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`Complaint IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`JOHNNY FLORES, ARIEL GOMEZ and
`DERRICK LEWIS, for themselves and others
`similarly situated,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC., and
`VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, LLC,
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`Defendants.
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`Case No. ________________
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DEMANDED
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Plaintiffs Johnny Flores, Ariel Gomez and Derrick Lewis, by and through their attorneys
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`Loevy & Loevy, brings this Class Action Complaint against Defendants MOTOROLA
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`SOLUTIONS, INC. (“MOTOROLA”) and VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, LLC (“VIGILANT”), on
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`behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals (“Plaintiffs”), and as follows:
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`INTRODUCTION
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`1.
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`Every individual has unique features by which he or she can be identified using a
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`set of standard quantitative measurements. For example, the shape of and distance between tiny
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`ridges on each person’s finger are unique, so measures of these features—an example of
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`“biometric” data—can be used to identify a specific individual as the person who made a
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`fingerprint. Similarly, each person also has a unique facial geometry composed of, among other
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`measures, distances between key facial landmarks and ratios between those distances. Once a
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`picture of person’s face is scanned and those biometric measurements are captured, computers
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`can store that information and use it to identify that individual any other time that person’s face
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`appears on the internet, in a scanned picture, and potentially in any of the billions of cameras that
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`are constantly monitoring our daily lives. Unlike fingerprints, however, facial biometrics are
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`readily observable and, thus, present an even graver and more immediate danger to privacy,
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`individual autonomy, and liberty. This fact about human facial geometry, the technologies that
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`record it, and the opportunities for surveillance those technologies enable present grave
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`challenges to traditional notions of privacy that people have expected since time immemorial.
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`2.
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`As the Illinois General Assembly has found: “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique
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`identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information. For example, social
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`security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically
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`unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at
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`heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated
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`transactions.” 740 ILCS § 14/5(c).
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`3.
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`Pursuant to Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS
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`§14/1, et seq., Illinois prohibits private entities from, among other things, collecting, capturing,
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`obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing, disseminating or profiting from the biometric identifiers or
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`information of an individual without providing written notice and without obtain a written
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`release from the impacted individual or his authorized representative. BIPA also requires private
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`entities in possession of biometric identifiers to adopt retention and destruction policies and to
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`take measures to prevent the release of that information.
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`4.
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`In violation of BIPA, Defendants Motorola and Vigilant collected, captured,
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`obtained, disclosed, redisclosed, disseminated and profited from the facial geometric scans of
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`hundreds of thousands of Illinois citizens in violation of BIPA’s requirements. Specifically,
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`2
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`Vigilant, with Motorola later joining, collected and presently maintain a “gallery” of over 18
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`million booking photos or “mugshots” which is expanding all the time. The “gallery” includes at
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`least tens of thousands of Illinois residents (many of whom were innocent and/or have had their
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`records expunged by court order). Defendants have extracted the facial biometrics of each of
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`person without permission.
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`5.
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`In particular, Defendants performed a scan of the facial geometry of each depicted
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`individual, stored the resultant biometric identifiers and information in a proprietary database
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`(the “Biometric Database”), and disclosed, redisclosed, and otherwise disseminated those
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`biometric identifiers and information to third parties in order to profit.
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`6.
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`Defendants possess the biometric identifiers and information of the individuals in
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`its Biometric Database without having adopted or made public any policy, written or otherwise,
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`to govern the retention and destruction of thereof.
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`7.
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`Defendants engaged in the above-described conduct: (a) without informing the
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`impacted individuals that their biometric identifiers and information were being collected,
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`captured, obtained, disclosed, redisclosed and otherwise disseminated; (b) without informing the
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`impacted individuals in writing of the purpose of the collection, capture, obtainment, disclosure,
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`redisclosure or dissemination of the biometric identifiers and information; and (c) without
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`seeking or obtaining written releases from such impacted individuals or their authorized
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`representatives.
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`8.
