throbber
Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:2070
`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 1 of 23 PageID #:2070
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`EXHIBIT A
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`EXHIBIT A
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 2 of 23 PageID #:2071
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`_________________________________________
`)
`
`
`)
`In re: Clearview AI, Inc. Consumer
`) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00135
`Privacy Litigation
`
`)
`
`
`)
`
`
`
`
`__________________________________________)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF CENTER ON PRIVACY & TECHNOLOGY IN
`SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO CLEARVIEW DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`
`
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 3 of 23 PageID #:2072
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`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`STATEMENT OF INTEREST ....................................................................................................1
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................................2
`
`I. BIPA furthers Illinois’s interest in protecting its residents’ First Amendment rights of
`speech and association....................................................................................................2
`
`A. Clearview AI facilitates unprecedented levels of police identification and
`surveillance ............................................................................................................3
`
`B. Clearview AI’s conduct unlawfully chills Illinois residents’ expressive and
`associational activities. ...........................................................................................6
`
`II. BIPA furthers Illinois’s interest in protecting its residents from police misuse of facial
`recognition technology. ................................................................................................ 10
`
`A. Police use Clearview AI’s software without implementing best practices to mitigate
`the unreliability of facial recognition technology. ................................................. 11
`
`B. Law enforcement’s reliance on Clearview AI puts Illinois residents at increased
`risk of misidentification and false arrest................................................................ 13
`
`III. BIPA furthers Illinois’s interest in ensuring the security of its residents’ sensitive
`personal information. ................................................................................................... 14
`
`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 15
`
`
`
`i
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`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 4 of 23 PageID #:2073
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`Cases Page(s)
`
`In re Anonymous Online Speakers,
`661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................... 8
`
`Bartnicki v. Vopper,
`532 U.S. 514 (2001) .............................................................................................................. 6
`
`Bates v. City of Little Rock,
`361 U.S. 516 (1960) .............................................................................................................. 7
`
`Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm.,
`459 U.S. 87 (1982) ................................................................................................................ 7
`
`Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc.,
`958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................... 15
`
`Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,
`525 U.S. 182 (1999) .............................................................................................................. 8
`
`Buckley v. Valeo,
`424 U.S. 1 (1976) .................................................................................................................. 8
`
`McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,
`
`514 U.S. 334 (1995) .......................................................................................................... 7, 8
`
`NAACP v. Alabama,
`
`357 U.S. 449 (1958) .......................................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`Patel v. Facebook, Inc.,
`932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................................... 2, 4
`
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
`564 U.S. 552 (2011) .............................................................................................................. 3
`
`Talley v. California,
`
`362 U.S. 60 (1960) ................................................................................................................ 7
`
`Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C.,
`512 U.S. 622 (1994) .............................................................................................................. 3
`
`United States v. Jones,
`565 U.S. 400 (2012) .............................................................................................................. 4
`
`United States v. O’Brien,
`391 U.S. 367 (1968) .......................................................................................................... 2, 3
`
`ii
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`

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`
`Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Stratton,
`536 U.S. 150 (2002) .............................................................................................................. 8
`
`Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,
`575 U.S. 433 (2015) .............................................................................................................. 3
`
`Statutes
`
`740 ILCS 14/5(c) ...................................................................................................................... 14
`
`740 ILCS 14/5(g) .................................................................................................................. 2, 15
`
`740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d) ............................................................................................................ 1, 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Richard Adhikari, ACLU Blasts Clearview AI’s Facial Recognition Accuracy
`Claims, ECT News Network, Feb. 14, 2020,
`https://www.technewsworld.com/story/86512.html ............................................................. 11
`
`Levi Boxell et al., Abstract, Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization,
`Working Paper 26669, National Bureau of Economic Research, rev. June
`2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26669. .......................................................................... 7
`
`Sarah Lewis, The Racial Bias Built Into Photography, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2019,
`https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/lens/sarah-lewis-racial-bias-
`photography.html ................................................................................................................ 12
`
`Philip Chertoff, Facial Recognition Has Its Eye on the U.K., Lawfare, Feb. 7,
`2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-has-its-eye-uk. .................................. 5
`
`Simon Denyer, Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big Dive for Total
`Surveillance, Washington Post, Jan. 7, 2018,
`https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-
`china-facial-recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance. ................................. 5
