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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
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`HMO LOUISIANA INC., ET AL.
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`VERSUS
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`NARINDER M. GUPTA
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`CIVIL ACTION
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`NO. 21-522
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`SECTION “R” (1)
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`ORDER AND REASONS
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`Plaintiff, Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Company and HMO
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`Louisiana, d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana (“BCBSLA”),
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`moves to remand this matter to state court.1 Defendant, Narinder M. Gupta,
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`M.D., opposes the motion to remand,2 and separately moves for leave to
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`conduct jurisdictional discovery.3 Because the Court finds that neither
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`ERISA nor FEHBA completely preempts BCBSLA’s claims, and because the
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`discovery defendant seeks would not affect the result, the Court grants
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`BCBSLA’s motion to remand, and denies defendant’s motion for
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`jurisdictional discovery.
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`1
`2
`3
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`R. Doc. 7.
`R. Doc. 10.
`R. Doc. 12
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 2 of 17
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`I.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This case arises from Dr. Gupta’s allegedly improper billing practices
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`for medical services he performed. BCBSLA alleges that Louisiana Health
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`Service & Indemnity Company is a non-profit mutual insurance company,
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`and that HMO Louisiana is a health maintenance organization (“HMO”).4
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`Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gupta, a medical service provider entered into a
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`“Physician Agreement” with BCBSLA.5 Among other terms, plaintiff
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`contends that Dr. Gupta agreed to comply with certain record-keeping
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`procedures, provide only “medically necessary” services to patients, and
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`refund BCBSLA for any payments based on erroneous or incomplete
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`information, or for services that were not “medically necessary.”6
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`On August 25, 2017 and December 13, 2017, BCBSLA allegedly
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`performed an audit on Dr. Gupta’s facility.7 Plaintiff states that it identified
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`numerous issues with Dr. Gupta’s practices, including that his records were
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`inadequate, and that he rendered services that were not “medically
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`necessary.”8 Accordingly, on August 15, 2018, pursuant to a provision in the
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`Physician Agreement, BCBSLA alleges that it sent Dr. Gupta a written
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`R. Doc. 1-1 at 2, ¶ 1.
`Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 2-3, 5.
`Id.at 3, ¶ 6.
`Id.at 4, ¶ 9.
`Id. at 4-5, ¶¶ 10-11.
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`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
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`2
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 3 of 17
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`recoupment request, seeking a refund
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`for overpayments
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`totaling
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`$240,222.31.9 Dr. Gupta allegedly failed to appeal the request within the
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`time allowed under the Physician Agreement.10 Nevertheless, plaintiff states
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`that Dr. Gupta has failed to tender the full amount owed.11 Specifically,
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`plaintiff alleges that $226,562.62 remains unpaid.12
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`On January 15, 2021, BCBSLA filed suit in Louisiana state court,
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`asserting claims for: (1) breach of contract,13 (2) violation of La. Rev. Stat.
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`§ 22:1838,14 (3) detrimental reliance,15 (4) unjust enrichment,16 and (5)
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`declaratory relief.17 On March 12, 2021, Dr. Gupta removed to federal court,
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`contending that the Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
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`(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and the Federal Employees Health
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`Benefits Act (“FEHBA”), 5 U.S.C. § 8901, et seq., completely preempt
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`plaintiff’s claims.18
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` Defendant argues that, under ERISA complete
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`Id. at 5, ¶ 12.
`Id. at ¶ 17.
`Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 19-20.
`Id. at 6, ¶ 20.
`Id.at 6, ¶¶ 21-26.
`Id. at 6-7, ¶¶ 27-32.
`Id. at 7, ¶¶ 33-37.
`Id. at 7-8, ¶¶ 38-39.
`Id. at 8, ¶¶ 40-41.
`R. Doc. 1 at 3-4, ¶¶ 8-9.
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`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
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`3
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 4 of 17
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`preemption doctrine, the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28
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`U.S.C. § 1331.
