Case 1:19-cv-02754-JMS-DLP Document 76 Filed 02/24/20 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 683
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
`INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
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`KURT ST. ANGELO,
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` Plaintiff,
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` vs.
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`WILLIAM P. BARR, CURTIS T. HILL, JR.,
`MARK SMOSNA, RYAN MEARS,
`BRYAN K. ROACH, and
`KERRY J. FORESTALL,
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` Defendants.
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`ORDER
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` No. 1:19-cv-2754-JMS-DLP
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`On July 5, 2019, pro se Plaintiff Kurt St. Angelo filed a Complaint against the United States
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`of America (“Government”) and the State of Indiana (“State”), challenging the validity of various
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`state and federal statutes related to the regulation of controlled substances. All of the Defendants
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`in this case have moved to dismiss Mr. St. Angelo’s claims, and those Motions to Dismiss are ripe
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`for the Court’s review.
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`I.
`BACKGROUND
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`Mr. St. Angelo originally filed a Complaint against the Government and the State. [Filing
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`No. 1.] The State responded to the Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
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`and for failure to state a claim. [Filing No. 15.] In response, Mr. St. Angelo filed a Motion to
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`Dismiss Counts #8-10 of his Complaint, [Filing No. 18], and a Motion to Join the Indiana Attorney
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`General and the United States Attorney General as defendants, [Filing No. 20]. Mr. St. Angelo
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`later filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint, [Filing No. 30], and a Motion to Join Four Additional
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`Defendants: Bryan Mears (Marion County Prosecutor), Kerry J. Forestal (Marion County Sheriff),
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`1
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`Bryan K. Roach (Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Chief), and Mark Smosna
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`(President of the Indiana Board of Pharmacy), in their official capacities, [Filing No. 32]. On
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`October 24, 2019, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure
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`to state a claim. [Filing No. 33.] The Court granted Mr. St. Angelo’s Motion to Amend his
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`Complaint, [Filing No. 37], and denied as moot his Motion to Add Four Additional Defendants,
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`[Filing No. 38]. Mr. St. Angelo’s Amended Complaint is brought against the following
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`Defendants: William P. Barr, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Mark Smosna, Ryan Mears, Ryan K. Roach, and
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`Kerry J. Forestal. [Filing No. 37 at 1.]
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`On November 12, 2019, the Court filed an Entry acknowledging that Mr. St. Angelo filed
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`an Amended Complaint while the State’s and the Government’s Motions to Dismiss were still
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`pending. [Filing No. 39 at 2.] The Court gave the State and the Government until November 20,
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`2019 to indicate whether they wished to supplement their briefing in support of their Motions to
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`Dismiss or whether they would like the Court to treat their Motions to Dismiss as challenging the
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`Amended Complaint. [Filing No. 39 at 2.] The Government responded by requesting that the
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`Court treat its Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 33], as challenging the Amended Complaint. [Filing
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`No. 42.] The State responded by requesting permission to supplement its briefing in support of its
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`Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 46], and filing a supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
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`Amended Complaint, [Filing No. 47]. While those motions were pending, Mr. Mears and Mr.
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`Smosna filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, [Filing No. 65], and
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`Sheriff Forestal and Chief Roach filed a Motion to Dismiss [Filing No. 71].
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`Currently pending before the Court are Mr. St. Angelo’s Motion to Dismiss Counts #8-10
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`of his Complaint filed on July 5, 2019, [Filing No. 18], the State’s Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No.
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`15], the Government’s Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 33], the State’s Supplemental Motion to
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`Dismiss, [Filing No. 47], Mr. Mears and Mr. Smosna’s Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 65], and
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`Sheriff Forestal and Chief Roach’s Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 71]. These motions are ripe for
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`the Court’s review. Although the State of Indiana and the United States are no longer named
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`defendants in the lawsuit, their Motions to Dismiss still require a ruling because Mr. St. Angelo is
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`now suing the Indiana Attorney General and the United States Attorney General in their official
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`capacities. [Filing No. 37 at 2.]
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`The Court will first address Mr. St. Angelo’s Motion to Dismiss Counts #8-10, then will
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`analyze the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants.
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`II.