`
`Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data,
`Center on Privacy & Technology, Mar. 16, 2019,
`https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ .................................................................................. 12, 13
`
`Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the
`United States, Center on Privacy & Technology, May 16, 2019,
`https://www.americaunderwatch.com. ................................................................................... 5
`
`Dave Gershgorn, Glasses Equipped With Facial Recognition Are Coming,
`OneZero, May 22, 2020, https://onezero.medium.com/glasses-equipped-with-
`facial-recognition-are-coming-ac2ccfe2795a ......................................................................... 5
`
`iii
`
`

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`
`Patrick Grother et al., Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3:
`Demographic Effects, NIST, U.S. Department of Commerce, December 2019,
`at 2, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf. ........................................ 11
`
`Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition
`Match, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2020,
`https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-
`misidentify-jail.html ............................................................................................................ 13
`
`Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It,
`N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2020,
`https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-
`recognition.html .............................................................................................................. 4, 12
`
`Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2020,
`https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-
`arrest.html. .......................................................................................................................... 13
`
`Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2021,
`https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-
`clearview-ai.html. .................................................................................................................. 4
`
`Martin Kaste, Real-Time Facial Recognition Is Available, But Will U.S. Police
`Buy It?, NPR, May 10, 2018,
`https://www.npr.org/2018/05/10/609422158/real-time-facial-recognition-is-
`available-but-will-u-s-police-buy-it? ..................................................................................... 5
`
`Law Enforcement, Clearview AI, https://clearview.ai/law-enforcement (last
`visited June 7, 2021) ............................................................................................................ 10
`
`Ryan Mac et al., Clearview AI Has Promised to Cancel All Relationships with
`Private Companies, BuzzFeed News, May 7, 2020,
`https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-no-facial-
`recognition-private-companies ............................................................................................ 10
`
`Thomas Macaulay, Clearview AI’s false claims of accuracy increase the dangers
`of its face recognition software, TNW, Feb. 11, 2020,
`https://thenextweb.com/news/Clearview AI-ais-false-claims-of-accuracy-
`increase-the-dangers-of-its-face-recognition-software ......................................................... 11
`
`Sara Morrison, The world’s scariest facial recognition company is now linked to
`everybody from ICE to Macy’s, Vox, Feb. 28, 2020,
`https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/26/21154606/clearview-ai-data-breach ....................... 10
`
`Paul Mozur, In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jul.
`26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-
`protests-facial-recognition-surveillance.html. ........................................................................ 5
`
`iv
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`

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`Order re Final Approval, Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, and Incentive Awards, In re
`Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No. 15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal. Feb.
`26, 2021) . ............................................................................................................................. 9
`
`Privacy Impact Assessment Report for the Utilization of Facial Recognition
`Technologies to Identify Subjects in the Field, International Justice and Public
`Safety Network, at 17 (June 30, 2011),
`https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/09_-
`_facial_recognition_pia_report_final_v2_2.pdf. .................................................................... 6
`
`Tom Schuba, CPD using controversial facial recognition program that scans
`billions of photos from Facebook, other sites, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 29,
`2020, https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2020/1/29/21080729/Clearview AI-
`ai-facial-recognition-chicago-police-cpd. ............................................................................. 10
`
`Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of Silence
`Effects in the Wake of NSA Internet Monitoring, 93 Journalism & Mass
`Communication Quarterly (Mar. 8, 2016) .............................................................................. 8
`
`Jordan Valinsky, Clearview AI Has Billions of Our Photos. Its Entire Client List
`Was Just Stolen, CNN Business, Feb. 26, 2020,
`https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/26/tech/Clearview AI-ai-hack/index.html. ........................... 14
`
`Zack Whittaker, Security lapse exposed Clearview AI source code, TechCrunch,
`Apr. 16, 2020, https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/16/clearview-source-code-
`lapse .................................................................................................................................... 14
`
`
`
`
`v
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`

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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 8 of 23 PageID #:2077
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`STATEMENT OF INTEREST
`
`The Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law (the Center) is a think tank which
`
`
`
`investigates ways in which modern surveillance technologies expand the government’s ability to
`
`monitor and track individuals. The Center has extensively researched and published reports on a
`
`wide range of issues raised by facial recognition technology, such as how algorithmic biases
`
`disproportionately affect people of color and how police officers’ misuse of the technology
`
`increases the risk of false identification. The Center files this amicus brief to provide the Court
`
`insights on the ways in which the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) mitigates the
`
`harms of facial recognition technology and protects Illinois residents’ rights to privacy and free
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`expression.
`
`INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA) prohibits private entities like
`
`
`
`
`Clearview AI from collecting and disseminating a person’s biometric information without first
`
`obtaining that person’s informed consent. 740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d). In violation of BIPA, Clearview
`
`AI has compiled Illinois residents’ biometric information and disclosed that information to law
`
`enforcement agencies without providing notice to residents, let alone obtaining their consent.