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`In violation of BIPA, Defendants have also profited, and continues to profit, from
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`their unlawful collection, possession, disclosure, and dissemination of the biometric identifiers
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`and information of Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class (the “Class Members”). For a
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`fee, Defendants offer law enforcement agencies and others throughout the country the
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`3
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`opportunity to access and use their Biometric Database as a “facial search engine” allowing the
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`identification of persons in the database. Defendants also incorporate the Biometric Database
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`into their other facial recognition products thereby allowing the identification and tracking in real
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`time and near-real time of millions of people—including Plaintiff and Class Members—
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`wherever they may go.
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`9.
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`To be included in Defendants’ Biometric Database, a person merely had to have
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`been arrested. To Defendants, it did not and does not matter whether that arrest resulted in a
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`conviction or had been made in error or whether the booking photo has been expunged. Thus,
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`like the guests of the Hotel California, Plaintiffs and the Class Members can never leave, at least
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`not until this Court grants the requested relief.
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`10.
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`As the Illinois General Assembly has found and the Illinois Supreme Court has
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`confirmed, the harm to Plaintiffs and Class Members has already occurred.
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`11.
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`Public policy in Illinois provides that given the risks of unwanted data collection
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`and disclosure, its citizens need the power to make decisions about the fate of their unique
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`biometric identifiers and information.
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`12.
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`As a direct result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’
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`biometric identifiers and information are no longer under their control and are now available to a
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`potentially unlimited range of unknown
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`individuals—both employees and clients of
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`Defendants—who can surveil Plaintiffs and Class Members now and in the future. The injuries
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`described herein are imminent and certainly impending.
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`13.
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`Plaintiffs bring this Class Action Complaint seeking: (a) statutory damages of
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`$5,000 per BIPA violation, or in the alternative, $1,000 per BIPA violation, from each of the
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`Defendants, along with attorneys’ fees and costs; (b) disgorgement of Defendants’ ill-gotten
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`4
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`gains derived from the unlawful collection, possession, sale, disclosure, redisclosure, and
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`dissemination of the unlawfully-acquired data; and (c) an injunction ordering that Defendants
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`delete the data from its database.
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`PARTIES
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`14.
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`Plaintiff Derrick Lewis is an Illinois resident. At times relevant to this case, Mr.
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`Lewis was incarcerated at the Illinois Department of Corrections and at the Cook County Jail,
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`including on charges of which he was innocent and convictions which have been vacated on the
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`basis of innocence and expunged. Those entities made his and all detainees’ booking
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`photograph(s) searchable on their websites. On information and belief, Defendants are in
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`possession of Mr. Lewis’ booking photograph(s), have used it to extract his biometric identifiers
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`and are currently in possession of his biometric identifiers and information.
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`15.
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`Plaintiff Johnny Flores is an Illinois resident. At times relevant to this case, Mr.
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`Flores was incarcerated at the Illinois Department of Corrections on a charge of which he was
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`innocent. He was released in November of 2018 and is challenging his conviction in a post-
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`conviction proceeding. A booking photograph of him remains on the Illinois Department of
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`Corrections website to this day. On information and belief, Defendants are in possession of his
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`booking photo(s), have used it to extract his biometric identifiers and are currently in possession
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`of his biometric identifiers and information.
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`16.
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`Plaintiff Ariel Gomez is an Illinois resident. At times relevant to this case, Mr.
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`Gomez was incarcerated at the Illinois Department of Corrections on a charge of which he was
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`innocent. After 20 years of incarceration for a crime he did not commit, his conviction was
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`vacated and the charges against him dismissed. On information and belief, Defendants are in
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`5
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`possession of his booking photo(s), have used it to extract his biometric identifiers and are
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`currently in possession of his biometric identifiers and information.
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`17.
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`Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of current and former residents of Illinois
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`whose pictures appear in Defendants’ Biometric Database.
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`18.
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`Defendant Vigilant Solutions LLC is a Delaware corporation wholly owned by
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`Defendant Motorola. Motorola Solutions, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place
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`of business in Chicago, Illinois.
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`19.
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`On or about January 2019, Defendant Vigilant became a part of Defendant
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`Motorola. Much of the marketing takes place in and touts the companies’ connection to each
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`other and to Illinois. For example, Vigilant’s LinkedIn banner states: “Now Part Of The
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`Motorola Solutions Platform.” The famous Motorola logo appears higher on Vigilant’s Linkedin
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`page than does its own obscure logo. The same is true of Vigilant’s Twitter page which is not
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`titled to the Vigilant company but: “Vigilant from Motorola Solutions.” The company recently
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`tweeted a photograph of the Chicago skyline, lakefront and Lake Shore Drive with the caption:
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`“From Our Home To Yours, Wishing You a Happy Thanksgiving. Vigilant Solutions.”