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS #8-10
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`Counts 8 through 10 of Mr. St. Angelo’s original Complaint were:
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`• Count #8 – Damages for Conspiracy, Neglect and Deprivation of Rights Due to
`Legislative Fraud;
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`• Count #9 – Conspiracy, Neglect and Deprivation of Rights Due to Express
`Legislative Defamation; and,
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`• Count #10 - Conspiracy, Neglect and Deprivation of Rights Due to Fraud or Gross
`Negligence Upon the Courts.
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`[Filing No. 1 at 42-57.] All three counts were brought against the State of Indiana and the United
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`States. [Filing No. 1 at 1.]
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`On October 31, 2019, the Court granted Mr. St. Angelo’s Motion to Amend his Complaint,
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`and his Amended Complaint became the operative pleading on the same day. [Filing No. 36;
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`Filing No. 37.] The operative Amended Complaint does not include the claims formerly raised as
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`Counts 8 through 10, listed above. Therefore, Mr. St. Angelo’s request to dismiss Counts #8-10
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`of his original Complaint has been resolved, and his Motion to Dismiss Counts #8-10, [Filing No.
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`18], is DENIED AS MOOT.
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`III.
`DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS
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`A. Legal Standards
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`1. 12(b)(1) Motions
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “allows a party to move to dismiss a claim for
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`lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No.
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`7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
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`Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the
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`case. Rule 12(b)(1) requires dismissal of claims over which the federal court lacks subject-matter
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`jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the “power to decide,” Boley v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir.
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`2014), and federal courts may only decide claims that fall within both a statutory grant of authority
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`and the Constitution’s limits on the judiciary. In re Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188
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`(7th Cir. 1986).
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`Although a court deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion may accept the truth of the allegations
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`in the complaint, it should look beyond the complaint’s jurisdictional allegations and view
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`whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
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`exists. Ciarpaglini v. Norwood, 817 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2016). The party asserting the
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`existence of subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating by competent proof that
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`such jurisdiction in fact exists. See Thomas v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446 (1942); see also Silha v.
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`ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be raised at any time,
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`by either party or by the Court sua sponte. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
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`2. 12(b)(6) Motions
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of
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`the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
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`(2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “Specific facts are not necessary, the statement need
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`only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
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`rests.’” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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`A motion to dismiss asks whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter,
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`accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
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`U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In reviewing the sufficiency of a
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`complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences
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`in favor of the plaintiff. See Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883, 886 (7th
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`Cir. 2011). The Court will not accept legal conclusions or conclusory allegations as sufficient
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`to state a claim for relief. See McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011).
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`Factual allegations must plausibly state an entitlement to relief “to a degree that rises above
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`the speculative level.” Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2012). This plausibility
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`determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
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`experience and common sense.” Id.
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`B. Amended Complaint Allegations
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`In this case, Mr. St. Angelo is challenging various statutes that regulate controlled
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`substances. It is his position that those state and federal statutes are invalid. In his Amended
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`Complaint, Mr. St. Angelo asserts the following claims:
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`• Count #1 – Indiana’s Delegated Arrest Authority Over Controlled Substances is
`Unconstitutional;
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`• Count #2 – Indiana’s Penalty Statutes at I.C. § 35-48-Chapter 4 Are Ineffectual,
`Unenforceable, and False;
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`• Count #3 – Indiana’s Penalty Statutes at I.C. § 35-48-Chapter 4 Are
`Unconstitutional;
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`• Count #4 – U.S. Drug Prohibitions Are Inapplicable in Indiana and Are Applicable
`Only in the Federal Areas;
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`• Count #5 – Plaintiff Has a Natural Right in Indiana to Cultivate Marijuana for His
`Own Use;
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`• Count #6 – Plaintiff Has a Legal Right to Possess Drugs in the Federal Areas,
`Including on Ships and Aircraft; and,
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`• Count #7 – The Judicial Use Within Indiana of the Police Power of Prohibition
`Against Drug Possession and Interstate Drug Commerce Deprives Plaintiff and
`Other U.S. Citizens of Their Natural Right to a Republican Form of Government.
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`[Filing No. 37 at 1-2.]