`
`
`
`The Clearview Defendants (Clearview AI, Inc., Hoan Ton-That, Richard Schwartz, Rocky
`
`Mountain Data Analytics LLC, and Thomas Mulcaire) (collectively, “Clearview AI”) do not deny
`
`that they have violated—and are continuing to violate—BIPA. Instead, Clearview AI argues that
`
`it may ignore BIPA because the statute infringes Clearview AI’s First Amendment right to free
`
`speech by inhibiting the company’s ability to use, create, and disseminate information. Contrary
`
`to Clearview AI’s assertions, BIPA is a content-neutral law that seeks to safeguard Illinois
`
`residents’ biometric privacy. Even if BIPA incidentally burdens Clearview AI’s speech, BIPA
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`does not violate the First Amendment because BIPA furthers substantial governmental interests
`
`unrelated to the suppression of free expression. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
`
`
`
`BIPA furthers Illinois’s substantial interest in preventing the harms that may arise from
`
`Clearview AI’s unlawful collection of residents’ biometric information and unconsented-to
`
`dissemination of that information to law enforcement agencies. First, Clearview AI exposes
`
`Illinois residents to police identification even as they walk down the streets or attend public events.
`
`Heightened police surveillance can, in turn, discourage free speech and association. Second, facial
`
`recognition algorithms misidentify people of color more often than white people. When used by
`
`police departments in the absence of clear guidelines, Clearview AI’s facial recognition software
`
`will exacerbate systemic inequities in policing. Finally, the size and volume of Clearview AI’s
`
`database, coupled with the sensitivity of the information stored in that database, increase the
`
`likelihood of recurring breaches that may jeopardize the security of millions of Illinois residents.
`
`
`I.
`
`
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`BIPA furthers Illinois’s interest in protecting its residents’ First Amendment rights
`of speech and association.
`
`BIPA is a privacy statute that gives individuals final say over who can use their biometric
`
`information and for what purpose. In 2008, the Illinois General Assembly enacted BIPA to regulate
`
`“the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric
`
`identifiers and information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(g). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, BIPA
`
`“protect[s] an individual’s concrete interests in privacy.” Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264,
`
`1274 (9th Cir. 2019). Because “advances in technology can increase the potential for unreasonable
`
`intrusions into personal privacy,” BIPA ensures an “individual’s control of information concerning
`
`his or her person.” Id. at 1272–73.
`
`Clearview AI collects and sells millions of Illinois residents’ biometric information without
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`their knowledge and consent, stripping those individuals of the right to exercise control over their
`
`identities. The resulting loss of privacy and anonymity creates a chilling effect on speech and
`
`association as people fear that their views and activities, if made known to law enforcement, could
`
`invite additional surveillance, harassment, and retaliation. By preserving Illinois residents’ right
`
`to control the extent to which their biometric information is disclosed to third parties, especially
`
`the police, BIPA protects those residents’ First Amendment right to free speech and association.
`
`Relying on Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011), Clearview AI argues that
`
`because BIPA discriminates based on speech content and speaker, it must survive strict scrutiny.
`
`Clearview AI Mem. of Law at 9–15. Unlike the state law at issue in Sorrell, which engaged in
`
`speaker and viewpoint discrimination by disfavoring marketing speech by individuals working for
`
`pharmaceutical manufacturers, 564 U.S. at 563–64, BIPA prohibits the collection and
`
`dissemination without consent of biometric information of any person, not a subset of people, and
`
`by any private entity, not just Clearview AI, see 740 ILCS 14/15(b), (d). See also Turner Broad.
`
`Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994). Because BIPA regulates conduct, not speech, it is
`
`constitutional so long as “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
`
`nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” O’Brien, 391
`
`U.S. at 376. BIPA is constitutional because it furthers important governmental interests: namely,
`
`protecting Illinoisans’ right to engage in protected First Amendment activities and guarding
`
`against misuse of facial recognition technology.1
`
`A.
`
`Clearview AI facilitates unprecedented levels of police identification and
`surveillance.
`
`In the hands of law enforcement agencies, Clearview AI’s facial recognition software
`
`
`
`
`1 Even though strict scrutiny does not apply to BIPA, it would survive strict scrutiny because it is
`narrowly tailored to achieve these compelling governmental interests. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575
`U.S. 433, 444 (2015).
