden, Chamberlain has misused the
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`Rule. Its motion must be denied.
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`2.
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`Chamberlain Rehashes Previously Rejected Arguments, Which Is
`Improper Under Rule 59(e).
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`The Seventh Circuit has stated that a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) cannot “be
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`used to rehash previously rejected arguments.” Vesely, 762 F.3d at 666 (internal quotations
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`omitted) (citing Oto, 224 F.3d at 606); see also Right Field Rooftops, 2016 WL 4549087, at *2
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`(“[Rule 59(e)] motions are not appropriate vehicles for relitigating arguments that the district
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`court previously rejected.”)). But that is exactly what Chamberlain is doing here—rehashing the
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`indirect infringement arguments that this Court already rejected.
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`5
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:6786
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`Chamberlain devotes the majority of its motion to presenting arguments that rely on and
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`cite to evidence previously in the record, claiming this evidence demonstrates “indirect
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`infringement.” (See ECF 141 at 4-9). In its Order Granting TTI’s Motion for Reconsideration,
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`this Court already rejected Chamberlain’s argument that indirect infringement was at issue prior
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`to the injunction:
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`Defendants argue convincingly that Plaintiff never presented evidence of indirect
`infringement in the arguments prior to the injunction. The Court has reviewed
`the hearing transcripts and briefs, and indirect infringement (and specifically
`induced infringement) are mentioned sparingly by the parties, and only in the
`context of the ’966 patent. The Court explicitly enjoined Defendants’ [sic] from
`infringing the ’275 patent, not the ’966 patent.
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`The Court therefore never considered evidence of indirect infringement as to the
`’275 patent. Defendants argue that this creates an injustice, because they would
`have had the opportunity to argue defenses to indirect infringement, such as lack
`of intent to encourage another’s infringement. That issue was never briefed,
`argued, or resolved by the Court. Plaintiff has no credible response to
`Defendants’ arguments in this respect.
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`(ECF 138 at 4) (emphasis added). Yet Chamberlain rehashes the same arguments it already
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`presented in earlier briefing. This also is a misuse of Rule 59(e), and Chamberlain’s motion
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`should be denied
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`B.
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`Chamberlain Fails to Present Adequate Evidence of Indirect Infringement In
`Any Event.
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`Even if Chamberlain had addressed the proper standard for Rule 59(e) motions,
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`Chamberlain has not presented sufficient evidence that TTI is indirectly infringing to warrant a
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`preliminary injunction.3 Indeed, to establish induced infringement, Chamberlain must show,
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`inter alia, that TTI is knowingly inducing the infringing acts with a specific intent to encourage
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`3 As mentioned previously, see supra n.2, “indirect infringement” encompasses two statutory
`bases of liability: induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement
`under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Chamberlain does not address contributory infringement in its Rule
`59(e) Motion, so TTI only responds to Chamberlain’s apparent induced infringement allegations.
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`6
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`

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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:6787
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`infringement by its customers. See DSU Med. Corp. v. LMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
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`2006) (en banc in relevant part).
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`Chamberlain argues that TTI is “promoting the sale of the infringing product and
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`encouraging customers to use the exact features that were found to likely infringe” the ’275
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`patent “to this day.” (ECF 141 at 4, 11). It relies only on print-outs from TTI’s website, which
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`do not show the requisite specific intent to encourage infringement. Indeed, after this Court
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`entered the preliminary injunction, TTI took substantial acts to avoid infringement. For example,
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`TTI discontinued sales to The Home Depot and through its Direct Tool Outlet stores, halted
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`importation of the Ryobi GD200, and has completely recoded its website to remove any offers
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`for sale. The website used to have a “buy it now” link on its garage door opener page, which
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`linked to The Home Depot’s website, where a potential customer could order the Ryobi GD200.
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`That link has been removed along with all additional links to The Home Depot’s listing of the
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`Ryobi GD200. (See, e.g., ECF 141-3). The only remaining link is at the bottom of some
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`pages—in an area of the page that is not associated with any particular products—where TTI
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`states that Ryobi products are exclusively sold at The Home Depot. The link leads to a page
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`from The Home Depot with listings of 169 Ryobi Power Tools, none of which are garage door
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`openers. TTI’s website does not show a specific intent to induce its customers to buy the Ryobi
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`GD200, much less infringe the claims.
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`C. TTI Requests Expedited Consideration of Chamberlain’s 59(e) Motion
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`TTI has appealed the Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, and the Federal Circuit
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`has already ordered expedited briefing. But the Federal Circuit has not yet ruled on TTI’s
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`emergency motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction. In the meantime, Chamberlain has
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`misused Rule 59(e)—the only vehicle Chamberlain has left to try to force this Court to revisit the
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`indirect infringement issue—to delay TTI’s Federal Circuit appeal and keep the preliminary
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`7
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:6788
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`injunction in place as long as possible. Indeed, despite the numerous flaws in Chamberlain’s
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`Rule 59(e) Motion mentioned, just by filing it Chamberlain may have temporarily suspended
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`TTI’s appeal.
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`TTI therefore respectfully requests a swift resolution of Chamberlain’s Rule 59(e)
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`Motion.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`In view of the foregoing, TTI respectfully requests the Court deny Chamberlain’s Federal
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`Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Preliminary Injunction Order.
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`Dated: October 24, 2016
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`By: /s/ Jason C. White
`Jason C. White
`Michael J. Abernathy
`Sanjay K. Murthy
`Nicholas A. Restauri
`Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP
`77 W. Wacker Drive, Ste. 500
`Chicago, IL 60601
`Tel: (312) 324-1000
`Fax: (312) 324-1001
`E-mail: jason.white@morganlewis.com
`michael.abernathy@morganlewis.com
`sanjay.murthy@morganlewis.com
`nicholas.restauri@morganlewis.com
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`
`Attorneys for Defendants Techtronic Industries
`North America, Inc., One World Technologies
`Inc., OWT
`Industries,
`Inc., and Ryobi
`Technologies, Inc.
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`8
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`Case: 1:16-cv-06097 Document #: 144 Filed: 10/24/16 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:6789
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served via CM/ECF on October 24,
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`2016 upon all counsel of record.
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`/s/ Jason C. White
`Jason C. White
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