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`Mr. St. Angelo asserts that the cited statutes are unconstitutional when read in conjunction
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`with each other because: (1) they delegate arrest authority “over subject matter that is not criminal
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`and that is not subject to arrest,” [Filing No. 37 at 9]; (2) “only malum in se behavior constitutes a
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`crime or criminal case within Indiana under the U.S. and Indiana constitutions,” [Filing No. 37 at
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`10]; (3) people have a “natural right” to possess controlled substances, [Filing No. 37 at 10]; and,
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`(4) dealing controlled substances without Indiana or U.S. administrative permissions is a
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`regulatory violation, not a criminal matter that makes a person subject to arrest, [Filing No. 37 at
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`10]. Mr. St. Angelo alleges that end users of controlled substances—whom he calls “ultimate
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`users”—“may ‘lawfully possess’ these drugs for their own use and use of their households.”
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`[Filing No. 37 at 11.] He also asserts that dealing drugs is an activity that is “subject to the police
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`power of regulation, and is not subject to arrest under the police power of prohibition.” [Filing
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`No. 37 at 11-12.] Mr. St. Angelo argues that drug dealers have rights to administrative due process.
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`[Filing No. 37 at 13.] Mr. St. Angelo contends that “all persons who manufacture, distribute or
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`dispense controlled substances within Indiana are regulated by the Drug Enforcement
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`Administration and the Indiana Board of Pharmacy.” [Filing No. 37 at 24.] He seeks declaratory
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`and injunctive relief, [Filing No. 37 at 1], including the “release from custody [of] all people
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`incarcerated as the result of these unconstitutional provisions or unlawful enforcement” and “the
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`expunging of the pertinent arrest and criminal records of victims of false arrest.” [Filing No. 37
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`at 20.]
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`C. Discussion
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`Because the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss contain the same or similar arguments, they
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`will be discussed together.
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`Defendants argue that Mr. St. Angelo’s “idiosyncratic” reading of the Controlled
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`Substances Act (“Act”) is wrong, [Filing No. 34 at 1], and that the Act and binding precedent make
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`clear that possession of controlled substances, even for personal use, is unlawful, [Filing No. 34 at
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`3]. Defendants argue that there is no individual right to possess marijuana or other illegal drugs,
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`and this fact has been confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1
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`(2005). [Filing No. 34 at 4; Filing No. 70 at 2-3.] But more importantly, Defendants argue, Mr.
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`St. Angelo lacks standing to sue because he has failed to show that he suffered “an invasion of a
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`legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
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`conjectural or hypothetical.” [Filing No. 16 at 4-5 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
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`U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); Filing No. 34 at 4; Filing No. 25 at 4; Filing No. 66 at 4; Filing No. 72 at
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`2-5.] Defendants argue that because there is no fundamental right to grow, use, or access
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`marijuana, there is no legally protected right that is being infringed here. [Filing No. 16 at 5.]
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`Further, Defendants argue, Mr. St. Angelo has not suffered an injury-in-fact because his grievance
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`is merely that he believes the federal and state governments have violated individuals’ rights by
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`arresting and incarcerating them for drug crimes. [Filing No. 34 at 9.] Defendants point out that
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`Mr. St. Angelo does not claim that he has ever been arrested for his drug use, and therefore, his
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`injury is hypothetical. [Filing No. 34 at 10.] Defendants also argue that Mr. St. Angelo does not
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`have standing to sue on behalf of third-party “drug dealers,” because “a person . . . may not
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`challenge [a] statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others
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`in situations not before the Court.” [Filing No. 16 at 5-6 (quoting Ind. Voluntary Firemen’s Ass’n,
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`Inc. v. Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 421, 428 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (citation omitted); Filing No. 66 at 6.]
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`Defendants argue that the standard for third-party standing has not been met here because: (1) Mr.
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`St. Angelo has not suffered an injury in fact; (2) he does not have a close relationship with the
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`third-parties; and, (3) there is no reason that those third-parties would not be able to protect their
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`own interests. [Filing No. 34 at 12; Filing No. 72 at 8.]