`
`
`
`3
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`

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`amplifies the government’s ability to identify unknown individuals. The company scrapes images
`
`of individuals from various websites, including Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, and creates
`
`“faceprints” based on those images. A faceprint, like a fingerprint, maps the physical
`
`characteristics that make each person unique. When a police officer submits an image of an
`
`unidentified suspect—or a “probe image”—to Clearview AI’s software, the company’s facial
`
`recognition algorithm generates a faceprint from the probe image, compares that faceprint with
`
`more than three billion existing faceprints in the Clearview AI database, and proposes possible
`
`matches.2 Clearview AI also directs the police officer to the websites from which the images were
`
`scraped. These source websites may reveal the names and other personal information about the
`
`individuals Clearview AI suggests as matches.
`
`Over 3,100 law enforcement agencies in the United States use Clearview AI’s facial
`
`recognition software. 3 Police departments, intelligence agencies, immigration enforcement
`
`authorities, and any other users of Clearview AI’s software may be able to “identify [an] individual
`
`in any of the . . . hundreds of millions of photos” uploaded to the Internet each day. See Patel, 932
`
`F.3d at 1273. The government may identify others “who are present in the photo” as well. See id.
`
`If taken at a political rally, a church service, or an abortion clinic, an individual’s photo could
`
`unveil to the government “a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious,
`
`and sexual associations.” See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
`
`concurring). Indeed, photos posted on social media often have geotags, captions, and “likes,”
`
`revealing a person’s locational history, preferences, and relationships.
`
`The surveillance practices of other countries illustrate how far governments may be willing
`
`
`2 Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,
`2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html.
`3 Kashmir Hill, Your Face Is Not Your Own, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2021,
`https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html.
`
`
`
`4
`
`

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`to deploy facial recognition technology to monitor and track individuals. In China, a network of
`
`surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition software can single out individuals from a
`
`crowd, analyze their faces, and trace their movements across a city.4 The Chinese government’s
`
`use of real-time facial recognition is so widespread that Hong Kong democracy activists covered
`
`their faces during a series of protests to avoid being identified by the state.5 In the United Kingdom,
`
`there are “eye[s] in the sky” scanning faces of individuals throughout the London streets to
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`determine whether any of those individuals belongs to a police watch list.6
`
`Real-time facial identification is not a remote concern for Americans, including those in
`
`Illinois. The Chicago Police Department once proposed in its application for a Department of
`
`Homeland Security grant to deploy facial recognition technology on surveillance cameras in and
`
`around Chicago.7 Similarly, the Detroit Police Department indicated in its facial recognition policy
`
`that the department “may connect the face recognition system to any interface that performs live
`
`video, including cameras, drone footage, and body-worn cameras.”8 Clearview AI has already
`
`begun embedding its facial recognition software into surveillance cameras and wearable smart
`
`devices, providing police departments across the country with an option for acquiring real-time
`
`identification capability.9
`
`
`4 Simon Denyer, Beijing Bets on Facial Recognition in a Big Dive for Total Surveillance, Washington
`Post, Jan. 7, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/07/feature/in-china-facial-
`recognition-is-sharp-end-of-a-drive-for-total-surveillance.
`5 Paul Mozur, In Hong Kong Protests, Faces Become Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jul. 26, 2019,
`https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/technology/hong-kong-protests-facial-recognition-
`surveillance.html.
`6 Philip Chertoff, Facial Recognition Has Its Eye on the U.K., Lawfare, Feb. 7, 2020,
`https://www.lawfareblog.com/facial-recognition-has-its-eye-uk.
`7 Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the United States, Center
`on Privacy & Technology, May 16, 2019, https://www.americaunderwatch.com.
`8 Id.
`9 Dave Gershgorn, Glasses Equipped With Facial Recognition Are Coming, OneZero, May 22, 2020,
`https://onezero.medium.com/glasses-equipped-with-facial-recognition-are-coming-ac2ccfe2795a; Martin
`Kaste, Real-Time Facial Recognition Is Available, But Will U.S. Police Buy It?, NPR, May 10, 2018,
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 13 of 23 PageID #:2082
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`B.
`
`Clearview AI’s conduct unlawfully chills Illinois residents’ expressive and
`associational activities.
`
`The ongoing partnership between Clearview AI and law enforcement exposes Illinois
`
`
`
`residents to the heightened threat of government surveillance and creates a chilling effect on those
`
`residents’ First Amendment activities. For one, Clearview AI’s extraction of individuals’ biometric
`
`information from the Internet and dissemination of that information to police departments in the
`
`absence of those individuals’ knowledge and consent can chill expressive activities online. A
`
`website user may well weigh the benefits of every movement on the Internet—whether it be
`
`commenting on a political subject or endorsing a controversial public figure—against the costs of
`
`Clearview AI’s data scraping and the government’s subsequent use of that data. As the Supreme
`
`Court has noted, “[f]ear or suspicion that one’s speech is being monitored by a stranger . . . can
`
`have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.”