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`20.
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`Vigilant and Motorola also recently marketed their facial recognition products at
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`the 2019 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) convention in McCormick Place
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`stating: “Vigilant is now part of Motorola Solutions” with a picture of the skyline along the
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`Chicago River. As another example of the companies’ partnership and connection to Illinois,
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`Motorola marketed a facial recognition “lunch and learn” on its twitter feed, held at the
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`Westmont Police Department on February 6, 2020 and at the Rockford Police Department prior
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`to that.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`21.
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`This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (the “Class Action
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`Fairness Act”) because sufficient diversity of citizenship exists between the parties in this action,
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`the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and
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`there are 100 or more members of the Class. Because it is estimated that the Class will have tens
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`of thousands of members and Defendants’ intentional and reckless violations of BIPA are
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`punishable by statutory damages of $5,000 per violation, the amount in controversy is well in
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`excess of $5,000,000. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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`22.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Vigilant because it collected,
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`or participated in collecting, and currently maintains the booking photos taken of Plaintiffs and
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`Class Members in Illinois. Defendant knew that its collection, capture, obtainment, disclosure,
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`redisclosure and dissemination of impacted individuals’ biometric identifiers and information
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`would injure Illinois residents. Those unlawful acts, committed in violation of the rights of
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`Illinois residents using the resources of Illinois jurisdictions, are at the center of this suit.
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`Vigilant is also conducts its marketing from and within Illinois as well as in a partnership with
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`Motorola, which is a resident of Illinois. Vigilant also profits by contracting with law
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`enforcement agencies throughout Illinois, including those in Chicago, Burr Ridge, and Rockford,
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`to provide access to its surveillance technology. Vigilant knew or had reason to know that
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`collecting, capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing and disseminating Illinois citizens’ and
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`residents’ biometric identifiers and information without providing the requisite consent and
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`obtaining the requisite releases would deprive Illinois citizens and residents of their statutorily-
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`protected privacy rights, neutralize Illinois citizens’ and residents’ ability to control access to
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`7
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 8 of 27 PageID #:8
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`their biometric identifiers and information, and expose Illinois citizens and residents to potential
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`surveillance and other privacy harms.
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`23.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction of Defendant Motorola, because it has its
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`principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois.
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`24.
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`Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the
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`acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Illinois. Alternatively, venue is proper
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`under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants
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`Vigilant and/or Motorola.
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`ILLINIOIS BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAWS
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`BIPA seeks to safeguard individuals’ biometric identifiers and information.
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`Biometric identifiers include a scan of an individual’s face geometry. 740 ILCS §
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`25.
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`26.
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`14/10.
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`27.
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`Biometric information is “any information . . . based on an individual’s biometric
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`identifier used to identify an individual.” 740 ILCS § 14/10.
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`28.
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`Pursuant to BIPA, a private entity, such as Defendants, are among other things:
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`(a) prohibited from collecting, capturing or otherwise obtaining an individual’s biometric
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`identifiers and information without providing written notice and obtaining a written release; (b)
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`prohibited from selling, leasing, trading or otherwise profiting from an individual’s biometric
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`identifiers and
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`information; (c) prohibited from disclosing, redisclosing or otherwise
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`disseminating an
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`individual’s biometric
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`identifiers or
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`information
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`in
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`the absence of
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`circumstances specifically set forth in the statute; and (d) required, to the extent it is in
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`possession of biometric identifiers or information, to develop a written policy, made available to
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`the public, that establishes a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying such
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`identifiers and information. 740 ILCS § 14/15.
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`29.
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`BIPA provides for a private right of action and allows a prevailing party to
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`recover liquidated damages in the amount of: (a) $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater,
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`for negligent violations of its provisions; and (b) $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater,
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`for intentional or reckless violations of its provisions. 740 ILCS § 14/20. BIPA also allows for
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`the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs and injunctive relief. 740 ILCS § 14/20.
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`I.