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`In response, Mr. St. Angelo argues that he has standing to sue because he “has been falsely
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`searched for drugs on at least three occasions without his consent,” and he “has spent tens of
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`thousands of dollars for marijuana, from disreputable merchants, occasionally in dangerous
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`circumstances that would not have occurred but for false enforcement” of the drug laws. [Filing
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`No. 19 at 8-9.] Additionally, he argues, he “is always under threat of arrest and prosecution under
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`I.C. § 35-48-4-11,” which prohibits the possession of marijuana. [Filing No. 19 at 9.] He argues
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`that he has standing to sue the Indiana Attorney General for declaratory relief because his arrest is
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`imminent each time he possesses or uses drugs. [Filing No. 58 at 7.] To attempt to show that this
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`threat is imminent, Mr. St. Angelo cites a few “near misses” he has experienced where he
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`“narrowly escaped being discovered” having marijuana in his possession. [Filing No. 19 at 9.] He
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`also contends that he has standing for declaratory and injunctive relief because he “is ‘actually
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`threatened’ with arrest and prosecution.” [Filing No. 69 at 22.] He alleges that Mr. Mears “has
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`made a written threat that [Mr. St. Angelo], if caught exercising his constitutional rights to possess
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`30 grams or more of marijuana, will be arrested and prosecuted in Marion County, Indiana.”
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`[Filing No. 69 at 21 (citing Filing No. 48-1).] He also alleges that Sheriff Forestal and Chief Roach
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`have “publicly threatened to arrest [him] for possession of any quantity of marijuana.” [Filing No.
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`69 at 21.] Mr. St. Angelo argues that these “open, notorious, and ubiquitously-enforced threats of
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`arrest” meet the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. [Filing No. 69 at 22.] He compares
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`himself to the plaintiff in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), who was threatened with arrest
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`for passing out handbills at a mall in protest of the Vietnam war, and who the Supreme Court found
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`had standing. [Filing No. 19 at 10.] Mr. St. Angelo argues that he does not need to first be arrested
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`to be able “to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional right.”
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`[Filing No. 19 at 11 (quoting Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459).] Mr. St. Angelo states that if the Court does
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`not believe he currently has standing, then he will register to be a marijuana grower and then he
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`will have standing as a drug dealer who is subject to regulation. [Filing No. 19 at 18.] He argues
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`that the Defendants have failed to offer any “constitutional, statutory or case law authority for
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`arresting people for property possession or commerce, and they offer no statutes which declare
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`drug possession and dealing to be unlawful or prohibited, which are the operative words needed
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`to criminalize behavior.” [Filing No. 74 at 2.] Regarding third-party standing, Mr. St. Angelo
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`claims that he is “literally these drug users’ only hope of representation because of the malpractice
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`in America’s defense bar. He is his class of drug users’ best and only advocate.” [Filing No. 19
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`at 13.] He argues that he has standing to sue on behalf of these third parties because he “is the
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`only person (other than his few students) who seems to know what the rights of drug dealers are,”
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`and his “unique knowledge” makes him a good representative for them. [Filing No. 19 at 16.] Mr.
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`St. Angelo also argues that if the Court grants him the relief he requests, this grant of relief must
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`necessarily extend to others similarly situated because, otherwise, it would be “private justice.”
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`[Filing No. 19 at 15.] Mr. St. Angelo also asks the Court to sua sponte certify drug dealers as a
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`class and appoint attorneys to represent the “commercial interests of drug dealers who have been
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`victimized by the wrongful practices of Defendants and their predecessors.” [Filing No. 69 at 26;
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`Filing No. 19 at 17.] Finally, Mr. St. Angelo argues that this Court has discretion to choose not to
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`dismiss this case and instead review the merits. [Filing No. 19 at 18.]
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`In reply, Defendants argue that even if the threat of arrest was imminent, an injury-in-fact
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`only exists if the plaintiff was “engag[ing] in a course of conduct arguably affected with a
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`constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute,” and Mr. St. Angelo does not have any
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`constitutional interest in using illegal drugs. [Filing No. 34 at 11 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List
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`v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).] Defendants aruge
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`Mr. St. Angelo is different than the plaintiff in Steffel because, there, the plaintiff’s First
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`Amendment rights were at issue. [Filing No. 34 at 11.] Here, on the other hand, Mr. St. Angelo
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`does not have a constitutional right to use or possess illegal drugs. [Filing No. 34 at 11.] Mr.
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`Mears also contests Mr. St. Angelo’s assertion that Mr. Mears threatened him, clarifying that what
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`Mr. St. Angelo characterizes as a “threat” directed at him was simply a memorandum to Marion
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`County Deputy Prosecutors advising that, effective immediately, the office will be declining to
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`prosecute possession of marijuana cases in certain instances. [Filing No. 70 at 2; see Filing No.