`
`Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (quotation omitted). Similarly, individuals may be
`
`deterred from attending political rallies or participating in public protests out of fear that police
`
`might identify them from a crowd, track their whereabouts, and use that information against them.
`
`Even police and government officials recognize that facial recognition is “a form of surveillance”
`
`that “can adversely impact freedom, creativity, and self-development.”10
`
`The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized privacy and anonymity as core First
`
`Amendment values that enable individuals to express ideas and seek membership in groups
`
`without fear of retaliation. In NAACP v. Alabama, for example, the Court stressed this “vital
`
`relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.” 357 U.S. 449, 462
`
`
`https://www.npr.org/2018/05/10/609422158/real-time-facial-recognition-is-available-but-will-u-s-police-
`buy-it.
`10 Privacy Impact Assessment Report for the Utilization of Facial Recognition Technologies to Identify
`Subjects in the Field, International Justice and Public Safety Network, at 17 (June 30, 2011),
`https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/09_-_facial_recognition_pia_report_final_v2_2.pdf.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 14 of 23 PageID #:2083
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`(1958). The Court held that the NAACP could not be compelled by state law to disclose the
`
`identities of its members because such disclosure, “particularly where a group espouses dissident
`
`beliefs,” would restrain the members’ freedom of association and expose them to “economic
`
`reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
`
`hostility.” Id.; see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960) (holding that cities
`
`cannot compel organizations to disclose membership lists because doing so would deter free
`
`association).
`
`The Supreme Court has underscored the particular importance of privacy and anonymity
`
`to minority groups. In Talley v. California, the Court struck down a city ordinance that prohibited
`
`anonymous handbills, noting that throughout history, “persecuted groups . . . have been able to
`
`criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.” 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
`
`Similarly, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Court recognized anonymous speech as
`
`“an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent” that “exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
`
`of Rights[] and of the First Amendment[,]” which is “to protect unpopular individuals from
`
`retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” 514 U.S. 334,
`
`357 (1995). “Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.” Id.
`
`Illinois has a substantial interest in protecting the First Amendment activities of its
`
`residents, especially those who support unpopular ideas in today’s increasingly polarized political
`
`climate.11 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, there is “substantial evidence of past and present
`
`hostility from private persons and government officials” against members of minority groups,
`
`“subject[ing] those persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats, harassment or
`
`reprisals.” Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982); cf.
`
`
`11 See Levi Boxell et al., Abstract, Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization, Working Paper 26669,
`National Bureau of Economic Research, rev. June 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26669.
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 120-1 Filed: 07/08/21 Page 15 of 23 PageID #:2084
`
`Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71 (1976) (“[T]he damage done by disclosure to the associational
`
`interests of the minor parties and their members . . . could be significant . . . to the point where the
`
`movement cannot survive.”). Consequently, when people realize that their privacy and anonymity
`
`have been compromised, “they readily conform their behavior—expressing opinions when they
`
`are in the majority, and suppressing them when they’re not.”12
`
`Clearview AI argues that individuals have no privacy interest in photographs they post on
`
`the Internet. This argument is wrong for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has made clear that
`
`individuals retain their right to remain anonymous even where they have voluntarily exposed their
`
`faces to the public. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Stratton, 536 U.S.
`
`150, 166–67 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a village ordinance requiring canvassers to identify
`
`themselves in a permit and to display that permit upon demand). Watchtower affirms that
`
`individuals have the right to remain anonymous even as they walk down the streets or attend public
`
`protests. Id.; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999)
`
`(holding that a state statute requiring petition circulators to wear identification badges violated the
`
`circulators’ First Amendment right to free speech); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 (“[T]he identity of
`
`the speaker is no different from other components of the document’s content that the author is free
`
`to include or exclude.”).
`
`The same reasoning applies to the digital space. “Although the Internet is the latest platform
`
`for anonymous speech, online speech stands on the same footing as other speech.” In re
`
`Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011). Indeed, a social media user
`
`whose photo may be visible to others on the Internet would not reasonably anticipate her facial
`
`geometry to be measured from her photo, scanned into a database, analyzed to create a faceprint,
`
`
`12 Elizabeth Stoycheff, Under Surveillance: Examining Facebook’s Spiral of

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