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`Plaintiff moves to remand on the grounds that neither ERISA nor
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`FEHBA completely preempts its claims, and that the Court therefore lacks
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`jurisdiction.19 Defendant opposes the motion,20 and seeks jurisdictional
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`discovery to determine whether plaintiff’s claims involve benefit plans
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`covered by ERISA or FEHBA.21 The Court considers the parties’ arguments
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`below.
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`II. LEGAL STANDARD
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`A defendant may generally remove a civil action filed in state court if
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`the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1441(a). The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal
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`jurisdiction exists. See Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th
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`Cir. 1995). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over cases
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`“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1331.
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`R. Doc. 7.
`19
`20 R. Doc. 10.
`21
`R. Doc. 12.
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`4
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 5 of 17
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`Whether a claim arises under federal law must be determined by
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`referring to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
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`Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
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`Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)); see also Howery v.
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`Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the well-pleaded
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`complaint rule, the federal question must appear on the face of the
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`complaint. See Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542
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`(5th Cir. 1997). Because a defendant may remove a case to federal court only
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`if the plaintiff could have brought the action in federal court from the outset,
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`“the question of removal jurisdiction must also be determined by reference
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`to the ‘well-pleaded complaint.’” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (citation
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`omitted). “[A] defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the
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`plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case ‘arises under’ federal law.”
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`Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U .S. at 10 (emphasis in original). The mere presence
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`of “[a] defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal
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`jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.
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`Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12, 13-
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`14. Therefore, federal question jurisdiction does not exist unless the
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`“vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some
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`construction of federal law.” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809.
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`5
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 6 of 17
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`There is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule “when a
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`federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through
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`complete preemption.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207
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`(2004) (quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)
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`(internal quotation marks omitted)). Removal of such a claim is appropriate
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`because, “‘[w]hen the federal statute completely [preempts] the state law
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`cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action,
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`even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.’” Id.
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`(quoting Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8); see also Met. Life Ins. Co. v.
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`Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (“Congress may so completely preempt a
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`particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
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`necessarily federal in character.”). Even if a complaint does not refer to
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`federal law, a federal statute that completely preempts a field effectively
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`“‘recharacterizes’ preempted state law claims as ‘arising under’ federal law
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`for the purposes of making removal available to the defendant.” McClelland,
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`155 F.3d at 516; see also Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332,
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`337 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999).
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`6
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 7 of 17
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. ERISA Preemption
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`ERISA may preempt state law claims in one of two ways. See Giles, 172
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`F.3d at 336 (citing McClelland, 155 F.3d at 507), overruled in part on other
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`grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 n.11 (5th Cir.
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`2003). First, it may “occupy a particular field, resulting in complete
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`preemption under [ERISA] § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).” Giles, 172 F.3d at
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`336 (citing Met. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 58; McClelland, 155 F.3d at 516-17); see
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`also Arana, 338 F.3d at 437. “[C]omplete preemption exists when a remedy
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`falls within the scope of or is in direct conflict with ERISA § 502(a), and
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`therefore is within the jurisdiction of federal court.” McGowin v. Man Power
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`Int'l, Inc., 363 F.3d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 2004). ERISA § 502(a) provides
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`several causes of action that may be brought by an ERISA plan beneficiary,
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`participant, the Secretary of Labor, or plan administrator or fiduciary. Any
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`state cause of action that seeks the same relief as a cause of action authorized
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`by ERISA § 502(a), “regardless of how artfully pleaded as a state action,” is
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`completely preempted. Giles, 172 F.3d at 337. But only when ERISA § 502(a)
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`completely preempts a state law claim does it raise a federal question
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`providing a basis for removal jurisdiction. Giles, 172 F.3d at 336-37.