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`Allegations Related to Named Plaintiffs
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`ALLEGATIONS
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`30.
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`Defendants populate the Biometric Database with over 18 million booking
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`photographs, constantly updating it with new photos as they appear. Among these are the
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`booking photographs that are appear and are searchable on the Illinois Department of
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`Corrections (“IDOC”) inmate search websites. Defendant Vigilant began obtaining the booking
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`photographs it uses no later than 2014. On information and belief, the Biometric Database
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`includes Plaintiffs’ booking photographs because, among other reasons, they were each at IDOC
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`after Vigilant began collecting the booking photos and their photos were available on the
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`website.
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`31.
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`For each of their photographs, Defendants, singularly and/or in concert, scanned
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`their facial geometry; and included their photos, biometric information, and other identifying
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`information – including, inter alia, their names and other information in the Biometric Database.
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`32.
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`After surreptitiously obtaining Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers and information,
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`Defendants, singularly and/or in concert, disclosed, redisclosed, disseminated, sold, traded, and
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`profited from Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers and information.
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`9
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`33.
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`To this day, Defendants have (a) failed and continue to fail to advise Plaintiffs
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`that they were performing scans of their facial geometries; (b) failed and continue to fail to
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`inform Plaintiffs in writing or otherwise of the purpose for which it was collecting, capturing,
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`obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing and disseminating Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers and
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`information; (c) failed and continue to fail to adopt a policy about and to make publically
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`available notice about the length of time they would retain Plaintiffs’ identifiers and information
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`and guidelines for how they would destroy it; (d) failed and continue to fail to permanently
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`destroy Plaintiffs’ identifiers after the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers
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`or information has been satisfied and/or within 3 years of the individual's last interaction with the
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`private entity (which there never was) and (e) never sought, nor received, a written release from
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`Plaintiffs or their authorized representatives that allowed them to collect, capture, obtain,
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`disclose, redisclose and disseminate Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers and information.
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`34.
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`Defendants’ conduct has injured Plaintiffs or, alternatively, the injury to Plaintiffs
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`is imminent and certainly impending.
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`II.
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`Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct
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`35.
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`Defendants sell a range of surveillance and facial recognition products to
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`government agencies and private companies throughout the United States, including the
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`Motorola Command Center Software Suite, “FaceSearch” technology, license plate readers,
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`video “Lineups” of real time or near-real time public video, Avigilon, and others.
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`36.
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`According to Defendant Vigilant, the “facial recognition technology utilizes
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`biometric algorithms of facial landmarks to find potential matches to help law enforcement
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`develop strong investigative leads.”
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`10
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`37. When Defendants acquire a mugshot or booking photo, they scan the facial
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`geometry of the individual in the photo so that the resulting biometric identifiers and information
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`can be matched against future unknown individuals.
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`38. When one of Defendant’s customers uploads a “probe image” to the facial
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`recognition application, the “algorithm creates a face print of the probe image.” and “[f]acial
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`recognition compares the probe image against the image gallery.”
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`39.
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`As of 2019, Defendants claimed that the Biometric Database provided access to
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`18 million open-source images, including the “mugshots,” against which the “probe images” are
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`compared.
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`40.
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`At relevant times, the Biometric Database included IDOC booking photos and, on
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`information and belief, publicly-available booking photos from other Illinois correctional and
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`law enforcement agencies.
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`41.
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`On information and belief, Defendants: (a) acquired Plaintiffs’ and Class
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`Members’ booking photos; (b) collected, captured and otherwise obtained Plaintiffs’ and Class
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`Members’ biometric identifiers and information from those images; and (c) disclosed,
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`redisclosed, disseminated, sold, and otherwise profited from those biometric identifiers and
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`information.
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`42.
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`Defendants engaged in the above-described conduct without complying with
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`BIPA’s notice or consent provisions.
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`43.
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`In collecting, capturing and otherwise obtaining the biometric identifiers and
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`information of Plaintiffs and Class Members and, subsequently, disclosing, redisclosing and
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`otherwise disseminating those biometric identifiers and information – all without providing the
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`11
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 12 of 27 PageID #:12
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`requisite notice, obtaining the requisite releases or satisfying any of BIPA’s other provisions that
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`would excuse it from BIPA’s mandates – Defendants again violated BIPA.