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`48-1.] Defendants further argue that Mr. St. Angelo’s “near misses” do not show that he faces “a
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`credible threat of prosecution” that is “sufficiently imminent.” [Filing No. 34 at 10 (quoting Susan
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`B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158-159).] Defendants contrast the case here with the Steffel case by
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`noting that, in Steffel, the plaintiff’s arrest was actually imminent because he was personally told
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`by police that he would be arrested if he did not stop passing out the handbills, and his companion
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`actually was arrested. [Filing No. 34 at 11.] Defendants also contrast Mr. St. Angelo with the
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`plaintiffs in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), who had property (cannabis plants) seized and
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`destroyed by federal agents. [Filing No. 67 at 3.] Defendants argue that Mr. St. Angelo has not
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`identified an instance when police actually threatened him with arrest or confiscated marijuana
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`that was in his possession, nor has he stated that he has a medical need for marijuana use. [Filing
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`No. 67 at 3.] Therefore, they argue, he lacks standing and his lawsuit must be dismissed.
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`In addition to the arguments regarding lack of standing, Defendants also contend that Mr.
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`St. Angelo cannot show that he is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive relief he is seeking, and
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`that his claims against the State and state officials are barred by the immunity provided under the
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`Eleventh Amendment.
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`Before the Court can address the merits of Mr. St. Angelo’s claims, it must first confirm
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`that it has the jurisdiction to do so. Therefore, the Court will first address the threshold
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`jurisdictional question of whether Mr. St. Angelo has standing to sue, because “[s]tanding to sue
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`is part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” See Steel Co. v.
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`Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
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`149, 155 (1990)).
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`Article III of the Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over “cases and
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`controversies,” and the standing doctrine is the tool used to identify which cases and controversies
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`the federal judicial process can appropriately resolve. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 154-55. Standing is
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`“the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the
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`suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). “[T]he ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of
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`standing consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that
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`is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
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`by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (internal
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`citations omitted); see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013) (“[I]t is not enough that
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`the party invoking the power of the court have a keen interest in the issue. That party must also
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`have ‘standing’ which requires, among other things, that it have suffered a concrete and
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`particularized injury.”). The particularized injury must be “a personal and tangible harm,” and not
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`just a “generalized grievance.” Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 704, 706. The Supreme Court has
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`explained that
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`Id. at 706.
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`[a] litigant ‘raising only a generally available grievance about
`government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest
`in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
`that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
`public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.
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`A district court in the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of generalized grievances in
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`Johnson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2014 WL 12649836 (E.D. Wis. July 21, 2014), aff’d, 783
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`F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015). In that case, the plaintiffs—a Senator and his legislative counsel—filed
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`a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and its director “from
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`enforcing and implementing a regulation promulgated by [the Office] related to the [Affordable
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`Care Act (“ACA”)] on the grounds [that the regulation] is inconsistent with the ACA,” that the
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`Office acted “in excess of its authority,” and that the regulation violated the Equal Protection
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`Clause. Id. at *5. The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, stating,
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`although Plaintiffs believe the regulation is unlawful, such a belief
`cannot be enough to create standing because that would open the
`door to any uninjured party who had a generalized grievance with a
`government regulation. Under such an approach, there would be no
`principled limit on standing because a plaintiff need only allege a
`belief that the challenged regulation is illegal.
`
`Id.
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` The Johnson court cited the case of Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for
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`Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982), where the Supreme Court similarly
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`found that a plaintiff lacked standing and the Court stated, “Although respondents claim that the
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`Case 1:19-cv-02754-JMS-DLP Document 76 Filed 02/24/20 Page 13 of 15 PageID #: 695
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`Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury
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`suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological
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`consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” See
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`Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 707 (“Article III standing is not to be placed in the hands of concerned
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`bystanders, who will use it simply as a vehicle for the vindication of value interests.”) (internal
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`quotation omitted).
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`The Johnson Court summarized this principle as follows: “In short, one’s personal belief
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`that a regulation is unlawful is not itself an ‘injury’ sufficient to confer standing.” Id. That issue
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`is what is presented here because Mr. St. Angelo only alleges that the statute is unconstitutional,
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`and he has not made any allegations regarding: (1) how he has been actually injured by the statute;
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`(2) how the injury can be fairly traced to the conduct of the Defendants; or (3) that the injury is
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`likely to be redressed by a favorable decision from this Court. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. His
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`alleged injuries are hypothetical and, therefore, cannot form the basis for Article III standing.