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`7
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 8 of 17
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`The second form of ERISA preemption is known as “ordinary” or
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`“conflict” preemption. It exists when ERISA provides an affirmative defense
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`to state law claims and involves ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Giles,
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`172 F.3d at 337. Section 514(a) provides that ERISA “shall supersede any
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`and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employer
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`benefit plan.” The Fifth Circuit in Giles made clear that the existence of
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`conflict preemption under § 514 of ERISA does not create an exception to the
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`well-pleaded complaint rule. “‘State law claims [that] fall outside the scope
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`of ERISA's civil enforcement provision § 502, even if preempted by § 514(a),
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`are still governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule and, therefore, are not
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`removable under the complete-preemption principles established in
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`Metropolitan Life.’” Id. (quoting Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350,
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`355 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 23-27
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`(explaining that even though ERISA § 514(a) may preclude enforcement of a
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`state law claim, removal of a claim that falls outside the scope of ERISA §
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`502(a) is inappropriate). Thus, the mere presence of conflict preemption
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`does not raise a federal question. Instead of “transmogrifying a state cause
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`of action into a federal one—as occurs with complete preemption—conflict
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`preemption serves as a defense to a state action.” Giles, 172 F.3d at 337
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`8
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 9 of 17
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`(citing Soley v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406, 407-08 (5th
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`Cir. 1991)).
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`In order for a district court to exercise removal jurisdiction, complete
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`preemption must exist. “When the doctrine of complete preemption does
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`not apply, but the plaintiff's state claim is arguably preempted under
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`§ 514(a), the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, cannot
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`resolve the dispute regarding preemption.” Id. State law causes of action are
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`completely preempted by ERISA when: (1) an individual, at some point in
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`time, could have brought the claim under ERISA, and (2) there is no legal
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`duty independent of ERISA or the plan terms that is implicated by the
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`defendant's actions. Davila, 542 U.S. at 209-210.
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`1.
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`ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
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`Defendant relies primarily on § 502(a)(1)(B) in support of complete
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`preemption. That section states that a “participant” or “beneficiary” may
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`bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
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`plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
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`to future benefits under the terms of the plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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`To have standing to bring a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B) a plaintiff must be a
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`“participant” or “beneficiary” of an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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`Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held that a medical provider may have
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`9
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 10 of 17
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`standing to bring a claim under § 502(a)(1)(B)—as a “participant” or
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`“beneficiary”—by virtue of a valid assignment. Dallas Cty. Hosp. Dist. v.
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`Associates’ Health & Welfare Plan, 293 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 2002).
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`ERISA defines a “participant” as “any employee or former employee of an
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`employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization,
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`who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
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`employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members
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`of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any
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`such benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). “Beneficiary” means “a person
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`designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who
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`is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
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`BCBSLA’s complaint makes no mention of an ERISA plan. Even
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`assuming, as defendant contends, that some of the medical claims at issue in
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`this suit were made under ERISA plans, it is apparent that BCBSLA is neither
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`a “participant” nor a “beneficiary” of such plans. Instead, BCBSLA states,
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`and defendant does not contest, that it is an insurer that processes,
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`administers, and pays medical claims. Further, defendant does not argue
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`that BCBSLA has standing as the assignee of a participant’s or beneficiary’s
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`10
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 11 of 17
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`rights.22 Because § 502(a)(1)(B) confers a cause of action only on
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`“participants” or “beneficiaries,” plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the scope
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`of that provision. See United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Sanctuary Surgical
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`Ctr., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (stating that “it is
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`apparent that [the
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`insurance company plaintiffs’] claims [seeking
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`recoupment for alleged overpayments] could not originate under Section
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`502(a)(1)” because the plaintiffs were not participants or beneficiaries);
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`Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey v. E. Brunswick Surgery Ctr.,
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`623 F. Supp. 2d 568, 574 (D.N.J. 2009) (noting that an insurance company’s
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`claims—seeking recoupment of allegedly fraudulently induced payments—
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`“would not originate under section 502(a)(1) of ERISA” because the plaintiff
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`was not a participant nor beneficiary).
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`2.