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`44.
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`In further violation of BIPA, Defendants failed to use a reasonable standard of
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`care to protect Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric identifiers and information from
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`disclosure and, in fact, affirmatively disclosed Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ identifiers and
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`information.
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`45.
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`In further violation of BIPA, as a private entity in possession of Plaintiffs’ and
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`Class Members’ biometric identifiers and information, Defendants have failed to adopt or make
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`available to the public a retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying such
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`biometric identifiers and information once the initial purpose for collecting them has been
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`satisfied.
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`46.
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`In further violation of BIPA, Defendants also sold, leased, traded, and otherwise
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`profited from the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
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`47.
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`In further violation of BIPA, Defendants also failed and continue to fail to
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`permanently destroy Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ identifiers after the initial purpose for
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`collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied and/or within 3 years of
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`the individual's last interaction with the private entity (which there never was).
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`48.
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`In sum, whether selling FaceSearch or products incorporating the technology
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`Defendants did exactly what BIPA prohibits.
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`49.
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`Defendants’ violations of BIPA were intentional and reckless or, in the
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`alternative, negligent.
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`12
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`III.
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`Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Injuries and Damages
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`50.
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`As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and Class Members have
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`already sustained injuries and face many more imminent and certainly impending injuries, which
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`injuries they will continue to suffer.
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`51.
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`Defendants’ unlawful conduct has resulted in, among other things: (a) Plaintiffs’
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`and Class Members’ unique biometric identifiers and information being collected, captured,
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`obtained, disclosed, redisclosed, and otherwise disseminated without the requisite notice having
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`been given and without the requisite releases having been obtained; (b) Plaintiffs and Class
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`Members being deprived of the very control over their biometric identifiers and information that
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`BIPA was designed to protect; and (c) Plaintiffs and the Class Members being left without any
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`understanding or security of when and how their biometric information and identifiers would
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`finally be destroyed. .
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`52.
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`Further, as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs and Class
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`Members do not know which, or how many, individuals or entities have received, obtained,
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`accessed, stored, disclosed, redisclosed or otherwise made use of their biometric identifiers and
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`information, exposing them to the imminent and certainly impending injuries of surveillance,
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`reputational harm, stalking, and other privacy harms.1
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`53.
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`Plaintiffs and Class Members have no recourse for the fact that Defendants
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`compromised their unique biometric identifiers and information. Moreover, Plaintiffs and Class
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`Members are at heightened risk for other potential injuries and are likely to withdraw from
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`biometric-facilitated transactions and other facially-mediated electronic participation.
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`
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`1 Facial Recognition Tech: 10 Views on Risks and Rewards,
`https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/04/03/facial-recognition-tech-10-views-on-risks-
`and-rewards/#54d3e1716b3c (accessed on Feb. 1, 2020)
`13
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`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
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`54.
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`Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated
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`individuals as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, seeking damages and
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`equitable relief on behalf of the following Class for which Plaintiff seeks certification: All
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`Illinois residents whose faces appeared in the Biometric Database during the period February 14,
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`2015 to the present.
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`55.
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`Excluded from the Class are: (a) Defendants Vigilant and Motorola; (b) any of
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`their parents, affiliates or subsidiaries; (c) any entities in which Defendants have a controlling
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`interest; (d) any of Defendants’ officers or directors; or (e) any successors or assigns of
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`Defendants. Also excluded are any judge or court personnel assigned to this case and members
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`of their immediate families.
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`56.
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`Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or modify the class definition with greater
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`specificity or division after having had an opportunity to conduct discovery.
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`57.
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`Numerosity. While the exact number of Class members is not known at this
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`time, Defendants collected, captured, obtained, disclosed, redisclosed, otherwise disseminated,
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`sold, leased, traded, profited from and currently maintain the biometric identifiers and
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`information from at least 18 million images of faces, of which, on information and belief,
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`hundreds of thousands are photos of Illinois residents. The Class, therefore, likely includes tens
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`of thousands of unique individuals. Consistent with Rule 23(a)(1), the proposed Class is
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`therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Class Members may be
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`identified through objective means, including objective data available to Defendants regarding
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`the images in the Biometric Database and associated names and residency information. Class
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`Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice
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`
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`14
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 15 of 27 PageID #:15
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`dissemination methods, which may include U.S. mail, electronic mail, internet postings, social
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`media and/or published notice.