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`Here, Mr. St. Angelo does not set forth sufficient allegations regarding how he has actually
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`suffered an injury because of the allegedly unconstitutional statutes. Instead, he states generally
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`that the statutes are “ineffectual,” “unenforceable,” “false,” “inapplicable,” and “unconstitutional,”
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`and that he and other United States citizens are being deprived of their rights to cultivate marijuana
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`for their own use, possess drugs, and have “a republican form of government.” [Filing No. 37 at
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`2.] This is the type of “generalized grievance” that Hollingsworth and other cases have determined
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`is insufficient to constitute a particularized injury for the purpose of Article III standing.
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`Moreover, even if Mr. St. Angelo did experience an injury that was imminent, such injury
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`would not create Article III standing because arrest and prosecution for drug crimes are not
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`“invasion[s] of a legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see generally Steffel, 415 U.S.
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`at 455 (where the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were at issue when he was threatened with
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`arrest for “distributing handbills protesting American involvement in Vietnam” on a sidewalk);
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`see also Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 14 (where the Supreme Court acknowledged that “the manufacture,
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`distribution, or possession of marijuana [is] a criminal offense, with the sole exception being use
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`of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration preapproved research study”).
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`To the extent that Mr. St. Angelo attempts to bring this claim on behalf of others who were
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`allegedly injured by the relevant statutes, that is not permissible because a pro se plaintiff cannot
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`bring lawsuits on behalf of anyone except himself. See Georgakis v. Illinois State Univ., 722 F.3d
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`1075, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, he cannot invoke third-party standing because: (1) he has not
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`suffered an injury in fact; (2) there is no evidence that he has a close relationship to the other drug
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`dealers and users; and, (3) there is no evidence that there is a “hinderance to the third part[ies’]
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`ability to protect [their] own interest[s].” Marin-Garia v. Holder, 647 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir.
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`2011).
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`Mr. St. Angelo lacks standing and, therefore, his Amended Complaint must be dismissed
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`because this Court does not have the power to entertain his suit. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
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`498 (1975). Accordingly, the Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.1 Dismissal of complaints for
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`lack of standing is usually without prejudice. See Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir.
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`2011) (“Generally, when a complaint is dismissed because it is not ripe (or because the plaintiffs
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`lack standing, for that matter) it is dismissed without prejudice unless it appears beyond a doubt
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`that there is no way the plaintiffs’ grievance could ever mature into justiciable claims.”). However,
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`here, Mr. St. Angelo has already had the opportunity to amend his Complaint after being put on
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`1 Because the Court has found that Mr. St. Angelo lacks standing, it need not and will not consider
`Defendants’ other arguments set forth in their Motions to Dismiss.
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`notice of the issues regarding Article III standing, and his Amended Complaint fares no better and
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`fails to demonstrate that he has standing to bring this lawsuit. Therefore, Mr. St. Angelo’s
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`Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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`IV.
`CONCLUSION
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`Based on the foregoing, the Court makes the following rulings:
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`1. Mr. St. Angelo’s Motion to Dismiss Counts #8-10 of his Complaint, [18], is
`DENIED AS MOOT;
`
`2. The State’s Motion to Dismiss, [15], is DENIED AS MOOT, because the State
`filed a supplemental Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 47];
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`3. The State’s Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, [47], is GRANTED;
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`4. The Government’s Motion to Dismiss, [33], is GRANTED;
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`5. Mr. Mears and Mr. Smosna’s Motion to Dismiss, [65], is GRANTED;
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`6. Sheriff Forestal and Chief Roach’s Motion to Dismiss, [71], is GRANTED;
`and,
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`7. Mr. St. Angelo’s Amended Complaint, [37], is DISMISSED WITH
`PREJUDICE.
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`Final judgment shall issue accordingly.
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`Distribution via ECF to all counsel of record
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`Distribution via U.S. Mail to:
`
`Kurt St. Angelo
`1304 N. Gladstone Avenue
`Indianapolis, IN 46201
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`15
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`Date: 2/24/2020
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`