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`ERISA § 502(a)(3)
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`Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of
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`ERISA § 502(a)(3). Section 502(a)(3) provides that a “participant,
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`beneficiary, or fiduciary” may bring a cause of action “(A) to enjoin any act
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`22 Dr. Gupta argues that he submitted the medical claims at issue in this
`suit pursuant to an assignment from patients, some of whom may be
`participants or beneficiaries of an ERISA plan. But whether defendant may
`or may not have standing to bring a hypothetical claim for benefits under
`ERISA based on those assigned rights is irrelevant. Here, the Court’s inquiry
`is focused on whether plaintiff’s claims fall within the scope of ERISA’s civil
`enforcement scheme.
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`11
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 12 of 17
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`or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the
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`plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such
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`violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of
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`the plan.” The Fifth Circuit describes § 502(a)(3) as ERISA’s “catchall”
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`provision, as it creates a cause of action in equity for violations of ERISA not
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`addressed by the other causes of actions permitted under the statute.
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`Manuel v. Turner Indus. Grp., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 859, 864-65 (5th Cir. 2018).
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`The Supreme Court in Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S.
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`356, 361 (2006), stated that § 502(a)(3) authorizes “only those categories of
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`relief that were typically available in equity.” (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt
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`Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Section 502(a)(3) does not permit claims that seek “nothing other than
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`compensatory damages.” Id. The Sereboff Court found that a plaintiff may
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`bring a claim for “equitable restitution,” i.e., claims in which a plaintiff seeks
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`“to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular funds or
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`property in the defendant’s possession[,]” under § 502(a)(3). Id. (emphasis
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`added) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a plaintiff seeks to
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`recover from a defendant’s “assets generally,” the claim is not equitable, but
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`legal in nature. Id.; see also Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 263 (2d Cir.
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`2006) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court [in Sereboff] reaffirmed the holding of
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 13 of 17
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`Knudson that money damages are unavailable under section 502(a)(3) when
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`the plaintiff does
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`‘not seek to recover a particular fund from the
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`defendant.’”).
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`In United Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Sanctuary Surgical Ctr., 5
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`F. Supp. 3d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2014), the plaintiffs—insurance providers and
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`plan administrators—sought to recover fraudulently induced overpayments
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`from medical service providers. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing
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`that the claims were preempted by ERISA. But, following Sereboff, the court
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`found that the plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(3)
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`because they did “not seek to recover against a particular fund in possession
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`of the defendants . . . .” Id. at 1160. The Sanctuary Surgical court ultimately
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`held that ERISA did not completely preempt the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at
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`1161.
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`Here, plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $226,562.62, which it
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`contends make up the unpaid balance of overpayments to Dr. Gupta.23
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`23 R. Doc. 1-1 at 8, ¶ 42. Although plaintiff also states in its complaint
`that it seeks declaratory relief and “all other equitable relief to which
`BCBSLA is entitled, whether pled or not,” the Court finds that the relief
`plaintiff seeks—monetary compensation—is legal in nature. Id.; see also
`Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund ex rel. Bunte v. Health
`Special Risk, Inc., 756 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Simply framing a claim
`as equitable relief is insufficient to escape a determination that the relief
`sought is legal.”); see also Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
`U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (“Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by
`13
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 14 of 17
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`BCBSLA’s complaint does not seek a constructive trust or an equitable lien
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`on particular funds. Rather, it seeks to recover from Dr. Gupta’s assets
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`generally. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims are not equitable in
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`nature, and are outside the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(3).
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`In sum, the Court finds that neither ERISA § 502(a)(1), nor § 502(a)(3),
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`completely preempts plaintiff’s claims. The Court finds that defendant has
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`failed to show that the Court has removal jurisdiction over this matter based
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`on ERISA complete preemption.
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`B. FEHBA Preemption
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`FEHBA, like ERISA, contains a preemption provision. See 5 U.S.C.
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`§ 8902(m)(1). In Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S.