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`58.
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`Commonality and predominance. Common questions of law and fact exist as
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`to all Class Members. These common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
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`affecting only individual members of the proposed Class. Common questions include, but are
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`not limited to, the following:
`
`a.
`
`Whether Defendants collected, captured, otherwise obtained and/or
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`currently maintain the biometric identifiers or information of Plaintiffs and
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`Class Members;
`
`b.
`
`c.
`
`d.
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`e.
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`Whether Defendants possess or possessed the biometric identifiers or
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`information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
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`Whether Defendants disclosed, redisclosed or otherwise disseminated the
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`biometric identifiers or information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
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`Whether Defendants sold, leased, traded or otherwise profited from the
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`biometric identifiers or information of Plaintiffs and Class Members;
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`Whether Defendants provided the notice required by BIPA before
`
`collecting, capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing or otherwise
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`disseminating the biometric identifiers or information of Plaintiffs and
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`Class Members;
`
`f.
`
`Whether Defendants obtained written releases from Plaintiffs and Class
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`Members or their authorized representatives before collecting, capturing,
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`obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing or otherwise disseminating
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`the
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`biometric identifiers and information or Plaintiffs and Class Members;
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`
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`15
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 16 of 27 PageID #:16
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`g.
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`Whether Defendants had in place – and disclosed to the public – the
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`written retention and destruction policies required by BIPA while in
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`possession of Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric identifiers and
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`information;
`
`h.
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`Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered damages as a proximate
`
`result of Defendants conduct;
`
`i.
`
`Whether Defendants protected Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric
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`identifiers and information from disclosure using the reasonable standard
`
`of care within the industry and in a manner that was the same as or more
`
`protective than the manner in which each of them protects other
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`confidential and sensitive information; and
`
`j.
`
`Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to damages, equitable
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`relief and other relief.
`
`59.
`
`Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class they seek to
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`represent because Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed Class have suffered similar injuries
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`as a result of the same practices alleged herein. Plaintiffs have no interests to advance adverse to
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`the interests of the other members of the proposed Class.
`
`60.
`
`Adequacy. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
`
`proposed Class and have retained as his counsel attorneys experienced in class actions and
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`complex litigation.
`
`61.
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`Superiority. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and
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`efficient adjudication of this dispute. The injury suffered by each Class Member, while
`
`meaningful on an individual basis, may not be of such magnitude as to make the prosecution of
`
`
`
`16
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`
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 17 of 27 PageID #:17
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`individual actions against Defendants economically feasible. Even if Class Members could
`
`afford individual litigation, those actions would put immeasurable strain on the court system.
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`Moreover, individual litigation of the legal and factual issues of the case would increase the
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`delay and expense to all parties and the court system. A class action, however, presents far fewer
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`management difficulties and provides the benefit of a single adjudication, economy of scale and
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`comprehensive supervision by a single court.
`
`62.
`
`In the alternative, the proposed Class may be certified because:
`
`a.
`
`The prosecution of separate actions by each individual member of the
`
`proposed Class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications, which
`
`could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants;
`
`b.
`
`The prosecution of individual actions could result in adjudications that as
`
`a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of non-party Class
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`Members or which would substantially impair their ability to protect their
`
`interests; and
`
`c.
`
`Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
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`proposed Class, thereby making final and injunctive relief appropriate
`
`with respect to members of the proposed Class.
`
`63.
`
`Pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4), particular issues are appropriate for certification –
`
`namely the issues described above – because resolution of such issues would advance the
`
`disposition of the matter and the parties’ interests therein.
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`
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`
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`
`17
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`Case: 1:20-cv-01128 Document #: 1 Filed: 02/14/20 Page 18 of 27 PageID #:18
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`CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
`
`COUNT ONE
`(VIOLATION OF BIPA – 740 ILCS § 14/15(a))
`
`Plaintiffs restate and reallege all paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as
`
`64.
`
`though fully set forth herein.
`
`65.
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`As alleged above, Defendants violated BIPA by failing to develop a written
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`policy that