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`677, 697 (2006), the Supreme Court considered whether FEHBA’s
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`preemption provision conferred jurisdiction on the federal district courts for
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`judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum
`of money to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has
`traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for
`loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal duty.” (citation omitted));
`Coan, 457 F.3d at 264 (holding that ERISA § 502(a)(3) did not provide a
`remedy when “the alternative relief [plaintiff sought],” an injunction
`requiring defendants to restore funds to a defunct plan, “does not transform
`what is effectively a money damages request into equitable relief” (citation
`omitted)).
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`14
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 15 of 17
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`“contract-based reimbursement claims.” The Court found that, even if
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`FEHBA’s preemption provision applied to the plaintiff’s claims, “that
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`provision is not sufficiently broad to confer federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 698.
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`The Court noted that, “if Congress intends a preemption instruction
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`completely to displace ordinarily applicable state law, and to confer federal
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`jurisdiction thereby, it may be expected to make that atypical intention
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`clear.” Id. But, regarding FEHBA, the Court held that “Congress has not
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`done so . . . .” Id.
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`Following Empire Healthchoice, the First and Fourth Circuits have
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`held that FEHBA does not confer removal jurisdiction because the statute
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`does not completely preempt state law. Lopez-Munoz v. Triple-S Salud, Inc.,
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`754 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014); Pollitt v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 558 F.3d 615,
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`616 (7th Cir. 2009). Consistent with this authority, including binding
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`Supreme Court precedent, the Court finds that FEHBA does not create
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`removal jurisdiction over this matter.
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`C. Federal Officer Removal
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`In opposition to the motion to remand, Dr. Gupta argues that federal
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`officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) exists in this case.
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`To remove an action under § 1442(a), a defendant must show:
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`(1) it has asserted a colorable federal defense, (2) it is a ‘person’
`within the meaning of the statute, (3) that has acted pursuant to
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`15
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 16 of 17
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`a federal officer's directions, and (4) the charged conduct is
`connected or associated with an act pursuant to a federal officer's
`directions.
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`Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2020).
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`Defendant argues that, if FEHBA-governed benefit plans are at issue in this
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`case, plaintiff was likely acting pursuant to a federal officer’s directions.24
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`But the federal officer removal statute is concerned with whether the
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`defendant, here Dr. Gupta, was acting under a federal officer’s directives.
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`Defendant makes no showing to that effect. Thus, the Court finds that Dr.
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`Gupta has failed to show that removal jurisdiction exists under § 1442(a).
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`D. Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery
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`Finally, defendant requests leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery.25
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`Specifically, Dr. Gupta seeks information from plaintiff as to whether the
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`claims on which it seeks recoupment were initially made under benefit plans
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`covered by ERISA or FEHBA. The Court “has broad discretion in all
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`discovery matters.” Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982).
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`Jurisdictional discovery may be warranted when “the issue of subject matter
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`jurisdiction turns on a disputed fact.” In re MPF Holdings US LLC, 701 F.3d
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`449, 457 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 672 F.3d
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`24 R. Doc. 10 at 14.
`25 R. Doc. 12.
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`16
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`Case 2:21-cv-00522-SSV-JVM Document 24 Filed 06/30/21 Page 17 of 17
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`310, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2012)). “The party seeking discovery bears the burden
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`of showing its necessity.” Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 341 (5th
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`Cir. 2009).
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`Defendant has failed to show that jurisdictional discovery is necessary.
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`Even assuming that BCBSLA originally paid Dr. Gupta pursuant to an ERISA
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`or FEHBA plan, that would not change the Court’s conclusion that plaintiff
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`is not a “beneficiary” or “participant” for the purposes of ERISA
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`§ 502(a)(1)(B), or that the relief sought is legal in nature for the purposes of
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`ERISA § 502(a)(3). Nor would it change the Court’s conclusion that FEHBA
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`does not confer removal jurisdiction, or that the federal officer removal
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`statute is not satisfied. Accordingly, the Court denies defendant’s motion for
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`jurisdictional discovery.
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to
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`remand. The Court DENIES defendant’s motion for leave to conduct
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`jurisdictional discovery.
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`New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of June, 2021.
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`_____________________
`SARAH S. VANCE
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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`17
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`30th
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